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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Market abuse practices may directly or indirectly give rise to diverse problems such as 
inaccurate stock market prices, low public investor confidence, reduced market integrity and 
poor efficiency in the affected financial markets.   This thesis reveals that three major forms 
of market abuse, namely insider trading, prohibited trading practices (trade-based market 
manipulation) and the making or publication of false, misleading or deceptive statements, 
promises and forecasts relating to listed securities (disclosure-based market manipulation) are 
prohibited in South Africa.  However, although South Africa has had market abuse legislation 
for about 30 years, and must be commended for its great effort to enhance market integrity by 
combating market abuse practices, the enforcement of such legislation is still problematic.   
Moreover, in spite of the fact that there is no empirical data or accurate figures quantifying the 
occurrence and extent of market abuse activities in the South African financial markets, this 
thesis submits that market abuse practices are still to be completely eradicated.  Accordingly, 
this thesis suggests that the aforementioned problem might have been aggravated by inter 
alia, various gaps, flaws and/or inconsistent implementation and enforcement of the market 
abuse legislation in South Africa.  To this end, the anti-market abuse enforcement framework 
under the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004 is analysed to investigate its adequacy.   The co-
operation and role of the Financial Services Board, the courts, the Directorate of Market 
Abuse and other relevant stakeholders is also examined and discussed.  Moreover, the co-
operation between the Financial Services Board and similar international agencies is 
discussed to gauge its effectiveness in relation to the combating of cross-border market abuse 
practices.  The adequacy of the awareness and preventative measures in place to curb market 
abuse practices is also investigated to determine whether such measures are robust enough to 
combat other new challenges that were posed by the 2007 to 2009 global financial crisis.  
Furthermore, a comparative analysis is undertaken of the enforcement of the market abuse 
prohibition in other jurisdictions, namely the United States of America, the United Kingdom, 
the European Union and Australia.  This was done to investigate the relevant lessons that can 
be learnt or adopted from these jurisdictions.  The thesis further discusses the adequacy of the 
recently introduced provisions of the Financial Markets Bill as well as the subsequent market 
abuse provisions of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.  The thesis highlights that the 
aforementioned Bills are positive attempts by the policy makers to improve the enforcement 
iv 
of the market abuse provisions in South Africa.   Nonetheless, the thesis reveals that most of 
the shortcomings contained in the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004 were duplicated in the 
Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   In light of this, it remains to be 
seen whether the market abuse provisions contained in the Financial Markets Bill and/or the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 will improve the combating of market abuse practices in South 
Africa.  Consequently, it is hoped that the relevant market abuse provisions of the Securities 
Services Act 36 of 2004, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 
will be comprehensively reviewed in regard to the recommendations made in this thesis.   To 
this end, the thesis proposes a viable anti-market abuse model and policy framework and sets 
out both policy objectives and provisions which policy makers could use to strengthen some 
of the market abuse provisions in South Africa. 
v 
KEY TERMS AND CONCEPTS 
 
1.  Insider trading. 
 
2.  Inside information. 
 
3.  Market abuse. 
 
4.  Market manipulation. 
 
5.  Securities. 
 
6.  Financial instruments. 
 
7.  Enforcement approaches. 
 
8.  Regulated markets. 
 
9.  Issuers. 
 
10.  Enforcement framework. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
RESEARCH OUTLINE AND CONTEXT 
 
 
1  Introduction and Background of the Research 
1 1  Introduction 
 
Although South Africa has had market abuse legislation for about 30 years,1 and must be 
commended for its effort to enhance market integrity by combating market abuse practices, 
enforcement of such legislation is still problematic.   
 
Market abuse is a very difficult concept to define.  It is generally accepted that there is no 
comprehensive and satisfactory definition of this concept that exists to date.2  Market abuse 
involves the misuse of material information (price-sensitive information), the dissemination 
of false or misleading information and practices which abnormally or artificially affect, or are 
likely to affect, the formation of prices or volumes of trading of financial instruments.3   This 
definition is nonetheless narrowly limited to market manipulation by way of misuse of price-
sensitive information and engaging in prohibited trading practices.   It does not clearly state or 
define insider trading as another form of market abuse.    Thus, although the European Union 
Directive on Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation4 generally uses the term “market 
abuse” to refer to transaction and/or trade-based market manipulation as well as disclosure 
and/or information-based market manipulation and insider trading, it does not expressly 
define the concept of market abuse to cover all these forms of prohibited trading practices.   
Moreover, the concept of market abuse is not defined in the United States of America. 
1  Scholtz, Paige & Van Zyl “Financial Markets, Market Abuse, Money Laundering and the National Credit 
Act” (31-03-2008) < http://www.legal500.com/index.php?option=com_content&task> (accessed 30-04- 
2008).   
2    Fischel and Ross “Should the Law Prohibit ‘Market Manipulation’ in Financial Markets” 1991 Harvard 
Law Review 503 506 and Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse: A Legal and 
Economic Analysis (2005) 104.  
3  See the Forum of European Securities Commissions (FESCO) “Market abuse: FESCO’s Response to the 
Call for Views from the Securities Regulators under the EU’s Action Plan for Financial Services Com 
(1999) 232” (19-03-2008) < http://www.europefesco.org> (accessed 10-05-2008).    
4    See art 1(2)(a)-(c) of the Directive of the European Parliament and Council of 28 January 2003, on 
Insider Dealing and Manipulation (Market Abuse) 2003/6/EC OJ 2003, L 96/16.    Also see Ferrarini 
“The European Market Abuse Directive” 2004 Common Market Law Review 711 724-728. 
1 
                                               
However, in the Cargil Inc v Hardin case5 market abuse was defined as an act involving 
market manipulation or any activity, scheme or artifice that deliberately influences the price 
of a financial asset, resulting in a price other than the one that would have resulted in the 
absence of such intervention.   This definition is once again narrow and does not expressly 
apply to insider trading and hence it has attracted similar criticisms from some scholars.6   
Despite these definitional deficiencies, all the forms of market manipulation and insider 
trading are generally treated as “market abuse” in the United States of America.  This is the 
same approach adopted in the United Kingdom, where the concept of market abuse was 
widely defined as behaviour, whether by one person alone or by two or more persons jointly 
or in concert, which occurs in relation to qualifying investments traded or admitted to trading 
on a prescribed market or in respect of which a request for admission to trading on such a 
market has been made and which falls within any one or more types of prohibited behaviour 
set out under the Financial Services and Markets Act.7    The term “market abuse” is broadly 
used to refer to a number illegal practices like insider trading, improper disclosure, misuse of 
information, manipulating transactions, manipulating devices, dissemination and distortion 
and misleading behaviour.8  Notwithstanding the fact that these practices are different from 
each other, the use of the generic term “market abuse” has reduced confusion to a certain 
extent and enhanced the enforcement of market abuse prohibition in the United Kingdom.9   
Similarly, in South Africa and for the purposes of this thesis, “market abuse” is used as a 
generic term referring to insider trading, prohibited trading practices (trade-based market 
manipulation) and the making or publication of false, misleading or deceptive promises, 
statements or forecasts (disclosure-based market manipulation).10  Therefore, although the 
Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 did 
5  (1971) 452 F2d 1154 1163; 1167-1170. 
6   Easterbrook “Monopoly, Manipulation and the Regulation of Futures Markets” 1986 J Bus S 102; 
Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse: A Legal and Economic Analysis 104-106. 
7  2000 (c 8), hereinafter referred to as the Financial Services and Markets Act.    See s 118(1)-(8) of the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.  Also see Swan Market Abuse Regulation (2006) 29-33; 205. 
8  Swan Market Abuse Regulation 205-206; Barnes Stock Market Efficiency, Insider Dealing and Market 
Abuse (2009) 130-139; Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley Market Abuse and Insider Dealing (2009) 
72-73.    
9   Barnes Stock Market Efficiency, Insider Dealing and Market Abuse 129-139; Rider, Alexander, Linklater 
& Bazley Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 72-73. 
10  See Chapter VIII entitled “Market Abuse” of the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004, hereinafter referred 
to as the Securities Services Act; also see s 73; s 75 & s 76 of the Securities Services Act; also see clauses 
82; 84; 85; 86 & 87 of the Financial Markets Bill [B-2011], hereinafter referred to as the Financial 
Markets Bill & clauses 80; 82; 83 & 84 of the Financial Markets Bill [B12-2012], hereinafter referred to 
as the Financial Markets Bill 2012 (I have employed the term “clause” to refer to the provisions of both 
the Financial Markets Bill & the Financial Markets Bill 2012 because at the time of writing this chapter, 
the aforementioned Bills had not yet effectively been passed into law).   
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not expressly define the concept of market abuse, this thesis employs the term “market abuse” 
to refer to all the forms of market manipulation and insider trading as outlawed in the relevant 
legislation in jurisdictions such as South Africa, the United States of America, Australia, the 
United Kingdom and the European Union for consistency and eradication of unnecessary 
confusion. 
 
As indicated above, it is clear that market manipulation and insider trading are the two main 
forms of market abuse that fall under the scope of this research.    Insider trading is a practice 
by which one person armed with price-sensitive non-public (confidential) information, 
concludes a transaction in securities to which that information relates without sharing that 
information with others.11  The insider trading debate dates back to the 1920s when its effect 
was first felt in the United States of America after a heavy crash occurred in its stock markets.   
In 1933 the United States of America became the first country to enforce legislation on 
market abuse practices that include insider trading.   
 
In South Africa the prohibition on market abuse practices like market manipulation can be 
linked back to sections 20 to 23 of the Financial Markets Control Act12 and section 40 of the 
Stock Exchanges Control Act.13  These provisions were also supplemented by section 16214 
of the Companies Act.15   Likewise, the crack down on insider trading can be traced back to 
section 233 of the Companies Act which was later replaced by section 440F of the same Act 
in 1990.   Section 440F was repealed and replaced by the provisions of the Insider Trading 
Act16 on 17 January 1999.  Market abuse practices were allegedly common in South Africa.17 
 
11  Osode “Defending the Regulation of Insider Trading on Basis of Sound Legal Orthodoxy: The Fiduciary 
Obligations Theory” in Okpaluba (ed) Law in Contemporary South African Society (2004) 303.   Many 
countries enacted market abuse legislation.   Only a few countries have managed somewhat to enforce 
such legislation effectively to protect the issuers of securities, while the majority of the countries are still 
to achieve success in the enforcement thereof.   The term “issuer of securities” is used in this thesis to 
refer to a company or any other issuer of money market instruments.  However, the enforcement of 
market abuse legislation in South Africa has not been able to adequately protect the investors who 
purchase or sell shares to their disadvantage because they are ignorant of market abuse practices such as 
insider trading.  
12   55 of 1989, hereinafter referred to as the Financial Markets Control Act.   
13    1 of 1985, hereinafter referred to as the Stock Exchanges Control Act.   
14    This section prohibited the dissemination of false information in a prospectus.  
15     61 of 1973, hereinafter referred to as the Companies Act. 
16     135 of 1998, hereinafter referred to as the Insider Trading Act. 
17     Henning & Du Toit “The Regulation of False Trading, Market Manipulation and Insider Trading” 2000 
Journal for Juridical Science 155 155-165. 
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In an attempt to improve the regulation of market abuse practices, the Securities Services Act 
was enacted as a separate piece of legislation that specifically consolidates18 and deals more 
with market abuse practices.19  These provisions could be further repealed by the market 
abuse provisions contained in the Financial Markets Bill20 or the Financial Markets Bill 
2012.21  The historical development of the market abuse enforcement framework will be dealt 
with in Chapter Two of this thesis.   
 
This research will explore whether the enforcement framework provided for by the Securities 
Services Act has been successful in combating market abuse practices.  This will be done by 
investigating the problems associated with ineffective enforcement of market abuse 
provisions in the South African companies and financial markets.  Furthermore, an analysis of 
the gaps and flaws in the current enforcement framework22 will be undertaken.  The 
enforcement problems seem to be far from being solved and technological developments such 
as the electronic buying and selling (online trading) of securities on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange Limited23 might, if not managed properly, lead to more challenges in relation to the 
detection of abnormal and unscrupulous trading activity.  It is still controversial whether the 
regulation and interpretation of specific market abuse practices like market manipulation and 
insider trading activity in regulated markets should be done similarly to or differently from 
each other.  However, this research submits that market abuse practices will only be curbed if 
there is an adequate enforcement framework in place that is effectively implemented and 
enforced by the courts.   To determine the validity of this and other concerns, the following 
question must be addressed in this research:   
18    The Securities Services Act came into force on 1 February 2005 and repealed the Stock Exchanges 
Control Act, the Financial Markets Control Act, the Custody and Administration of Securities Act 85 of 
1992 & the Insider Trading Act.   It further amended the Companies Act (notably this Act has now been 
amended by the new Companies Act 71 of 2008) and the Financial Services Board Act 97 of 1990.     
19   The government and its policy makers have made some efforts to combat market abuse by passing the 
Securities Services Act which repealed and replaced all previous market manipulation and insider trading 
provisions.  Although a number of activities that are related to market abuse practices are now prohibited, 
there are inconsistencies in the practical enforcement of the relevant provisions of the Securities Services 
Act and this will be discussed later in Chapters Two & Three of this thesis.       
20    See clauses 82; 84; 85; 86 & 87 & other relevant clauses under Chapter X entitled “Market Abuse”. 
21    See clauses 80; 82; 83 & 84 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012 & also see other relevant clauses under 
Chapter X entitled “Market Abuse”. 
22   For purposes of this thesis the terms “enforcement framework” and “legal enforcement framework” are 
used interchangeably.   
23     Hereinafter referred to as the JSE.   Notably, the JSE was originally established on 8 November 1887 and 
it was formerly known simply as the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.  However, on 8 November 2000 it 
adopted its new name as the Johannesburg Securities Exchange South Africa, which was later changed to 
its current name as Johannesburg Stock Exchange Limited on 01 July 2005. 
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(a) Is the current anti-market abuse legal enforcement framework being successfully 
implemented by the relevant authorities to combat market abuse practices in South 
Africa?  
 
The provisions on market abuse have continued to be inconsistently enforced in the South 
African courts.24  Although a number of investigations were reported to have been conducted 
by the Financial Services Board and the Insider Trading Directorate (which is now the 
Directorate of Market Abuse), the mere fact that only a few settlements in civil cases and no 
criminal convictions have been recorded in insider trading cases, confirms that assumption.25   
A closer look into the role of the courts, the Financial Services Board, the Directorate for 
Market Abuse, the Enforcement Committee and the JSE will be carried out.   Each of these 
organs will be discussed.   
 
This research will include a comparative analysis of the enforcement of market abuse 
practices in other selected countries for the purpose of learning from their enforcement 
frameworks and bringing the South African enforcement framework in line with the latest 
developments elsewhere.  The discussions in Chapters Five, Six, Seven and Eight will focus 
on the United States of America (mainly from a federal perspective), the European Union, the 
United Kingdom and Australia respectively.26   
  
1 2  Background of the Research  
 
It is generally agreed that market abuse practices are still prevalent in South African 
companies and financial markets.  It is further submitted that some insider traders and market 
manipulators are still able to enjoy profits of their illegal practices without incurring any 
liability, owing to the ineffective enforcement of the Securities Services Act.27  Furthermore, 
it is argued that improper use of price-sensitive information, for instance by delaying its 
publication or disclosure to other relevant parties, is by far one of the most common forms of 
market abuse in South Africa.28  Although the Securities Services Act has been a positive 
24  Luiz “Market Abuse – II” 2002 JBL’s Quarterly Law Review for People in Business 180-183.     
25     For more information on market abuse cases visit <http://www.fsb.co.za> (accessed 13-07-2008). 
26   See par 1 8 of this Chapter for the justification of my selection of each of these jurisdictions for 
comparative analysis.  
27     Luiz 2002 JBL’s Quarterly Law Review for People in Business 180-183.  
28    Henning & Du Toit 2000 Journal for Juridical Science 159. 
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attempt to curb various forms of market abuse, much needs to be done to achieve more 
success in the enforcement of its provisions.29  It is therefore a real challenge on the part of 
the Financial Services Board and other enforcement authorities to ensure that insider traders, 
market manipulators and any other unscrupulous persons who contravene the relevant 
provisions of the Securities Services Act are exposed and penalised.   Enforcement authorities 
must further ensure that any person who fall victim to such illicit practices is accorded 
appropriate remedies. 
 
It is against this background that an analysis into the implementation of the current 
enforcement framework will be assumed in this research to recommend possible measures 
that can be employed to combat market abuse practices in South Africa.  
 
1 3  The Case for Regulating Market Abuse 
 
The objective underlying securities laws (market manipulation and insider trading provisions) 
in various countries is to promote a free and fair market that will competitively attract both 
domestic and foreign investment.  This usually occurs in markets where the price of a security 
reflects its true value and securities trading is done transparently and efficiently, by 
prohibiting market abuse practices.30  However, a number of commentators have had different 
views on this matter.31  Some commentators, financial analysts and academics argue that the 
regulation of market abuse activities is economically undesirable in many respects.32  On the 
other hand, other persons allude to the fact that effective regulation of market abuse 
legislation is key to achieving accurate and internationally competitive financial markets.33    
In other words, the main objective underlying the regulation of market abuse in the financial 
markets is to freely promote and maintain the natural forces of supply and demand to 
29   Luiz 2002 JBL’s Quarterly Law Review for People in Business 182-183. 
30      Henning & Du Toit 2000 Journal for Juridical Science 155. 
31    For purposes of this sub-heading this market manipulation and insider trading debate is presented 
concurrently.  The controversy pertaining to the enforcement of insider trading provisions as well as 
market manipulation provisions will therefore not be treated separately and differently.  
32     Akerlof “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism” 1970 Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 488 488-500; Ali “Market Abuse: It’s Not just a Wall Street Thing” 2006 The 
Company Lawyer 222 224; Fischel and Ross 1991 Harvard Law Review 512-513 & 553.   
33   In order to promote market integrity, protect investors and to keep the markets free from fraud, it is 
argued that market manipulation and insider trading legislation must be effectively enforced.   See related 
remarks by Anonymous “The Regulation of Insider Trading in the United States of America” (09-03-
2008) <http://www.sec.gov> (accessed 08-06-2008).  
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determine the price of securities; to boost public investor confidence in the integrity of such 
markets and to protect investors from illicit market abuse activities.34 
 
Although the question of whether it is beneficial and cost effective35 to regulate and combat 
market abuse practices is still to be answered, this research submits that adequate legislation 
alone is not sufficient; instead, such legislation must be supplemented by effective 
enforcement of its provisions to curb market abuse activities.  Arguments against the 
regulation of market manipulation and insider trading can be outlined as follows:  
 
It is stated that market abuse legislation in most cases will be too legalistic and difficult to 
enforce practically.36  It is argued further that most countries have enacted some legislation 
that is fairly good but it is not easily enforceable37 and this has contributed more problems 
than solutions in many securities and financial markets globally.38  Furthermore, several 
market abuse laws have had little or no success in many countries that had enacted them due 
to the inherent difficult nature of market abuse activities, especially insider trading, to detect, 
investigate and prosecute.39  It is possible that, in some instances, a significant number of 
these activities will go undetected.  Apparently, very few instances of successful prosecutions 
and settlements have been reported in cases involving market manipulation and insider 
trading.   For instance, it is claimed that prior to 1980 in the United States of America, only 37 
cases of insider trading were settled out of court by the United States Securities Exchange 
Commission and the disgorgement of profits fine was secured only in twelve cases.40  
 
34   Cassim “An Analysis of Market Manipulation under the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004 (Part 1)” 
2008 SA Merc LJ 33 39.  
35      Henning & Du Toit 2000 Journal for Juridical Science 155.  
36   Caccese “Insider Trading Laws and the Role of Securities Analysts” 1997 Financial Analysts Journal 9 9; 
Jie Hu & Noe “The Insider Trading Debate” 1997 Economic Review 34 35. 
37   Bris “Do Insider Trading Laws Work?” 2005 European Financial Management 267. 
38   Semaan, Freeman & Adams “Is Insider Trading a Necessary Evil for Efficient Markets?: An International 
Comparative Analysis” 1999 CSLJ 220 226–227. 
39  See generally the Forum of European Securities Commissions (FESCO) article (19-03-2008) 
<http://www.europefesco.org> (accessed 10-05-2008).         
40   Jie Hu & Noe 1997 Economic Review 35.  Also see generally Newkirk & Robertson “Speech by SEC 
Staff: Insider Trading a United States Perspective” (19-09-1998) 16th International Symposium on 
Economic Crime 2 <http://www.sec.gov/speecharchive/1998/spch221.htm> (accessed 30-06-2008).    
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Another example of a country that had a poor track record in the prosecution of market abuse 
in the early 1990s is Australia.41   It is agreed that the low number of successful prosecutions, 
especially in insider trading cases, was a result of both the ineffectiveness and the 
unenforceability of insider trading laws.42  
 
The same can be said of South Africa.   Prosecution of market abuse practices has not been 
very successful.   However, the absence of more successful convictions, especially in insider 
trading cases, has been viewed by some commentators as a sign or proof that the insider 
trading provisions are being effectively enforced.43  For instance, according to the Insider 
Trading Directorate report as quoted in the Insider Trading Booklet,44 80% of the persons 
interviewed in a survey that was carried out to investigate the impact and effectiveness of the 
insider trading legislation submitted that insider trading cases were remarkably less prevalent.  
About 141 cases were provisionally detected during the period between May 1999 and 
September 2002 but only 115 cases were finally investigated, 15 cases were settled out of 
court and no criminal prosecution was successfully concluded.45  This explains why it is 
argued that market abuse cases are very difficult to prosecute and enforce because the 
evidentiary burden of proof in such cases is extremely high and difficulty to prove.46 
 
Another argument against the regulation of market abuse activities is that such regulation will 
negatively affect market efficiency and the work of securities analysts, stock brokers and 
other market participants.  Manne,47 as well as Calton and Fischel,48 purport that the 
regulation of insider trading will inhibit bona fide transactions and disclosure of information 
between company employees, financial analysts and other market participants.  They contend 
41   Gething “Insider Trading Enforcement: Where are We Now and Where do We Go from Here?” 1998 
Company and Securities Law Journal 607 614-618; Tomasic “Insider Trading Law Reform in Australia” 
1991 Company and Securities Law Journal 121 142-143 & Bostock “Australia’s New Insider Trading 
Laws” 1992 Company and Securities Law Journal 165 181.  
42   Gething 1998 Company and Securities Law Journal 607 614-618; Tomasic 1991 Company and Securities 
Law Journal 121 142-143.   
43   See the analysis by Loubser “Insider Trading and Other Market Abuses (Including the Effective 
Management of Price-sensitive Information)” in the Insider Trading Booklet final draft (10-10-2006) 4-6 
<http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-09-2007). 
44    Loubser article (10-10-2006) 4-6 <http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-09-
2007). 
45   Luiz 2002 JBL’s Quarterly Law Review for People in Business 180-183; Cassim “Some Aspects of 
Insider Trading–has the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004 Gone too Far?” 2007 SA Merc LJ 44 59.  
46   Chanetsa “Insider Trading is Notoriously Hard to Prosecute” (2004-04-26) Business Report. 
47   Manne Insider Trading and the Stock Market (1966) 189.    
48   Calton & Fischel “The Regulation of Insider Trading” 1983 Stanford Law Review 857-866.        
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that information plays a pivotal role49 in financial and securities markets, hence the regulation 
of insider trading might interfere with bona fide analytical research or any other work of 
financial analysts.  Therefore, the regulation of insider trading will give rise to financial 
analysts not being able to execute their duties as freely as they would have liked owing to fear 
of apprehension and contravention of provisions on disclosure of price-sensitive information.  
It is further argued that market prices must reflect all relevant information to enhance the 
markets to have optimal allocation of resources and to enable securities and financial analysts 
to make accurate analyses.50 
 
Furthermore, it is stated that market abuse laws increase the manager-shareholder conflict and 
this may give rise to more agency costs.51  Therefore, disclosure of price-sensitive 
information must be restricted only if it is cost effective or when the cost of production, in this 
case the cost of regulation, is lower than the market value.   It is also stated that market 
participants do not have an incentive to produce information unless they are permitted to trade 
with it for their personal gain52 and this will hinder market efficiency.  For instance, various 
mechanisms are put in place by companies to protect their valuable price-sensitive 
information from being abused by insiders and other market participants in the course of 
carrying out their duties.   Therefore, if market abuse is not regulated, insider traders and other 
market participants might be more encouraged to create and collect more price-sensitive 
information in order to enjoy a trade benefit out of such information.53  It is also said that 
when insiders trade freely on price-sensitive information, obtaining more accurate securities 
prices and efficient financial markets will be facilitated.54   
 
Another argument is that market abuse practices, especially insider trading, may serve as an 
efficient disclosure mechanism that is economically cheaper than other means of disclosure, 
49   Ten Oever “Case Note: Insider Trading and the Dual Role of Information-United States v O`Hagan 
(1996) 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir)” 1997 Yale Law Journal 1325 1328. 
50   See Georgakopoulos “Insider Trading as a Transaction Cost: A Market Microstructure Justification and 
Optimization of Insider Trading Regulation” 1993 Connecticut Law Review 1 1-51.    
51   Agency costs can be defined as the expenses incurred by a company that hires the services of stock 
brokers and financial analysts in an attempt to enhance efficiency.  Jensen & Meckling “Theory of the 
Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure” 1976 Journal of Financial 
Economics 305. 
52  Ten Oever 1997 Yale Law Journal 1325; 1328.  
53   Ausubel “Insider Trading in a Rational Expectations Economy” 1990 American Economic Review 1022 
1025.    
54   Ausubel 1990 American Economic Review 1025. 
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hence no market abuse laws are needed.  Manne55 contends that the use of non-public 
information will, whenever it occurs, cause prices to adjust and to reflect the value of the 
securities more accurately.56  
 
Market abuse practices, particularly insider trading, may offer an incentive and a legitimate 
means of compensation.57   It is also said that market abuse practices will give an incentive to 
insiders to innovate and develop new ideas that will give rise to increased productivity for 
their companies.58  Therefore, when market abuse practices are not regulated, companies will 
reduce expenditure by not paying higher salaries to their employees (insiders) because they 
will be generating their own profit through their innovative insider trading or market 
manipulation.59  
 
On the contrary, proponents of the regulation of market abuse practices argue that market 
abuse laws will increase market fairness and investor confidence.60  They contend that market 
abuse practices may result in several financial problems such as corruption, fraud and poor 
economies.61  They also maintain that the regulation of market abuse will promote market 
integrity62 and efficiency of financial markets.63  Therefore, countries64 with a good track 
record of combating market manipulation and insider trading65 attract more investment.  Their 
arguments can be summarised as follows: 
 
55     Manne “In Defence of Insider Trading” 1966 Harvard Business Review 113 113-122.    
56   For instance it is argued that persons who possess inside information will not trade in securities or 
financial instruments without practically disclosing it.   Hence it is both undesirable and unnecessary to 
have insider trading provisions because insider trading is a victimless offence.   
57    See Manne 1966 Harvard Business Review 116-118; Dye “Insider Trading and Incentives” 1984 Journal 
of Business 295 295 & Calton & Fischel 1983 Stanford Law Review 857-866.   
58   Black “The Reform of the Insider Trading Law in Australia” 1992 UNSW Law Journal 214 219.     
59   Moore “What is Really Unethical about Insider Trading?” 1990 Journal of Business Ethics 171 178.   
60    Martin & Peterson “Insider Trading Revisited” 1991 Journal of Business Ethics 57 59.   
61   Bainbridge “The Insider Trading Prohibition: An Economic Enigma” 1986 University of Florida Law 
Review 35 56.    
62   Also see Anonymous article “Discussion of the Need for Good Corporate Governance” (31-07-2008) on 
<http://www.oecd.org> (accessed 02-03-2009).  
63   See Bollen “Research Analysts and the Australian Market Misconduct Regime” 2003 Murdoch 
University Electronic Journal of Law 19 19; also comparatively see McGee & Block “Information, 
Privilege, Opportunity and Insider Trading” 1989 Northern Illinois University Law Review 2 11.  
64   Velasquez Business Ethics: Concepts and Cases (2002) 454.  
65     Velasquez Business Ethics: Concepts and Cases 454. 
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Market abuse practices must be prohibited to ensure that all market participants have equal 
access to correct information and to price-sensitive information.66   Therefore, those who, by 
virtue of their positions or professions, have access to such price-sensitive information must 
be prohibited from manipulating financial markets or from trading with it for their own 
personal gain.67  They argue that market abuse activities will expose innocent outside 
investors to risks such as unexpected fall or rise in stock or share prices.68  They maintain that 
the regulation of market abuse will give rise to reduced market integrity and investor 
confidence.69   The basis of this argument is that there must not be any disparity between 
market participants in accessing relevant information.70  Securities transactions should be 
concluded on a level playing field to prevent one person from reaping the benefits of such 
transactions, regardless of whether he owes a fiduciary duty to other persons or not.71   
 
Velasquez72 argues that market abuse practices, especially insider trading, may give rise to 
misappropriation and theft of a corporation or company’s property.   Therefore, market abuse 
laws must be enacted and adopted to avoid the negative effects that market abuse activities 
might have on companies and financial markets.73  This argument asserts that non-public 
price-sensitive information belongs to a corporation or company and if it is abused through 
insider trading or market manipulation, the perpetrators must be punished.74  Dooley75 further 
asserts that illegal disclosure of non-public price-sensitive information by insiders or market 
participants is an offence against their companies or corporations.   
66     Manove “The Harm from Insider Trading and Informed Speculation” 1989 The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 823 843.  Additionally see Marques’s article entitled “FSA in Debate on Market Abuse 
Tactics” (13-06-2008) <http://www.legal500.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2955> 
(accessed 05-07-2008) & a similar article by Berwin entitled “Criminalising Market Abuse: The Shifting 
Sands of Enforcement by FSA” (13-06-2008) <http://www.legal500.com/index.php?option=com_content 
&task=view&id=2955> (accessed 15-08-2008). 
67  Bergmans Insider Information and Securities Trading: A Legal and Economic Analysis of the 
Foundations of Liability in the USA and the European Community (1991) 9; 12; 105-106.       
68  Scotland “Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne” 1967 Virginia Law Review 1425-1478.   
69   Bainbridge1986 University of Florida Law Review 55-61; Moore 1990 Journal of Business Ethics 172; 
Easterbrook “Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and The Production of Information” 
1981 Supreme Court Review 309 317 & Brazier Insider Dealing: Law and Regulation (1996) 80-81. 
70      Mitchell Insider Dealing and Directors’ Duties (1989) 21.  
71    Yulong Ma & Huey-Lian Sun “Where Should the Line be Drawn on Insider Trading Ethics?” 1998 
Journal of Business Ethics 67 70; Henning & Du Toit “High-pressure Selling of Securities: From Rigging 
the Market to False Trading, Market Manipulation and Insider Dealing” 2000 The Company Lawyer 29 
29-36. 
72   Velasquez Business Ethics: Concepts and Cases 455. 
73     Bainbridge 1986 University of Florida Law Review 55-61. 
74     Caccese 1997 Financial Analysts Journal 10. 
75     Dooley “Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions” 1980 Virginia Law Review 1 1-89.    
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Market abuse practices, especially insider trading, amount to a breach of fiduciary duties 
owed to the companies and shareholders by insiders and other market participants.  It is 
against this background that proponents of the regulation of market abuse contend that 
practices that amount to breach of fiduciary duties must be strongly discouraged.    However, 
there appear to be divergent views about this fiduciary duty argument. Some commentators 
argue that insiders or employees owe a fiduciary duty only to the company.76   On the other 
hand, other persons maintain that insiders or employees owe fiduciary duties to both the 
company and the shareholders.77  This is the so-called manager-shareholder conflict.78  
 
Market abuse harms public investor confidence and must be curbed by effective enforcement 
of market abuse laws.79  This argument is based on the premise that market abuse activities 
destroy market integrity, hence effective enforcement of market abuse provisions will help to 
promote and maintain investor confidence, and enhance efficient and competitive financial 
markets that attract more investors.80  
 
Market abuse practices damage the efficiency, accuracy and proper functioning of securities 
and financial markets.   Therefore, an efficient market must reflect prices of stock or shares at 
any given time as the best estimate of what they will be in the future.  In other words, any 
publication or forecast must accurately reflect the true value of the securities in question.81  
This is the so-called efficient market hypothesis.82   It asserts that relevant information should 
play a crucial role in the determination of share prices.   Moreover, it is also said that the time 
between the production of such information and its dissemination into the financial markets 
may only be properly managed by regulating and discouraging market abuse practices.   It is 
further stipulated that the more efficient and accurate information about securities is reflected 
in market prices, the more stable the financial markets would be.83  
76   Ferran Company Law and Corporate Finance (1999) 123.  
77     In re Cady, Roberts and Company [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH Fede Sec L Rep 76 803  81 016.   
78     Georgakopoulos 1993 Connecticut Law Review 1-51; Jensen & Meckling 1976 Journal of Financial 
Economics 305.  
79  Additionally see the Forum of European Securities Commissions (FESCO) article (19-03-2008) 
<http://www.europefesco.org> (accessed 10-05-2008).            
80  Additionally see the Forum of European Securities Commissions (FESCO) article (19-03-2008) 
<http://www.europefesco.org> (accessed 10-05-2008).            
81     Bergmans Insider Information and Securities Trading 105-106.  
82     Gitman Principles of Managerial Finance (2000) 300-301.   
83   Macey “Securities Trading: A Contractual Perspective” 1999 Case Western Reserve Law Review 269 
275.  
12 
                                               
Market abuse activities reduce market liquidity.84   This view is also supported by Kraakman, 
who argues that financial markets characterised by higher levels of insider trading depict 
higher trading costs and reduced market liquidity.85  These trading costs are then passed on to 
uninformed investors and market participants, giving rise to lower market liquidity.86 
Therefore, market abuse practices will lead to the exploitation of financial markets by insiders 
and other market participants at the expense of the affected company and its shareholders.   It 
is contended that no person will invest in a company or financial market characterised by 
rampant market manipulation and insider trading.   In other words, if the information 
asymmetry is higher, uninformed investors may reduce their investments or withdraw totally 
from participating in such a company or financial market.  This will negatively affect the 
chances of companies to generate more capital and the overall liquidity of the financial 
markets.  
 
1 4  General Enforcement Approaches to Combat Market Abuse 
 
This sub-heading seeks to provide a theoretical analysis of the basic approaches to market 
abuse enforcement.   Selected approaches will be briefly discussed to investigate how they are 
used in other jurisdictions to combat market abuse effectively, the objective being to 
recommend, where necessary, those enforcement methods (approaches) that can be 
incorporated into the Securities Services Act to enhance and improve the enforcement of 
market abuse in South Africa.   The approaches to market abuse enforcement can be outlined 
as follows:  
 
Reliance on criminal sanctions.  Market abuse is usually treated as a criminal offence in 
many jurisdictions.  Most countries have enacted significantly high criminal penalties to deter 
all persons from engaging in market abuse activities.87  In South Africa, the criminal 
sanctions for market abuse have been increased to a fine not exceeding R50 million, or to 
84   See Beny “A Comparative Empirical Investigation of Agency and Market Theories of Insider Trading” 
(08-08-1999) 15 Harvard Law School Discussion Paper 264 
<http://www.law.harvard.edu/Programs/onlin_center>   (accessed 03-08-2008); Loubser article (10-10-
2006) 4-6 <http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-09-2007). 
85    Kraakman “The Legal Theory of Insider Trading Regulation in the United States” in Hopt & Wymeersch 
(eds) European Insider Dealing-Law and Practice (1991) 39-54.  
86     Kraakman “The Legal Theory of Insider Trading Regulation in the United States” 39-54; Beny ((08-08-
1999) 15 Harvard Law School Discussion Paper 264 <http://www.law.harvard.edu/ 
Programs/onlin_center>   (accessed 03-08-2008). 
87      See the discussions that will be later assumed in Chapters Four, Five, Six, Seven & Eight of this thesis. 
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imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years, or to both such fine and imprisonment.88  
The prosecution of criminal cases of market abuse is done by the Director of Public 
Prosecutions.  The Financial Services Board may only prosecute such cases when the Director 
of Public Prosecutions failed or neglected to prosecute them as required under the Securities 
Services Act.  Notably, in criminal prosecutions the burden of proof is usually imposed on the 
prosecuting authorities to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the market abuse offence was 
committed by the accused persons.  However, the reliance on criminal sanctions to enforce 
and combat market abuse has not been very successful in many jurisdictions such as the 
United States of America,89 Australia,90 the United Kingdom91 and South Africa.92  
 
Reliance on civil sanctions.  The market abuse regulatory and enforcement frameworks in 
several countries rely heavily on civil sanctions to discourage market abuse activities.93  The 
legislation in many countries provides civil remedies to prejudiced persons to compensate 
them for any losses they might have incurred as a result of market abuse activities.  This civil 
action is usually enforced on the behalf of affected persons by authorised independent 
regulatory bodies.   These regulatory bodies are, in most instances, empowered with a wide 
range of powers to enable them to exercise their functions effectively.  Such powers may 
include powers to administer proof of claims and to distribute payments to successful 
claimants in civil cases.  The civil penalties (depending on a country) are imposed against the 
offenders for the profit made or the loss avoided as a result of their market abuse practices.  In 
South Africa, the Financial Services Board may impose and recover civil penalties of up to 
three times the profit made or the loss avoided by the offenders.   
 
88   S 115 (a) of the Securities Services Act. 
89   See further Newkirk & Robertson (19-09-1998) 16th International Symposium on Economic Crime 2-3 
<http://www.sec.gov/speecharchive/1998/spch221.htm> (accessed 30-06-2008).           
90    Gething 1998 Company and Securities Law Journal 614-618; Tomasic 1991Company and Securities Law 
Journal 142-143 & Bostock 1992 Company and Securities Law Journal 181.  
91   Russen Financial Services Authorisation, Supervision, and Enforcement: A Litigator’s Guide (2006) 181-
182.   
92    Loubser article (10-10-2006) 4-6 <http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-09-
2007). 
93   Comino “High Court Relegates Strategic Regulation and Pyramidal Enforcement to Insignificance” (28-
02-2007) <http://www.parsons.law.usyd.edu.au/CLTA/CominoPaper.pdf> (accessed 20-05-2007); Mann 
& Lustgarten “Internationalization of Insider Trading Enforcement-A guide to Regulation and Co-
operation” in Hopt & Wymeersch (eds) European Insider Dealing-Law and Practice (1991) 368; 
Tomasic “Insider Trading in the USA and United Kingdom” 1991 Australian Studies in Law, Crime and 
Justice Series 31 31-39.  
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Likewise, in the United States of America, the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission may impose civil penalties of up to three times the profit made or the loss 
avoided as a result of market abuse practices.  The United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission may also effect a payment of up to ten percent of the fine collected (bounty 
rewards) to anyone who provided information leading to civil penalties.94  In Australia, the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission may impose civil penalties on those who 
indulge in insider trading under the Corporations Act.95  
 
It is must be borne in mind that the enforcement of civil sanctions for market abuse, unlike the 
criminal sanctions, has been fairly successful in several countries.  
 
Administrative sanctions.  It is claimed that a few countries have adopted administrative 
sanctions to discourage market abuse practices.  Administrative sanctions are usually enforced 
by competent and authorised regulatory bodies.  As earlier discussed, these bodies are 
empowered to take administrative action on the behalf of prejudiced persons.96  
Administrative sanctions may include unlimited fines, public censure, revocation of licences, 
asset freezes, injunctions to restrain wrongful conduct, suspension of listing, disciplinary 
actions, disqualification of managers or  any other person involved in another profession, 
restitution to affected persons and orders for the disgorgement of profits.  Most of these 
administrative sanctions are also used by the Financial Services Authority in the United 
Kingdom.97  On the other hand, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission may 
also impose civil penalties up to $500,000 to order disgorgement of profits in administrative 
proceedings and to issue cease and desist orders against offenders.98  In Australia, the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission may impose administrative sanctions on 
the offenders such as civil non-monetary penalties which include community service orders 
and disqualification orders.99   
94   Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations (2005) 370.  Also see s 21A (e) of the Insider 
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act 1988. 
95   50 of 2001(Cth) as amended, hereinafter referred to as the Corporations Act.    See s 1043L & s 1317K of 
the Corporations Act.    
96    Wood Regulation of International Finance (The Law and Practice of International Finance Series 
Volume 7)  (2007) 586-590.  
97     Wood Regulation of International Finance 586-590. 
98     Wood Regulation of International Finance 586-590; Palmiter Securities Regulation 436-438.    
99     Comino article (28-02-2007) <http://www.parsons.law.usyd.edu.au/CLTA/CominoPaper.pdf> (accessed 
20-05-2007); see further the Australian Law Reform Commission Principled Regulation: Federal Civil 
and Administrative Penalties in Australia Report No 95 (2002) 113. 
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In South Africa, the Enforcement Committee is mandated to enforce the administrative 
sanctions in terms of the Securities Services Act.100  The Enforcement Committee may only 
institute civil proceedings in a court of law against persons who contravene sections 73 and 
77 on a referral basis and where no compensation was paid by the defendant in terms of 
section 77.101  The Enforcement Committee may impose administrative sanctions on the 
offenders such as cost orders for the investigation and preparation of cases by the Financial 
Services Board, compensation orders in cases where there is a link between the unlawful 
conduct and calculable damages suffered by another party and unlimited fines as provided in 
the Securities Services Act.102 
 
Administrative sanctions may offer a more expeditious and efficient option for market abuse 
enforcement in South Africa. 
 
Establishment of competent regulatory bodies.  As highlighted earlier, several countries, 
including South Africa, have established and empowered some regulatory bodies to supervise 
and enforce market abuse provisions. Regulatory bodies like the Financial Services Authority, 
the Australian Securities and Investments Commission and the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission have, to a greater extent, managed to enforce market abuse laws 
consistently in their respective jurisdictions.   
 
Detection.  Market abuse activities are extremely difficult to detect, as a result many 
countries have surveillance systems in place to detect the occurrence of such activities. In the 
United States of America, the Corporate Finance Division of the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission is responsible for operating the electronic market surveillance.  In 
Australia, the Australian Stock Exchange is responsible for operating the electronic market 
surveillance by way of monitoring market activity and trading patterns through a 
computerised and sophisticated system called the Surveillance of Market Activity.  In South 
Africa, the electronic market surveillance is offered by the JSE’s Surveillance Division.  It is 
claimed that the JSE’s Surveillance Division has a number of sophisticated proprietary 
100   S 97 to s 105; no similar provision is expressly made under clauses 105 & 101 of the Financial Markets 
Bill & the Financial Markets Bill 2012 respectively.      
101   S 105 of the Securities Services Act; no similar provision is expressly made under clauses 105 & 101 of 
the Financial Markets Bill & the Financial Markets Bill 2012 respectively. 
102   No similar provision is expressly made under clauses 105 & 101 of the Financial Markets Bill & the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 respectively. 
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systems in place that are specifically designed to detect suspicious trading volumes and price 
movements which could be indicative of insider trading or market manipulation.  The JSE’s 
Surveillance Division also uses a scan method to detect suspicious trading patterns by 
analysing the profits made, say in the top fifty accounts of brokers.103  If suspicious trading is 
detected, it is reported to the Directorate of Market Abuse for further investigation.  
 
Investigation, surveillance and information gathering.   In most countries, the regulatory 
bodies are usually responsible for investigating market abuse activities.  These bodies are 
given powers which include carrying out on-site inspections, summoning and interrogating 
any persons suspected to have violated market abuse provisions and searching and seizing any 
document or material from any person or premises which is suspected to be relevant to the 
ongoing market abuse investigations.  In spite of the fact that the investigations are sometimes 
prolonged, it is argued that the United States Securities and Exchange Commission has 
managed to make its investigations and settlements timeously in many instances.104  The 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission also shares any information gathered 
from its investigations with the Department of Justice for use in criminal proceedings. 
 
Bounty rewards and whistle-blowing.  The purpose of these measures is to encourage 
individuals to expose market abuse activities without fear of reprisals.  In the United 
Kingdom, whistle-blowers are protected against the risk of getting fired or sidelined.  In 
Australia and the United States of America, bounty rewards are used to enhance the 
enforcement of market abuse.  For instance, as earlier stated, the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission may effect a payment of up to 10% of the fine collected to persons 
who give information relating to market abuse activities.  Nevertheless, the whistle-blowing 
method is not statutorily employed in South Africa. 
 
Establishment of self-regulatory organisations.  Developed countries such as the United 
States of America, the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada have managed to incorporate 
other self-regulatory organisations in their enforcement frameworks to improve and increase 
market abuse enforcement.  The self-regulatory organisations are established to complement 
103   This information was obtained from an interview that was conducted at the FSB by the researcher, with 
Mr Gerhard van Deventer (the Executive  Director of the DMA) on 05 May 2009; also see Loubser article 
(10-10-2006) 25 <http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-09-2007). 
104    Palmiter Securities Regulation 459. 
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the national regulatory bodies in the enforcement.  They usually exercise some direct 
oversight enforcement responsibility in their respective areas of competence and in the 
financial markets.105  The self-regulatory organisations are further required to ensure that the 
business interests of all market participants are protected by observing standards of fairness 
and confidentiality when exercising their enforcement powers.  In South Africa, the Financial 
Services Board is mainly responsible for the enforcement of market abuse and no provision 
was made for the establishment of self-regulatory organisations. 
 
Arbitration and alternative dispute resolution.  These measures are not commonly used to 
curb market abuse in many jurisdictions.  They are, however, employed in the United States 
of America, as another useful method that allows more settlements to be obtained without the 
parties involved incurring litigation costs.106  The arbitration and alternative dispute resolution 
does not waive compliance with market abuse legislation, but allows the parties (claimants 
and defendants) to secure agreements timeously on punitive damages as required by the 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission.  The United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission also requires the arbitrations to be published and the parties involved 
to avoid concluding arbitration agreements which do not allow other affected parties to get 
remedies from the offenders. 
 
Private rights of action.  This method is used in countries like Canada.  Private rights of 
action include punitive damages and contingent fees dependent on the success of the action 
taken.  They are used to encourage the prejudiced persons (issuers of securities or 
shareholders) to claim remedies directly from the offenders.107 
 
1 5  Statement of Problem 
 
Although there is no empirical data or accurate figures quantifying the extent of market abuse 
activity in the South African financial markets, the researcher submits that market abuse 
practices are still common.  This might be caused inter alia by poor implementation and 
enforcement of market manipulation and insider trading provisions.108  For instance, the 
105   Wood Regulation of International Finance 38-39; Pettet Company Law (2001) 339-341. 
106      Wood Regulation of International Finance 599. 
107      Wood Regulation of International Finance 596-597. 
108      Luiz 2002 JBL’s Quarterly Law Review for People in Business 180-183. 
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minimal number of convictions and successful civil settlements could suggest that market 
abuse legislation is still ineffectively109 enforced and many issuers of securities are being 
prejudiced.  It is against this background that this research will examine the perceived 
problems in the enforcement of the Securities Services Act in order to recommend possible 
solutions needed to overcome such problems.  For the purposes of this research, the following 
problems need to be addressed:  
 
(a) The implementation and enforcement of market abuse provisions in South Africa 
have not been very successful.  Therefore, the adequacy and efficiency of the 
Financial Services Board in relation to the enforcement of market abuse practices 
will be discussed.  
 
(b) The low number of convictions and successful settlements in both market abuse and 
insider trading cases implies that the enforcement authorities’ dependence on severe 
penalties and deterrence to curb market abuse activity has not been very successful.  
The adequacy or otherwise of preventative measures in place to curb market abuse 
practices and the absence of a rigorous anti-market abuse culture will be investigated. 
 
(c) Relevant stakeholders, companies and members of the public should become more 
aware of market abuse offences and available remedies in respect thereof.  Apart 
from the insider trading and market manipulation booklet110 which was published by 
the JSE, little or no further measures were undertaken to educate the public and other 
relevant persons about these offences and their consequences.  This has also been 
exacerbated, in part, by the fact that no attempt has been made by the legislature to 
define the concept of market abuse in the Securities Services Act.  Instead, market 
manipulation and insider trading offences continue to be treated separately and 
differently.111 
 
(d) The co-operation between the Financial Services Board and other enforcement 
agencies will be examined.  Therefore, the existing co-operation between the 
109     Crotty “First Insider Trading Case Goes to Court” Business Report (2001-10-19).     
110     Loubser article (10-10-2006) 4-6 <http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-09-
2007). 
111   Luiz 2002 JBL’s Quarterly Law Review for People in Business 183; Loubser article (10-10-2006) 4-6 
<http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-09-2007).   
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Financial Services Board and the JSE’s Surveillance Division will be discussed.112  
Moreover, the co-operation between the Financial Services Board and similar 
agencies at international level will also be considered for purposes of promoting the 
curbing of cross-border market abuse activities.  Apart from the co-operation 
agreements113 between the Financial Services Board and the Financial Services 
Authority, the United States Securities Exchange Commission and the International 
Organisation of Securities Commissions, very little has been practically achieved to 
date in the detection and investigation of market abuse practices in South Africa.114   
 
(e) Flaws and complexities in the detection, investigation, and proof of occurrence of 
market abuse activity will be investigated.  The evidentiary burden of proof in both 
civil and criminal cases of market abuse in South Africa will be scrutinised.115  For 
example, it is extremely difficult to prove beyond reasonable doubt that an accused 
person would have knowingly contravened market abuse provisions.116 
 
(f) The flaws and inconsistencies in the enforcement of market abuse provisions will 
also be examined.  
 
1 6  Aims and Objectives 
1 6 1  Aim 
 
The aim of this research is to examine the Securities Services Act’s market abuse provisions 
and to give recommendations for the establishment of an effective, sound and efficient anti-
market abuse enforcement framework in South Africa.  This research submits that the 
Securities Services Act can only be successful in combating market abuse if it is backed up by 
rigorous and effective enforcement on the part of all the relevant enforcement authorities.  
112   Loubser article (10-10-2006) 25-28 <http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-
09-2007).  
113     Loubser article (10-10-2006) 4-6 <http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-09-
2007). 
114    Loubser article (10-10-2006) 26 <http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-09-
2007); also see generally The Forum of European Securities Commissions (FESCO) article (19-03-2008) 
<http://www.europefesco.org> (accessed 10-05-2008).  The discussion on the co-operation of the 
Financial Services Board and similar international organisations will be undertaken in Chapter Three of 
this thesis.   
115     Luiz 2002 JBL’s Quarterly Law Review for People in Business 180-183. 
116    For related comments and analysis see the article by Ciaran “Insider Trading: Go Elsewhere for Thrills” 
(04-08-2008) <http://www.legal500.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view2958> (accessed 14-
10-2008); Chanetsa Business Report (2004-04-26).              
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Therefore, this research seeks to expose the problems or gaps in the current enforcement 
framework in order to recommend possible solutions to such problems.    
 
1 6 2  Objectives 
 
For the purposes of this research, this thesis will investigate the flaws in the enforcement and 
make recommendations that may be adopted where necessary to improve the enforcement of 
market abuse in South Africa.  To realise this, problems and flaws in the enforcement of the 
Securities Services Act must be identified and adequately resolved.  Furthermore, a critical 
analysis of the current provisions that deal with the enforcement of market abuse activities 
will be made to explore the reasons why, if any, so little has been achieved in terms of their 
enforcement to date.  This research will further look incisively into the functions of the 
Financial Services Board, the Directorate of Market Abuse, the Enforcement Committee, the 
JSE and the relevant courts in relation to the combating of market abuse practices in South 
Africa.   
 
1 7  Rationale for the Study  
 
The problem of ineffective enforcement of market abuse legislation has been evident in many 
countries of the world.   South Africa is no exception.  The flaws, disparities and 
inconsistencies in the enforcement of the market abuse provisions are the core reason for this 
research, the rationale being the development of a strong enforcement ethics culture in our 
financial markets, enhancing co-operation between enforcement authorities; promoting 
market integrity, market efficiency and investor confidence, and increasing education and 
awareness thereof.  Put differently, where market abuse activity is not sufficiently regulated, 
such activity will harm the efficiency and integrity of the financial markets and this may 
reduce public investor confidence.117  Therefore, good market abuse legislation must be 
supplemented by efficient and effective enforcement to reduce, as much as possible, the 
problem of market abuse practices in the financial markets.  It is contended that South Africa 
has good market abuse legislation but it is inconsistently implemented and enforced.  The 
mere fact that some companies have been investigated by the Financial Services Board 
117    Loubser article (10-10-2006) 4-6 <http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-09-
2007); The Forum of European Securities Commissions (FESCO) article (19-03-2008) 
<http://www.europefesco.org> (accessed 10-05-2008).    
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through the Directorate of Market Abuse is not necessarily an indication of rigorous 
enforcement of the Securities Services Act but rather that market abuse is still an enigma in 
South Africa.  This evidenced by the paucity of settlements and convictions reported in the 
relevant South African courts.118   To substantiate this, the anti-market abuse enforcement 
framework in the Securities Services Act will be examined to recommend, where necessary, 
other measures that may be used to enhance enforcement.  Furthermore, a comparative 
analysis of selected foreign legislation that deals with the enforcement of the market abuse 
ban from the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the European Union and 
Australia will be carried out for the purposes of drawing some lessons from these 
jurisdictions. 
 
1 8  Justifications for Comparative Analysis 
 
Legislation from the United Kingdom will be considered because the South African company 
law derives from the United Kingdom and again the United Kingdom has, to some extent, 
managed to develop a strong anti-market abuse culture in its financial markets119 and has 
relatively influenced the South African market abuse laws.  For instance, the Securities 
Services Act, like its United Kingdom counterpart, the Criminal Justice Act,120 has attempted 
to provide definitions of terms such as “insider” and “inside information”.  The European 
Union market abuse enforcement framework will be considered to explore the different and 
relevant enforcement approaches adopted by selected member states.  The United States of 
America’s market abuse laws will be examined because it has, to a fair extent, managed to 
establish an enforcement framework,121 based on statutory (government) as well as private 
actions, that enhances compliance with the law and facilitates the levying of sanctions should 
any violation occur.122  In this regard, it is said that effective enforcement is the key attribute 
of the United States of America’s market abuse laws that distinguishes it from similar laws in 
other countries.123  Lastly, the Australian experience will be considered because it has 
118   See <http://www.fsb.co.za> (accessed 13 June 2008).    Various companies have been investigated and 
some are still being investigated, especially for insider trading violations but very few convictions in 
criminal cases and settlements in civil cases have been achieved to date. 
119      Steinberg “Insider Trading Regulation–A Comparative Perspective” 2003 The International Lawyer 153 
169. 
120    1993 (c 36), hereinafter referred to as the Criminal Justice Act.   
121      Steinberg 2003 The International Lawyer 169-171. 
122      Steinberg 2003 The International Lawyer 169. 
123  Steinberg 2003 The International Lawyer 169. 
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managed to adopt a more expansive enforcement approach which uses other measures such as 
administrative sanctions, whistle-blowing and self-regulatory organisations to combat market 
abuse practices.  Furthermore, Australia is an example of a modern Commonwealth 
jurisdiction which incorporated international best practice.  
 
1 9  Specific Matters to be Examined 
 
(a) The researcher will examine primarily the strengths and weaknesses of the existing 
provisions dealing with the enforcement of market abuse practices in South Africa. 
 
(b) The framework for co-operation between the South African market abuse 
enforcement authorities will be examined.   The Memorandum of Understanding 
agreements for co-operation between the Financial Services Board and similar bodies 
elsewhere will also be investigated. 
 
(c) Various problems associated with the ineffective enforcement of market abuse 
provisions will be discussed.  
 
(d) The role of the JSE in the prevention, detection and investigation of market abuse 
activities will be analysed.     
 
1 10  Limitation of the Study  
 
The research will focus on the provisions of the Securities Services Act and other selected 
legislation that deals with the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in South Africa.   
The provisions of the Securities Services Act and other selected legislation that relates to the 
definitions and the general regulation of market abuse will not be dealt with in detail because 
this research is restricted only to the enforcement of the market manipulation and insider 
trading prohibition.  In other words, the study will not discuss all the provisions of the 
Securities Services Act and other selected legislation, but will be limited to those that are 
relevant to the topic.   However, it is important to note that statutory provisions that dealt with 
the enforcement of market abuse prohibition prior to 2004 will be discussed to trace the 
historical development of their enforcement.  For the purposes of references and comparative 
analysis, relevant provisions of other South African statutes will also be discussed.   
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Moreover, selected foreign legislation that deals with the enforcement of the market abuse 
prohibition from Australia, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the 
European Union will be referred to only for purposes of comparative study and drawing some 
lessons from their well established anti-market abuse enforcement frameworks.  For instance, 
the market abuse legislation of the United Kingdom and the European Union is somewhat 
similar to the Securities Services Act and will only be contrasted and/or referred to for 
comparative purposes and for drawing some relevant enforcement lessons from their 
experiences.  
 
1 11  Research Methodology 
 
For purposes of addressing the problems as highlighted and making appropriate 
recommendations to promote the effective enforcement of market abuse provisions in South 
Africa, the following research methods will be used: 
 
(a) Primary and Secondary Sources 
 
A number of libraries will be visited to access relevant books, case law, journals, statutes and 
other relevant materials.  This research will also refer to relevant websites for information.   
This is important and convenient because it provides the researcher with more access to the 
opinions of various renowned commentators and authors.  The dates referred to, are the dates 
on which the websites were accessed by the researcher. 
 
(b) Case Law and Court Decisions 
 
An examination and analysis of relevant case law and judicial precedents will be conducted. 
 
(c) Comparative Research Method  
 
This research will employ comparative studies between the South African anti-market abuse 
enforcement framework and that of selected countries that may have more effective 
enforcement structures in place, to learn from their experiences and for purposes of possible 
application in South Africa.  Therefore, comparative analysis of market abuse legislation from 
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the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the European Union and Australia will be 
carried out as earlier stated in paragraph 1 8.  
 
(d)  Analysis of Relevant Legislation and Statutes 
 
This research will focus on the Securities Services Act.  Other relevant statutes from South 
Africa and other selected countries will be referred to for purposes of historical and 
comparative analysis.  
 
(e)   Historical Analysis 
 
This method will be employed in Chapter Two of this thesis.  The main objective is to 
investigate the adequacy of the South African anti-market abuse enforcement framework prior 
to 2004 and to compare it with the current enforcement framework. 
 
2  Structure of the Thesis   
 
This thesis has ten chapters, including this chapter.124  
 
Chapter One deals with the general research context.  It outlines the aims, objectives, the 
statement of problem, the rationale of the study, specific matters to be investigated, general 
enforcement approaches to combat market abuse and the research methodology.  
 
Chapter Two provides a historical overview of the regulation of market abuse practices in 
South Africa.  
 
Chapter Three examines and provides an overview of the adequacy and effectiveness of the 
relevant role-players in the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in South Africa. 
 
Chapter Four discusses the problems associated with the ineffective enforcement of the 
market abuse prohibition in South Africa.  
124   It is important to note that for purposes of this thesis the researcher uses the masculine to refer also to the 
feminine. 
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Chapter Five provides a comparative perspective of the enforcement of the market abuse 
prohibition in the United States of America and South Africa. 
 
Chapter Six provides a comparative analysis of the enforcement of the market abuse 
prohibition in the European Union and South Africa.  
 
Chapter Seven provides a comparative analysis of the enforcement of the market abuse 
prohibition in the United Kingdom and South Africa.  
 
Chapter Eight gives a comparative analysis of the enforcement of the market abuse 
prohibition in Australia and South Africa.  
 
Chapter Nine provides an overall comparative evaluation and analysis of the enforcement of 
the market abuse prohibition in the European Union, the United Kingdom, Australia, the 
United States of America and South Africa.  
 
Chapter Ten provides some guidelines, conclusions and recommendations to improve the 
enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in South Africa.  
26 
CHAPTER TWO 
A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE REGULATION OF MARKET 
ABUSE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
2 1  Introduction 
 
The effects of market abuse have been felt in a number of financial markets globally.1  South 
Africa is not an exception.2  A reputation of high levels of market abuse practices associated 
with the South African financial markets in the mid 1990s is a case in point.3 
 
In an early attempt to combat market abuse practices in South African financial markets, 
legislation such as the Companies Act,4 the Financial Markets Control Act5 and the Stock 
Exchanges Control Act6 were enacted.  However, these Acts failed to effectively curb market 
abuse activities that were allegedly rife in the financial markets.7  As a result, in 1995 the 
Ministry of Finance appointed “The King Task Group into the Insider Trading Legislation”8 
which recommended further reforms of insider trading and other related laws.9  The Insider 
Trading Act10 was enacted and came into effect on 17 January 1999. 
 
1  Myburgh & Davis “The Impact of South Africa’s Insider Trading Regime: A Report for the Financial 
Services Board” (25-03-2004) 8 <http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 
09-02-2009); also see generally the analysis by Bhattacharya & Daouk “The World Price of Insider 
Trading” <http://www.faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~charvey/Teaching/BA453_2004/BD_The world.pdf> 
(accessed 19-06-2004).   See further analysis and discussion by Van Deventer “Anti-Market Abuse 
Legislation in South Africa” (10-06-2008) 1-5 <http://www.fsb.co.za/public/marketabuse/ 
FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 05-05-2009). 
2      Van Deventer (10-06-2008) 1-4 <http://www.fsb.co.za/public/marketabuse/FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 
05-05-2009); Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 8-13 <http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/ 
FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 09-02-2009).  
3      Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 11<http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 
09-02-2009).  
4      61 of 1973, hereinafter referred to as the Companies Act; see s 162 & s 229 to s 233. 
5      55 of 1989, hereinafter referred to as the Financial Markets Control Act; see s 20 to s 23. 
6      1 of 1985, hereinafter referred to as the Stock Exchanges Control Act; see s 40. 
7     Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 11<http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 
09-02-2009).  
8      Hereinafter referred to as “The King Task Group” and its report as “The King Report”. 
9      The King Task Group published its first draft report on 15 May 1997 and the final report on 21 October 
1997. 
10     135 of 1998; hereinafter referred to as the Insider Trading Act. 
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While the introduction of the Insider Trading Act brought some confidence in the financial 
markets, market abuse activities were still not extinguished.  The provisions of the Insider 
Trading Act were to some extent, inadequate and ineffectively implemented.11  A number of 
factors contributed to the enactment of the flawed provisions of the Insider Trading Act which 
were further ineffectively enforced.12  Such factors include inadequate resources, inadequate 
sanctions and the inherent difficult nature of investigating and prosecuting market abuse 
cases.13  The Securities Services Act14 was eventually enacted to repeal and replace all the 
flawed provisions of the Insider Trading Act and improve the regulation and enforcement of 
market abuse in South Africa.  Three major forms of market abuse, namely insider trading, 
prohibited trading practices (trade-based market manipulation) and the publication of false, 
misleading or deceptive statements relating to listed companies (disclosure-based market 
manipulation), are prohibited in South Africa.15 
 
Although the enactment of Insider Trading Act and the Securities Services Act could be seen 
as a good attempt on the part of the South African legislature to improve the general 
regulation of market abuse, more may still need to be done to increase the number of 
convictions and settlements in cases involving market abuse in South Africa.  It is against this 
background that a detailed analysis of the regulation of market abuse in South Africa would 
be carried out in this chapter.  The analysis and discussion on the regulation of market abuse 
is divided into three main parts.  Firstly, the historical development and regulation of market 
manipulation prior to 2004 will be examined.  Secondly, the regulation and enforcement of 
insider trading legislation prior to 2004 will be carefully discussed.  Lastly, an analysis of the 
11   Osode “The New South African Insider Trading Act: Sound Law Reform or Legislative Overkill?” 2000 
Journal of African Law 239 239.   
12    Jooste “A Critique of the Insider Trading Provisions of the 2004 Securities Services Act” 2006 SALJ 437 
441-460; Osode 2000 Journal of African Law 239; Van Deventer “New Watchdog for Insider Trading” 
1999 FSB Bulletin 3 3; the Minority Report on Insider Trading by The King Task Group into Insider 
Trading Legislation paragraph 3.4 as summarised in Beuthin & Luiz Beuthin`s Basic Company Law 
(2000) 235-238; also see generally Chitimira The Regulation of Insider Trading in South Africa: A 
Roadmap for an Effective, Competitive and Adequate Regulatory Statutory Framework LLM 
Dissertation, University of Fort Hare (2008)  41-72.   
13   Jooste 2006 SALJ 441-460; Beuthin & Luiz Beuthin`s Basic Company Law 235-238 & Osode 2000 
Journal of African Law 239.  
14     36 of 2004, hereinafter referred to as the Securities Services Act and it came into effect on 1 February 
2005. 
15    See s 73; s 75; s 76 & s 77 of the Securities Services Act; clauses 82; 84; 85; 86 & 87 of the Financial 
Markets Bill [B-2011], hereinafter referred to as the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 80; 82; 83 & 84 of 
the Financial Markets Bill [B12-2012], hereinafter referred to as the Financial Markets Bill 2012 (I have 
employed the term “clause” to refer to the provisions of both the Financial Markets Bill & the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012 because at the time of writing this chapter, the aforementioned Bills were not yet 
effectively passed into law).  
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effectiveness of the market abuse regulatory framework under the Securities Services Act will 
be carried out to find out whether it has managed to enhance market integrity and restore 
public investor confidence in the South African financial markets.  This will be done by 
cautiously discussing whether the market abuse legislation in South Africa is being properly 
enforced.16  In addition, this chapter will discuss other additional measures that can, where 
necessary, be incorporated into the current South African market abuse legislation to improve 
the implementation of its provisions.17 
 
2 2  The Regulation of Market Manipulation Prior to 2004 
 
In order to establish the historical background of the enforcement of market abuse in South 
Africa, a closer look at previous legislation that dealt with market abuse is necessary.18  This 
will be done by briefly examining the regulation of market manipulation under the Stock 
Exchanges Control Act and the Financial Markets Control Act.   
 
2 2 1  The Regulation of Market Manipulation in terms of the Stock Exchanges 
Control Act 1 of 1985 
 
Two forms of market abuse, namely prohibited trading practices (trade-based market 
manipulation) and the publication of false, misleading or deceptive statements (disclosure-
based market manipulation) relating to listed securities were prohibited in terms of the Stock 
Exchanges Control Act.19   
 
The enforcement responsibility was upon the Johannesburg Stock Exchange itself and the 
courts.20  Furthermore, the delayed publication of price-sensitive information relating to listed 
securities was arguably the most common form of disclosure-based market manipulation in 
16   See the discussion under paragraphs 2 4 & 2 5 of this chapter read with paragraph 3 2 7 in Chapter Three 
of this thesis.  
17    In spite of the paucity of convictions and settlements in civil and criminal cases involving market abuse, 
the legislature has relatively managed to improve and raise the South African financial markets up to a 
level that would make them more comparable to the highest standards of similar markets in the developed 
world and international best practice by enacting stricter definitions of market abuse practices and 
introducing civil and administrative sanctions.             
18    It should be borne in mind that prior to 2004 insider trading was regulated separately under the 
Companies Act and later under the Insider Trading Act while market manipulation was outlawed in the 
Stock Exchanges Control Act and the Financial Markets Control Act.    
19     See s 40. 
20    Henning & Du Toit “The Regulation of False Trading, Market Manipulation and Insider Trading” 2000 
Journal for Juridical Science 155 159.  
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South Africa.21  Publication of ambiguous information, tip-offs (tipping) and rumours also 
created another challenge for the enforcement authorities.22   
 
2 2 2  The Regulation of Market Manipulation in terms of the Financial Markets 
Control Act 55 of 1989 
 
The enactment of the Financial Markets Control Act was aimed at, among other things, 
curbing market manipulative practices that were allegedly common in option and term 
contracts transactions.23  Two forms of market abuse, namely trade-based market 
manipulation and the publication of false, misleading or deceptive statements (disclosure-
based market manipulation) relating to listed securities were prohibited under the Financial 
Markets Control Act.24  
 
Furthermore, the Financial Markets Control Act prohibited the dissemination or making of 
statements which a person knew or ought reasonably to have known that such statements were 
likely to induce other persons to deal in financial instruments or have the effect of altering the 
price for dealing in financial instruments.25  The Financial Markets Control Act prohibited the 
publication or non-publication of information which had the effect of inducing another person 
to deal in a financial instrument on a financial market.26  This was further complemented by 
the Companies Act, which prohibited the dissemination of false information in a prospectus.27 
 
Where the contravention of the relevant provisions of the Financial Markets Control Act 
caused another person to be prejudiced, a statutory action for damages was provided for under 
the same Act.28  For example, damages were calculated by looking at the difference between 
the price at which the dealing takes place and the price at which it would be likely to have 
taken place if the contravention had not occurred.29  Claimants were not required to prove that 
21     Henning & Du Toit 2000 Journal for Juridical Science 159. 
22  A few prosecutions especially in market manipulation cases involving option and term contracts share 
transactions were successfully concluded under the Stock Exchanges Control Act.  
23     See s 20 to s 23 of the Financial Markets Control Act. 
24     See s 20 of the Financial Markets Control Act. 
25     See s 21 of the Financial Markets Control Act.   Also see Henning & Du Toit 2000 Journal for Juridical 
Science 158.   
26    See s 22 of the Financial Markets Control Act. 
27     See s 162 of the Companies Act.  Also see Henning & Du Toit 2000 Journal for Juridical Science 159. 
28     See s 20 to s 23 of the Financial Markets Control Act. 
29     See s 23(2) of the Financial Markets Control Act. 
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the price had been altered by the offender’s misrepresentation or market manipulation.30  The 
Financial Markets Control Act further stipulated that prejudiced persons may claim twice the 
profit gained or likely to be gained or the loss avoided from the contravention of its market 
abuse provisions.31  Prejudiced persons had two years to institute a claim against any person 
who violated the relevant provisions of the Financial Markets Control Act.32  
 
In addition, the Registrar of Financial Institutions had the responsibility of instituting claims 
on the behalf of all the prejudiced persons.33   In order to get compensation in such instances, 
the burden of proof was on the claimant to prove that the loss he suffered was caused by the 
offender’s market manipulative actions.34 
 
2 2 3  Evaluation of the Enforcement of the Market Manipulation Prohibition under 
the Stock Exchanges Control Act and the Financial Markets Control Act   
 
Both the Stock Exchanges Control Act and the Financial Markets Control Act had little 
success in combating market manipulation in South Africa.35  A minimum number of 
settlements and prosecutions were achieved in civil and criminal cases involving market 
manipulation and other market abuse activities in South Africa prior to 2004.36   The paucity 
of successful settlements and prosecutions of market manipulation cases was allegedly caused 
by the failure on the part of the South African legislature to enact a more appropriate market 
abuse enforcement framework.37  Notably, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange’s enforcement 
responsibility was not clearly defined, especially in the Stock Exchanges Control Act.  The 
Stock Exchanges Control Act only stated that the Johannesburg Stock Exchange had the 
responsibility of policing market manipulation provisions without expressly and clearly 
30    See s 23(2) & (3) of the Financial Markets Control Act.   Also see generally Henning & Du Toit 2000 
Journal for Juridical Science 160.   
31     See s 23(3) of the Financial Markets Control Act. 
32     See s 23(4) of the Financial Markets Control Act. 
33     See s 23(5) of the Financial Markets Control Act. 
34     Henning & Du Toit 2000 Journal for Juridical Science 158-160, for further analysis and related 
comments. 
35     Henning & Du Toit 2000 Journal for Juridical Science 158-160. 
36     Henning & Du Toit 2000 Journal for Juridical Science 158-160. 
37     Henning & Du Toit 2000 Journal for Juridical Science 158-160, for further analysis and related 
comments. 
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defining its powers and functions.38  Furthermore, it is unclear whether the courts or the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange was solely responsible for the prosecution of market 
manipulation cases in South Africa.39   While it may be assumed that the courts were 
responsible for the prosecution of market manipulation cases, it is unclear whether the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange had similar prosecutorial powers, especially in criminal 
matters.  This follows the fact that the Johannesburg Stock Exchange was merely given the 
general powers to oversee the regulation and detection of the occurrence of market abuse 
activity in the regulated financial markets in South Africa.40  No express authority was 
statutorily conferred on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange itself to adjudicate and prosecute 
market manipulation cases in South Africa prior to 2004.41 
 
Although the penalties for committing market manipulation offences were not clearly 
stipulated in the Stock Exchanges Control Act and the Financial Markets Control Act, such 
offences could possibly have led to considerably high civil or criminal sanctions against 
offenders.  Both the Stock Exchanges Control Act and the Financial Markets Control Act 
overlooked the express provision of administrative or civil monetary penalties, an 
imprisonment term or any other appropriate penalties that could be imposed on unscrupulous 
persons who engaged in market manipulation practices in the South African financial markets 
prior to 2004.42  This ambiguity could have further contributed to the inconsistent 
enforcement of market manipulation provisions under the Stock Exchanges Control Act and 
the Financial Markets Control Act.43  
 
The Stock Exchanges Control Act and the Financial Markets Control Act did not provide 
adequate measures and mechanisms for effective detection, investigation, prosecution and 
prevention of market manipulation in the South African financial markets.  The Stock 
Exchange was solely responsible for the detection of market manipulation activities in the 
South African financial markets.44  Other enforcement authorities like the courts and the 
38   Also see further Henning & Du Toit 2000 Journal for Juridical Science 159; Van Zyl “Aspekte van 
Beleggersbeskerming in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg” 1992 Transactions of the Center for Business Law 231 
231. 
39     Henning & Du Toit 2000 Journal for Juridical Science 159. 
40     Henning & Du Toit 2000 Journal for Juridical Science 159, for related concerns and criticisms. 
41     Henning & Du Toit 2000 Journal for Juridical Science 158-160, for further discussion. 
42     Henning & Du Toit 2000 Journal for Juridical Science 158-165, for related concerns and criticisms. 
43     Henning & Du Toit 2000 Journal for Juridical Science 158-165, for similar comments. 
44     Henning & Du Toit 2000 Journal for Juridical Science 158-165.    
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Directorate of Public Prosecutions were probably less co-operative or not involved in the 
primary investigation, detection and prevention of market manipulation practices in the South 
African financial markets prior to 2004.45  Moreover, the Stock Exchanges Control Act and 
the Financial Markets Control Act did not expressly provide for the establishment of a 
surveillance system and other methods such as arbitration and alternative dispute resolution, 
whistle-blowing and bounty rewards to enhance the detection and investigation of market 
manipulation in the financial markets. 
 
It appears as if the market manipulation prohibition under the Stock Exchanges Control Act 
and the Financial Markets Control Act did not have extra-territorial application.46   
Furthermore, it is unclear whether there were any co-operation agreements between the South 
African enforcement authorities and similar authorities at an international level to combat 
cross-border market abuse activities prior to 2004.   
 
2 3  The Regulation of Insider Trading Prior to 2004 
 
The insider trading enforcement framework established under the Companies Act (including 
all its amendments)47 and the Insider Trading Act will be examined below to explore how 
their regulatory and enforcement frameworks were implemented.    However, it is not 
intended for this sub-heading to discuss all the provisions of these Acts in detail.  The focus 
will be on the provisions that dealt with the regulation and enforcement of the insider trading 
ban under the mentioned statutes.  
 
2 3 1 The Regulation of Insider Trading in terms of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 
before its 1989 and 1990 Amendments 
 
It is generally agreed that the regulation of insider trading was only introduced by the relevant 
provisions of the Companies Act.48  The enactment of these provisions was done in 
accordance with the recommendations of the Van Wyk de Vries Commission of Inquiry into 
45   Henning & Du Toit 2000 Journal for Juridical Science 158-165. 
46     See s 40 of the Stock Exchanges Control Act; also see s 20 to s 23 of the Financial Markets Control Act.    
47    The Companies Act was amended by the Companies Amendment Act 78 of 1989 and the Second 
Companies Amendment Act 69 of 1990.    
48    See s 224 & s 229 to s 233.  Also see further Jooste “Insider Trading: A New Clamp-Down” 1991 BML 
248 248; the Explanatory Memorandum to the Objects of the Companies Second Amendment Bill of 1990 
B 119-90 (GA); Botha “Control of Insider Trading: A Comparative Analysis” 1991 SA Merc LJ 1 4. 
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the Companies Act of 1973.49  The relevant provisions of the Companies Act will be briefly 
outlined, with the emphasis on those that directly and expressly outlawed the practice of 
insider trading.50 
 
Some of the provisions of the Companies Act were enacted to enhance the enforcement of its 
insider trading prohibition by precluding directors, officers and other employees from dealing 
in a company’s shares before the inside information relating to such shares was made 
public.51  Directors and certain officers were prohibited from dealing in share and debenture 
options of the company or any associated company.52 
 
A number of definitions were introduced for the purposes of enforcing the insider trading and 
other related provisions of the Companies Act.53   The term “interest” was defined to include 
any right to subscribe for, or any right to any shares or debentures or any option in respect of 
shares or debentures, without derogating from the generality of the word.   The term “officer” 
included any employee who would be in possession of any information consequent to his 
immediate relationship with directors immediately before public announcement of that 
information under the general insider trading provision.54  The use of the phrase “includes” 
suggests that these definitions were not exhaustive.55   The definitions of “past director” and 
“person” respectively had the effect of extending the general insider trading provisions56 to 
persons according to whose instructions directors would normally act and to past directors for 
a period of six months after they had ceased to be directors.  “Shares and debentures of the 
company” included shares and debentures of companies in the same group. 
49    For the purposes of this thesis the Commission is hereinafter referred to as the “Van Wyk de Vries 
Commission” and its main report as “Van Wyk de Vries Report”.  See Van Wyk de Vries Report 
paragraphs 44.49 & 44.57. 
50    S 224 & s 229 to s 232 will be briefly discussed while more emphasis will be focused on s 233 which 
generally provided for the regulation of insider trading in South Africa under the Companies Act.    The 
analysis of all the provisions of the Companies Act is, however, beyond the scope of this thesis.   
51    S 224 & s 229 to s 232 which were enacted in a bid to improve the enforcement of the insider trading 
prohibition that was contained in s 233 of the Companies Act.    Also see Botha 1991 SA Merc LJ 5.   
52    See s 224 of the Companies Act. 
53    See further s 229 of the Companies Act which contained several definitions for the purposes of enforcing 
s 230 to s 233 of the same Act.  
54     See s 233 of the Companies Act. 
55    The term “interest” may for instance also cover the interest of beneficiaries under a trust to receive 
dividends or which a trustee, executor or guardian might have had in those capacities, in a company’s 
shares.  Likewise, the term “officer” was wider than the definition in s 1of the Companies Act in the sense 
that it could include other employees who did not occupy executive positions.  Also see Milne, Nathan, 
Lamont Smith & Meskin Henochsberg on the Companies Act (1975) 404-405. 
56     See s 230 to s 233 of the Companies Act. 
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Every public company was required to keep a special register of interests of directors and 
others in shares and debentures of the company.57  Failure to comply with any of these 
provisions was a criminal offence.58  
 
Directors, past directors, officers and certain persons were obliged to lodge with the company 
within a specified period a written notice regarding changes in any material interest in their 
shareholding in the company concerned.59  In other words, directors were required, as soon as 
they acquired knowledge of the non-public inside information, to determine forthwith by 
resolution, names of officers taken to be in possession of that information.60 
 
Every director, past director, officer or any person who had knowledge of inside information 
concerning a transaction or proposed transaction or the affairs of the company, which, if it 
would become publicly known, could be expected to materially affect the price of the shares 
or debentures, shall be guilty of an offence if he would deal in any way to his advantage, 
directly or indirectly, in such shares or debentures before public announcement of such 
information on a stock exchange or in a newspaper or through medium of the radio or 
television.61  The Companies Act specifically prohibited insider trading in relation to listed 
shares.62  Insider trading was merely treated as a criminal offence which could be committed 
by a director, officer or employee of the company or a person in accordance with whose 
instructions, any director was accustomed to act.   
 
2 3 1 1 Evaluation of the Enforcement of the Insider Trading Prohibition under the 
Companies Act 61 of 1973 before its 1989 and 1990 Amendments 
 
The enforcement of the insider trading prohibition was probably a co-operative responsibility 
of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, the Registrar of Companies under the jurisdiction of the 
Department of Trade and Industry, and the Department of Justice (Attorney-General’s 
57     See s 230(1); (2) & (3) of the Companies Act. 
58     See s 231(2) of the Companies Act; see further s 230(4) & s 232 (3) of the same Act. 
59   See s 232(1)(b) & (c) read with s 230(2) of the Companies Act.   See also subsection (1)(a) that provided 
for particulars relating to non public inside information at the time the Act came into operation. 
60     See s 232(1)(d) & (2) of the Companies Act.   
61     See s 233of the Companies Act.   
62    The term “insider trading” was only used in relation to securities listed on a regulated market and it 
applied only to directors or officers of a company.  Moreover, the concept of “insider trading” was not 
defined under the Companies Act.  See s 233 of the Companies Act.    
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Office).63  The Johannesburg Stock Exchange was primarily responsible for monitoring and 
detecting the occurrence of insider trading.  The Johannesburg Stock Exchange was further 
mandated to monitor all trading and request dealing returns from brokers when suspected 
insider trading activities were detected.  In addition, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange was 
required to submit such dealing returns to the Registrar of Companies when suspected insider 
trading activities were confirmed by the preliminary investigation.64  Furthermore, the 
Registrar of Companies was responsible for further analysis of the relevant data and for 
referring such data to the Attorney-General’s Office.  
 
In addition, the Attorney-General’s Office was responsible for the prosecution of insider 
trading cases.65  However, no successful prosecutions of insider trading cases were brought 
under the Companies Act.66  This could have been caused in part by serious flaws that were 
embedded in its initial insider trading provisions.67  For example, key terms like “insider”, 
“tippee” and “tipping” were not statutorily and expressly defined under the Companies Act.  
Moreover, proving that the accused was a person falling under one of the categories of 
insiders as was proscribed in the Companies Act was difficult and the onus was on the 
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the person accused was aware of the fact 
that the information he possessed was non-public confidential information.  This may have 
been extremely difficult to prove and could have impeded the successful prosecution of 
insider trading cases.  Besides, the criminal penalties for insider trading68 were not sufficient 
to deter potential offenders, considering the enormous profits that an insider could make from 
such transactions.69  In light of this, a provision for civil liability could have been an 
additional deterrent to potential offenders and a meaningful remedy to victims of insider 
trading.  Nonetheless, no provision was made for directors or other insiders to pay civil 
monetary fines or compensate shareholders, if, for example, such shareholders had sold their 
63     See generally s 224; s 230 to s 233 & s 440 to s 441of the Companies Act.  Also see Botha 1991 SA Merc 
LJ 5-7. 
64     See further s 224; s 230 to s 233 & s 440 to s 441of the Companies Act. 
65     See further s 230 to s 233 & s 440 to s 441of the Companies Act.  Also see Botha 1991 SA Merc LJ 5. 
66     The provisions of s 233 came into operation on 1 January 1974.  Also see Botha 1991 SA Merc LJ 5-6. 
67     See s 233 & s 441of the Companies Act. 
68      There were no civil penalties for insider trading.   See s 441(1)(b) of the Companies Act.  
69      Botha 1991 SA Merc LJ 5.   
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shares to the directors ignorant of the fact that they might suffer prejudice due to insider 
trading.70  
 
Professors Bhana and Botha submit that these shortcomings hindered the general 
enforcement, detection, investigation and prosecution of insider trading cases in South Africa, 
especially under the Companies Act.71  As a result, some unscrupulous directors and 
employees of companies could have enjoyed an unfair advantage over other persons who 
were denied the opportunity to compete fairly in the buying and selling of shares.72 
 
2 3 2 The Regulation of Insider Trading in terms of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 
Subsequent to the 1989 Amendments 
 
The original insider trading provision had several flaws.73  As a result it was repealed and 
replaced by a new provision in terms of the Companies Amendment Act.74  A chapter that 
dealt with the regulation of securities was added to the Companies Act.75  Section 440F 
formed part of this chapter and contained a prohibition of insider trading in very wide terms.  
A director, past director or any other person connected with a company who had knowledge 
of any information which, when published, was likely to affect the price of such securities, 
would be guilty of an offence if he would deal in such securities within 24 hours after the 
public announcement of that information on a stock exchange, or in a newspaper or television, 
or by other means.76  Thus, tippees would incur the same liability if they were to deal on the 
basis of the information received from any of the persons referred to in subsection (2)(a), at 
any time when the tipper was  not allowed to deal.77   
 
70    See related views and comments in Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch 421, were it was inter alia argued that 
directors do not owe any common law fiduciary duties to individual shareholders hence such shareholders 
will not sue them for insider trading; Pretorius and Another v Natal South Sea Investment Trust 1965 3 
410 (W) 417 for further discussion on insider trading enforcement in South Africa prior to 2004. 
71     Bhana “Take-Over Announcements and Insider Trading Activity on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange” 
1987 South African Journal of Business Management 198 201; Botha 1991 SA Merc LJ 6. 
72    Osode “The Regulation of Insider Trading in South Africa: A Public Choice Perspective” 1999 African 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 688 694-695. 
73      See s 233 of the Companies Act. 
74      78 of 1989.  See s 6 of the Companies Amendment Act 78 of 1989. 
75      Chapter XVA “Regulation of Securities”.    
76      Also see s 440F (2)(a) of the Companies Amendment Act 78 of 1989.     
77      See s 440F (2)(b) of the Companies Amendment Act 78 of 1989.       
37 
                                               
Nevertheless, the insider trading provisions of the Companies Amendment Act78 in their 
original form repeated some of the flaws that were discussed in relation to the initial insider 
trading prohibition that was contained in the Companies Act.79  It came under fire for having 
largely adopted American principles on insider trading without proper regard to the South 
African circumstances.80 
 
2 3 2 1 The Purported Enforcement Framework for Insider Trading under the 
Companies Act 61 of 1973 Subsequent to the 1989 Amendments 
 
The Companies Amendment Act81 introduced the Securities Regulation Panel as a regulatory 
body that was required to monitor and enforce the insider trading prohibition.82  Eventually, 
the Securities Regulation Panel had powers to police insider trading by supervising dealings 
in securities.83  The Securities Regulation Panel further had powers to subpoena and 
interrogate any persons accused of insider trading.84  Additionally, certain persons were 
required to disclose to the Securities Regulation Panel any information regarding their 
beneficial holding of securities.85  Put differently, the Securities Regulation Panel was inter 
alia entrusted with the main responsibility of monitoring and investigating insider trading 
activities in South Africa prior to 1998.86  This was clearly stated in the Memorandum on the 
Objects of the Companies Second Amendment Bill of 1989.87  
 
Consequently, the maximum sentence was considerably increased.  Persons convicted of 
insider trading were liable to pay the relevant enforcement authorities a fine of R500 000, or 
to be imprisoned for a period not exceeding ten years, or both.  Notwithstanding the efforts on 
the part of the legislature to outlaw insider trading, the provisions of the Companies 
Amendment Act 78 of 1989 were still seriously flawed.  As a result, the insider trading 
78      78 of 1989; see the original s 440F of the Companies Amendment Act 78 of 1989. 
79      See s 233 of the Companies Act. 
80     Botha 1991 SA Merc LJ 7-11; also see generally Bhana 1987 South African Journal of Business 
Management 201-202 & Osode 1999 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 690-695.   
81     78 of 1989. 
82     See s 440B of the Companies Amendment Act 78 of 1989. 
83     See s 440C(1)(b) of the Companies Amendment Act 78 of 1989. 
84     See s 440D of the Companies Amendment Act 78 of 1989; also see further s 440C(6)(c) of the same Act.  
85     See s 440G of the Companies Amendment Act 78 of 1989. 
86     Botha 1991 SA Merc LJ 7; also see further Osode 1999 African Journal of International and Comparative 
Law 690-695.   
87     [B 99-89 (GA)]. 
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prohibition under the Companies Amendment Act88 never came into operation and will 
therefore not be discussed in detail.   It was replaced by a new insider trading prohibition that 
was introduced in terms of the Second Companies Amendment Act.89 
 
2 3 3 The Regulation of Insider Trading in terms of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 
Subsequent to the 1990 Amendments  
 
Due to fears that the insider trading ban under the Companies Amendment Act90 was not good 
enough, the Second Companies Amendment Act91 extensively revised the provisions that 
dealt with insider trading and introduced a number of innovations.92  The prohibition on 
insider trading was expressly made applicable to all dealings in securities.  The term 
“securities” was defined to include company shares as well as stock debentures convertible 
into shares and any rights or interests in a company or rights or interests in respect of any such 
shares, stock or debentures including any financial instruments as defined in the Financial 
Markets Control Act.93  This definition was still limited to securities in a company or 
financial instruments as stated.94 Insider trading in relation to interests in other entities, 
including government and semi-government stock, was therefore not expressly prohibited.95   
However, the Minister could, on the advice of the Securities Regulation Panel and by notice 
in the Government Gazette, exempt certain classes of persons from the insider trading 
provisions.96  
 
The provisions of the Second Companies Amendment Act97 were, inter alia, targeted at 
correcting the shortcomings of the Companies Amendment Act.98   This was enumerated in 
the Memorandum on the Objects of the Companies Second Amendment Bill of 1990.99    
88     78 of 1989. 
89     69 of 1990; see the revised s 440F of the Second Companies Amendment Act 69 of 1990. 
90     78 of 1989. 
91     69 of 1990. 
92     See the revised s 440F of the Second Companies Amendment Act 69 of 1990. 
93     See the definition of “security” in s 440A (1) of the Second Companies Amendment Act 69 of 1990. 
94   The term “company” in this context entailed entities registered or recognised in terms of the Companies 
Act.   See s 1 to 3 of the Companies Act.  
95     Luiz “Prohibition Against Trading on Inside Information–The Saga Continues” 1990 SA Merc LJ 328 
328.  
96     See s 440F (5) and (6) of the Second Companies Amendment Act 69 of 1990. 
97     69 of 1990. 
98     78 of 1989. 
99     [B 119-90 (GA)].   See further Botha 1991 SA Merc LJ 11. 
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Therefore, any person who would knowingly deal directly or indirectly in a security on the 
basis of unpublished price-sensitive information100 in respect of that security would be guilty 
of an offence if he knew that such information had been obtained:    
 
(a) by virtue of a relationship of trust or any contractual relationship, irrespective of 
whether or not the person concerned was a party to that relationship; or  
 
(b) through espionage, theft, bribery, fraud, misrepresentation or any other wrongful 
method, irrespective of the nature thereof.101 
 
This clearly suggested that insiders and their tippees were prohibited from dealing in 
securities on the basis of unpublished price-sensitive information.102  This can be regarded as 
a positive development. 
 
Moreover, unpublished price-sensitive information was defined as information which:   
   
(a) related to matters of internal affairs of a company, or to its operations, assets, earning 
power or involvement as offeror or offeree company in an affected transaction; or 
 
(b) was not generally available to the reasonable investor; or 
 
(c) would reasonably be expected to materially affect the price of such securities if it 
were generally available.103 
 
Seemingly, the term “generally available”104 meant available in the sense that such steps had 
been taken, and such time had elapsed, that it could reasonably be expected that the 
100    Information other than financial data that could also lead to insider trading was not considered.    
Examples may include the incompetence and resignation of a company’s directors.   Such information 
may arguably not be treated as inside information in terms of the Companies Act but it may still have a 
material effect on the price of securities or financial instruments if investors withdraw their investments in 
the company concerned. Generally see Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 8 <http://www.genesis-
analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 09-02-2009); also see Van Deventer (10-06-2008) 1-5 
<http://www.fsb.co.za/public/marketabuse/FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 05-05-2009) for further discussion 
and related analysis. 
101    S 440F(1) of the Second Companies Amendment Act 69 of 1990. 
102    Botha 1991 SA Merc LJ 12. 
103    S 440F(2) of the Second Companies Amendment Act 69 of 1990. 
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information in question should have been known to the reasonable investor in the relevant 
markets.105 
 
2 3 3 1 The Enforcement of the Insider Trading Prohibition in terms of the Companies 
Act 61 of 1973 Subsequent to the 1990 Amendments  
 
The enforcement of the insider trading ban was now a joint responsibility of the Securities 
Regulation Panel, the Registrar of Companies and the Department of Justice.   As indicated 
earlier,106 the Securities Regulation Panel was responsible for investigating and policing 
insider trading provisions.  Its functions included the supervision of dealings in securities and 
exercising control over insider trading.  In another attempt to improve the enforcement, the 
Securities Regulation Panel was again given powers to subpoena and to further interrogate 
witnesses and impose an obligation on certain persons to disclose to the Securities Regulation 
Panel information relating to their beneficial dealing in securities.  This was done by 
requesting companies to disclose all the details of the amount of equity securities of which a 
person was a beneficial owner.107  It was also responsible for ensuring that persons who suffer 
harm due to insider trading have a fair platform to lodge their complaints so that they have 
proper access to a civil remedy.   Nonetheless, there was no provision for victims to claim 
compensation directly from persons who were convicted of insider trading (private rights of 
action).  
 
Two presumptions were introduced to assist the enforcement and prosecuting authorities in 
obtaining convictions in matters involving insider trading.108  Firstly, if it was proved that the 
accused, at the time of the alleged dealing, was in possession of unpublished price-sensitive 
information in respect of the relevant securities, it would be deemed, unless the contrary is 
proved, that the accused had knowingly dealt in those securities on the basis of such 
information.  Secondly, if proved that the unpublished price-sensitive information was 
obtained in a manner as stated earlier in the relevant provisions of the Second Companies 
104    See s 140A(3) of the Companies Act as introduced in terms of the Companies Amendment Act 37 of 
1999; also see explanatory remarks on disclosure requirements in Government Gazette (18868) 8 May 
1998. 
105    S 440F(2)(b) of the Second Companies Amendment Act 69 of 1990. 
106    See paragraph 2 3 2 1 above. 
107   S 440B of the Second Companies Amendment Act 69 of 1990; also see s 140A (3) introduced in terms of 
the Companies Amendment Act 37 of 1999.  
108    S 440F(3) of the Second Companies Amendment Act 69 of 1990. 
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Amendment Act,109 the accused was deemed to have known that the information had been so 
obtained, unless the accused could prove the contrary.110 
 
The maximum sentence for insider trading was a fine of R500 000, or imprisonment for a 
period of ten years, or both.  In spite of these significant changes, the enforcement of insider 
trading remained problematic in that no person was convicted for insider trading under the 
Second Companies Amendment Act.111   Moreover, the Securities Regulation Panel did not 
have its own surveillance preventative measures to assist in the detection of suspected insider 
trading activities and it further lacked authority to impose civil penalties that could have 
increased settlements in civil cases of insider trading.112  One could still raise some concerns 
as to whether there was sufficient co-operation between the Securities Regulation Panel, the 
Registrar of Companies and the Department of Justice in relation to the enforcement of the 
insider trading prohibition.    
 
2 3 4 The Regulation of Insider Trading in terms of the Insider Trading Act 135 of 
1998 
 
A novel regime aimed at resolving the tenacious insider trading problem in South Africa was 
introduced by the Insider Trading Act.113  The Insider Trading Act repealed and replaced the 
relevant provisions of the Companies Act in an effort to broaden the scope of the insider 
trading prohibition.   In addition to treating insider trading as a criminal offence, an attempt 
was made to provide more appropriate civil remedies to those who would suffer prejudice as a 
result of insider trading activities.   Furthermore, more severe criminal sanctions were 
introduced and the insider trading ban was extended to a wide spectrum of financial 
instruments other than securities of companies.114  The provisions of the Insider Trading Act, 
enforcement methods and the role of the enforcement authorities will be analysed below.   
This analysis is divided into four parts.  Firstly, the provisions that relate to the key concepts 
of the insider trading prohibition will be briefly discussed.  Secondly, the provisions that deal 
with the enforcement of the insider trading sanctions and penalties will be examined.  Thirdly, 
109     69 of 1990. 
110      S 440F(1)(a) or (b) of the Second Companies Amendment Act 69 of 1990. 
111      69 of 1990. 
112      Botha 1991 SA Merc LJ 18.   
113      Benade, Du Plessis, Delport, De Koker & Pretorius Entrepreneurial Law (2003) 130. 
114     Osode 2000 Journal of African Law 239-248.  
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a closer look at the roles of the enforcement authorities will be carried out.   Lastly, the 
enforcement methods adopted under the Insider Trading Act will be discussed. 
 
2 3 4 1 The Definition of Selected Key Terms and Concepts under the Insider Trading 
Act 135 of 1998 
 
The term “insider” was defined as an individual who has inside information through being a 
director, employee or shareholder of an issuer of securities or financial instruments to which 
the inside information relates or having access to such information by virtue of his 
employment, office or profession or where such individual knew that the direct or indirect 
source of the inside information was a director, employee or shareholder as contemplated in 
the Insider Trading Act.115  
 
Two categories of insiders were therefore contemplated under the Insider Trading Act.   
Firstly, there were primary insiders such as the directors, employees or shareholders of an 
issuer of securities or financial instruments to which the inside information relates, and which 
may include fortuitous insiders or individuals who have access to the inside information by 
virtue of their employment, office or profession but who are not officers or employees of the 
company itself.116  Secondly, there were secondary insiders or tippees, being individuals who 
know that the direct or indirect source of their inside information is a primary insider.   
 
The focus in the definition on individuals as insiders clearly implies the exclusion of juristic 
persons.  In this context the scope of the definition is too limited.117  Individuals can easily 
involve themselves in insider trading activities through juristic persons under their control 
without their entities or companies incurring any liability.   The exclusion of companies and 
other juristic persons from the definition of an “insider” can therefore be regarded as a serious 
flaw that was contained in the Insider Trading Act and a major compromise on the part of the 
legislature.  
 
115     S 1of the Insider Trading Act. 
116    In this regard, the pool of individuals who could become insiders was now large and included not only 
directors, employees and advisors but also many others, like advertising and production professionals 
engaged to compile and publish inside information for printing.   
117      Osode 2000 Journal of African Law 239-248; generally see Jooste 2006 SALJ 438-441. 
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Inside information was defined as specific or precise information which has not been made 
public and which is obtained or learned by an individual as an insider and which, if it were 
made public, would be likely to have a material effect on the price or value of any securities 
or financial instruments.118   
 
Only accurate and factual non-public inside information would fall in the ambit of the 
definition.119 Information therefore had to meet four requirements to qualify as inside 
information in terms of the Insider Trading Act.   Firstly, the information was required to be 
factually specific or precise. Inaccurate and any unconfirmed information, speculation about 
whether information might be true, rumours or promises were excluded.   Trading on the basis 
of rumours or speculation about the value of securities or financial instruments could, 
however, still occur and harm ignorant outsiders.   The terms “specific” or “precise” were not 
defined and it was left to the courts to determine what would constitute specific or precise 
information. Although it can be assumed that all persons should have a broad understanding 
of the general meaning of these terms, everybody might not appreciate the degree of 
specificity or precision required for information to qualify.  This obscurity could have offered 
other persons an opportunity to engage in insider trading practices without incurring liability.   
 
Secondly, the inside information must have been information which was only obtained from 
an insider.   Instances where the information originated from sources other than the insiders 
were therefore not expressly included in the definition.   This exclusion might also have left 
room for abuse.  Whatever the situation, the fact remains that price-sensitive information that 
is leaked unintentionally by insiders was not covered by the definition and could still be used 
by other persons to indulge in insider trading activities.   
 
Thirdly, the information must not have been made public as superficially stipulated in the 
Insider Trading Act.120  The term “publication” was not statutorily defined, but a number of 
ways in which the non-public inside information was deemed to have been published were 
enumerated.121  Lastly, the non-public inside information was required to be likely to have a 
118     S 1of the Insider Trading Act. 
119      Osode 2000 Journal of African Law 248. 
120     S 3 of the Insider Trading Act. 
121     S 3 of the Insider Trading Act 
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material effect on the price or value of the securities122 or financial instruments123 after having 
been made public.   Nonetheless, the term “material effect” was not defined.   Moreover, 
although some of the elements of the insider trading offence were merely stated, the concept 
of “insider trading” was not statutorily and expressly defined under the Insider Trading Act.   
It could be argued that the failure of the Insider Trading Act to provide adequate definitions of 
these and other terms contributed to the inconsistent enforcement of its provisions. 
 
2 3 4 2 The Selected Key Elements of the Insider Trading Offence under the Insider 
Trading Act 135 of 1998 
 
Actual dealing in securities or financial instruments for making a profit or avoiding a loss for 
oneself as well as for any other person was prohibited.124   Individuals were only liable if they 
knew that they had inside information.  Therefore, knowledge was a prerequisite for criminal 
liability under the Insider Trading Act.125  Consequently, it was very difficult for the 
prosecuting authorities to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was aware that he 
was in possession of inside information.126  Seemingly circumstantial evidence would not 
suffice for the purposes of the insider trading offence under the Insider Trading Act.127  This 
might explain why very little or no success was achieved in the enforcement of the criminal 
sanctions especially under the Insider Trading Act.128  
 
Encouraging or discouraging (tipping) another person to deal or from dealing in securities or 
financial instruments was prohibited.129   Nonetheless, what constituted illegal conduct or 
tipping on the part of the insider was not distinctly and expressly stated.130  Apparently, it was 
122     See the definition in s 1 of the Insider Trading Act. 
123     See the definition in s 1 of the Insider Trading Act. 
124     S 2(1)(a) of the Insider Trading Act. 
125     S 2(1)(a) of the Insider Trading Act. 
126     Chanetsa “Insider Trading is Notoriously Hard to Prosecute” Business Report (2004-04-26). 
127    Osode 2000 Journal of African Law 248 for a generally related discussion. 
128   During the period between January 1999 and January 2002, 28 cases of insider trading were investigated. 
Only 22 cases were successfully settled for civil penalties and no convictions were obtained in the other 
six criminal cases. This information was obtained from an interview that was conducted at the Financial 
Services Board by the researcher, with Mr Gerhard van Deventer (the Executive Director of the 
Directorate of Market Abuse or the DMA) on 05 May 2009.  
129   This prohibition was aimed at discouraging persons who were privy to non public price-sensitive 
information to incite others to deal or to refrain from dealing in securities or financial instruments to the 
detriment of innocent (outside) investors who were at an informational disadvantage.   See further s 
2(1)(b) of the Insider Trading Act. 
130    S 2(1)(b) of the Insider Trading Act. 
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immaterial for purposes of incurring liability whether the tippee had actually acted on the tip 
or whether the insider involved had made a profit or avoided a loss.    
 
Improper disclosure of non-public price-sensitive information was further outlawed.131  The 
use of the term “individual”132 once again implied the exclusion of juristic persons and a 
natural person could only be guilty of the offence if he was fully aware that he was in 
possession of inside information and failed to prove any of the defences that were provided.133  
Ostensibly, mere disclosure of information by a person who knew that it was inside 
information was sufficient to constitute an offence in terms of the section, irrespective of 
whether it was acted upon or not.  However, the prohibition did not extend to innocent 
disclosure by an individual who was ignorant of the fact that the information had not yet been 
made public.    For example, an uneducated individual who was simply employed to clean up 
the company’s offices (a cleaner in a company) who overheard the directors celebrating the 
company’s good financial results while performing his duties and later innocently and 
ignorantly disclosed that information to his friend who then purchased shares on the basis 
thereof, could not be convicted under Insider Trading Act.134 
 
Civil liability could be incurred by any person who dealt in securities or financial instruments 
for his own account.135  Such person could be ordered to pay to the Financial Services Board 
an amount as provided for in the civil provisions of the Insider Trading Act.136   This enabled 
the Financial Services Board to assist prejudiced persons to be compensated by individuals 
who practised insider trading for their own benefit.  Nevertheless, the onus of proof was on 
the Financial Services Board to prove on a balance of probabilities that the defendant 
knowingly dealt directly or indirectly in the affected securities or financial instruments for his 
own account.137  
 
131    S 2(2) of the Insider Trading Act. 
132    S 2(2) of the Insider Trading Act. 
133    S 4(2) of the Insider Trading Act. 
134    S 5 of the Insider Trading Act. 
135    S 6(1)(a) of the Insider Trading Act.  
136    S 6(4) of the Insider Trading Act. 
137    S 6(1)(a) of the Insider Trading Act. 
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Any individual who knew that he had inside information and dealt in the affected securities or 
financial instruments to gain a profit or avoid a loss through such dealing138 could be ordered 
to pay to the Financial Services Board an amount as provided for in the relevant provisions of 
the Insider Trading Act.139  Additionally, civil penalties for the improper disclosure of price-
sensitive information could be imposed on an individual who knowingly disclosed that 
information to other persons140 and failed to prove on a balance of probabilities any one of the 
stipulated defences or any other defence available to him.141 
 
Civil liability for encouraging or causing another person to deal in securities or financial 
instruments was further discouraged under the Insider Trading Act.142  Furthermore, civil 
liability could be incurred by any person who dealt in securities or financial instruments for 
another person’s account.143   Accordingly, any person who entered into any unlawful dealing 
on behalf of any other person could therefore incur civil liability jointly and severally with 
that person irrespective of their relationship.144   
 
2 3 4 3 The Enforcement of the Insider Trading Prohibition under the Insider Trading 
Act 135 of 1998 
 
The contravention of the provisions of the Insider Trading Act attracted criminal and civil 
sanctions.145   Likewise, the Financial Services Board, courts, the Insider Trading Directorate 
and the Directorate of Public Prosecutions were entrusted with responsibility to jointly 
enforce these provisions.146  Precisely, the Financial Services Board was given wide powers 
to monitor and enforce the insider trading prohibition.147   
 
138    S 6(1)(b) of the Insider Trading Act. 
139   S 6(4)(a) of the Insider Trading Act.   Also see Van Deventer 1999 FSB Bulletin 3 for more discussion on 
the role of the Financial Services Board. 
140    S 6(2)(a) of the Insider Trading Act. 
141    S 6(4)(a) of the Insider Trading Act. 
142    S 6(2)(b) of the Insider Trading Act. 
143    S 6(2)(c) of the Insider Trading Act. 
144    S 6(2)(c) of the Insider Trading Act. 
145    S 2 & s 6 of the Insider Trading Act. 
146    Generally see Osode 2000 Journal of African Law 239-248. 
147    S 11(1) & (2)(a) to (i) & subsections (3) to (11) of the Insider Trading Act. 
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Additionally, the Insider Trading Directorate was, as a committee of the Financial Services 
Board, responsible for exercising all the powers of the Financial Services Board.148   It also 
had powers to decide whether to take civil action or to refer criminal matters to the 
Directorate of Public Prosecutions or the courts.  The Insider Trading Directorate could also 
institute a prosecution when the Directorate of Public Prosecutions or the courts neglected to 
prosecute any alleged insider trading case.149   The Insider Trading Directorate was further 
entitled to withdraw, abandon or compromise any civil proceedings in terms of the Insider 
Trading Act.150  The Insider Trading Directorate was nevertheless limited and it relied heavily 
on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange Limited’s151 Surveillance Department, for the tracking 
and detection of insider trading activities.   
 
Individuals convicted of any insider trading offence could be sentenced to pay the Financial 
Services Board a fine not exceeding R2 million, or imprisonment for a period not exceeding 
ten years, or both such fine and such imprisonment.152  Be that as it may, the enforcement of 
the provisions of the Insider Trading Act was still difficult in that only a few civil settlements 
and criminal convictions were successfully obtained.153  The R2 million fine and the ten years 
term of imprisonment were yet again not sufficient to deter persons from getting involved in 
insider trading activities.154   Furthermore, the courts and the Directorate of Public 
Prosecutions did not have the capacity to conduct effective and timeous prosecutions. 
Although the Financial Services Board was empowered in terms of the Insider Trading Act to 
regulate insider trading, the prosecuting function was mainly vested in the courts.   Besides, 
the everlasting backlog in our criminal courts might also have delayed criminal prosecutions 
for insider trading and in spite of the fact that South Africa was among the first countries to 
introduce civil remedies,155 the flaws in the civil provisions could have undermined the 
successful enforcement of the civil sanctions.156 
148    S 12 of the Insider Trading Act. 
149   See s 11(10) of the Insider Trading Act.   Also see Luiz “Insider Trading Regulation – If at First You 
Don’t Succeed…” 1999 SA Merc LJ 139 145.  
150    S 6; s 12(13) & (14) of the Insider Trading Act.  
151     Hereinafter referred to as the JSE. 
152     S 2(2) of the Insider Trading Act. 
153     In relation to this, generally see Osode 2000 Journal of African Law 239-248; Luiz 1999 SA Merc LJ 
139-145. 
154     Van der Lingen “Tougher Legislation to Combat Insider Trading” 1997 FSB Bulletin 10 10. 
155    See further Osode 2000 Journal of African Law 239-248; Luiz 1999 SA Merc LJ 139-145& Botha 1991 
SA Merc LJ 4-18.     
156     S 6 of the Insider Trading Act. 
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2 3 5  Evaluation of the Enforcement of the Insider Trading Prohibition Prior to 2004 
 
The pioneering provisions in the Companies Act (including all its amendments) were not only 
inconsistent for the purposes of combating insider trading, but were also not properly 
enforced.157   Notably, the enforcement (approaches) methods adopted under the Companies 
Act as amended were few and restricted to criminal sanctions.158  By enacting criminal 
penalties, it appears the legislature relied mainly on the policy goal of deterrence which 
nonetheless failed to discourage some persons from practising insider trading.159  Other 
enforcement approaches such as civil sanctions, bounty rewards and whistle-blowing were not 
considered.   
 
As indicated earlier,160 the enforcement bodies established in terms of the Companies Act did 
not achieve much success in the enforcement of the insider trading prohibition.   In light of 
this, the Second Companies Amendment Act161 officially launched the Securities Regulation 
Panel as an independent body with powers to supervise, detect, investigate, and police insider 
trading in South Africa.162  The Second Companies Amendment Act163 further introduced 
civil sanctions.164   In spite of this, not much success was achieved in terms of the 
enforcement of criminal and civil sanctions of insider trading under the Second Companies 
Amendment Act.165 This might have been caused by the fact that other enforcement methods 
such as whistle-blowing, bounty rewards and administrative sanctions were not considered.   
 
The enactment of the Insider Trading Act was therefore welcomed as another attempt to 
enhance the enforcement of insider trading in South Africa.   This Act introduced 
considerably higher criminal penalties and more elaborate civil remedies.  Notably, the 
Insider Trading Act empowered the Financial Services Board to be solely responsible for the 
policing of insider trading and established the Insider Trading Directorate as an investigatory 
157     See the discussions in paragraphs 2 3 1 1; 2 3 2 1 & 2 3 3 1 above. 
158     S 229 to s 233 of the Companies Act; also see s 440F of the Companies Amendment Act 78 of 1989.   
159    See the discussions in paragraphs 2 3 1 1; 2 3 2 1 & 2 3 3 1 above.  Also see Jooste “Insider Dealing in 
South Africa–The Criminal Aspects” 1990 De Ratione 21 21; Botha “Increased Maximum Fine for 
Insider Trading: A Realistic and Effective Deterrent?” 1990 SALJ 504 504. 
160    See the discussions in paragraphs 2 3 1 1 & 2 3 2 1 above. 
161    69 of 1990. 
162    See the discussions in paragraph 2 3 3 1 above. 
163    69 of 1990. 
164    S 440F of the Second Companies Amendment Act of 1990. 
165    69 of 1990. 
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arm of the Financial Services Board.  Notwithstanding these developments, various gaps and 
flaws were still embedded in the provisions of the Insider Trading Act and these, in a way, 
impeded the proper enforcement of the insider trading ban in South Africa.166  Not giving less 
regard to some key factors like the challenges involving the availability of adequate financial 
resources in South Africa, the Insider Trading Act, like its predecessors, also failed to provide 
expressly for other alternative practical enforcement methods like administrative sanctions, 
whistle-blowing, private rights of action, the establishment of additional self-reguatory organs 
and specific insider trading courts or tribunals to complement the enforcement efforts of the 
Financial Services Board. 
 
As summarised above, one can probably assert that the general enforcement of the insider 
trading prohibition prior to 2004 was not very successful.  
 
The Companies Act was recently repealed by the Companies Act167 which inter alia broadly 
deals with the disclosure of relevant information relating to uncertified securities by issuers 
and Central Securities Depository participants in another attempt to combat illicit trading 
practices. For instance, the Companies Act168 provides that issuers, companies and/or Central 
Securities Depository participants must timeously record and maintain all the relevant details 
relating to uncertified securities in their securities registers.169   This Act also states that 
issuers, companies and/or Central Securities Depository participants must have clear 
guidelines and requirements in place for the inspection of such registers170 as well as their 
own internal audit committees.171 Issuers, companies and/or registered shareholders are 
further required to disclose any of their beneficial interests held in respect of their 
securities.172  Nonetheless, it remains to be seen whether or not the relevant provisions of the 
Companies Act173 are robust enough to prevent insider trading and market manipulation in 
South Africa. 
 
166     See paragraph 2 3 4 3 above. 
167     71 of 2008. 
168     71 of 2008. 
169     S 50 & s 52 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
170     S 50 & s 52 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
171     S 94(7)(i) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
172     S 56 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
173    71 of 2008. 
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2 4  The Regulation of Market Abuse under the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004 
2 4 1 Definitions of Selected Terms and Concepts 
 
The regulation of market abuse under the Securities Services Act will be briefly examined 
under this sub-heading by investigating the meaning and application of some selected terms 
and concepts such as “person”, “participant”, “regulated market”, “market abuse”, “market 
corner”, and “market abuse rules”. 
 
2 4 1 1 The Concept of Market Abuse 
 
“Market abuse” is not statutorily and expressly defined in the Securities Services Act.   
However, a number of practices that would give rise to criminal and civil liability for market 
abuse are simply stated in the Securities Services Act.174  Three major forms of market abuse, 
namely insider trading, prohibited trading practices (trade-based market manipulation) and the 
publication of false, misleading or deceptive statements (disclosure-based market 
manipulation) relating to listed securities are prohibited under the Securities Services Act.   
Notably, the same types of market abuse are also outlawed in the Financial Markets Bill and 
the Financial Markets Bill 2012 but nonetheless the concept of market abuse is not defined in 
these Bills.175 
 
Insider trading is specifically prohibited in the Securities Services Act.176  For example, any 
person who knows that he has non-public price-sensitive information and who improperly 
discloses it or encourages or discourages another person from dealing or who deals directly or 
indirectly for his benefit or for the benefit of any other person in securities to which such 
information relates or where the price of such securities is likely to be affected by such 
dealing will incur criminal or civil liability for insider trading.177  The same practices will also 
give rise to insider trading under the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 
2012.178 
174    See s 73; s 75; s 76 & s 77 of the Securities Services Act. 
175   Clauses 81; 82; 84; 85; 86 & 87 of the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 80; 82; 83 & 84 of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.   
176   S 73 & s 77 of the Securities Services Act; also see clauses 82 & 86 of the Financial Markets Bill & 
clauses 80 & 84 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
177     S 73 & s 77 of the Securities Services Act respectively. 
178     Clauses 82 & 86 of the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 80 & 84 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
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A prohibition against trade-based market manipulation is further stipulated in the Securities 
Services Act.179   Examples of activities that are deemed to be manipulative include executing 
a transaction with no beneficial change of ownership of the securities and entering orders into 
the market near the close of the market or during the auctioning process for the purpose of 
creating a deceptive appearance in that market.180  The same approach is also employed in the 
Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 and accordingly, similar conduct 
that amounts to, or that may be deemed to constitute trade-based market manipulation, is 
outlawed in the aforementioned Bills.181 
 
Disclosure-based market manipulation is also prohibited under the Securities Services Act.182 
This prohibition on the making or publication of false, misleading or deceptive statements, 
promises and forecasts can be welcomed because such information often distorts the market 
price of securities, giving rise to direct or indirect prejudice to innocent market participants.    
The same practices are prohibited in the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 
2012,183 but nonetheless Internet-related manipulative disclosures are still not expressly 
outlawed in the aforementioned Bills. 
 
In spite of the relatively new changes briefly stated above and the fact that the Securities 
Services Act was enacted as a separate piece of legislation that specifically consolidates all 
previous market abuse laws, the regulation and enforcement of the market abuse ban in South 
Africa have remained scant and inconsistent to date.184  This could have been inter alia 
aggravated by the fact that it would only amount to market abuse if the accused person knew 
that he contravened, directly or indirectly, the relevant provisions of the Securities Services 
Act.   This suggests that the knowledge of the market abuse offence in question is required on 
the part of the offenders before any liability can be imputed on them.  Nonetheless, the 
Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 do not 
have any presumptions which could be used to enhance the prosecution of market abuse cases 
in South Africa.   In light of this, it is suggested that enacting a statutory provision for a 
179     S 75 of the Securities Services Act. 
180     A brief discussion on each of the sub-sections under s 75 of the Securities Services Act will be carried out 
later. 
181     Clause 84 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 82 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
182     S 76 of the Securities Services Act. 
183     Clause 85 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 83 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
184     See the analysis that will ensue later in paragraph 3 2 7 in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
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definition of the concept of “market abuse” involving all the elements of this offence (how it 
is committed), many types of market abuse and presumptions could improve the enforcement 
of the market abuse prohibition in South Africa.   Moreover, notwithstanding the difficulties 
that might have been previously encountered in relation to factors like repetition of same 
provisions, double jeopardy and over-criminalisation of market abuse practices in different 
statutes, the mere consolidation of the market abuse provisions into the Securities Services 
Act on its own did not sufficiently improve the enforcement of the market abuse ban in South 
Africa.185  Furthermore, given the fact that the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012’s market abuse provisions duplicated some of the flaws previously 
contained in the Securities Services Act, it remains to be seen whether or not the Financial 
Markets Bill or the Financial Markets Bill 2012’s market abuse prohibition will enhance the 
combating of market abuse activities in South Africa. 
 
2 4 1 2 The Meaning of “Market Corner” and “Market Abuse Rules” 
 
The term “market corner” is defined as any arrangement, agreement, commitment or 
understanding involving the purchasing, selling or issuing of securities listed on a regulated 
market by which a person, or a group of persons acting in concert, acquires direct or indirect 
beneficial ownership of, or exercises control over, or is able to influence the price of securities 
listed on a regulated market; and where the effect of the arrangement, agreement, commitment 
or understanding is or is likely to be that the trading price of the securities listed on a 
regulated market, as reflected through the facilities of a regulated market, is or is likely to be 
abnormally influenced or arbitrarily dictated by such person or group of persons in that the 
said trading price deviates or is likely to deviate materially from the trading price which 
would otherwise likely have been reflected through the facilities of the regulated market on 
which the particular securities are traded.186   This definition discourages market manipulation 
through the creation of a false impression of the volumes traded in securities or abnormal and 
artificial trading prices in listed securities.  Even so, a “market corner” can only be formed 
after an arrangement or agreement in respect of the selling, issuing or purchasing of securities 
listed on a regulated market is made by a person or the persons involved.   Instances where a 
“market corner” could have been formed in respect of, and/or influenced by securities traded 
185      See the analysis that will ensue later in paragraph 3 2 7 in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
186   S 72 of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 81 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 79 of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.    
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in the over the counter markets were not expressly outlawed under the Securities Services 
Act.  The same flaw is retained in the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 
2012.187 
 
Furthermore, the term “market abuse rules” is defined to include the duties of the Financial 
Services Board to make relevant rules concerning the administration of market abuse by the 
Financial Services Board and the Directorate of Market Abuse; the manner in which 
investigations of market abuse are to be conducted; the notification of any civil monetary 
compensatory amounts received; the procedure for the lodging and proof of claims; the 
administration of trust accounts and the distribution of payments in respect of claims; the 
meetings of the Directorate of Market Abuse which are generally designed to ensure that the 
Financial Services Board and the Directorate of Market Abuse are able to perform their 
functions dealing with the manner in which inside information should be disclosed and with 
the conduct expected of persons with regard to such information.188   Notably, the Financial 
Services Board has discretion to make such “market abuse rules” only after consulting with 
the Directorate of Market Abuse.   Besides this, no express provision was made in the 
Securities Services Act to empower the Financial Services Board to make its own market 
abuse rules pertaining to the enforcement of criminal and administrative sanctions for market 
abuse offences.   This flaw is also retained in the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.189 
 
2 4 1 3 The Meaning of “Person” and “Regulated Market” 
 
The term “person” is defined in the Securities Services Act to include a partnership and any 
trust.190  This implies that market abuse offences can now be committed by an insider or a 
“person” as defined who misuse inside information through insider trading or market 
manipulation and not by “individuals” alone.   Accordingly, an “insider” means a person who 
has inside information through being a director, employee or shareholder of an issuer of 
187    Clause 81of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 79 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.    
188   S 82(2)(g)(i) to (vi) of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 91(2)(f)(i) to (vi) of the Financial 
Markets Bill & clause 86(2)(f)(i) to (vi) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
189   Clause 91(2)(f)(i) to (vi) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 86(2)(f)(i) to (vi) of the Financial Markets 
Bill 2012.   
190   S 72 of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 81 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 79 of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.    
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securities listed on a regulated market to which the inside information relates;191 or having 
access to such information by virtue of employment, office or profession;192 or where such 
person knows that the direct or indirect source of the information was an insider as 
contemplated in the Securities Services Act.193 Additionally, inside information means 
specific or precise information which has not been made public and which is obtained or 
learned by an insider and which, if it were made public, would be likely to have a material 
effect on the price or value of any security listed on a regulated market.194  However, Jooste 
argues that the definition of a “person” leaves some doubt as to whether it also includes a 
corporate195 or any other legal entity.196   In relation to this, the researcher agrees in part with 
Jooste, and further submits that the inconsistence or confusion is caused by the employment 
of the phrases “he or she”197 in some market abuse provisions of the Securities Services Act.  
Accordingly, this employment of the phrases “he or she” could imply that the definition of the 
term “person” is still limited to natural persons alone.  This flaw remains unresolved in the 
Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012.198 
 
Likewise, the term “regulated market” means any market, whether domestic or foreign, which 
is regulated in terms of the laws of the country in which the market conducts business as a 
market for dealing in securities listed on that market.199  This suggests that market abuse 
provisions have extra-territorial application.  For example, any person who commits market 
abuse on a regulated foreign market say, by manipulating share prices or dealing on the basis 
of non public price-sensitive information relating to securities listed on such market while 
191   S 72(a)(i) of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 81(a)(i) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 
79(a)(i) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.    
192   S 72(a)(ii) of the Securities Services Act; clause 81(a)(ii) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 79(a)(ii) 
of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.    
193    S 72(b) of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 81(b) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 79(b) 
of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.    
194   S 72 of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 81of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 79 of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.    
195    S 332(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 in this regard.  
196   See the definition of “person” in s 2 of the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957.    This doubt was probably 
caused by the reference to “he or she” in some market abuse provisions such as s 73 & s 77 of the 
Securities Services Act.  Also see Jooste 2006 SALJ 438. 
197    For example see s 73 & s 77 of the Securities Services Act.   
198    For example see clauses 82 & 86 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 80 of the Financial Markets Bill 
2012.    
199   S 72 of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 81 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 79 of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.    
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domiciled in South Africa, can be prosecuted in South Africa.200   The application of the 
market abuse prohibition under the Securities Services Act is surprisingly not limited to 
situations where there is a territorial link between the actual commission of market abuse 
offences and South Africa.   The same status quo is set to be retained under the Financial 
Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012.201   Thus, even though this extra-territorial 
application appears to be a sound move for curbing cross-border market abuse activities, it has 
not been used more regularly, probably due to lack of adequate resources.202   From a 
comparative perspective, one can argue that a restricted and more practical approach should 
have been adopted to meritoriously combat market abuse in South Africa.203  In light of this, 
the prohibition on market abuse should apply to transactions on foreign markets where a 
territorial link is present by virtue either of the fact that the offender is at the time physically 
present in South Africa, or was acting through an intermediary who is in South Africa or by 
virtue of the prohibited conduct occurring in South Africa.204  Nonetheless, the timeous 
enforcement and recognition of foreign judgements in cross-border market abuse cases is 
another challenge that could be associated with the extra-territorial application of market 
abuse provisions in South Africa.   In order to solve this problem, it is submitted that the 
South African courts or tribunals should recognise, where necessary, the relevant international 
law and foreign law as enshrined in the constitution.205  Apparently, if a South African citizen 
who is an insider but is domiciled in New York, contacted a broker in South Africa to 
purchase any security listed on the JSE in order to conceal the illegal nature of such dealing, 
the Financial Services Board and/or the relevant court can co-operatively rely on the United 
States Securities and Exchange Commission to investigate, interrogate or prosecute such 
person for market abuse.  In this regard, when a judgement relating to such market abuse is 
handed down in South Africa, it will also have extra-territorial force in the United States of 
America. 
 
 
200    For further discussion see Jooste 2006 SALJ 453. 
201    See clause 81 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 79 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.  
202   Also see further Loubser “Insider Trading and other Market Abuses (Including the Effective Management 
of Price-sensitive Information)” in the Insider Trading Booklet final draft 2006 (02-10-2006) 26-27 
<http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-10-2008).   
203    Jooste 2006 SALJ 453.  
204   Cassim “Some Aspects of Insider Trading–Has the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004 Gone too Far?” 
2007 SA Merc LJ 44 67. 
205    See s 39(1)(b) & (c) of the constitution. 
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2 5  Prohibited Trading Practices and Penalties 
 
The prohibition on trade-based market manipulation, disclosure-based market manipulation, 
insider trading and the available penalties in respect thereof will be briefly investigated under 
this sub-heading. 
 
2 5 1 Prohibition on “Trade-based Market Manipulation” 
 
A considerable number of trade-related manipulative practices are prohibited under the 
Securities Services Act.206  For example, any person who directly or indirectly uses or 
knowingly participates in the use of any manipulative, improper, false or deceptive practice of 
trading in a security listed on a regulated market, either for such person’s own account or on 
behalf of another person, where such practice creates or might create a false or deceptive 
appearance of the trading activity in connection with or an artificial price for that security will 
be guilty of an offence.207  In addition, any person who places an order to buy or sell listed 
securities which, to his knowledge will, if executed, have the effect of creating a false or 
deceptive appearance of the trading activity in connection with or an artificial price for such 
securities will be guilty of an offence.208 
 
The other examples of trading practices that are deemed to be manipulative include, among 
others, executing a transaction with no beneficial change of ownership of the securities;209 
entering an order to buy or sell a security on a regulated market knowing of a similar opposite 
order that has been entered, or will be entered,210 with the intention of creating a deceptive 
appearance of active public trading in connection with or an artificial market price for that 
206   S 75 of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 84 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 82 of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
207   S 75(1)(a)(i) & (ii) of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 84(1)(a)(i) & (ii) of the Financial 
Markets Bill  & clause 82(1)(a)(i) & (ii) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.     
208   S 75(1)(b) & (2) of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 84(1)(b) & (2) of the Financial Markets 
Bill & clause 82(1)(b) & (2) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.    
209   This practice is sometimes called a “wash trade”.   See s 75(3)(a) of the Securities Services Act; also see 
clause 84(3)(a) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 82(3)(a) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   See 
further Alcock “Market Abuse” 2002 The Company Lawyer 142 143.   
210   S 75(3)(b) of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 84(3)(b) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 
82(3)(b) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.    
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security;211 entering on a regulated market, orders to buy or sell a security listed on that 
market at successfully higher or lower prices for the purpose of improperly influencing the 
market price for that security;212 entering on a regulated market an order at or near the close 
of the market to change or maintain the closing price of a security listed on that market;213 
entering on a regulated market an order to buy or sell a security listed on that market during 
any auctioning process or pre-opening session and cancelling such order immediately prior to 
the opening of the market to create a deceptive or false appearance of demand for or supply 
for that security;214 maintaining an artificial price for dealing in securities listed on a regulated 
market;215 employing any device, scheme or artifice to defraud other persons as a result of a 
transaction effected through the facilities of a regulated market;216 engaging in an act, practice 
or course of business in respect of dealings in any listed securities which is deceptive or 
which is likely to have such effect217 and effecting a market corner.218  
 
The offender is required to know that he is taking part in a prohibited trading practice on a 
regulated market and the effect or possible effect of such practice before he can incur any 
liability.219 This may imply that persons who engage in trade-based market manipulative 
practices in respect of any listed securities in South Africa may evade their liability if they 
prove that they ignorantly dealt in the affected securities.220   Moreover, the prohibition on 
211   The false trading practice need only create the false appearance of trading or artificial price and it need 
not actually have had the defined effect.  See Luiz “Market Abuse - II” 2002 JBL’s Quarterly Law Review 
for People in Business 180 180 for further review and related comments. 
212   S 75(3)(c) of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 84(3)(c) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 
82(3)(c) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.    
213   S 75(3)(d) of the Securities Services Act; clause 84(3)(d) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 82(3)(d) 
of the Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
214   S 75(3)(e) of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 84(3)(e) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 
82(3)(e) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.    
215   S 75(3)(g) of the Securities Services Act; clause 84(3)(g) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 82(3)(g) 
of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.    
216   S 75(3)(h) of the Securities Services Act; clause 84(3)(h) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 82(3)(h) 
of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.    
217   S 75(3)(i) of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 84(3)(i) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 
82(3)(i) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.  Additional comparative analysis of these practices that are 
deemed manipulative in South Africa will ensue later in Chapters Nine of this thesis.  
218   S 75(3)(f) of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 84(3)(f) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 
82(3)(f) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.    
219   Cassim “An Analysis of Market Manipulation under the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004 (Part 1)” 
2008 SA Merc LJ 33 33-43.  
220   S 75 of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 84 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 82 of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.    
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trade-based market manipulation is generally limited to transactions relating to securities 
listed on a regulated market.221    
 
Trade-based market manipulative practices are difficult to detect, investigate and prosecute.222 
Enforcement authorities around the world have surveillance systems and other measures in 
place to detect and combat market manipulation.223  Likewise, South Africa has mainly 
empowered the Financial Services Board and other bodies such as the JSE to enforce the 
prohibition on market manipulation.  For example, the JSE requires its members to comply 
with certain requirements to prevent, among other things, all the forms of market 
manipulation by mandating them to give consideration to the circumstances of orders placed 
by clients before entering such orders in the JSE equities trading system and to be responsible 
for the integrity of such orders.224 The JSE’s Surveillance Division operates a system that 
identifies unusual price and trading volumes and when possible market manipulation is 
detected, an initial investigation is carried out and the results are handed over to the 
Directorate of Market Abuse.    Regardless of this, up until now, very little success has been 
achieved in respect of the settlements and prosecutions of cases involving trade-based market 
manipulation.225  Moreover, the Securities Services Act does not provide a civil remedy for 
trade-based market manipulation.   Trade-based market manipulation is only treated as a 
criminal offence.   This flaw was addressed by the Financial Markets Bill which now provides 
a civil remedy for market manipulation226 but nonetheless this provision is no longer included 
in the Financial Markets Bill 2012.227 
 
221   S 75 of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 84 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 82 of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.    
222   Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 46-49; also see further Barnes Stock Market Efficiency, Insider Dealing and 
Market Abuse (2009) 19-125.   
223    Barnes Stock Market Efficiency, Insider Dealing and Market Abuse 19-125. 
224    See Rule 7.10.1 of the JSE’s Listing Requirements. 
225   Statutory administrative sanctions have been successfully obtained in minimal cases of trade-based 
market manipulation such as iFour Properties Limited (R2 million penalty), SA Retail Properties Limited 
(2) (R2 million penalty), Stratcorp Limited (R10 000 penalty), New Rand Warrants Limited (R750 000 
penalty), Imperial Holdings Limited (R25 000 penalty), King Consolidated Holdings Limited (R10 000 
penalty), SilverBridge Holdings Limited (R10 000 penalty) and Sunflower December 2007 to January 
2008 Contract (R50 000 penalty).  This information was obtained from an interview that was conducted at 
the Financial Services Board by the researcher, with Mr Gerhard van Deventer (the Executive Director of 
the DMA) on 05 May 2009. 
226    Clause 87 of the Financial Markets Bill. 
227    See the relevant clauses under Chapter X entitled “Market Abuse” of the Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
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2 5 2  Prohibition on Insider Trading 
2 5 2 1 Criminal Liability for Insider Trading 
 
As earlier stated,228 the prohibition on insider trading is also contained in the Securities 
Services Act.229  Specifically, any person who violates the relevant provisions of the 
Securities Services Act will be liable for a criminal offence of insider trading.230  For instance, 
actual dealing directly or indirectly or through an agent in securities listed on a regulated 
market by an insider who knows that he has inside information to which such securities 
relates or which are likely to be affected by it for his own personal benefit will give rise to a 
criminal offence of insider trading.231  Nevertheless, it is not certain whether this prohibition 
further applies to any dealing or unlawful transactions that may be relating to other money 
market instruments such as derivatives.  This obscurity has not been addressed by the 
Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012.232 
 
The words “through an agent” were introduced in some insider trading provisions under the 
Securities Services Act.233  Therefore, any insider who knowingly and indirectly practises 
insider trading through an agent for his personal benefit will now be expressly liable for a 
criminal offence.  The extension of the criminal liability to dealing through an agent is a 
positive development, but it is not clear who exactly may be regarded as an agent for the 
purposes of this prohibition.234   This confusion could have enabled other persons who 
knowingly dealt in listed securities through agents as well as such agents to escape liability 
for their insider trading offences.   The same flaw is retained in the Financial Markets Bill and 
the Financial Markets Bill 2012.235 
228    See paragraph 2 4 1 1 above. 
229   S 73 & 77 of the Securities Services Act; also see clauses 82 & 86 of the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 
80 & 84 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.    
230   S 73 of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 82 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 80 of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.    
231   S 73(1)(a) of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 82(1)(a) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 
80(1)(a) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.    
232    Clause 82 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 82 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.    
233   S 73(1)(a) of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 82(1)(a) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 
80(1)(a) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.    
234   S 73(1)(a) of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 82(1)(a) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 
80(1)(a) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   Also see Cassim 2007 SA Merc LJ 67.   The term “agent” is 
however defined in other jurisdictions like in Australia and the United Kingdom.    In relation to this, see 
s 1042B of the Australian Corporations Act 2001(C’th) & s 62(1) & (2) of the English Criminal Justice 
Act 1993 (c 36).     
235    Clause 82(1)(a) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 80(1)(a) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.    
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Actual dealing in securities for the benefit of another person is further prohibited.236  
Therefore, any insider who knows that he has inside information and who deals directly or 
indirectly for the benefit of any other person in any listed securities to which such inside 
information relates or which are likely to be affected by it commits a criminal offence.237  
Conspicuously, the absence of the words “through an agent”238 in this regard indicates the 
inconsistencies found in some of the insider trading provisions contained in the Securities 
Services Act.   This might have also contributed to the skimpy convictions achieved in 
criminal cases involving insider trading in South Africa to date.   The aforementioned flaw is 
set to be addressed in the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012, 
which now expressly includes the words “through an agent” in its prohibition on dealing in 
securities for the benefit of another person.239 
 
Moreover, an insider who knows that he has inside information and who encourages or causes 
another person to deal, or discourages or stops another person from dealing in the securities 
listed on a regulated market to which the information relates or which are likely to be affected 
by it is liable for a criminal offence.240  As earlier stated,241 the accused must know that he has 
inside information and it is possible for an accused to plead that he was ignorant of the price-
sensitive nature of the inside information at the time when he encouraged or discouraged 
others to deal in the securities concerned.  The same status quo is set to be retained in the 
Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012.242 
 
An insider who knows that he has inside information and who discloses such information to 
another person will be liable for a criminal offence.243  In spite of this, improper disclosure of 
confidential matters or inside information that relate to juristic persons by their agents who 
are not necessarily insiders appears not to be expressly covered under the Securities Services 
236   S 73(2)(a) of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 82(2)(a) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 
80(2)(a) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.    
237   S 73(2)(a) of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 82(2)(a) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 
80(2)(a) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.     
238    S 73(2)(a) of the Securities Services Act.   
239   Clause 82(2)(a) & (3)(a) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 80(2)(a) & (3)(a)of the Financial Markets 
Bill 2012.    
240   S 73(4) of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 82(5) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 80(5) 
of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.     
241    See paragraph 2 4 1 1 above. 
242    Clause 82 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 80 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.    
243   S 73(3)(a) of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 82(4)(a) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 
80(4)(a) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.      
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Act.244  This flaw is still not resolved in the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets 
Bill 2012.245 
 
2 5 2 2 Civil Liability for Insider Trading 
 
Any insider or person who is involved in insider trading activities may incur civil liability.246  
This civil liability can be imposed on an insider who knows that he has inside information and 
who deals directly or indirectly or through an agent for his own account in securities listed on 
a regulated market to which the information relates or which are likely to be affected by it and 
who makes a profit or would have made a profit if he had sold the securities at any stage, or 
avoids a loss through such dealing unless he proves one of the defences set out in the 
Securities Services Act.247  Such a person is then liable at the suit of the Financial Services 
Board, in any court of competent jurisdiction, for the civil compensatory fine as stipulated in 
the Securities Services Act.248  Moreover, an insider who engages in insider trading and 
makes a profit or avoids a loss for personal benefit or for the benefit of any other person 
incurs civil liability.249   Therefore, the person involved will be liable to pay the Financial 
Services Board an amount equivalent to the profit made or loss avoided or a penalty for 
compensatory and punitive purposes,250 but not exceeding three times the amount of the profit 
made or loss avoided plus any other amount for interest and legal costs as determined by a 
competent court.251    
 
244    S 73(3)(a) of the Securities Services Act.   
245    Clause 82(4)(a) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 80(4)(a) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.      
246   S 77 of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 86 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 84 of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.        
247   S 77(1) of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 86(1) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 84 of 
the Financial Markets Bill 2012.      
248   S 77(1) of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 86(1) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 84(1) 
of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.          
249   S 77(1)(b) & (2)(b) of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 86(1)(b) & (2)(b) of the Financial 
Markets Bill & clause 84 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.      
250   S 77(1)(c); (2)(c); (3)(b); (4)(a) to (e) read with subsections (5) & (6) of the Securities Services Act; also 
see clause 86(1)(c); (2)(c); (3)(b); (4)(b); (5)(a) to (e) read with  subsections (6) & (7) of the Financial 
Markets Bill & clause 84(1) & (4) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.         
251   These are the High Courts and regional courts as outlined in s 79 of the Securities Services Act.  Notably, 
the Financial Markets Bill now only provides that a court of competent jurisdiction includes a court 
within whose jurisdiction the regulated market has its principal place of business or head office or in 
which any element of the dealing or offence occurred, and there is no need to make any attachment to 
found or confirm its jurisdiction. See clause 81 of the Financial Markets Bill.  However, no similar 
provision is made in clause 79 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
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The person or insider who indulges in insider trading activities for the benefit of another 
person will be jointly and severally liable together with that other person to pay the Financial 
Services Board a penalty for compensatory and punitive purposes plus interest or costs as 
determined by the relevant courts.252  As a result, this joint and several liability is contingent 
upon a tippee’s liability as an insider.   It appears that that there will be no liability for a party 
who, for instance, deals in the securities in question but is not an insider as defined in the 
Securities Services Act.253 Seemingly, this shortcoming has now been resolved in the 
Financial Markets Bill254 but no similar provision is made in the Financial Markets Bill 
2012.255 
 
Civil liability is further imposed on an insider who knows that he has price-sensitive inside 
information and improperly discloses such information to other persons.256  However, the 
Securities Services Act does not specifically and expressly provide how companies can 
lawfully disclose price-sensitive inside information to relevant persons such as investment 
analysts so that they would not be practising or falling victims to insider trading.257   This 
shortcoming is still not resolved in the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 
2012.258 
 
In addition, any person who knowingly encourages or causes another person to deal in 
securities listed on a regulated market will incur civil liability.259  The discouragement of 
others from dealing in such securities by any person who knows that he has inside 
information is therefore not expressly prohibited under the civil provisions of the Securities 
Services Act.260   Yet again, this disparity leaves room for some persons to evade their civil 
252   S 77(5) of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 86(6) & (7) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 
84 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
253   S 72 of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 81 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 79 of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.   Also see further Jooste 2006 SALJ 454–455.   
254   Clause 86(6) & (7) of the Financial Markets Bill.    
255    Clause 84 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.      
256    S 77(3) of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 86(4) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 84(1) 
of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.       
257  Jooste 2006 SALJ 452-453; Loubser (02-10-2006) 14-15 
<http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-10-2008).   
258    Clause 86(4) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 84 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.      
259    S 77(4) of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 86(5) of the Financial Markets Bill.    
260   S 77(4) of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 86(5) of the Financial Markets Bill.  Also see 
Jooste 2006 SALJ 455.   
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insider trading liability.  Amazingly, this flaw was not resolved in the Financial Markets 
Bill.261  However, this flaw could be addressed by the Financial Markets Bill 2012.262 
 
2 5 3 Prohibition on False or Deceptive Statements, Promises and Forecasts 
(Disclosure-based Market Manipulation)  
 
Publication of false or deceptive statements, promises and forecasts is further prohibited under 
the Securities Services Act.263 Accordingly, any person who directly or indirectly makes or 
publishes in respect of listed securities, or in respect of the past or future performance of a 
public company, any statement, promise or forecast which is, at the time and in the light of 
the circumstances in which it is made, false or misleading or deceptive in respect of any 
material fact and which the person knows, or ought reasonably to know is false, misleading or 
deceptive will be guilty of an offence.264   Likewise, any person who directly or indirectly, 
makes or publishes in respect of listed securities, or in respect of the past or future 
performance of a public company, any statement, promise or forecast which is, by reason of 
the omission of a material fact, rendered false, misleading or deceptive and which the person 
knows, or ought reasonably to know is rendered false, misleading or deceptive by reason of 
the omission of that fact commits an offence.265   This clearly indicates that disclosure-based 
market manipulation is discouraged in South Africa.266  Thus, the issuing of false, deceptive 
or misleading statements reduces public investor confidence and can harm the integrity of the 
financial markets and is as such prohibited in South Africa.267  For example, incorrect 
published information regarding the financial state of a listed company may discourage or 
encourage investors to trade in the company’s shares at prices that would not be sustainable 
when the true facts are later known.268  
 
261   Clause 86(5).     
262    Clause 84 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
263   S 76 of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 85 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 83 of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.        
264   S 76 (1)(a) of the Securities Services Act; clause 85(1)(a) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 83(1)(a) 
of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.         
265   S 76 (1)(b) of the Securities Services Act; clause 85(1)(b) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 83(1)(b) 
of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.            
266   For further reading see Cassim “An Analysis of Market Manipulation under the Securities Services Act 
36 of 2004 (Part 2)” 2008 SA Merc LJ 177 177-178.  
267    Loubser (02-10-2006) 24 <http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-10-2008); 
Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 177-183.  
268    Loubser (02-10-2006) 24 <http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-10-2008). 
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The making or publication of false statements regarding matters that are not directly 
associated with the company’s current performance, but which may nevertheless artificially 
inflate the share price is prohibited under the Securities Services Act.269    For example, the 
publication or making of false claims regarding orders purchased or products developed by 
the company concerned will give rise to an offence under the Securities Services Act.   The 
prohibition on the making or publication of false or deceptive statements also applies to 
matters relating to the non-publication of price-sensitive information or the omission of 
material facts, often done to avoid the negative effect it could have on the share prices.270  
Irrespective of this, no provision is made in the Securities Services Act for any presumptions 
that will provide insight as to when a fact or an omitted fact would be material for the 
purposes of disclosure-based market manipulation.271  Furthermore, no such provision is 
made in the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012.272 
 
Further liability is imposed on persons who either intentionally or negligently publish or make 
incorrect statements.273   For example, a company director who allows a trading statement to 
be published without taking reasonable steps to ensure that such statement is correct will be 
liable for causing a false statement to be made or published negligently and recklessly.   
Nonetheless, the Securities Services Act does not impose civil liability on persons who make 
or publish false, misleading or deceptive statements, promises and forecasts.274   In this 
regard, the JSE’s Listing Requirements that prohibit false or misleading statements by the 
JSE’s member companies are usually used to extend civil liability to such companies or other 
relevant entities and their agents.275  The aforesaid flaw has been addressed by the Financial 
Markets Bill which now provides a civil remedy for market manipulation.276   However, this 
provision was omitted in the Financial Markets Bill 2012.277 
269   S 76 of the Securities Services Act; clause 85 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 83 of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012. Also see further related findings and comments by Loubser (02-10-2006) 24 
<http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-10-2008).   
270   S 76(1)(b) of the Securities Services Act; clause 85(1)(b) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 83(1)(b) 
of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.    Also see Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 180.  
271    S 76 of the Securities Services Act.    
272    Clause 85 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 83 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.               
273   S 76(1) of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 85(1) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 83(1) 
read with subsections (2) & (3) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.              
274    S 76 of the Securities Services Act.    
275    See Rules 8.20.2; 8.20.3 and 8.20.6 of the JSE Listing Requirements. 
276    Clause 87 of the Financial Markets Bill. 
277    See the relevant clauses under Chapter X entitled “Market Abuse” of the Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
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The making or publication of false, misleading or deceptive statements, promises and 
forecasts on the Internet is not prohibited in the Securities Services Act.278   Therefore, the 
Internet could be providing unscrupulous persons in South Africa with opportunities to 
participate in disclosure-based market manipulation activities more easily and faster.279   In 
addition, the words “directly or indirectly”280 which are employed for the purposes of this 
prohibition281 do not seem to extend liability to secondary offenders who do not directly 
engage in the making or publishing of false, misleading or deceptive statements, promises or 
forecasts but who simply aided and abetted another person to make or publish such 
statements, promises or forecasts.   This obscurity remains unresolved in the Financial 
Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012.282 
 
2 5 4  Available Penalties 
 
Criminal penalties can be imposed on all the three main forms of market abuse which are 
outlawed in South Africa, namely insider trading, trade-based market manipulation and 
disclosure-based market manipulation.283  Consequently, persons who engage in any of these 
market abuse activities may be sentenced to a fine not exceeding R50 million or 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years or both such fine and imprisonment.284   
Notably, with regard to insider trading, the criminal sanctions were increased significantly 
from a fine of R2 million (previously stipulated in the Insider Trading Act)285 to R50 million 
under the Securities Services Act.286 
 
While the introduction of new market abuse penalties is a positive improvement, this research 
submits that standing alone, even the R50 million fine and a 10 years’ imprisonment term 
278   S 76 of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 85 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 83 of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.              
279   S 76(1) of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 85(1) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 83(1) 
of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.  Also see Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 178.     
280    Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 178. 
281    S 76(1) of the Securities Services Act.   
282    Clause 85(1) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 83(1) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.      
283    Loubser (02-10-2006) 28 <http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-10-2008).    
284   S 115(a) of the Securities Services Act; clause 115(a) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 111(a) of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.                 
285    S 5 of the Insider Trading Act. 
286   S 115(a) of the Securities Services Act; clause 115(a) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 111(a) of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.                    
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cannot be an effective deterrent.287  It is possible that prospects of enormous profits may 
outweigh the deterring effect of the stipulated fine and/or prison sentence.  For example, 
companies may simply regard it as just another cost of doing business, especially where 
profits gained exceed the penalty imposed.288  Moreover, the fact that the actual perpetrators 
may plead guilty and be convicted of lesser offences may also have a negative effect on any 
impact a criminal sanction might have.  In addition, the difficult burden of proof needed in the 
criminal prosecution of market abuse offences has, to some extent, marred the prosecution of 
such offences in South Africa to date and this is unlikely to be different in future. 289 
 
As discussed earlier,290 civil penalties for insider trading can be imposed on offenders for the 
profit made or loss avoided or as a penalty for compensatory and punitive purposes, an 
amount as determined by a competent court but not exceeding three times the amount of the 
profit made or loss avoided plus interest and legal costs as determined by the court.291  
Nevertheless,  prejudiced persons who prove their claims as provided for in the Securities 
Services Act will only get their compensation after the Financial Services Board has recouped 
its costs and expenses in relation to a successful litigation.292  The same approach is employed 
in the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012.293  It is submitted that if 
not properly executed, this approach may give rise to bureaucracy and unnecessary delays 
before the affected persons receive their compensation. 
 
In addition to criminal and civil penalties, administrative penalties are provided for all the 
three forms of market abuse that are prohibited by the Securities Services Act.  The 
Enforcement Committee may, on a referral basis, impose unlimited administrative penalties 
287    Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 194; Jooste 2006 SALJ 453–454.   
288    Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 194; Jooste 2006 SALJ 453–454.   
289   Only 32 cases of insider trading, 8 cases of trade-based market manipulation and no cases for disclosure-
based market manipulation were reportedly investigated by the Financial Services Board during the 
period between January 1999 and December 2007.     No convictions were obtained in all these criminal 
cases of market abuse. This information was obtained from an interview that was conducted at the 
Financial Services Board by the researcher, with Mr Gerhard van Deventer (the Executive Director of the 
DMA) on 05 May 2009.   Also see Jooste 2006 SALJ 453–454.   
290    See paragraph 2 5 2 2 above. 
291   S 77 of the Securities Services Act; clause 86 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 84 of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.                      
292   No civil penalties may, however, be levied against the culprits who indulge in market manipulation 
practices.  See related review and comparison of the civil penalties for insider trading by Whiting “Civil 
Liability for Insider Trading: A Comparison of the Insider Trading Act of 1998 with the Securities 
Services Act of 2004” 2005 Responsa Meridiana 99 116-117.  
293    Clause 86 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 84 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.           
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on persons who indulge in market abuse activities.294  Thus, administrative penalties, namely 
a civil monetary penalty, an order for remedial action, costs orders, separate order for legal 
costs, remuneration costs orders, a fine for punitive purposes and other appropriate 
disciplinary sanctions may be imposed on the offenders.295 Specifically, the Enforcement 
Committee may impose an administrative compensatory amount payable to the Financial 
Services Board for distribution to the victims only in respect of insider trading.296  No similar 
provision is made for trade-based market manipulation and disclosure-based market 
manipulation.   This might be caused by the fact that it would be very difficult to accurately 
calculate the amount of loss incurred by the victims of market manipulation.297 Moreover, the 
Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 do not provide any specific 
administrative functions of the Enforcement Committee in detail.298   Nonetheless, the 
introduction of administrative penalties might have the effect of increasing the compliance 
with, and the enforcement of the market abuse provisions in South Africa.299   
 
2 6  Concluding Remarks 
 
As discussed in this chapter,300 it is clear that the various market abuse laws enacted in South 
Africa were mainly aimed at improving the regulation of market manipulation and insider 
trading in order to inter alia restore public investor confidence in our financial markets. 
Numerous amendments and changes to the market abuse legislation were introduced from 
time to time in a bid to improve the regulation of market abuse practices in South Africa.   
Nonetheless, in relation to this it was indicated that both the Stock Exchanges Control Act and 
the Financial Markets Control Act had little success in combating market manipulation in 
South Africa.301   It was further stated that the pioneering provisions in the Companies Act 
(including all its amendments) were not only inconsistent for the purposes of combating 
294   S 94(e) & s 102 to s 105 of the Securities Services Act; generally see clause 86 of the Financial Markets 
Bill & clause 84 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.                   
295   S 94(e) & s 102 to s 105 of the Securities Services Act; generally see clause 86 of the Financial Markets 
Bill & clause 84 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   Also see Van Deventer “Harnassing Administrative 
Law in Encouraging Compliance” 2009 FSB Bulletin 3 3-4. 
296    Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 195. 
297   Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 195. 
298   See clause 105 & the relevant clauses under Chapter X entitled “Market Abuse” in the Financial Markets 
Bill & clause 101 & the relevant clauses under Chapter X entitled “Market Abuse” of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.    
299    Van Deventer 2009 FSB Bulletin 3-4. 
300    See the discussions under paragraphs 2 2; 2 3; 2 4 & 2 5 above. 
301    See paragraph 2 2 3 above. 
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insider trading, but were also not properly enforced.302  Notably, the enforcement 
(approaches) methods adopted under the Companies Act as amended were few and only 
restricted to criminal sanctions.303   Moreover, it was indicated that other enforcement 
methods such as whistle-blowing, bounty rewards and administrative sanctions were not 
considered under the Companies Act (including all its amendments).304  The Insider Trading 
Act was eventually enacted and welcomed as another attempt to enhance the enforcement of 
insider trading in South Africa.305  This Act introduced considerably higher criminal penalties 
and more elaborate civil remedies.   However, not giving less regard to some key factors like 
the challenges involving the availability of adequate financial resources in South Africa, the 
Insider Trading Act, like its predecessors, also failed to expressly provide for other alternative 
practical enforcement methods like administrative sanctions, whistle-blowing, private rights 
of action, the establishment of additional self-regulatory organs and specific insider trading 
courts or tribunals to complement the enforcement efforts of the Financial Services Board.306   
As a result, the Securities Services Act was later introduced and it brought more elaborate 
civil remedies, new criminal penalties, administrative sanctions and additional regulatory 
bodies such as the Enforcement Committee, the Board of Appeal and the Directorate of 
Market Abuse in a bid to enhance regulation and enforcement of the market abuse ban in 
South Africa.307  Nonetheless, it was stated that the concept of “market abuse” is not 
statutorily and expressly defined in the Securities Services Act.308   In light of this, it was 
suggested that enacting a statutory provision for a definition of the concept of “market abuse” 
involving all the elements of this offence (how it is committed), many types of market abuse 
and presumptions could improve the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in South 
Africa.309   It was also highlighted that no express provision was made in the Securities 
Services Act to empower the Financial Services Board to make its own market abuse rules 
pertaining to the enforcement of criminal and administrative sanctions for market abuse 
offences.310   This flaw is also retained in the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial 
302    See the discussions in paragraphs 2 3 1 1; 2 3 2 1 & 2 3 3 1 above. 
303    See paragraph 2 3 5 above.   
304    See paragraph 2 3 5 above.   
305      See paragraph 2 3 5 above.   
306      See paragraph 2 3 5 above.   
307      See the discussions under paragraphs 2 4 & 2 5 above. 
308      See paragraph 2 4 1 1 above. 
309      See paragraph 2 4 1 1 above. 
310      See paragraph 2 4 1 2 above. 
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Markets Bill 2012.311   It was also stated that instances where a “market corner” could have 
been formed in respect of, and/or influenced by, securities traded in the over the counter 
markets were not expressly outlawed under the Securities Services Act.312  The same flaw is 
retained in the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012.313   It was further 
indicated that the application of the market abuse prohibition under the Securities Services 
Act is surprisingly not limited to situations where there is a territorial link between the actual 
commission of market abuse offences and South Africa.314  The same status quo is set to be 
retained under the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012.315  In light of 
this, it was suggested that the prohibition on market abuse should apply to transactions on 
foreign markets where a territorial link is present by virtue, either of the fact that the offender 
is at the time physically present in South Africa, or was acting through an intermediary who is 
in South Africa or by virtue of the prohibited conduct occurring in South Africa.316    
 
It was also indicated that the Securities Services Act has inconsistently prohibited three major 
forms of market abuse, namely insider trading, trade-based market manipulation and the 
disclosure-based market manipulation relating to listed securities in South Africa.317   
Furthermore, it was stated that the criminal penalties imposed against market abuse offenders 
are still very little for deterrence purposes.318   It was submitted that  the fact that prejudiced 
persons who prove their claims as provided for in the Securities Services Act, the Financial 
Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 will only get their compensation after the 
Financial Services Board has recouped its costs and expenses in relation to a successful 
litigation may, if not properly executed, give rise to bureaucracy and unnecessary delays 
before the affected persons receive their compensation.319  As indicated above, various gaps 
are still found in the relevant market abuse provisions in South Africa.   Thus, although a 
general foundation for the regulation of market abuse has been laid in this chapter, the 
question to be addressed later is whether the current market abuse provisions are robust 
enough and/or being effectively implemented to prevent insider trading and market 
311      See paragraph 2 4 1 2 above. 
312      See paragraph 2 4 1 2 above. 
313      See paragraph 2 4 1 2 above. 
314      See paragraph 2 4 1 3 above. 
315      See paragraph 2 4 1 3 above. 
316      See paragraph 2 4 1 3 above. 
317      See paragraphs 2 5 1; 2 5 2; 2 5 2 1; 2 5 2 2 & 2 5 3 above. 
318      See paragraph 2 5 4 above.      
319      See paragraph 2 5 4 above. 
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manipulation in the South African financial markets.   This and other related aspects 
pertaining to the enforcement of market abuse provisions in South Africa will be carefully 
discussed and examined in Chapter Three.   
71 
CHAPTER THREE 
OVERVIEW OF THE ROLE-PLAYERS IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF 
MARKET ABUSE PROVISIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
3 1  Introduction   
 
Since the previous chapter has already laid a general foundation for the regulation of market 
abuse, this chapter will now examine whether the current market abuse provisions are being 
effectively implemented to prevent insider trading and market manipulation in the South 
African financial markets.  
 
An overview of the functions of the enforcement authorities, such as the Financial Services 
Board, Johannesburg Stock Exchange Limited,1 the Directorate of Market Abuse and the 
Enforcement Committee will be undertaken below to explore how market abuse practices are 
detected, investigated, prosecuted and prevented in South Africa. 
 
3 2 The Detection, Investigation and Enforcement of the Market Abuse Prohibition 
under the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004 
3 2 1 The Role of the Financial Services Board 
 
The Financial Services Board is an independent board established2 to inter alia monitor and 
enforce the market abuse prohibition in South Africa.  Accordingly, the functions of the 
Financial Services Board under the Financial Services Board Act include: 
 
(a) supervising compliance with laws regulating financial institutions3 and the provision 
of financial services;4  
 
1       Hereinafter referred to as the JSE. 
2       S 2 of the Financial Services Board Act 97 of 1990 (hereinafter referred to as the Financial Services 
Board Act). 
3       See the definition of the term “financial institution” in s 1 of the Financial Services Board Act. 
4      S 3(a) of the Financial Services Board Act. 
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(b) advising the Minister on matters concerning financial institutions and financial 
services, either of its own accord or at the request of the Minister;5 and  
 
(c) promoting programmes and initiatives by financial institutions and bodies 
representing the financial services industry to inform and educate users and potential 
users of financial products and services.6 
 
Moreover, as earlier discussed,7 the Financial Services Board has ostensibly wide powers to 
ensure the proper supervision and enforcement of the South African market abuse prohibition 
in terms of the Securities Services Act.8   For instance, the Financial Services Board has 
powers which include to: 
 
(a) supervise and to ensure that all persons comply with the market abuse provisions;9  
 
(b) investigate any matter relating to an offence relating to market abuse, including 
insider trading committed before the repeal of the provisions of the Insider Trading 
Act and section 440F of the Companies Act;10 
 
(c) institute proceedings as are contemplated in terms of the relevant market abuse 
provisions;11 
 
(d) administer proof of claims and distribution of payments in civil cases of insider 
trading;12  
 
(e) summon any person suspected to be in possession of any information or document 
relevant to an ongoing investigation of the Financial Services Board for interrogation 
or production of such document;13  
 
5     S 3(b) of the Financial Services Board Act. 
6      S 3(c) of the Financial Services Board Act. 
7      See paragraph 2 3 4 3 of Chapter Two. 
8      36 of 2004, hereinafter referred to as the Securities Services Act; see s 82 of the Securities Services Act. 
9      S 82(1) of the Securities Services Act. 
10     S 82(2)(a) of the Securities Services Act. 
11     S 82(2)(b) of the Securities Services Act. 
12     S 82(2)(c) of the Securities Services Act. 
13     S 82(2)(d) of the Securities Services Act. 
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(f) interrogate any such persons under oath or affirmation and examine or retain for 
further examination any such document unless the copies of any such document have 
been made;14  
 
(g) after obtaining a search warrant, enter and search any premises or open any 
strongroom for the purpose of obtaining any document which it suspects might relate 
to an ongoing investigation and, if found, to examine, make extracts from and copy 
the document or remove it temporarily from those premises for that purpose or retain 
it for as long as it may be required for criminal or other proceedings;15  
 
(h) make market abuse rules after consultation with the Directorate of Market Abuse;16 
require relevant regulated markets to implement such systems as are necessary for 
the effective monitoring and identification of market abuse activities.   This is done 
after consultation with such markets;17 
 
(i) subject to conditions it may determine, delegate the power to investigate, interrogate 
or search premises or persons accused of violating the market abuse provisions to 
any fit person;18 
 
(j) publish in the Gazette a notice of any proposed market abuse rule or amendment of 
such rule and to call all interested persons who have objections to the proposed rule 
or amendment to lodge their objections with the Financial Services Board within a 
period of fourteen days from the date of publication of the notice;19  
 
(k) ensure, after consultation with the Directorate of Market Abuse, that the market 
abuse rule or amendment to such rule comes into operation on a date determined by 
the Financial Services Board by notice in the Gazette if there were no objections;20  
 
(l) amend the proposed market abuse rule after consultation with the Directorate of 
Market Abuse and ensure that the amended rule comes into operation on a date 
14      S 82(2)(e) of the Securities Services Act. 
15      S 82(2)(f) read with sub-section (3) of the Securities Services Act. 
16      S 82(2)(g) of the Securities Services Act. 
17      S 82(2)(h) of the Securities Services Act. 
18      S 82(4) of the Securities Services Act. 
19      S 82(5) of the Securities Services Act. 
20      S 82(6) of the Securities Services Act. 
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determined by the Financial Services Board by notice in the Gazette and ensure that 
such rule is binding on regulated persons and members of the public;21 
 
(m) prosecute any alleged market abuse offence in any competent court22 if the Director 
of Public Prosecutions declines to do so, in terms of the Securities Services Act and 
the Criminal Procedure Act;23 and 
 
(n) investigate any matter, summon and interrogate any person in respect of matters 
relating to market abuse at the request of the Directorate of Market Abuse.24   
 
As indicated above, these wide powers are relatively similar to the duties that were initially 
conferred upon the Financial Services Board under the Insider Trading Act.25   Over and 
above, the same powers are set to be retained with a few minor changes in the Financial 
Markets Bill 2011 and the Financial Markets Bill 2012.26  In relation to this, such changes 
include new powers that are conferred upon the Financial Services Board to:  
 
(a) assist foreign regulators with investigations pertaining to any cross-border market 
abuse cases;27  
 
(b) publish by notice on its official website or by means of other appropriate public 
media, any outcome, status or details of market abuse investigations (public censure) 
if such publication is in the public interest;28 and  
 
 
21    S 82(7) & (8) of the Securities Services Act. 
22     S 79 of the Securities Services Act. 
23    51 of 1977.    See s 82(9) of the Securities Services Act; also see s 8(2) & (3) of the Criminal Procedure 
Act 51 of 1977.   
24     S 82(10) of the Securities Services Act. 
25    135 of 1998 (hereinafter referred to as the Insider Trading Act); see s 11 of the Insider Trading Act & also 
see paragraph 2 3 4 3 in Chapter Two of this thesis.   
26    See clause 91of the Financial Markets Bill [B-2011], hereinafter referred to as the Financial Markets Bill; 
clause 86 of the Financial Markets Bill [B12-2012], hereinafter referred to as the Financial Markets Bill 
2012 (I have employed the term “clause” to refer to the provisions of both the Financial Markets Bill & 
the Financial Markets Bill 2012 because at the time of writing this Chapter, the aforementioned Bills were 
not yet effectively passed into law).  
27     Clause 91(2)(b) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 86(2)(b) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
28     Clause 91(2)(e) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 86(2)(e) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
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(c) enter upon or search any premises in relation to market abuse investigations during 
the day and ensure that such investigations could be assisted by a police officer, in a 
orderly justifiable manner with due regard to the accused person’s right to dignity, 
privacy, freedom and security.29 
 
Nonetheless, it remains to be seen whether the Financial Services Board will be able to 
consistently and timeously enforce its public censure and other investigation powers 
introduced by the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 to combat 
market abuse activities in South Africa and elsewhere. 
 
The Financial Services Board is staffed with persons who have forensic and prosecutorial 
skills as well as relevant expertise in relation to the financial markets.  Despite this, the 
Financial Services Board does not have its own sophisticated surveillance equipment in place 
to detect any suspected illegal trading and to provide the details of the beneficial owners of 
securities held in nominee accounts.30  In most instances, the Financial Services Board relies 
on the JSE’s Surveillance Division to detect suspicious trading volumes and trading patterns.   
The Financial Services Board further relies on the broker-dealer accounts system to extract 
relevant information from other market participants like brokers by investigating their trading 
history for purposes of detecting market abuse practices.31  This enables the Financial 
Services Board to check a broker’s trading history by scrutinising his telephonic 
conversations, bank records and other relevant trading records to detect unusual or abnormal 
trading patterns which could be a signal of market abuse activity.  The Financial Services 
Board also uses the auction process system to curb market manipulation.  The Financial 
Services Board may investigate all the transactions that are carried out at the JSE by 
examining volumes of securities traded, say at the close of the day, and such transactions are 
kept in a database for easy identification and detection of illicit trading activities which may 
give rise to market abuse.   This is referred to as the transactions database system, which is 
29    Clause 91(3)(g); (h) & (i) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 86(4)(d); (e) & (f) of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.   
30     Barrow “Insider Trading Directorate” Business Report (2004-07-28).              
31   This information was obtained from an interview that was conducted at the Financial Services Board by 
the researcher, with Mr Gerhard van Deventer (the Executive Director of the DMA) on 05 May 2009.    
Also see a similar interview and analysis in footnotes 128 & 289 as earlier discussed under paragraphs 2 3 
4 2 & 2 5 4 of Chapter Two respectively. 
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reportedly being used by the Financial Services Board in some instances.32  Additionally, the 
Financial Services Board may publish or issue a press release to disclose the details of the 
proposed market abuse rules regarding the affected securities and the culprits involved.33  
This name and shaming practice is used by the Financial Services Board to deter persons from 
engaging in market abuse activities because of fear of losing their jobs and damaging their 
reputation.34 
 
In order to curb cross-border market abuse activities, the Financial Services Board has forged 
some multilateral co-operation agreements with similar authorities in the developed world, 
like the Financial Services Authority of the United Kingdom and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission of the United States of America.35  For example, if a South African citizen who 
is an insider but is domiciled in New York contacted a broker in South Africa to purchase any 
security listed on the JSE in order to conceal the illegal nature of such dealing, the Financial 
Services Board can rely on the United States Securities and Exchange Commission to 
investigate, interrogate or prosecute such person for market abuse.  Gerhard van Deventer36 
submits that these multilateral co-operation agreements have been utilised by the Financial 
Services Board in a number of instances to combat cross-border market abuse.    
 
The Financial Services Board may itself prosecute matters relating to market abuse practices 
only when the relevant courts decline to do so37 or where a matter is settled out of court.   The 
same authority is also retained in the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 
2012.38   Moreover, a civil penalty for the actual profit made or loss avoided in matters 
relating to insider trading is determined by competent courts.39  Under the Financial Markets 
Bill, a similar civil penalty as determined by competent courts40 is now extended to matters 
32   This information was obtained from an interview that was conducted at the Financial Services Board by 
the researcher, with Mr Gerhard van Deventer (the Executive Director of the DMA) on 05 May 2009.      
33     S 82(5) to (8) of the Securities Services Act. 
34     S 82(5) to (8) of the Securities Services Act. 
35    See further Loubser “Insider Trading and other Market Abuses (Including the Effective Management of 
Price-sensitive Information)” in the Insider Trading Booklet final draft 2006 (02-10-2006) 26-27 
<http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-10-2008).  
36    Generally see the interview and analysis as earlier discussed under paragraphs 2 3 4 2 & 2 5 4 of Chapter 
Two respectively.  
37     S 82(9) of the Securities Services Act. 
38     Clause 91(9) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 86(10) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
39     S 77 read with s 79 of the Securities Services Act. 
40     See the definition of “court of competent jurisdiction” in s 81 of the Financial Markets Bill. 
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involving both insider trading41 and market manipulation.42  However, there is no provision 
for civil penalties for market manipulation under the Financial Markets Bill 2012.43 
 
Interrogation of persons or search of premises in matters relating to market abuse is only 
possible when permission or a search warrant is granted upon the application by the Financial 
Services Board, to a judge or magistrate who has jurisdiction in the area where the persons or 
premises are located.44  This could imply, given the backlog challenges in the South African 
courts, that not all premises and persons will be promptly searched, interrogated or prosecuted 
respectively by the Financial Services Board and the competent courts.  
 
The Financial Services Board may only consult with, and request the regulated markets to 
have systems that are necessary to monitor and detect market abuse practices in such 
markets.45   The same position is also retained in the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.46   This may suggest that there is some co-operation between the Financial 
Services Board and the regulated markets in South Africa.   Although more can still be done, 
one can argue that the Financial Services Board has so far played an important role in the 
detection, investigation and prevention of market abuse in South Africa.47  
 
3 2 2 The Role of the Directorate of Market Abuse 
 
The Directorate of Market Abuse is established as a committee of the Financial Services 
Board which may perform some of its functions.48  Apart from the changing of the name from 
41     Clause 86 of the Financial Markets Bill.  
42     Clause 87 of the Financial Markets Bill. 
43    Clauses 82; 83 & other relevant clauses under Chapter X entitled “Market Abuse” of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.   
44    S 82(3)(a) of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 91(3)(e) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 
86(4)(b) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   Also see Crotty “First Insider Trading Case Goes to Court” 
Business Report (2001-10-19); Cokayne “Setback for South Africa’s First Insider Trading Case” Business 
Report (2004-04-28).  
45     S 82(2)(h) of the Securities Services Act. 
46     Clause 91(2)(g) of the Financial Markets Bill; clause 86(2)(g) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
47   For further comparative discussion on the role of the Financial Services Board see Myburgh & Davis 
“The Impact of South Africa’s Insider Trading Regime: A Report for the Financial Services Board” (25-
03-2004) 15-30 <http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 09-02-2009).  
48    S 83(1)(a) of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 92(1)(a) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 
87(1)(a) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
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the Insider Trading Directorate to the Directorate of Market Abuse,49 the functions of the 
Directorate of Market Abuse under the Securities Services Act,50 the Financial Markets Bill51 
and the Financial Markets Bill 201252 still resemble those of the Insider Trading Directorate 
in many respects.53 
 
Specifically, the Directorate of Market Abuse is made up of representatives of the regulated 
markets, the Share Holders’ Association of South Africa, the fund management industry, the 
insurance industry, the South African Reserve Bank, the bankers, and the accounting and 
legal professions.  These persons are appointed by the Minister of Finance54 on the basis of 
their availability, expertise and knowledge of the financial markets.55   The same position is 
replicated in the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 without any 
changes.56  
 
The Directorate of Market Abuse is empowered to institute any civil proceedings as 
contemplated in the Securities Services Act and to investigate any matter relating to market 
abuse.57  If it obtains an appropriate warrant, it has the powers to summon, interrogate, and 
search and seize any documents in possession of suspected persons.58  These powers are also 
replicated in the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012.59  Moreover, the 
Directorate of Market Abuse may withdraw, abandon or compromise any civil proceedings 
instituted as contemplated in the Securities Services Act.60  Notably, in terms of the Financial 
Markets Bill, the Directorate of Market Abuse may withdraw, abandon or compromise any 
civil proceedings in respect of both insider trading and market manipulation.61  Nevertheless, 
any such compromise should be done in terms of an order of court and any compensatory 
49     S 83(1)(b) of the Securities Services Act; clause 92(1)(b) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 87(1)(b) 
of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
50      S 83(1)(c);(d) & (e). 
51      Clause 92(1)(c); (d) & (e). 
52      Clause 87(1)(c) & (d).   
53      S 12 of the Insider Trading Act. 
54      S 83(3)(a) to (j) of the Securities Services Act. 
55      S 83(4) of the Securities Services Act. 
56    Clause 92(3)(a) to (j) read with clause 92(4) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 87(3)(a) to (j) read 
with clause 87(4) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
57     S 83(1)(c) of the Securities Services Act. 
58     S 83(1)(c) read with s 82(2) of the Securities Services Act. 
59     Clause 92(1)(c) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 87(1)(c) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
60     S 78(1) of the Securities Services Act. 
61     Clause 88(1). 
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amount recovered in terms of the compromise must be made public under the Securities 
Services Act62 as well as the Financial Markets Bill.63  No similar provision is made in the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.64 
 
Furthermore, the Directorate of Market Abuse may, on behalf of the Financial Services 
Board, decide whether to refer a matter to the Enforcement Committee or to institute 
derivative civil proceedings or to refer a matter to the Director of Public Prosecutions.65  In 
addition, the Directorate of Market Abuse may only institute civil proceedings in the name of 
the Financial Services Board and may settle any matter only after confirmation from the 
Financial Services Board or a competent court.    This may rather indicate that the Directorate 
of Market Abuse only exercises certain specific powers in the name of the Financial Services 
Board.66  
 
Although the referral of market abuse cases to the Enforcement Committee does not affect the 
power of the Directorate of Market Abuse to take a derivative civil action against a person 
who contravenes the insider trading provisions,67 no civil proceedings may be instituted in 
respect of the same set of facts if such person (respondent) has paid the compensatory amount 
as stipulated in the Securities Services Act.68  This is probably good and justifiable in that it is 
aimed at reducing the potentially negative effects of over-deterrence and the risk of double 
jeopardy on the part of the defendant concerned.  Strikingly, no similar provision is contained 
in the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012,69 but nonetheless only the 
Financial Markets Bill states that a court should take into account any award or penalty 
previously imposed against the offenders in respect of the same cause.70  
 
The Directorate of Market Abuse does not operate in isolation.   It may further investigate any 
suspected market abuse cases forwarded to it by the JSE’s Surveillance Division.  Put 
62     S 78(1) & (2) of the Securities Services Act. 
63     Clause 88(1) & (2). 
64     See the relevant clauses under Chapter X entitled “Market Abuse” of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
65     Loubser (02-10-2006) 26-27 <http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-10-
2008).   
66     Loubser (02-10-2006) 26 <http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-10-2008).     
67      S 101(2) of the Securities Services Act. 
68      S 105(5) of the Securities Services Act. 
69    Clause 92 read with clauses 86 & 87 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 87 read with clause 84 of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
70      Clause 89 of the Financial Markets Bill. 
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differently, the investigation team of the Directorate of Market Abuse undertakes full forensic 
investigations into alerts on the JSE’s radar screen to detect market abuse activities.71   
Irrespective of this, the Securities Services Act does not clearly provide whether the JSE’s 
Surveillance Division is statutorily obliged to report incidences of market abuse to the 
Directorate of Market Abuse.   This flaw is still not addressed in the Financial Markets Bill 
and the Financial Markets Bill 2012.72    
 
Finally, the Directorate of Market Abuse may, on behalf of the Financial Services Board, 
publish a list of market abuse cases under investigation and proposed action, if any, in the 
press after every one of its meetings.73  Thus, the scope of the mandate and functions of the 
Directorate of Market Abuse is considerably wider because it deals with all the forms of 
market abuse as proscribed in the Securities Services Act.   Importantly, this situation could 
still continue under the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012.74 
 
3 2 3 The Role of the Enforcement Committee 
 
The Enforcement Committee is established as another committee of the Financial Services 
Board that administrates and adjudicates on all the forms of market abuse referred to it by the 
Directorate of Market Abuse or the Registrar of Securities Services.75  The Financial Services 
Board extended the jurisdiction of the Enforcement Committee to all the industries it regulates 
under the Securities Services Act76 by the insertion of some of its relevant provisions in the 
Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act 28 of 2001 as amended.77   In relation to this, 
the powers of the Registrar of Securities Services to refer matters to the Enforcement 
71    Loubser (02-10-2006) 26 <http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-10-2008).   
72    See the functions of the Directorate of Market Abuse as contained in clause 92 of the Financial Markets 
Bill & clause 87 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
73    Generally see Loubser (02-10-2006) 26 <http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 
10-10-2008).  Nineteen cases of insider trading were investigated by the DMA between November 2004 
and April 2007.  Three of these cases were abandoned (closed) and the remaining sixteen are still 
pending.  See the Directorate of Market Abuse Report Media Release < http://www.fsb.co.za> (accessed 
13-06-2008).  
74    Clause 92 read with clauses 86; 87 & 88 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 87 read with clause 84 of 
the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
75   See s 94(e) & 97 of the Securities Services Act; see further Luiz “Market Abuse and the Enforcement 
Committee” 2011 SA Merc LJ 151 155-172.   
76      S 97 to 105 of the Securities Services Act. 
77     Hereinafter referred to as the Protection of Funds Act; see s 6B to 6I of the Protection of Funds Act.   
Also see Van Deventer “Harnassing Administrative Law in Encouraging Compliance” 2009 FSB Bulletin 
3 3-4.   
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Committee have been reintroduced in the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets 
Bill 2012.78  
 
Moreover, the Enforcement Committee is made up of members who are appointed by the 
Financial Services Board.79  At least two of the appointed members must be legally 
qualified.80 The Enforcement Committee may further appoint additional members with 
appropriate knowledge and experience.81  Any of the members who have investigated or who 
have an interest in a matter cannot take part in a decision of the Enforcement Committee on 
that matter.82  The Financial Services Board may yet again appoint, from the members, a 
chairperson and deputy chairperson of the Enforcement Committee.83  Conspicuously, the 
Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 do not have a specific provision 
that deals with the general composition of the Enforcement Committee.84  
 
The functions of the Enforcement Committee include powers to deal with any matter referred 
to it in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Securities Services Act.85   The 
Enforcement Committee is also required to submit to the Financial Services Board an annual 
report on the activities of the Enforcement Committee during the preceding calendar year 
within the period and containing the information specified by the Financial Services Board.86  
However, the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 do not provide any 
specific functions of the Enforcement Committee in detail.87 
 
Referral of any matter relating to market abuse to the Enforcement Committee may be 
instituted in terms of the relevant provisions of either the Securities Services Act88 or the 
78      Clause 105 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 101 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
79      S 98 of the Securities Services Act. 
80      S 98(1) of the Securities Services Act. 
81     S 98(2) of the Securities Services Act. 
82     S 98(3) of the Securities Services Act. 
83     S 98(4) of the Securities Services Act. 
84    See clause 105 & the relevant clauses under Chapter X entitled “Market Abuse” of the Financial Markets 
Bill & clause 101 & the relevant clauses under Chapter X entitled “Market Abuse” of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.   
85     S 99 & s 102 to s 105 of the Securities Services Act. 
86     S 99(2) of the Securities Services Act. 
87    See clause 105 & the relevant clauses under Chapter X entitled “Market Abuse” in the Financial Markets 
Bill; clause 101 & the relevant clauses under Chapter X entitled “Market Abuse” of the Financial Markets 
Bill 2012.   
88     S 94(e) of the Securities Services Act. 
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Protection of Funds Act.89   The referral of any matter to the Enforcement Committee in terms 
of the Securities Services Act is usually done by the Directorate of Market Abuse.90   
Precisely, the referral of any matter in terms of the Securities Services Act must be instituted 
in the manner proscribed in its relevant provisions.91  More to the point, the referral of a 
matter to the Enforcement Committee in terms of the Securities Services Act may be 
withdrawn by the Registrar of Securities Services or the Directorate of Market Abuse.92  
Likewise, the referral of any matter to the Enforcement Committee in terms of the Protection 
of Funds Act may be done by the Registrar of Securities Services or the Directorate of Market 
Abuse.93  Nonetheless, cases in which the Registrar of Securities Services has authority to 
impose penalties cannot be referred to the Enforcement Committee.94  Moreover, as earlier 
stated, the Registrar of Securities Services also has powers to refer matters to the Enforcement 
Committee in terms of the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012.95  
 
Each matter referred in terms of the Securities Services Act will be assigned to a panel 
consisting of the chairperson or deputy chairperson and at least two other members of the 
Enforcement Committee.96  This panel determines its own procedure for the performance of 
its functions and its proceedings are open to the public.97   The decision of the panel must be 
given in writing with reasons and the decision of the majority of the members of the panel is 
regarded as the decision of the Enforcement Committee.98  
 
Where any matter relating to market abuse or other related violations is referred to the 
Enforcement Committee as contemplated in the Protection of Funds Act, the applicant must 
give a notice with details of the alleged contravention, proposed administrative sanction and 
an affidavit setting out the facts and documents supporting such notice.99   The applicant is 
further required to deliver a copy of the notice and affidavit to the respondent’s residential 
89     See further s 6A read with s 6B to s 6I of the Protection of Funds Act. 
90     S 94(e) of the Securities Services Act. 
91     S 102 of the Securities Services Act read with s 94(e) of the same Act. 
92     S 101(1) of the Securities Services Act. 
93     S 6A(1) & (2) of the Protection of Funds Act. 
94     Van Deventer 2009 FSB Bulletin 3. 
95     Clause 105 of the Financial Markets Bill; clause 101 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
96     S 100(1) of the Securities Services Act read with s 94(e) of the same Act. 
97     S 100(2) & (3) of the Securities Services Act. 
98     S 100(4) & (5) of the Securities Services Act; also see s 6D(4) of the Protection of Funds Act. 
99     S 6B(1) & (2) of the Protection of Funds Act read further with s 6A of the same Act. 
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address, registered office or principal place of business and to give the respondent an 
opportunity to submit an answering affidavit within 30 days of delivery of such notice and 
affidavit to the respondent.100   Thereafter, the respondent is required in any matter relating to 
market abuse to file a copy of the answering affidavit with the Enforcement Committee and 
the applicant.    This affidavit must state which allegations the respondent admits or denies, as 
well as the respondent’s version of facts.  The applicant must deliver an affidavit in response 
in the manner stipulated in the Protection of Funds Act101 within 30 days of delivery to the 
applicant of the respondent’s affidavit.102 No further affidavits may be filled without 
permission of the Enforcement Committee.103 Nevertheless, the applicant may, after prior 
notice to the Enforcement Committee and the respondent, withdraw the referral of any matter 
involving market abuse, or enter into a written settlement agreement with the respondent 
during or after the proceedings of the Enforcement Committee.104  
 
The hearing of any matter by the Enforcement Committee gives all the parties involved an 
opportunity to argue their case.105   In other words, the Enforcement Committee may order the 
parties involved or any other person to be examined and cross-examined so as to determine 
whether any market abuse offence was committed.106 The Enforcement Committee may 
therefore impose administrative sanctions such as a penalty for punitive purposes by ordering 
the respondent (offender) to pay a sum of money to the Financial Services Board and a 
compensatory penalty by ordering the respondent (offender) to pay any affected person an 
amount of money determined by the Enforcement Committee for the damage or patrimonial 
loss suffered.107  The Enforcement Committee may further impose a compensatory penalty by 
ordering the respondent who engaged in insider trading practices to pay the Financial Services 
Board an amount of money calculated in accordance with relevant provisions of the Securities 
Services Act.108  This compensatory penalty is usually paid by the insider trading offenders 
and distributed to the affected persons by the Financial Services Board. Additionally, the 
Enforcement Committee may impose unlimited administrative penalties on any respondent 
100     S 6B(2) of the Protection of Funds Act. 
101     S 6B(2)(a) of the Protection of Funds Act. 
102     S 6B(4) of the Protection of Funds Act. 
103     S 6B(5) of the Protection of Funds Act. 
104     S 6B(6) & (7) of the Protection of Funds Act. 
105     S 6C(1) & (2) of the Protection of Funds Act.  
106     S 6C(3) to (5) of the Protection of Funds Act.  
107     S 6D(2) of the Protection of Funds Act. 
108      S 77(1); (2); (3) or (4) of the Securities Services Act. 
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who admits that he contravened the market abuse provisions or when it determines that he 
actually contravened such provisions.109  
 
Furthermore, the Enforcement Committee may impose compensatory orders on the market 
abuse offenders in cases where there is a link between the unlawful conduct and calculable 
damages suffered by the affected party or the applicant.110   The Enforcement Committee may 
also impose cost orders on the market abuse offenders for the investigation and preparation 
costs of the Financial Services Board.111   The Enforcement Committee may yet again order 
such offenders to pay the remuneration costs of its panel members.112  Any order made by the 
Enforcement Committee has legal force as if it was made by the High Court and may be 
enforced by the Financial Services Board in cases of non-payment by lodging a certified copy 
of the order with the High Court or any competent court.113  Any order or sanction imposed 
on the market abuse offenders by the Enforcement Committee must be made public.114   No 
member or employee of the Enforcement Committee and the Financial Services Board is 
allowed to disclose any information acquired in the performance of the functions of the 
Enforcement Committee and which relates to its decision unless such disclosure is done in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of the Securities Services Act.115 
 
When determining an appropriate administrative sanction, the Enforcement Committee may 
give regard to other factors such as the nature, duration, seriousness and extent of the 
contravention;116 any loss or damage suffered;117 the extent of the profit derived or loss 
avoided by the respondent;118 the effect of the unlawful conduct on the relevant sector of the 
financial services industry;119 previous penalties or compensation paid on the same set of 
facts;120 the degree to which the respondent co-operated with the applicant and the 
109      S 103 & s104 of the Securities Services Act; also see s 6D of the Protection of Funds Act. 
110      Van Deventer 2009 FSB Bulletin 3-4. 
111      Van Deventer 2009 FSB Bulletin 3-4. 
112      S 6D(5) of the Protection of Funds Act; see further s 105 of the Securities Services Act. 
113      S 6E(2) of the Protection of Funds Act. 
114      S 6G of the Protection of Funds Act. 
115      S 106 of the Securities Services Act. 
116      S 6D(3)(a)of the Protection of Funds Act. 
117      S 6D(3)(b)of the Protection of Funds Act. 
118      S 6D(3)(c)of the Protection of Funds Act. 
119      S 6D(3)(d) of the Protection of Funds Act. 
120      S 6D(3)(f) of the Protection of Funds Act. 
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Enforcement Committee;121 any mitigating factors submitted by the respondent that the 
Enforcement Committee considers relevant122 and the deterrent effect of the administrative 
sanction.123 
 
A respondent or any person not happy with the market abuse sanctions or any order made by 
the Enforcement Committee may appeal to the High Court.124  In light of this, the appellant 
does not need to apply to the Enforcement Committee for the leave to appeal.125  Moreover, 
the launching of the appeal proceedings does not suspend the operation or execution of a 
decision made by the panel of the Enforcement Committee.126  The appellant may still apply 
to the chairperson of the Enforcement Committee for such suspension.127 
 
The Enforcement Committee’s market abuse proceedings do not affect any person’s right to 
seek a legal redress in other appropriate forums.128  It is therefore possible for a respondent to 
be penalised by the Enforcement Committee and to be also sued by the affected person in the 
civil courts.   Seemingly, the administrative sanctions imposed by the Enforcement 
Committee against the market abuse offenders do not limit the possibility of further criminal 
prosecution or other appropriate disciplinary proceedings to be effected against such 
offenders.129  This does not amount to double jeopardy as the latter court or tribunal is 
required to take into account any previous administrative sanctions imposed by the 
Enforcement Committee.130 
 
Lastly, the Enforcement Committee may utilise the administrative sanctions recovered from 
the market abuse offenders for the purposes of consumer education and the protection of the 
public by paying them into a trust fund as provided in the Securities Services Act.131   
Regardless of this, this research maintains that the mere fact that the Enforcement Committee 
121      S 6D(3)(h) of the Protection of Funds Act 
122      S 6D(3)(i) of the Protection of Funds Act. 
123      S 6D(3)(g) of the Protection of Funds Act; also see s 104(7); (8) & (9)(a) to (f) of the  Securities Services 
Act.  
124      S 6F of the Protection of Funds Act. 
125      S 6F(1) of the Protection of Funds Act. 
126      S 6F(2) of the Protection of Funds Act. 
127      S 6F(2) of the Protection of Funds Act. 
128      Van Deventer 2009 FSB Bulletin 3-4. 
129     Van Deventer 2009 FSB Bulletin 3-4. 
130     S 6I of the Protection of Funds Act.  Also see Van Deventer 2009 FSB Bulletin 3-4. 
131     S 77(7); (8) & (9) of the Securities Services Act.   See further s 6H of the Protection of Funds Act.    
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may only institute appropriate proceedings against the market abuse offenders on a referral 
basis132 and where no compensation was paid by such offenders in respect of the same facts133 
could, if not properly managed, have the effect of restricting and impeding the execution of its 
functions.134 Moreover, unlike the position under the Securities Services Act and the 
Protection of Funds Act as indicated above, the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012 do not stipulate any specific procedure that may be followed in respect of 
any referral of market abuse matters to the Enforcement Committee.135 
 
3 2 4 The Role of the Board of Appeal 
 
The Board of Appeal is an independent body established136 to hear and afford all the 
aggrieved persons an opportunity to appeal or lodge their complaints against any decisions of 
the Registrar of Securities Services, the Enforcement Committee or the Financial Services 
Board regarding market abuse for them to be addressed.137   For example, under the Securities 
Services Act,138 a person aggrieved by any decision of the Registrar of Securities Services 
may appeal to the Board of Appeal for further adjudication.    Moreover, any person who is 
not satisfied with the decision of the Enforcement Committee to impose an administrative fine 
or an obligation to pay a compensatory amount to the Financial Services Board or to the 
affected persons (victims) has the right to appeal to the Board of Appeal.139   Likewise, any 
person aggrieved by the decision of the claims officer as contemplated in the Securities 
Services Act140 may apply to the Board of Appeal for a redress.141   Even so, such an appeal 
must be consistent with the relevant provisions of the Securities Services Act.142  Apart from 
changing the name of the Board of Appeal to Appeal Board,143 the Financial Markets Bill and 
132     S 94(e) of the Securities Services Act; 6A of the Protection of Funds Act. 
133     S 6D(3)(f) of the Protection of Funds Act. 
134    Cassim “An Analysis of Market Manipulation under the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004 (Part 2)” 
2008 SA Merc LJ 177 191–193.      
135     Clause 105 of the Financial Markets Bill; clause 101 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
136     See s 26A of the Financial Services Board Act. 
137     S 111 & 6F of the Securities Services Act & the Protection of Funds Act respectively. 
138      S 111(1)(a) of the Securities Services Act. 
139      S 111(1)(b) of the Securities Services Act. 
140      S 77(7)(b) of the Securities Services Act read with s 77(8) & (9) of the same Act. 
141      S 111(1)(i) of the Securities Services Act. 
142      S 111of the Securities Services Act. 
143      Clause 1 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 1 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
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the Financial Markets Bill 2012 retain substantially the same functions of this body.144  For 
instance, all the persons aggrieved by any decision of the Registrar of Securities Services, 
independent clearing house, an exchange, claims officer and the central securities depository 
may now appeal or lodge their complaints with the Appeal Board.145 
 
The Board of Appeal hearings must be conducted in public146 and where an appeal is against 
a decision of the Enforcement Committee, the Registrar of Securities Services must act as the 
respondent.147  Where the respondent does not appeal against the Enforcement Committee 
within the stipulated period, the Registrar of Securities Services must make the decision of the 
Enforcement Committee public, unless such publication will be contrary to the Securities 
Services Act or there are exceptional circumstances that justify the keeping of the decision 
confidential as stipulated in the Securities Services Act.148   No similar provisions are found 
in the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets 2012.149 
 
In determining its decision, the Board of Appeal takes into account several factors which 
include among others, the reasons for the decision appealed against, the grounds of appeal, 
documentary or verbal evidence submitted or given by any person at the request or with the 
permission of the Board of Appeal and any other information at the disposal of the Board of 
Appeal.150  Furthermore, the Board of Appeal must make its decision within a reasonable time 
and that decision is binding on the parties to the appeal.151 Once a respondent has exhausted 
all the remedies provided under the Securities Services Act, he may still have the decision of 
the Board of Appeal reviewed by a competent court.152  However, it is rather amusing that the 
Financial Markets Bill removed the conditions153 that used to be taken into account by the 
Board of Appeal before making any decision pertaining to the aggrieved persons’ appeal.154 
 
144      Clause 111 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 107 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
145      Clause 111 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 107 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
146      S 111(2) of the Securities Services Act. 
147      S 111(3) of the Securities Services Act. 
148    S 106 of the Securities Services Act. 
149    Clause 111 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 107 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
150    S 111(5) of the Securities Services Act. 
151    S 111(6) & 7(a) of the Securities Services Act. 
152    S 111(7)(b) of the Securities Services Act. 
153    See s 111(5) of the Securities Services Act. 
154    Clause 111 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 107 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
88 
                                               
Notwithstanding the Board of Appeal’s enforcement efforts, not many persons have so far 
utilised its appeal proceedings.155  This could indicate that some persons are unaware of the 
role of the Board of Appeal or that no persons are being aggrieved by the decisions or 
sanctions imposed by the Registrar of Securities Services, the Financial Services Board or the 
Enforcement Committee.  While the latter may be true, it remains to be seen how successful 
the Board of Appeal will be in relation to the affording of all the aggrieved persons’ 
appropriate redress timeously.156  In the same vein, it is still questionable whether the Appeal 
Board which was re-introduced in the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 
2012 will also be able to provide adequate and timeous redress to all the aggrieved persons.157 
 
3 2 5  The Role of the JSE Limited 
 
The JSE plays a pivotal role in the detection, investigation and prevention of market abuse in 
South Africa.158  Specifically, the JSE has the Market Practices Department in its Surveillance 
Division which is mainly responsible for preventing and detecting market abuse activities.159 
 
With regard to prevention, the JSE requires all the listed companies to promptly disclose non-
public price-sensitive information relating to any securities in order to inter alia, minimise the 
occurrence of market abuse activities.160  This is done by ensuring that all the listed 
companies comply with the JSE Listing Requirements relating to the disclosure of non-public 
price-sensitive information.161  For example, the JSE imposes a general obligation of 
disclosure on all the issuers of securities to make a public announcement, through the JSE’s 
Stock Exchange News, of any developments or activities that might result in a material effect 
on the price of the issuer’s listed securities.162  
 
155   Luiz “Market Abuse - II” 2002 JBL’s Quarterly Law Review for People in Business 180 180-183; see 
further Loubser (02-10-2006) 25-28 <http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-
10-2008).    
156    See similar criticism by Luiz 2002 JBL’s Quarterly Law Review for People in Business 180-183. 
157    Clause 111 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 107 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
158   Loubser (02-10-2006) 25 <http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-10-2008).   
Also see similar remarks in paragraphs 3 2 1 & 3 2 2 above.  
159    Loubser (02-10-2006) 25 <http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-10-2008). 
160    Loubser (02-10-2006) 25 <http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-10-2008). 
161    See generally s 3 of the JSE Listing Requirements. 
162    See s 3.4 of the JSE Listing Requirements. 
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The JSE further requires, except for trading statements,163 that an issuer must immediately, 
unless the information is kept confidential for a limited period,164 release an announcement 
providing details of any developments in such issuer’s activities that are not publicly 
known165 and which might lead to material movements of the reference price of such issuer’s 
listed securities or illicit market abuse practices.  All issuers other than those who publish 
quarterly results must comply with the JSE’s disclosure requirements.166  All issuers are 
further required to publish a trading statement as soon they are satisfied that a reasonable 
degree of certainty exists that the financial results for a period to be reported upon next will 
differ by at least 20% from the most recent of the financial results for a previous 
corresponding period or of a profit forecast previously provided to the market in relation to 
such a period in order to curb market abuse activities.167  The determination of a reasonable 
degree of certainty referred above is a judgmental decision taken by the issuer and its 
directors, excluding the JSE itself.168  However, the JSE provides procedures that must be 
followed during and after the publication of the trading statements by the issuers to enhance 
the accurate dissemination of price-sensitive information for the purposes of combating 
market abuse practices.169  For instance, the JSE provides that price-sensitive confidential 
information may not be released to any third party, an analyst, printer or media during the 
JSE’s trading hours until it is published in accordance with or outside of the JSE’s trading 
hours or until such information has been authenticated or proved170 and arrangements have 
been made before the next business day’s opening of the JSE’s trading hours.171  Above and 
beyond, price-sensitive information may only, in the strictest confidence, be disclosed to 
persons such as government departments, the South African Reserve Bank, the Securities 
Regulation Panel, the Financial Services Board, investment analysts or any other statutory or 
regulatory body and may not be published unless there is a breach of confidentiality and the 
market is made aware of such information.172   
 
163   See s 3.4(b) of the JSE Listing Requirements. 
164    See s 3.6 of the JSE Listing Requirements. 
165    See s 3.4(a) of the JSE Listing Requirements. 
166     See s 3.4(b)(i) to (vi) of the JSE Listing Requirements. 
167     See s 3.4(b)(i) of the JSE Listing Requirements. 
168     See s 3.4(b)(ii) of the JSE Listing Requirements. 
169     See further s 3.4(b)(vii) to (viii) of the JSE Listing Requirements. 
170     See paragraphs 6; 7 & 8 of schedule 19 of the JSE Listing Requirements. 
171     This provision is subject to s 3.6 to s 3.8 of the JSE Listing Requirements. 
172     See s 3.6 to s 3.8 of the JSE Listing Requirements. 
90 
                                               
The JSE also requires issuers to disclosure cautionary announcements and periodic financial 
information regarding their listed securities.173   More to the point, issuers must, by way of 
notice and in writing, inform the JSE immediately of any proportion of the listed securities in 
the hands of the public which might have been affected or fallen below shareholder spread 
requirements.174 This is probably done to combat insider trading and market manipulation.   
Issuers must yet again disclose all relevant information to holders of securities to enable them 
to exercise their rights.175 Furthermore, issuers must disclose all the details of their 
transactions in securities relating to the issuer by or on behalf of the director, company 
secretary, any associate of the issuer or any independent entity, if such issuer may derive a 
beneficial interest.176  Issuers who fail to comply with these disclosure requirements, 
especially to those that deal with the disclosure of annual financial statements, may risk 
suspension or possible termination or delay of their securities from the JSE.177   
 
As earlier stated,178 with regard to detection, the JSE’s Surveillance Division has in place a 
number of sophisticated proprietary surveillance systems that are specifically designed to 
detect suspicious trading volumes and price movements which could be indicative of insider 
trading or market manipulation.179  These sophisticated surveillance systems are capable of 
identifying the names, addresses, telephone numbers and other details of the parties involved 
in the transactions.180   Precisely, the staff in the Market Practices Department of the JSE’s 
Surveillance Division is specifically responsible for detecting any signs of market abuses 
using such surveillance systems which are updated every 30 minutes.181  Additionally, the 
staff in the Market Practices Department of the JSE’s Surveillance Division may analyse the 
trading history of any account holder in relation to a particular security to detect unusual 
trading patterns which could be a sign of insider trading activity or market manipulation.182   
In other words, trading through different accounts at different brokerage firms can be linked, 
173     See s 3.9; s 3.11 & s 3.12 to s 3.22 of the JSE Listing Requirements. 
174    See s 3.42 & s 3.43 of the JSE Listing Requirements. 
175    See s 3.44 of the JSE Listing Requirements. 
176    See also paragraph 3.83 of the JSE Listing Requirements.  
177    See s 3.23 of the JSE Listing Requirements. 
178    See similar remarks in paragraphs 3 2 1; 3 2 2 above & 2 5 1 in Chapter Two of this thesis. 
179    Loubser (02-10-2006) 25 <http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-10-2008); 
Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 196–198.  
180    Loubser (02-10-2006) 25 <http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-10-2008). 
181    Loubser (02-10-2006) 25 <http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-10-2008). 
182    Loubser (02-10-2006) 25 <http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-10-2008). 
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as well as accounts with similar details, such as addresses and telephone numbers to prevent 
market abuse practices. Where suspicious trading is detected and there appears to be no clarity 
on the cause, surveillance officers may contact the directors of the affected listed company to 
find out whether they are aware of any price-sensitive information that is due to be made 
public.   If this is the case, the company concerned is requested to make a relevant 
announcement as soon as possible through the JSE’s Stock Exchange News.   The detected 
unusual trading activity may further be reported to the Directorate of Market Abuse for 
further investigation.183  When the publication of the suspicious trading announcement is 
delayed or not done, the JSE may stop trading in the affected company’s shares until the 
announcement has been made to prevent market abuse activities.184 Where the published 
announcements affect or may affect the prices of the listed securities, the JSE’s Surveillance 
Division examines the trading activity prior to the announcements to investigate whether there 
is evidence of possible market abuse.185   
 
Notwithstanding the fact that the JSE and the Financial Services Board have a relatively good 
co-operation,186 this research submits that more may still need to be done to ensure that such 
co-operation continues to be utilised to combat market abuse activity in South Africa.187   In 
light of this, such co-operation could be further impeded by the absence of a provision in the 
Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012, which statutorily obliges the 
JSE’s Surveillance Division to report incidences of market abuse to the Financial Services 
Board.188 
 
183    Loubser (02-10-2006) 25 <http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-10-2008). 
184    Loubser (02-10-2006) 25 <http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-10-2008). 
185    Loubser (02-10-2006) 25 <http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-10-2008).  
186    Loubser (02-10-2006) 25 <http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-10-2008); 
also see generally Van Deventer 2009 FSB Bulletin 3-4.  
187    See the discussion that will be held later in paragraph 4 3 1 of Chapter Four of this thesis.  
188   Clause 91 & other relevant clauses under Chapter X entitled “Market Abuse” of the Financial Markets 
Bill & clause 86 & other relevant clauses under Chapter X entitled “Market Abuse” of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012. 
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3 2 6 The Role of the Courts 
 
Only the competent courts189 are responsible for the civil and criminal prosecution of market 
abuse cases in South Africa.   Therefore, the High Courts or regional courts have a 
prerogative to hear all the market abuse cases referred to them by the Financial Services 
Board.190   Remarkably, unlike the position under the Securities Services Act,191 the Financial 
Markets Bill now only provides that a ‘court of competent jurisdiction’ includes a court 
within whose jurisdiction the regulated market has its principal place of business or head 
office or in which any element of the dealing or offence occurred, without any need to make 
any attachment to found or confirm its jurisdiction.192  No similar provision is made in the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.193 Specifically, the Securities Services Act,194 Financial Markets 
Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012195 stipulate that the prosecution of all the criminal 
cases of market abuse rests mainly with the Director of Public Prosecutions.196  Even so, the 
Director of Public Prosecutions may only exercise its prosecutorial powers on a referral basis.  
In relation to this, under the Securities Services Act any person accused of a civil offence of 
insider trading may only be liable if he fails to prove on a balance of probabilities that he did 
not commit that offence.197  Similarly, any person accused of a civil offence of insider trading 
and/or market manipulation may only be liable if he fails to prove on a balance of 
probabilities that he did not commit that offence.198  Likewise, a person accused of a criminal 
offence of insider trading or market manipulation may only be liable if the Director of Public 
Prosecutions proves beyond reasonable doubt that he actually committed that offence.199   
Nonetheless, no appropriate presumptions were provided in the Securities Services Act to 
enable the Director of Public Prosecutions to obtain more convictions in criminal cases of 
189   These competent courts include the High Courts and Regional Courts.  See further s 79 of the Securities 
Services Act.   
190    S 79 of the Securities Services Act.   
191    S 79 of the Securities Services Act.   
192    Clause 81. 
193    Clause 79. 
194    S 82(9) read with s 79. 
195   Clause 91(9) read with clause 81 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 86(10) read with clause 79 of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.    
196    Loubser (02-10-2006) 26-28 <http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-10-
2008). 
197    S 77 of the Securities Services Act.  
198    Clauses 86 & 87 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 84 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
199   S 73; s 75 & s 76 of the Securities Services Act; clauses 82; 84 & 85 of the Financial Markets Bill & 
clause 80; 82 & 83 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.    
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market abuse.200  This flaw was not resolved in both the Financial Markets Bill and the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.201  
 
Under the Securities Services Act, the competent courts further play a crucial role in the 
determination and calculation of the appropriate damages in civil cases of insider trading,202 
namely the compensatory or punitive amounts to be paid to the Financial Services Board or to 
the actual prejudiced persons by the offenders.    This enables all the affected (claimants) 
persons to have an opportunity to get appropriate monetary remedies awarded to them by the 
courts from the Financial Services Board.203  On the one hand, the Financial Markets Bill now 
extends the same role of the competent courts in respect of both insider trading and market 
manipulation.204 Nonetheless, this is not the case under the Financial Markets Bill 2012.205 As 
indicated earlier,206 the competent courts may also hear an appeal by any person aggrieved by 
the decision of the Financial Services Board, Registrar of Securities Services, Enforcement 
Committee or the Board of Appeal and review such decision.207  It is important to note that 
the competent courts also have a similar role under the Financial Markets Bill and the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.208 
 
3 2 7 Analysis and Recommendations 
 
The success of any piece of legislation in any country is usually determined by the 
implementation of its provisions.209  It is against this background that a close examination of 
the relevant provisions of the Securities Services Act was undertaken to investigate whether 
200    Loubser (02-10-2006) 26-28 <http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-10-
2008). 
201    Clauses 82; 84 & 85 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 80; 82 & 83 of the Financial Markets Bill 
2012.    
202   See further s 77(1)(c)(i) to (iv); s 77(2)(c)(i) to (v); s 77(3)(b)(i) to (v) & s 77(4)(a) to (e) of the Securities 
Services Act.  
203    S 77(7) to (10) of the Securities Services Act. 
204    Clauses 86 & 87. 
205   Clause 84 read with other relevant clauses under Chapter X entitled “Market Abuse” of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.   
206    See similar comments in paragraph 3 2 4 above. 
207    S 111(7)(b) of the Securities Services Act. 
208    Clause 111 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 107 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
209   See the comparative analysis that will be carried out later in Chapters Five, Six, Seven, Eight & Nine of 
this thesis.   
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they are being implemented to curb market abuse practices in South Africa.210  Consequently, 
the duties of the current market abuse enforcement authorities namely the Financial Services 
Board, the Directorate of Market Abuse, the Enforcement Committee, the Board of Appeal, 
the JSE and the courts will be briefly and carefully analysed below. 
 
As earlier discussed,211 the Financial Services Board still has various challenges with regard 
to the monitoring and enforcement of the market abuse provisions in South Africa.212   The 
fact that the Financial Services Board has limited prosecutorial powers in that it may only 
prosecute criminal cases of market abuse if the Director of Public Prosecutions or a competent 
court has declined to prosecute them is a case in point.213  Given the existing courts backlog 
challenges in South Africa, it is submitted that not all premises and persons will be promptly 
searched, interrogated or prosecuted by the Financial Services Board and/or the competent 
courts.   Thus, even though the availability of adequate resources could be problematic, more 
courts or additional special commercial courts or tribunals should be established to adjudicate 
on market abuse cases in South Africa.  In light of this, the Financial Services Board should 
further consider having more offices and other divisions of its departments in different regions 
of South Africa to increase awareness214 and to enhance the implementation of its functions.    
It is further submitted that although it might be cheaper for the victims of market abuse to 
claim their damages through the Financial Services Board, this might have, on the other hand, 
also deterred other affected persons from claiming their damages through the Financial 
Services Board because of fears that such a strategy would be too bureaucratic.215  Moreover, 
no cross-border market abuse cases have so far been successfully settled with the Financial 
Services Board, probably as a result of several factors which include, among others, the 
unavailability of the relevant resources.216  This could have been further aggravated by the 
210    See the discussions under paragraphs 2 4 & 2 5 in Chapter Two of this thesis. 
211    See paragraph 3 2 1 above. 
212   See s 82 of the Securities Services Act; clause 91 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 86 of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 which outlines some of the duties of the Financial Services Board.    
213   See s 82(9) of the Securities Services Act; clause 91(9) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 86(10) of 
the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
214   Notwithstanding the fact that the Financial Services Board is entitled to publish notices in relation to 
market abuse offences in terms of s 82(5) of the Securities Services Act to increase awareness, it has not 
successfully implemented this provision particularly owing to the inadequate availability of resources.   
Additionally, it remains to be seen whether a similar provision which is contained in clause 91(5) of the 
Financial Markets Bill & clause 86(6) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012 will be successfully utilised by 
the Financial Services Board to increase awareness.  
215    See related comments in paragraphs 2 5 4 in Chapter Two of this thesis & 3 2 1 above.  
216    See paragraph 3 2 1 above. 
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fact that the Financial Services Board does not have its own surveillance equipment in place 
to timeously detect any suspected market abuse practices and to provide the details of the 
beneficial owners of securities held in nominee accounts in South Africa or elsewhere.   
 
Notwithstanding its commendable efforts to curb market abuse in South Africa, the 
Directorate of Market Abuse is still to achieve more success in relation to the execution of its 
market abuse duties.217   For example, it has restricted authority and does not perform any of 
its duties without confirmation from the Financial Services Board and the competent 
courts.218 This clearly suggests that the Directorate of Market Abuse does not have the power 
of its own to make market abuse rules and this could be negatively affecting the execution of 
its duties.    In relation to this, one could have expected that the Directorate of Market Abuse 
(which is a committee of the Financial Services Board) will be allowed to execute its duties 
without prior confirmation from the Financial Services Board in order to curb potential 
bureaucracy.  Moreover, the Directorate of Market Abuse does not have its own surveillance 
systems in place to detect, investigate and prevent the occurrence of market abuse practices in 
the South African financial markets.   Specifically, as stated earlier,219 the Directorate of 
Market Abuse depends on the JSE’s Surveillance Division for its market abuse 
investigations.220 Despite submissions by other commentators like Rob Barrow (the former 
chief executive officer of the Financial Services Board)221 that the Directorate of Market 
Abuse now has sufficient measures in place and competent personnel to improve the 
enforcement of the market abuse provisions in South Africa, a few convictions and 
settlements attained to date may suggest otherwise.222 
 
Although the Enforcement Committee is empowered as a committee of the Financial Services 
Board which administers the administrative sanctions for market abuse in South Africa, it 
may only institute administrative or civil proceedings in a court of law against the offenders 
217    See paragraph 3 2 2 above. 
218   S 78 & s 83 of the Securities Services Act & clauses 92 & 88 of the Financial Markets Bill; clause 87 of 
the Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
219    See generally paragraph 3 2 2 above. 
220    Loubser (02-10-2006) 26-27 <http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-10-
2008). 
221    Barrow Business Report (2004-07-28).  Also see generally paragraph 3 2 1 above. 
222   Chanetsa “Insider Trading is Notoriously Hard to Prosecute” Business Report (2004-04-26).   Also see 
generally paragraph 3 2 2 above.     
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on a referral basis223 and where no compensation was paid by the defendant as provided under 
the Securities Services Act.224 This referral procedure might have weakened the enforcement 
functions of the Enforcement Committee and could, if not properly managed, continue to have 
the effect of restricting or impeding the implementation of the administrative sanctions for 
market abuse in South Africa.225  Besides, in spite of the fact that the Enforcement Committee 
may impose unlimited administrative penalties against the market abuse offenders, not many 
cases of market abuse have been settled with the Enforcement Committee to date.226 
 
The Board of Appeal is statutorily empowered to hear any appeal by persons aggrieved by the 
decisions or sanctions imposed by the Registrar of Securities Services, the Financial Services 
Board or the Enforcement Committee.227  While this may be a good move towards affording 
justice and equal opportunities to all persons, not many persons have to date employed the 
Board of Appeal proceedings for their redress.228  This research contends that this could also 
indicate that the Board of Appeal might be facing some difficulties in relation to the affording 
of all the aggrieved persons appropriate redress timeously. 
 
In spite of the fact that the JSE has played a considerable role in the enforcement of market 
abuse laws in South Africa, its efforts could still be interrupted and hampered by inconsistent 
co-operation with other regulatory bodies.229  In light of this, the JSE should continue co-
operating with the Financial Services Board, the Securities Regulation Panel and other 
relevant enforcement authorities in order to curb market abuse practices, especially in relation 
to over the counter transactions as well as cross-border market abuse activity.    
 
223  S 101 of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 105 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 101 of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
224    S 77 & s 105(5) of the Securities Services Act. 
225   See s 101 & s 102 of the Securities Services Act, read with clause 105 of the Financial Markets Bill & 
clause 101 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
226    See generally paragraph 3 2 3 above. 
227   S 111 of the Securities Services Act & also see clause 111 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 107 of 
the Financial Markets Bill 2012.    Also see paragraph 3 2 4 above.    
228    Luiz 2002 JBL’s Quarterly Law Review for People in Business 180-183; see further Loubser (02-10-
2006) 25-28 <http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-10-2008) & see further 
paragraph 3 2 4 above.    
229    See further paragraph 3 2 5 above. 
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Furthermore, the competent courts have played, and are still playing, a significant role in the 
enforcement of market abuse laws in South Africa.230  Nonetheless, the backlog and pressure 
on the part of the South African judicial services and the Director of Public Prosecutions 
might well be the reason for the absence of many convictions and settlements that have been 
obtained in market abuse cases in South Africa to date.231  In this regard, the introduction of 
additional separate commercial courts manned by specialists to deal with market abuse 
matters should receive serious consideration in order to improve the enforcement of market 
abuse provisions in South Africa. 
 
3 3  Concluding Remarks 
 
The enforcement framework established under the Securities Services Act can be welcomed 
as a better move towards improving the enforcement of market abuse provisions in South 
Africa and the eradication of a general belief that market abuse practices might be still rife in 
our financial markets.232 
 
Significant progress has been made in the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in this 
country.   For example, in an attempt to establish a good enforcement framework, more 
elaborate civil remedies and new criminal penalties were introduced under the Securities 
Services Act.233  Likewise, the Directorate of Market Abuse was established as an 
investigatory arm of the Financial Services Board, while the Enforcement Committee was 
empowered to hear cases of market abuse and to impose unlimited administrative sanctions 
against anyone who violates the market abuse provisions in South Africa.   The Board of 
Appeal was also given the mandate to hear appeal matters by persons aggrieved by any 
decision of the Enforcement Committee, the claims officer of the Financial Services Board or 
the Registrar of Securities Services.  With regard to the detection, prevention and 
investigation of market abuse activities, the Financial Services Board depends mainly on the 
JSE’s Surveillance Division.  
 
230    See paragraph 3 2 6 above. 
231    See paragraph 3 2 6 above. 
232     See the analysis in sub-paragraphs under paragraph 2 2 in Chapter Two of this thesis. 
233     See the analysis in paragraphs 2 4 1 1; 2 4 1 2; 2 4 1 3 & 2 5 4 in Chapter Two of this thesis. 
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Irrespective of this, various shortcomings are still found in the enforcement of the market 
abuse provisions in South Africa.234  Notably, the criminal penalties imposed against market 
abuse offenders are still very little for deterrence purposes.235  Moreover, the same deficiency 
is still contained in the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012.236  
Furthermore, the establishment of additional structures such as the Enforcement Committee to 
hear market abuse cases on a referral basis and the introduction of administrative sanctions 
has not been able to encourage all persons to comply with the market abuse prohibition in 
South Africa.237  In relation to this, it was stated that the aforesaid referral procedure might 
have weakened the enforcement functions of the Enforcement Committee and could, if not 
properly managed, continue to have the effect of restricting or impeding the implementation 
of the administrative sanctions for market abuse in South Africa.238  It was also indicated that 
the Directorate of Market Abuse does not have the power of its own to make market abuse 
rules and this could be negatively affecting the execution of its duties.239 In relation to this, it 
was suggested that the Directorate of Market Abuse (which is a committee of the Financial 
Services Board) should be allowed to execute its duties without prior confirmation from the 
Financial Services Board in order to curb potential bureaucracy.240  It was also suggested that 
both the Directorate of Market Abuse and the Financial Services Board should have their own 
surveillance systems in place to detect, investigate and prevent the occurrence of market 
abuse practices in the South African financial markets.241   
 
Moreover, in civil proceedings, the right to claim compensation is exclusively given to the 
Financial Services Board and no provision is made for the prejudiced persons to claim such 
compensation directly (a private right of action) from the perpetrators of market abuse.242   
This could be too rigid and bureaucratic and may, if not carefully enforced, lead to the failure, 
on the part of the Financial Services Board, to compensate all the affected persons speedily.243   
Incongruously, the same weakness is replicated in the Financial Markets Bill and the 
234     See the analysis in paragraph 3 2 7 above. 
235     S 115(a) of the Securities Services Act. 
236     Clause 115(a) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 111(a) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
237      See the analysis in paragraphs 3 2 3 & 3 2 7 above. 
238      See the analysis in paragraph 3 2 7 above. 
239      See the analysis in paragraph 3 2 7 above. 
240      See the analysis in paragraph 3 2 7 above. 
241      See the analysis in paragraph 3 2 7 above. 
242      S 82(2)(c) of the Securities Services Act. 
243      See paragraphs 3 2 1 & 3 2 7 above. 
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Financial Markets Bill 2012.244  Additionally, it was submitted that the failure of the Financial 
Services Board to have its own surveillance equipment that timeously detects any suspected 
market abuse practices and/or provides the details of the beneficial owners of securities held 
in nominee accounts in South Africa or elsewhere could be negatively affecting its combating 
of cross-border market abuse cases.245  It was further suggested that the Financial Services 
Board should consider having more offices and other divisions of its departments in different 
regions of South Africa to increase awareness and to enhance the implementation of its 
functions.246  Furthermore, it was stated that the JSE’s enforcement efforts could still be 
interrupted and hampered by inconsistent co-operation with other regulatory bodies.247  In 
light of this, it was submitted that the JSE should continue co-operating with the Financial 
Services Board, the Securities Regulation Panel and other relevant enforcement authorities in 
order to curb market abuse practices, especially in relation to over the counter transactions as 
well as cross-border market abuse activity.    
 
Not giving less regard to some practical considerations such as the current backlog in the 
courts, severe stress on the judicial resources and the availability of sufficient resources on the 
part of the Financial Services Board, it is submitted that there is still a need to introduce other 
alternative enforcement measures as discussed in this chapter to enhance and improve the 
enforcement of the market abuse provisions in South Africa.   In relation to this, it was 
suggested that even though the availability of adequate resources could be problematic, more 
courts or additional special commercial courts or tribunals should be established to adjudicate 
on market abuse cases in South Africa.248  
 
Given this background, the next chapter will focus on the current gaps and problems 
associated with the ineffective enforcement of the market abuse ban in South Africa.   The 
next chapter will also briefly discuss some selected new market abuse practices that 
manifested during the recent global economic crisis so as to evaluate whether the South 
African anti-market abuse enforcement framework is able to combat such practices 
successfully. 
244      Clause 91(2)(d) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 86(2)(d) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
245      See the analysis in paragraph 3 2 7 above. 
246      See the analysis in paragraph 3 2 7 above. 
247      See the analysis in paragraph 3 2 7 above. 
248      See the analysis in paragraph 3 2 7 above. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
OVERVIEW OF PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH INEFFECTIVE 
ENFORCEMENT OF MARKET ABUSE PROVISIONS 
IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
4 1  Introduction   
 
The enforcement of market abuse laws has been problematic in South Africa.1   Several 
factors like the inherent complexities and flaws in the detection, prosecution and prevention 
of market abuse practices have contributed too many challenges that are associated with the 
inconsistent enforcement of the market abuse laws in South Africa to date.2   As stated in 
Chapter Three, this chapter seeks to explore these enforcement problems by, firstly, taking a 
closer look at the effectiveness of the Financial Services Board as the market abuse national 
regulatory body in South Africa.  Secondly, the co-operation between the Financial Services 
Board and other similar local and international enforcement bodies will be examined.  
Thirdly, the adequacy of the available resources, penalties and remedies will be discussed.   
Fourthly, the adequacy of the market abuse preventative measures that were adopted in South 
Africa will be explored and discussed.   Finally, the gaps and flaws in the current market 
abuse enforcement framework in relation to some selected specific aspects of the financial 
markets in South Africa will be highlighted and briefly discussed.  
 
4 2  Adequacy and Efficiency of the National Regulator? 
 
As discussed earlier in Chapters Two3 and Three,4 the Financial Services Board was 
established in terms of the Financial Services Board Act5 as an independent board and a 
1    See related comments by Van Deventer “Anti-Market Abuse Legislation in South Africa” (10-06-2008) 
1-5 <http://www.fsb.co.za/public/marketabuse/FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 05-05-2009) & Myburgh & 
Davis “The Impact of South Africa’s Insider Trading Regime: A Report for the Financial Services Board” 
(25-03-2004) 8-33 <http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 09-02-2009).     
Also see Bhattacharya & Daouk “The World Price of Insider Trading” 2002 Journal of Finance 75 75-
108; Lyon & Du Plessis The Law of Insider Trading in Australia (2005) 159-168 for further related 
comparative analysis.  
2      See the discussions in Chapters Two and Three of this thesis.    
3       See paragraphs 2 3 4 3; 2 3 5 of Chapter Two of this thesis. 
4       See paragraph 3 2 1 of Chapter Three of this thesis. 
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national regulator to police, supervise and enforce the market abuse ban in South Africa.6  
The Financial Services Board has ostensibly wide powers to enhance and improve the 
enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in South Africa.7  Significant progress in relation 
to the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition has been made since the inception of the 
Financial Services Board in 1999.  For instance, the Financial Services Board is empowered 
to investigate all cases of suspected market abuse, including insider trading committed before 
the repeal of section 440F of the Companies Act8 and the Insider Trading Act.9  All incidents 
of unusual trading patterns are brought to the attention of the Financial Services Board for 
further investigation.   The Financial Services Board is further allowed to interrogate any 
persons believed to have information relating to an ongoing investigation,10 and search any 
person, premises or strongroom in order to seize any document suspected to have information 
relating to an ongoing investigation.11 Although not many criminal prosecutions have been 
successfully obtained, the Financial Services Board has managed to investigate a fair number 
of suspected market abuse violations to date.12 
The Financial Services Board is entitled to take civil action against any person who 
contravenes the relevant provisions of the Securities Services Act13 and fails to rely on any of 
5       97 of 1990, hereinafter referred to as the Financial Services Board Act. 
6       S 82(1) of the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004 (hereinafter referred to as the Securities Services Act). 
7     See s 82 of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 91 of the Financial Markets Bill [B-2011], 
hereinafter referred to as the Financial Markets Bill; clause 86 of the Financial Markets Bill [B12-2012], 
hereinafter referred to as the Financial Markets Bill 2012 (I have employed the term “clause” to refer to 
the provisions of both the Financial Markets Bill & the Financial Markets Bill 2012 because at the time of 
writing this chapter, the aforementioned Bills were not yet effectively passed into law).   
8       61 of 1973, hereinafter referred to as the Companies Act. 
9      135 of 1998, hereinafter referred to as the Insider Trading Act; also see s 82(2)(a) of the Securities 
Services Act.  Notably, in terms of the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012, the 
Financial Services Board is no longer required to investigate insider trading practices committed before 
the repeal of s 440 of the Companies Act, see clause 91 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 86 of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
10    S 82(2)(e) of the Securities Services Act; clause 91(3)(b) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 86(3)(b) 
of the Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
11    S 82(2)(f) of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 91(3)(d) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 
86(3)(c) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
12  Generally see Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 28 <http://www.genesis-
analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 09-02-2009).    Notwithstanding the fact that this 
Myburgh & Davis report was published before the Securities Services Act came into effect and the fact 
that it was somewhat influenced by the opinions of the interviewees, it shall be referred to in this Chapter 
where necessary, not as the only basis or evidence of the existence of market abuse activity in the South 
African financial markets but as a pointer on how market abuse laws were enforced in South Africa prior 
to the enactment of the Securities Services Act.  
13    S 77 of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 86 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 84 of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
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the defences set out in the same Act.14  This civil liability applies only to matters relating to 
insider trading under the Securities Services Act.  No similar civil action can be instituted 
against the market manipulation offenders under the Securities Services Act.15  This omission 
on the part of the legislature may, if not promptly addressed, affect the enforcement of the 
market abuse prohibition by the Financial Services Board.16   It is anticipated that this flaw 
could be corrected by the Financial Markets Bill which now extends the civil liability to 
matters involving market manipulation,17 if it comes into force.   However, the penalty for 
actual profit or loss avoided in civil cases relating to market manipulation or insider trading is 
determined by the competent courts and not the Financial Services Board.18  On the other 
hand, the Financial Markets Bill 2012 does not give civil penalties for market manipulation.19  
Moreover, no provision is expressly made for the aggrieved persons to institute their own 
claims for damages (private rights of action), apart from the Financial Services Board, directly 
against the market abuse offenders.20  Notably, unlike in criminal cases where the prosecuting 
authorities have to prove the guilty of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the Financial 
Services Board is only required to prove on a balance of probabilities that the defendant 
violated the relevant provisions of the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill 
and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 in civil cases of market abuse.  Accordingly, the 
Financial Services Board has to date relatively achieved some success in the enforcement of 
the civil sanctions of insider trading.   For example, the Financial Services Board is believed 
to have utilised and obtained the following remedies in a number of instances: 
 
(a) recovering the profit made or loss avoided by the offenders;  
 
(b) awarding a penalty for compensatory and punitive purposes of up to three times the 
profit made or loss avoided; and  
 
14    S 73 of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 82 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 80 of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
15     S 75 & s 76 Securities Services Act. 
16    Cassim “An Analysis of Market Manipulation under the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004 (part 2)” 2008 
SA Merc LJ 177 192; 193; 198 & 199.  
17     Clause 87 of the Financial Markets Bill. 
18     S 77 of the Securities Services Act; also see clauses 86 & 87 of the Financial Markets Bill. 
19     See generally clauses 82 & 83 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
20    S 77 of the Securities Services Act; also see clauses 86 & 87 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 84 of 
the Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
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(c) recouping its legal and investigation costs from the money recovered and distributing 
the balance to compensate the victims (prejudiced investors) who can prove that they 
suffered loss as a result of the illegal dealing (insider trading) by the insider 
concerned.21  
 
Nonetheless, although the Financial Services Board is reported to have sufficient 
sophisticated equipment in place and persons with the relevant expertise to detect market 
abuse and enforce the market abuse ban, a minimal number of successful prosecutions and 
settlements have been obtained in market abuse cases in South Africa to date.22  On the other 
hand, a survey conducted by the Genesis Analytics (Pty) Ltd on behalf of the Financial 
Services Board to assess its effectiveness and the impact of the insider trading laws revealed 
that market abuse activities especially insider trading, have been significantly reduced.23  For 
example, about 80% of the respondents reported that insider trading has become less 
acceptable, 77% of the traders and asset managers viewed the insider trading laws as having 
been successful in reducing insider trading and 59% of the listed companies interviewed had 
implemented insider trading policies and other measures to curb market abuse activity.24  The 
same survey indicated that 60% of smaller retail brokerages did not have compliance manuals 
dealing with insider trading and only 20% had some measures to deal with the protection and 
disclosure of inside information.25  Furthermore, 18% of the listed companies interviewed 
were reluctant to implement and comply with the insider trading laws and the relevant 
requirements of the Financial Services Board.26  The Financial Services Board also stated in 
its 2005 Annual Report that although there was a steady decline in insider trading cases, 
insider trading and other related market abuse practices had certainly not been completely 
eradicated.   It remains unclear whether the decline in reported cases is being caused by 
21    It is stated that about 1218 claimants benefited from the distribution of the funds recovered by the 
Financial Services Board (the FSB) during the period from 17 January 1999 to 31 January 2005.    See 
generally Van Deventer (10-06-2008) 1-5 <http://www.fsb.co.za/public/marketabuse/FSBReport.pdf> 
(accessed 05-05-2009); the Directorate of Market Abuse Report Media Release < http://www.fsb.co.za> 
(accessed 13-06-2008).   
22     Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 192–196.   
23  See further Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 27-28 <http://www.genesis-
analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 09-02-2009).           
24    For a more elaborate discussion and analysis see Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 17-20 
<http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 09-02-2009).          
25   Also see Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 24-25 <http://www.genesis-
analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 09-02-2009).  
26   See further Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 20 <http://www.genesis-
analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 09-02-2009).    
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effective enforcement on the part of the Financial Services Board or whether it could be due 
to the fact that some market abuse activities are not being detected by the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange Limited27 and/or the Financial Services Board.  This survey further revealed that 
individuals who settled with the Financial Services Board were either guilty or probably 
guilty according to 80% of the respondents.   It also showed that the fine imposed was the 
most important reason for consideration when settling with the Financial Services Board, 
according to 4% of the respondents.28  Other respondents were more concerned about how 
settling with the Financial Services Board would be perceived within the marketplace.  For 
example, about 75% of the respondents reported that they will consider the damage to their 
career, 12% said that they will look at the shame of being caught, 4% indicated that they 
would need to know if their names will be published in the press and 90% of the respondents 
said their major concern would be the damage to the company’s reputation.29  This implies 
that there is some stigma associated with settling with the Financial Services Board.  The 
reason for this stigma could be three-fold.   Firstly, it may be because the Financial Services 
Board has managed to change the attitudes of all the relevant persons and market abuse 
activities are now less acceptable in the South African financial markets.  Secondly, listed 
companies linked to market abuse settlements with the Financial Services Board have 
sometimes ended up being unsuccessful.30  Lastly, other affected persons may be having some 
doubts as to whether their cases will be successful or timeously settled.   This could be due to 
the fact that only successful claimants will receive compensation after the Financial Services 
Board had recouped its legal and investigation costs from the money recovered from the 
offenders. 
 
As highlighted above, notwithstanding the fact that there are still some inconsistencies and 
loop-holes in its enforcement, the Financial Services Board has to date played a pivotal role in 
tackling market abuse practices in South Africa.  
 
 
27     Hereinafter referred to as the JSE.   
28    See Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 15 <http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> 
(accessed 09-02-2009), for related discussion and comments.   
29    See Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 16 <http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> 
(accessed 09-02-2009), for related comments.   
30   Also see Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 17-18 <http://www.genesis-
analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 09-02-2009).   
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4 3  Co-operation and Adequacy of Resources?  
4 3 1  Co-operation between the Financial Services Board and other Local 
Enforcement Agencies 
 
The Financial Services Board does not operate in a vacuum; it works in association with other 
enforcement bodies namely the JSE, the Enforcement Committee, the Directorate of Market 
Abuse, the Board of Appeal and the courts.  Firstly, the Financial Services Board houses the 
Directorate of Market Abuse as its investigatory committee established in terms of the 
Securities Services Act.31 Duties and powers which the Directorate of Market Abuse may 
exercise on behalf of the Financial Services Board are clearly stipulated in the Securities 
Services Act.32  For example, the Directorate of Market Abuse may, on behalf of the 
Financial Services Board, decide whether to take a civil action or to refer a matter to the 
Enforcement Committee or the Director of Public Prosecutions.  Notably, the Directorate of 
Market Abuse may only institute civil proceedings in the name of the Financial Services 
Board and may settle any matter after confirmation from the Financial Services Board or the 
competent courts.  This may suggest that there is good co-operation between the Financial 
Services Board and the Directorate of Market Abuse.  In other words, the mere fact that the 
Directorate of Market Abuse only exercises specific powers in the name of the Financial 
Services Board and does not function as an independent regulatory body33 could be viewed as 
proof of an existing good co-operative relationship between the Financial Services Board and 
the Directorate of Market Abuse.34  Secondly, the Financial Services Board works closely 
with the Enforcement Committee as its committee responsible for adjudicating on all the 
market abuse cases referred to it by the Directorate of Market Abuse or the Registrar of 
Securities Services as provided for in the Securities Services Act.35  The Enforcement 
Committee is made up of members appointed by the Financial Services Board.36  Apart from 
being empowered to impose unlimited administrative penalties against the market abuse 
31    S 83(1)(b); also see clause 92(1)(a) & (b) of the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 87(1)(a) & (b) of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.  
32    S 83(1)(c); also see clause 92(1)(c) of the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 87(1)(c) of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.  
33    S 83(1)(d); also see clause 92(1)(d) of the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 87(1)(d) of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.  
34     See generally Loubser “Insider Trading and other Market Abuses (Including the Effective Management of 
Price-sensitive Information)” in the Insider Trading Booklet final draft 2006 (02-10-2006) 26-27 
<http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-10-2008).  
35    S 94(e); also see clause 105 of the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 101 of the Financial Markets Bill 
2012 & paragraph 3 2 3 in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
36     S 98 of the Securities Services Act; also see paragraph 3 2 3 in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
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offenders, the Enforcement Committee is obliged to submit annual reports regarding its 
activities and other relevant information during the preceding calendar year to the Financial 
Services Board.  Moreover, it is reported that there are regular meetings between the members 
of the Financial Services Board and the members of the Enforcement Committee.   This 
suggests that there is some co-operation between the Financial Services Board and the 
Enforcement Committee, and, according to Gerhard van Deventer,37 such co-operation has 
improved the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in South Africa.  
 
Thirdly, there is co-operation between the Financial Services Board and the Board of Appeal.  
The Board of Appeal was first established in terms of the Financial Services Board Act38 to 
hear and afford all the persons aggrieved with any decision of the executive officer of the 
Financial Services Board, the Registrar of Securities Services or the claims officer as 
contemplated in the Securities Services Act, a chance to lodge their complaints for them to be 
addressed.39  The Board of Appeal is an independent tribunal comprising members appointed 
by the Minister of Finance and who are neither employees of the Financial Services Board nor 
active participants in the financial industry.40  The Financial Services Board is reportedly co-
operating with the Board of Appeal in a number of ways, such as providing oral and/or 
written evidence or any other relevant information required by the Board of Appeal.  In order 
not to interfere with the proceedings and decisions of the Board of Appeal, the Financial 
Services Board directs all queries relating to an appeal by the aggrieved persons to the 
secretaries of the Board of Appeal.  Nonetheless, the consistency on the part of the Financial 
Services Board, to comply with the requests from the Board of Appeal remains uncertain.41  
Fourthly, the Financial Services Board enjoys much support from the JSE.  For example, the 
Financial Services Board depends on the JSE’s Surveillance Division to monitor, detect and 
prevent market abuse practices in the South African financial markets.42  The JSE further 
requires all the issuers of listed securities to disclose any developments or activities that might 
37    Van Deventer (10-06-2008) 1-5 <http://www.fsb.co.za/public/marketabuse/FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 
05-05-2009).  
38      S 26 of the Financial Services Board Act. 
39      S 26A & 26B of the Financial Services Laws General Amendment Act 22 of 2008. 
40      See paragraph 3 2 4 in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
41      In other words, the actual extent or degree of co-operation between the Financial Services Board and the 
Board of Appeal is not very clear.    See paragraph 3 2 4 in Chapter Three of this thesis.   
42  For further related discussion on the role of the JSE, see Loubser (02-10-2006) 25 
<http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-10-2008); Myburgh & Davis (25-03-
2004) 12-13 <http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 09-02-2009); also see 
paragraph 3 2 5 in Chapter Three of this thesis 
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have a material effect on the price of such securities.43  When an unusual trading activity is 
detected by the JSE’s Surveillance Division, it is reported to the Financial Services Board for 
further investigation.   It is reported that a number of market abuse investigations have in fact 
been carried out by the Financial Services Board on the advice of the JSE.44  In other words, 
the JSE has access to significant amounts of information through its surveillance and 
monitoring technology systems, which is used to isolate and report all possible market abuse 
incidents to the Financial Services Board.  The Financial Services Board and the JSE have 
further co-operatively played a key role in educating all the relevant persons about market 
abuse practices through seminars and workshops in South Africa.  Notably, the Financial 
Services Board also used to rely on the Bond Exchange of South Africa, before the latter was 
consolidated into the JSE,45 to detect and investigate market abuse activity in relation to the 
commodities, bonds and derivatives markets in South Africa.  However, the Bond Exchange 
of South Africa was reportedly not playing an active role in the surveillance of market abuse 
practices and in assisting the Financial Services Board to detect and enforce the market abuse 
ban in the South African commodities, bonds and derivatives markets.46  It remains to be seen 
whether this consolidation will enhance and improve the co-operation and effectiveness of the 
enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in South Africa by both the Financial Services 
Board and the JSE.  
 
Fifthly, the Law Society of South Africa and the Securities Regulation Panel offers further 
support to the Financial Services Board.  According to Gerhard van Deventer,47 the Financial 
Services Board has good co-operation with these bodies and has, in some instances, utilised 
their advice to tackle and/or combat certain market abuse activities in the South African 
financial markets.  Lastly, the Financial Services Board may rely on the courts.  Irrespective 
of the fact that the competent courts48 are empowered to hear market abuse cases referred to 
43      S 3.4 of the JSE Listing Requirements. 
44    See Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 28 <http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> 
(accessed 09-02-2009), who outlines the role played by the JSE especially in relation to the curbing of the 
insider trading activities prior to 2004.        
45    This formal consolidation was finalised on 22 June 2009 & the Bond Exchange of South Africa is now a 
fully owned subsidiary of the JSE.    
46    See Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 13 <http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> 
(accessed 09-02-2009).  
47   See generally Van Deventer (10-06-2008) 1-5 
<http://www.fsb.co.za/public/marketabuse/FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 05-05-2009). 
48    S 79 of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 81 of the Financial Markets Bill & generally see 
clauses 86(4)(b) & (10) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   See further paragraph 3 2 6 in Chapter Three 
of this thesis.  
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them by the Financial Services Board, some cases have been either withdrawn or abandoned 
by the courts.49  This might imply that there is little or no co-operation between the Financial 
Services Board and the courts. 
 
4 3 2  Co-operation between the Financial Services Board and Listed Companies  
 
It was revealed in a survey conducted by the Genesis Analytics (Pty) Ltd50 that about 72% of 
the listed companies had formal policies (internal measures) aimed at discouraging market 
abuse practices.  About 18% of the listed companies were co-operating with the Financial 
Services Board by implementing such policies to reduce market abuse practices in South 
Africa.51   Most of the listed companies that implemented anti-market abuse polices were, 
among others, asset managers, investment banking and corporate finance companies.52   The 
companies that failed to comply with the Financial Services Board’s market abuse policies 
and requirements were mainly retail brokerages companies and other smaller companies.53  
Furthermore, there have been very few or no incidents where the employees of the listed 
companies reported other persons involved or who might be involved in market abuse 
activities in their companies (whistle-blowing) to the Financial Services Board.   It is hoped 
that the co-operation between the Financial Services Board and the listed companies will 
continue to be encouraged to improve and enhance the enforcement of the market abuse ban 
in South Africa. 
 
4 3 3  Co-operation between the Financial Services Board and Similar International 
Enforcement Agencies   
 
Owing to the increasingly global nature of trading in listed instruments, the Financial Services 
Board has reportedly entered into some co-operation agreements with similar bodies 
elsewhere in the world, such as the Financial Services Authority and the United States 
49     See related analysis in paragraph 3 2 7 in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
50   See further Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 19 <http://www.genesis-
analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 09-02-2009).  
51    See Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 20 <http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> 
(accessed 09-02-2009).  
52  See further Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 23-24 <http://www.genesis-
analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 09-02-2009).  
53  See further Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 24-25 <http://www.genesis-
analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 09-02-2009).  
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Securities and Exchange Commission.54  The rationale behind these agreements is inter alia, 
to curb and reduce as much as possible all cross-border market abuse activities in the financial 
markets.  For instance, these co-operation agreements allow the Financial Services Board to 
track the activities of market abuse suspects who use other jurisdictions to contravene the 
South African market abuse laws, hoping to evade and escape liability.55  It is further reported 
that the Financial Services Board has, in some instances, relied on its Financial Services 
Authority and United States Securities and Exchange Commission co-operative agreements 
and the Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding it has with regulatory bodies in other 
jurisdictions56 to detect and prevent market abuse activities in the South African financial 
markets.  This extra-territorial application of the market abuse prohibition should continue to 
be promoted and successfully implemented to combat cross-border market abuse practices.  
However, the Financial Services Board does not seem to have its own sufficient additional 
resources and measures in place to enable it to co-operate more with similar bodies at an 
international level.57  In this regard, the Financial Services Board should continue striving to 
employ other relevant regulatory approaches from other jurisdictions to enable greater 
awareness of any enforcement changes that might occur in such jurisdictions and to develop 
trust and better communication with similar regulatory bodies, especially from the developed 
world. 
 
4 3 4  Adequacy of Available Resources 
 
There has been a growing recognition in recent years of the fact that having adequate market 
abuse laws alone is not sufficient;58 instead enforcement authorities should have the relevant 
54   See similar discussion in paragraph 3 2 1 in Chapter Three of this thesis; Loubser (02-10-2006) 26 
<http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-10-2008).   
55   See a related discussion in paragraph 3 2 1 in Chapter Three of this thesis; Loubser (02-10-2006) 26 
<http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-10-2008).     
56    For example the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) & the International Organisation of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO). 
57   Generally see Chapter Three read with Chapter Two of this thesis, for an overview discussion on the 
current market abuse position in South Africa.     
58   Also see Bhattacharya & Daouk 2002 Journal of Finance 75-108; Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 8-33 
<http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 09-02-2009); Lyon & Du Plessis 
The Law of Insider Trading in Australia 159-168 & see further Beny “Insider Trading Laws and Stock 
Markets Around the World: An Empirical Contribution to the Theoretical Law and Economics Debate” 
(2006) 35-41 John M Olin Center for Law and Economics University of Michigan Law School 
<http://www.law.umich.edu/centersandprograms/olin/papers.htm> (accessed 01-09-2009), for an 
additional general comparative analysis on the enforcement of insider trading laws in different 
jurisdictions.  
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resources and other appropriate measures in place in order to effectively enforce such laws to 
combat market abuse practices.  The enforcement authorities in many jurisdictions have 
resources like surveillance technology and equipment to detect and prevent market abuse 
activity in the financial markets.  Additionally, other enforcement authorities have the much-
needed financial resources to train their workers, recruit persons with the relevant expertise 
and employ the necessary methods to ensure compliance with, and proper enforcement of the 
market abuse laws in their respective jurisdictions.  Likewise, in South Africa, the Financial 
Services Board is reported to have sophisticated machinery in place and competent persons to 
detect and enforce the market abuse prohibition.59  The Financial Services Board does not rely 
on the government’s subsidies or other monetary support per se; it finances its operations by 
recouping all the legal and investigation costs it would have incurred from the money 
recovered from the market abuse offenders.60 However, the Financial Services Board does not 
have its own surveillance systems to detect possible market abuse practices in the South 
African financial markets.   In relation to this, the Financial Services Board is still to mobilise 
sufficient additional resources for the procurement and establishment of its own surveillance 
systems and other relevant market abuse preventative measures such as offices or awareness 
programmes in all the regions of South Africa so that its enforcement efforts may not be 
hampered by inefficiency and/or bureaucracy.  
 
4 4  Complexities and Flaws in the Detection and Prosecution  
4 4 1  Frequent Occurrence of Market Abuse Activity Extremely Difficult to Prove 
 
In the last few years, there has been a decline in the number of prosecutions and reported 
cases of insider trading and market manipulation in South Africa.61  The prima facie 
explanation for this reduction in reported cases and prosecutions may be that there are now 
very few or no market abuse activities occurring in South Africa.  However, the research 
interviews conducted by Genesis Analytics (Pty) Ltd with traders and asset managers, market 
advisors, company secretaries of listed companies and financial compliance officers indicated 
that, although the extent could not be accurately quantified, market abuse activities were still 
59    See Van Deventer (10-06-2008) 1-5 <http://www.fsb.co.za/public/marketabuse/FSBReport.pdf> 
(accessed 05-05-2009); Loubser (02-10-2006) 26-27 
<http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-10-2008).     
60    See s 77(7)(a) & s 84 of the Securities Services Act; also see clauses 86(9)(a); 87(3)(a) & 93 of the 
Financial Markets Bill  & clauses 84(2)(a) & 88 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.  
61   See Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 30 <http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> 
(accessed 09-02-2009). 
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occurring with some frequency in the South African financial markets.62  Nevertheless, these 
research findings and conclusions made by the Genesis Analytics (Pty) Ltd could be criticised 
in that they were more influenced by opinions and as a result, they lacked a strong accurate 
basis of empirical data regarding the frequency or degree of occurrence of market abuse 
activity in the South African financial markets.  Be that as it may, this research maintains that 
the Genesis Analytics (Pty) Ltd’s research findings could be employed because they usefully 
expose the inherent challenges involving the prosecution and/or detection of market abuse 
practices in South Africa.63  It is submitted that despite the lack of accurate figures or 
empirical data quantifying the occurrence of market abuse activity in South Africa, there is 
some anecdotal evidence64 indicating that insider trading and other related practices have not 
been completely eradicated from the South African financial markets.65  Therefore, the 
significant reduction in reported cases and prosecutions could be caused by the fact that the 
occurrence of market abuse activity is extremely difficult to prove and/or some instances of 
such activity may be going unnoticed. 
 
4 4 2  Market Abuse Activity Extremely Difficult to Detect 
 
In spite of the fact that the Financial Services Board is generally believed to have adequate 
resources and skilled persons to enforce the market abuse prohibition, there are still some 
challenges and shortcomings in the detection of the market abuse activity in the South African 
financial markets.66 At a glance, one could conclude that the reason underpinning such 
shortcomings is the inefficiency of the Financial Services Board.67   Furthermore, the 
procedures adopted by the Financial Services Board may be criticised to some extent for 
being bureaucratic.  For example, that the Financial Services Board may only detect or 
investigate possible market abuse activity after alerts of suspicious price movements and 
62   Also see Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 27-30 <http://www.genesis-
analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 09-02-2009). 
63      See further discussion that will ensue in paragraphs 4 4 2 & 4 4 3 of this Chapter. 
64  Additionally see Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 30 <http://www.genesis-
analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 09-02-2009). 
65   Generally see Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 30 <http://www.genesis-
analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 09-02-2009).  
66     See paragraphs 3 2 1 & 3 2 2 in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
67     See paragraph 4 2 above & paragraph 3 2 1 in Chapter Three of this thesis.  
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trading patterns from the JSE’s Surveillance Division.68 While the flaws mentioned above 
might have contributed to the inconsistent detection of market abuse in South Africa, other 
commentators69 have submitted that insider trading and other related practices are extremely 
difficult to detect for the enforcement and regulatory bodies globally.   The difficulty is 
sometimes experienced in detecting the identity of the actual perpetrators and thereafter 
proving their connection to any information relating to the alleged market abuse activity 
timeously.  With regard to insider trading, the need to distinguish the illegal dealing executed 
by insiders for their own benefit from bona fide insider trading done by such insiders on 
behalf of their companies poses further obstacles to the successful detection and prevention of 
market abuse activity in the financial markets.   However, one can still conclude that the 
difficulty in detecting the identity of the perpetrators in matters involving insider trading 
should be ameliorated because insider trading is usually done by directors or other employees 
(insiders) who trade in the securities of their own companies or of the companies with whom 
they have dealings, for example during takeover negotiations.70   
 
Although the challenges highlighted above may not be insurmountable, they might in some 
instances make it very difficult for the Financial Services Board to promptly detect all the 
market abuse activities occurring in the South African financial markets.   This difficulty 
could further occur because the Financial Services Board does not employ other methods like 
bounty rewards and whistle-blowing immunity to encourage all the relevant stakeholders to 
be more involved by providing information relating to any suspected market abuse violations.  
Moreover, the Financial Services Board does not seem to be using other detection strategies 
like engaging more brokerages and companies that tape or digitally record telephonic orders 
and other transactions from clients to their agencies in order to isolate all possible market 
abuse activities timeously. 
 
68   Generally see Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 28 <http://www.genesis-
analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 09-02-2009); also see paragraphs 3 2 1 & 3 2 5 in 
Chapter Three of this thesis. 
69    See generally Gething “Insider Trading Enforcement: Where are We Now and Where do We Go from 
Here?” 1998 Company and Securities Law Journal 607 618; Lyon & Du Plessis The Law of Insider 
Trading in Australia 163-166. 
70    See for example Tomasic & Pentony “Coming Down on Insiders: Why we Have to Curb the Casino 
Operators” 1989 Journal of the Australian Society of Security Analysts 24 26; Tomasic & Pentony 
“Crime and Opportunity in the Securities Markets: The Case of Insider Trading in Australia” 1989 
Company and Securities Law Journal 186 196-198. 
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4 4 3  Market Manipulation and Insider Trading Cases Inherently Difficult to 
Prosecute   
 
Notwithstanding the fact that much ground has been covered with regard to market abuse 
enforcement,71 some loop-holes are still found, especially in the prosecution of market abuse 
cases in South Africa.  The Financial Services Board may only prosecute criminal cases of 
market abuse if the Director of Public Prosecutions neglects to prosecute them.72   This 
clearly shows that, unless if a matter is settled out of the courts, only the Director of Public 
Prosecutions has the prerogative to prosecute any market abuse cases referred to it by the 
Financial Services Board. Nonetheless, a minimum number of market abuse cases have been 
successfully prosecuted by the courts to date.73  This could have been caused by the fact that 
market abuse cases are reportedly difficult to prosecute.74 Another explanation that has been 
given for the paucity of successful prosecutions is the complexities involving the burden of 
proof required, especially in criminal cases of market abuse.  Notably, the burden of proof 
required in civil cases is for the defendant to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that he did 
not commit the market abuse practice in question.75  As a result, the Financial Services Board 
has managed to obtain a fair number of settlements in civil cases of market abuse because the 
standard of proof required of the balance of probabilities is generally lower and more 
flexible.76  The reason for the low number of civil cases of market abuse that have been 
successfully settled in South Africa could be that the required burden of proof of the balance 
of probabilities might be inconsistently applied.77  On the other hand, the burden of proof 
required in criminal cases of market abuse is for the prosecuting authorities to prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that the accused person contravened the market abuse provisions in 
71     See paragraphs 3 2 1 & 3 2 7 in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
72    S 82(9) of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 91(9) of the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 
86(10) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.  
73    Only 32 cases of insider trading, eight cases of trade-based market manipulation and no cases for 
disclosure-based market manipulation were reportedly investigated by the Financial Services Board 
during the period between January 1999 and January 2008.     No convictions were obtained by the courts 
in all the criminal cases of market abuse.   This information was obtained from an interview that was 
conducted at the Financial Services Board by the researcher, with Mr Gerhard van Deventer (the 
Executive Director of the Directorate of Market Abuse) on 05 May 2009. 
74     Chanetsa “Insider Trading is Notoriously Hard to Prosecute” Business Report (2004-04-26 
75    S 77 of the Securities Services Act; also see clauses 86 & 87 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 84 of 
the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
76   Generally see Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 12 <http://www.genesis-
analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 09-02-2009).  
77    Luiz “Market Abuse - II” 2002 JBL’s Quarterly Law Review for People in Business 180 181-183. 
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question.   However, it is onerous on the part of the prosecuting authorities78 to prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that the accused person knowingly committed the market abuse offence in 
question.   This might have contributed to the minimum number of successful prosecutions 
obtained by the courts or the Director of Public Prosecutions to date.79  Furthermore, the 
backlog associated with the competent courts and much pressure on the part of the Director of 
Public Prosecutions could have caused other criminal cases of market abuse to be delayed, 
withdrawn or abandoned.80 
 
4 4 4  Enforcement of Market Manipulation and Insider Trading Prohibition Treated 
Separately and Differently  
 
Another challenge and/or problem associated with the enforcement of the market abuse 
prohibition in South Africa is the fact that insider trading and market manipulation offences 
are inconsistently defined and treated separately and differently.81  As discussed in Chapter 
Two,82 the Financial Services Board does not impose a derivative civil action against market 
manipulation offenders.83 Furthermore, the Enforcement Committee may only impose an 
obligation to pay the Financial Services Board a civil compensatory amount for distribution to 
the prejudiced persons in respect of insider trading offences.  In other words, although 
administrative sanctions may be imposed on all the forms of market abuse, the Enforcement 
Committee may statutorily impose on behalf of the victims a compensatory fine only in 
matters involving insider trading.84  Seemingly, the Securities Services Act treats market 
manipulation only as a criminal offence.85  This flaw could be resolved if the provisions of the 
Financial Markets Bill, which now seeks to extend civil liability compensation orders also to 
cases involving market manipulation, comes into effect.86  Ironically, these provisions have 
been omitted in the Financial Markets Bill 2012.87  Moreover, the concepts of insider trading 
78   Generally see Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 12 <http://www.genesis-
analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 09-02-2009).  
79    See paragraphs 3 2 1; 3 2 6 & 3 2 7 in Chapter Three of this thesis; also see Luiz 2002 JBL’s Quarterly 
Law Review for People in Business 182-183.   
80     See paragraph 3 2 7 in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
81     Luiz 2002 JBL’s Quarterly Law Review for People in Business 183. 
82     See paragraphs 2 5 1; 2 5 2 & 2 5 3 in Chapter Two of this thesis. 
83     Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 192.   
84    Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 195; Luiz 2002 JBL’s Quarterly Law Review for People in Business 183 & 
paragraph 2 5 3 in Chapter Two of this thesis.   
85     Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 191-193 & 199.  
86     Clause 87 of the Financial Markets Bill.   
87     Generally see clauses 82 & 83. 
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and market manipulation are both not expressly defined under Chapter VIII of the Securities 
Services Act.88  Some key terms relating to market abuse practices other than insider trading 
such as “market manipulation”, “market participant”, “making” or “publication” of false 
statements and “deceptive statements” are not expressly defined.89  This flaw was not 
corrected in both the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012.90 
Additionally, unlike in cases relating to insider trading, not many defences are provided for 
market manipulation.91  Only a price-stabilisation defence is provided for in the Securities 
Services Act.92  In this regard, this research concurs with Cassim93 that the Securities Services 
Act did not provide other additional defences for market manipulation, for example Chinese 
walls or the defence that the accused person believed on reasonable grounds that his 
behaviour did not amount to market manipulation so as not to discourage legitimate trading 
and to avoid unfair convictions of innocent accused persons.94  Moreover, this flaw is still not 
addressed in the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012.95 
 
4 4 5  Adequacy of Available Penalties and Remedies 
 
Although there may be a general assumption that there is no amount and/or number of 
penalties that can stop the occurrence of market abuse in the global financial markets, it is 
submitted that Cassim96 correctly argues that the market abuse penalties and remedies 
stipulated in the Securities Services Act somehow fall short when it comes to deterrence 
purposes.97  This flaw is also not addressed in the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.98  Administrative and criminal penalties can be imposed on all the forms 
of market abuse in South Africa.  Moreover, all the persons who contravene the Securities 
Services Act’s market abuse provisions may be sentenced to a fine not exceeding R50 million 
88     For example, only a few terms like “market abuse rules” and “market corner” are expressly defined. 
89     See s 72 read with s 75 & s 76 of the Securities Services Act. 
90    Clause 81 read with clauses 84 & 85 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 79 read with clauses 82 & 83 
of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.    
91     Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 183.  
92     S 75.   
93     Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 199. 
94     Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 183-191.  
95     Clauses 84 & 85 of the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 82 & 83 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.  
96     Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 191-195. 
97     S 115(a) of the Securities Services Act. 
98     Clause 115(a) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 111(a) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.  
116 
                                               
or imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years or both such fine and imprisonment.99  
With regard to insider trading, the accused persons would only incur criminal liability if they 
fail to rely on any of the defences provided in the Securities Services Act.  On the other hand, 
a statutory civil remedy is only available to matters involving insider trading.100  While the 
new market abuse criminal sanctions of a R50 million maximum fine and imprisonment for a 
period not exceeding ten years may be fairly dissuasive, this research submits that reliance on 
these sanctions alone cannot be an effective deterrent.101  As discussed in paragraph 4 4 3 
above, a criminal remedy alone may give rise to a few convictions to be obtained in market 
abuse cases because the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt is difficult to 
meet compared to the relatively lighter civil standard of proof on a balance of probabilities.102 
 
Apart from the criminal and civil penalties, the Securities Services Act provides 
administrative penalties for all the forms of market abuse.103 As earlier pointed out in Chapter 
Two,104 the Enforcement Committee may impose unlimited administrative penalties on the 
perpetrators of market abuse activities and a compensatory amount payable to the Financial 
Services Board only in matters relating to insider trading.105  Consequently, under the 
Securities Services Act, persons who fall victim to market manipulation practices will have to 
find their own compensatory remedies.  These disparities and the fact that the Enforcement 
Committee may only impose administrative penalties on a referral basis could have the effect 
of undermining the effectiveness of administrative sanctions in South Africa.  Other measures 
such as enacting a specific provision for a separate maximum criminal penalty for individuals 
and companies or other juristic persons, with a much higher maximum penalty to be imposed 
on such juristic persons are not provided for in the Securities Services Act.106  Unlike the 
99     S 115(a) of the Securities Services Act. 
100   Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 193; also see related remarks in paragraph 4 4 4 above. 
101   See s 115(a) of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 115(a) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 
111(a) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   See further paragraph 2 5 4 in Chapter Two of this thesis; 
Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 194.     
102    Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 193. 
103    See paragraph 2 5 4 in Chapter Two of this thesis. 
104    See paragraph 2 5 4 in Chapter Two of this thesis. 
105   S 105 read with s 77 of the Securities Services Act; also see generally clause 105 of the Financial Markets 
Bill. & clause 101 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   See further Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 195 & 
paragraph 4 4 4 above.  
106   See s 115(a) of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 115(a) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 
111(a) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.    Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 194.    
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Financial Services Authority,107 the Financial Services Board and other enforcement 
authorities may only impose a limited or fixed number of criminal penalties against the 
market abuse offenders as contemplated in the Securities Services Act.108 
 
4 4 6  Awareness of Market Abuse Practices? 
 
Market abuse activities are very difficult to detect or measure directly.  As a result, many 
victims seldom know that market abuse activities are illegal or when they have been 
prejudiced by such activities.109 It is against this background that the Financial Services Board 
and other enforcement authorities will be discussed here to examine whether if they have 
managed to increase awareness regarding the nature and consequences of market abuse 
among the relevant stakeholders in South Africa.    It is generally submitted that the 
enforcement of the market abuse prohibition has not been very successful in South Africa, 
partly because some small companies and other relevant persons are still unaware of the 
nature and effects of market abuse.110  According to a survey conducted by the Genesis 
Analytics (Pty) Ltd, the Financial Services Board and the JSE have played an important role 
in educating all the market participants and other relevant persons about the pervasiveness of 
market abuse since 1999.111  For example, both the Financial Services Board and the JSE 
have conducted some market abuse awareness presentations to the market participants and in 
2002 the JSE published the Insider Trading Booklet to provide a guide on matters involving 
insider trading to all the relevant stakeholders.112 The same survey also indicated that some 
persons in the work places were fairly aware of market abuse practices, especially insider 
trading.113  For example, 93% of the respondents stated that their fellow workmates were 
quite aware of insider trading and its regulations.  Moreover, company secretaries reported 
107   S 123(1) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (c 8), hereinafter referred to as the Financial 
Services and Markets Act; also see the related discussion in Chapter Seven of this thesis.   
108   See s 115(a) of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 115(a) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 
111(a) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.    See further Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 194.     
109  Generally see Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 8 <http://www.genesis-
analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 09-02-2009).  
110  Generally see Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 24-26<http://www.genesis-
analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 09-02-2009).  
111  Generally see Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 13 <http://www.genesis-
analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 09-02-2009).   
112   See Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 13 <http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> 
(accessed 09-02-2009).  
113   See Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 25 <http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> 
(accessed 09-02-2009).  
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that 89% of their associates were very aware of insider trading.  About 88% of the market 
advisors interviewed submitted that the awareness of insider trading laws and regulations had 
increased significantly in the South African financial markets.114   This survey further 
revealed that the JSE’s Insider Trading Booklet was read by 54% of the respondents and 42% 
of the respondents had attended a presentation by either the Financial Services Board or the 
JSE.115  This survey also revealed that 82% of the listed companies had increased the amount 
of education regarding insider trading during the period between 1999 and 2004.   It is further 
stated that the JSE’s Insider Trading Booklet was used by 27% of the listed companies to 
educate their employees and 53% of the listed companies developed or derived their own 
internal regulatory rules from the JSE’s Insider Trading Booklet during the same period.116   
 
However, the awareness efforts of the Financial Services Board and the JSE, as discussed 
above, were mainly focused on insider trading.   It seems as if very few or no measures were 
employed by the Financial Services Board and the JSE to provide awareness regarding other 
market abuse practices like market manipulation.   Moreover, the Financial Services Board 
does not employ a more expansive awareness strategy, involving the posting of 
comprehensive market abuse news on the Internet and the establishment of other divisions of 
its departments in all the provinces of South Africa.  Likewise, the Financial Services Board 
does not usually empower other market participants like lawyers or financial markets advisors 
to make presentations to educate the relevant persons about market abuse on its behalf.  
Additionally, there is no specific market abuse curriculum that has been developed or taught 
at least from grade ten in high schools up to tertiary level to increase awareness and to 
improve the enforcement of market abuse provisions in South Africa.  Put differently, there is 
no specific provision in the Securities Services Act which expressly provides for awareness or 
extensive education on market abuse from grassroots level in order to change the illicit norms 
and attitudes among the market participants and to help all the relevant persons to comply 
114   See Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 25 <http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> 
(accessed 09-02-2009).  
115   See Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 26 <http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> 
(accessed 09-02-2009).  
116  Generally see Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 26 <http://www.genesis-
analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 09-02-2009).   
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with the market abuse prohibition in South Africa.117 The same shortcoming was not resolved 
in the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012.118 
 
4 4 7  Development of Anti-Market Abuse Culture? 
 
Although several measures aimed at discouraging and combating market abuse, like the 
enactment of market abuse laws, were introduced in South Africa, market abuse activity is 
reportedly still common in the South African financial markets.119 This could raise some 
questions and doubts in the minds of potential investors as to whether the Financial Services 
Board has done enough to develop strong anti-market abuse norms and attitudes among all the 
relevant stakeholders in South Africa.   A survey conducted by the Genesis Analytics (Pty) 
Ltd on behalf of the Financial Services Board to assess the impact of South Africa’s insider 
trading laws indicated that insider trading was more socially acceptable until the late 1990s.120  
According to 90% of the market participants who were interviewed, the attitudes across the 
South African financial markets had changed and insider trading was now less acceptable, 
especially after 1999.121  Nonetheless, the Financial Services Board and lawyers advising the 
accused persons asserted that these accused persons were far less willing and reluctant to 
settle their market abuse cases with the Financial Services Board.122 Furthermore, 71% of the 
respondents submitted that insider trading was unacceptable in the South African financial 
markets.  They also alluded to the fact that the insider trading laws and other adopted anti-
market abuse measures had changed the attitudes of the market participants in the South 
African financial markets to a fair extent.  Moreover, such changes in the attitudes were 
believed to have increased positively the stigma associated with practising or being involved 
in insider trading activities among all the relevant persons.123  However, a significant minority 
of 22% of the respondents reported that insider trading was still acceptable in some 
117    See s 73; s 75; s 76 & s 77 of the Securities Services Act. 
118   Clauses 82; 84; 85; 86 & 87 of the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 80; 82; 83 & 84 of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.   
119   See Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 33 <http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> 
(accessed 09-02-2009).   
120   See Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 16 <http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> 
(accessed 09-02-2009).    
121  Generally see Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 17 <http://www.genesis-
analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 09-02-2009).   
122   See Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 16 <http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> 
(accessed 09-02-2009); also see paragraph 4 2 above. 
123   See Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 17 <http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> 
(accessed 09-02-2009). 
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companies and in South African financial markets.  For instance, only 72% of the companies 
had some internal anti-market abuse policies to discourage their employees from indulging in 
market abuse activities.124  
 
While these efforts on the part of the Financial Services Board could be welcomed as a 
positive attempt to develop a strong anti-market abuse culture, more may still need to be done 
to ensure that such a culture is fully developed and utilised to combat market abuse in South 
Africa.    In relation to this, it is unclear whether the Financial Services Board has also 
managed to change the pervasive attitudes of the market participants with regard to market 
abuse practices other than insider trading.   The Financial Services Board and the JSE seem to 
have given more attention only to insider trading at the expense of other market abuse 
practices like market manipulation.125  In other words, the legislature, the Financial Services 
Board, the JSE and other relevant stakeholders did not adopt a holistic approach with regard 
to the development of a strong anti-market abuse culture in South Africa.  For instance, other 
enforcement approaches like incentives, bounty rewards, allowing the Financial Services 
Board to impose unlimited criminal penalties on all the market abuse offences and whistle-
blower immunity126 are not used to combat market abuse practices in South Africa. 
 
4 5  Adequacy of Preventative Measures? 
 
The regulatory bodies globally must be statutorily empowered to have sufficient preventative 
measures in place to combat market abuse practices.  These preventative measures should be 
adequately defined in order for them to be properly enforced.   Given this background, this 
sub-heading will investigate whether the JSE and the Financial Services Board have such 
appropriate preventative systems in place to discourage and curb market abuse activity in 
South Africa.  A survey conducted by the Genesis Analytics (Pty) Ltd on behalf of the 
Financial Services Board, revealed that very few companies had some internal procedures and 
policies to discourage and prevent market abuse practices.127  The same survey showed that 
72% of the companies (mainly larger companies) had some policies to prevent insider trading 
124   See Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 19 <http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> 
(accessed 09-02-2009).   
125  See further Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 13-14 <http://www.genesis-
analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 09-02-2009).   
126    See paragraph 4 4 2 above. 
127  See further Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 19-20 <http://www.genesis-
analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 09-02-2009).     
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while smaller companies with fewer than 5000 employees did not have such policies.128  
Moreover, this survey revealed that 58% of the companies had some systems aimed at 
stopping all their employees (insiders), especially senior employees like directors, from 
trading in the company’s shares without permission and when a cautionary announcement 
was made.129  According to other respondents, 35% of the companies required their senior 
employees and/or all the employees to get written permission to trade in the company’s 
shares.130  This survey further showed that some companies had procedures to stop inside 
information from leaving their companies or being illegally disclosed.   For example, about 
96% of the companies had rules to control the flow of inside information by imposing 
restrictions on who among their employees was allowed to speak to financial analysts.  
Nevertheless, 50% of the companies interviewed did not take any record of the conversations 
between their employees and the financial analysts.131  Only 75% of the companies were in 
compliance with the JSE’s rules requiring any leaked inside information during a company’s 
annual general meetings to be timeously communicated to the financial markets through the 
JSE’s Securities Exchange News Service.132  However, only 67% of the institutional financial 
companies like investment banking divisions had compliance manuals and 80% of these 
companies obliged their employees to sign them before making any transaction.  Other 
institutional financial companies had a blacklist of shares that their employees were not 
allowed to trade in and about 90% of these companies had measures to stop their employees 
from entering their trading divisions or to physically separate employees with inside 
information from those who did not have it. 
 
As highlighted above, it is clear that other companies had some internal rules and systems in 
place to prevent insider trading.  The measures adopted by the companies seem not to be 
targeted at preventing market manipulation.  Moreover, apart from relying on its powers to 
128   See Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 20 <http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> 
(accessed 09-02-2009); Ojah, Muhanji & Myburg “Market Reaction and Equity Market Efficiency: A 
Survey of Insider Trading Law in South Africa” 2008 The African Finance Journal 1 9.  
129   See Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 20 <http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> 
(accessed 09-02-2009).     
130   See Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 20 <http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> 
(accessed 09-02-2009).    
131   See Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 21 <http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> 
(accessed 09-02-2009).   
132   See Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 21 <http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> 
(accessed 09-02-2009).   
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make market abuse rules133 and the JSE’s Surveillance Division to detect and prevent market 
abuse, the Financial Services Board does not seem to employ other preventative methods like 
public censure to discourage market abuse practices in South Africa.  This may give rise to 
non-compliance on the part of the market participants; for example, some listed companies 
and small retail brokerage companies do not have any internal measures to curb market abuse 
practices.134  Other listed companies do not comply with the JSE’s Listing Requirements 
which require all companies to enter into confidentially agreements with service providers 
like printing companies to prevent the illicit use of inside information for market abuse 
activities.135  
 
Additionally, the Securities Services Act does not have specific provisions136 for other market 
abuse preventative measures like:   
 
(a) the use of Chinese walls between the company’s trading divisions and the non-
trading divisions; 
 
(b) trading restrictions on the company itself, company directors and shareholders;  
 
(c) more stringent methods that will force all companies, especially listed companies, to 
have internal codes of conduct and procedures that will stop their employees from 
committing market abuse offences; 
 
(d) unlimited criminal penalties for market abuse offences; and 
 
(e) a prohibition on the illicit disclosure of price-sensitive information on the Internet to 
curb and prevent the illegal use of inside information since the Internet is one of the 
main conduits of much information globally.137  
 
133    S 82(2)(g) of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 91(2)(f) of the Financial Markets Bill. 
134  Also see Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 22; 24-25 <http://www.genesis-
analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 09-02-2009).   
135   See Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 22 <http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> 
(accessed 09-02-2009).      
136    S 73; s 75; s 76 & s 77 of the Securities Services Act. 
137    Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 182. 
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This flaw was not addressed in both the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 
2012.138 
 
4 6  Poor Reputation and Low Investor Confidence 
 
Generally, the inconsistent enforcement of the market prohibition in any country may give 
rise to a host of other problems like reputational loss, low investor confidence, poor market 
integrity, inefficiency and poor liquidity of the financial markets.139  In South Africa, a survey 
that was carried out by the Genesis Analytics (Pty) Ltd on behalf of the Financial Services 
Board once again indicated that the reputational effects of insider trading were being felt by a 
number of South African companies.140   This survey further stipulated that the employees of 
the companies that were linked to insider trading activities also suffered reputational losses 
and damage to their carriers according to 75% of the respondents.141 Moreover, 79% of the 
traders and asset managers interviewed reported that companies involved in insider trading 
lacked integrity.  Notwithstanding the Financial Services Board’s anti-market abuse 
enforcement efforts, the same survey showed that some companies were still indulging in 
market abuse practices and were associated with underperformance.142  For instance, where 
sixteen shares of different companies were involved in a settlement with the Financial 
Services Board, eight companies would have suspended their trading by the time such 
settlement was announced.  Of the eight remaining shares, only one company would have 
registered a share price increase during the period between the announcement of the 
138   Clauses 82; 84; 85; 86; 87 & 115(a) of the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 80; 82; 83; 84 & 111(a) of 
the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
139  See further Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 10-11 <http://www.genesis-
analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 09-02-2009); also see Wisniewski & Bohl “The 
Information Content of Registered Insider Trading Under Lax Law Enforcement” 2005 International 
Review of Law and Economics 169 169-185; Morck, Yeung & Yu “The Information Content of Stock 
Markets: Why do Emerging Markets Have Synchronous Stock Price Movements?” 2000 Journal of 
Financial Economics 215 215-260; Bhattacharya, Daouk, Jorhenson & Kehr “When an Event is Not an 
Event: The Curious Case of an Emerging Market” 2000 Journal of Financial Economics 69 69-101; 
Seyhun “Insiders’ Profits, Costs of Trading, and Market Efficiency” 1986 Journal of Financial 
Economics 189 189-212; Acquaah-Gaisie “Toward more Effective Corporate Governance Mechanisms” 
2005 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 1 33; Julan & Shang-Jin “Does Insider Trading Raise Market 
Volatility?” (2003) <http://www.nber.org/papers/9541> (04-09-2008) & Bhattacharya & Daouk 2002 
Journal of Finance 75-108. 
140  See further Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 17 <http://www.genesis-
analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 09-02-2009).     
141  See generally Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 16 <http://www.genesis-
analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 09-02-2009).        
142   See Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 18 <http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> 
(accessed 09-02-2009).   
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investigation and the settlement.143   The average share price at the time of settlement with the 
Financial Services Board was about 27% of the value at the beginning of the insider trading 
investigation in the companies concerned.144 Other market participants like asset managers 
alluded to the fact that they would be less or much less likely to buy securities in a company 
that settled with the Financial Services Board over suspected insider trading activity.145 The 
Financial Services Board and other relevant enforcement authorities should continue to step 
up their anti-market abuse enforcement efforts to avoid and to reduce as much as possible the 
problems highlighted above and the volatility and inefficiency of the South African financial 
markets that could result from market abuse practices.146    
 
4 7  Gaps and Flaws in the Current Market Abuse Enforcement Framework in 
Relation to Selected Aspects of the Financial Markets?  
 
The enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in relation to some specific aspects of the 
South African financial markets as well as selected market abuse practices that manifested 
during the recent global financial crisis147 will be highlighted and briefly discussed below to 
143   See Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 18 <http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> 
(accessed 09-02-2009).   
144   See Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 18 <http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> 
(accessed 09-02-2009).   
145    Ojah, Muhanji & Myburg 2008 The African Finance Journal 11; also see Myburgh & Davis (25-03-
2004) 18 <http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 09-02-2009).   
146    Ojah, Muhanji & Myburg 2008 The African Finance Journal 5; 19-23. 
147   The recent global financial crisis began in the subprime mortgage market (the so-called housing bubble) 
of the United States of America (US) approximately during the period between 2005 and 2006.     
Notably, increased loan incentives like the provision of relatively easy initial loan terms caused many 
borrowers to mistakenly believe that they would be able to repay their loans quickly at more favourable 
terms.    Nonetheless, high default rates on subprime and adjustable rate mortgages increased sharply 
thereafter.    Subprime mortgages were a type of loan which gave access to housing to people who did not 
have the required guarantees to be eligible for ordinary loans and as such, they were high yield mortgages 
which attracted enormous risks of defaults on the part of the borrowers.    The US’s subprime mortgages 
were further classified into securitisation issues, known as mortgage-backed securities which were later 
sold on the financial markets.   In this regard, securitisation refers to a financial operation which enables 
the sharing of financial risks.   Surplus inventory houses and increased interest rates led to a relative drop 
in the housing prices in the US in 2006 to 2007, and refinancing became a tall order.    Defaults and 
foreclosures soared from around 11% at the beginning of 2006 to over 20% in 2008.  About US$8 trillion 
losses were recorded by owners of stock in the US corporations while losses in other countries were 
averagely estimated at about 23% and 40%.   The US subprime owned houses were now lower than their 
initial mortgage loan by September 2010.    In a nutshell, the 2007 to 2009 global financial crisis was 
inter alia triggered in part by the inability of the borrowers (new home owners) to repay their subprime 
mortgages primarily because of their alleged overextending; the resetting of higher interest rates on 
adjustable rate mortgages; predatory lending and speculation; bad monetary and housing policies; flawed 
government regulation as well as financial products that distributed and/or concealed the risk of high 
mortgage defaults.   See Swart The Legal Framework Pertaining to Selected Segments of the Financial 
Market LLM Dissertation, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (2011) 98; Paulo “Europe and the 
Global Financial Crisis Explained in 10 Sheets: Taking Stock of the EU’s Policy Response” April 2011 
Fondation Robert Schuman 3 <http://www.robert-schuman.eu/frs-fichecrisefi-qe200-en.pdf> (accessed 
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investigate whether the current South African anti-market abuse enforcement framework is 
robust enough to deal with such aspects and practices across all the South African financial 
markets.   
 
4 7 1  Market Transparency 
 
Transparency is a key element for robust financial markets regulation and good corporate 
governance in any country.   According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the term 
“transparent” may be literally defined to denote something that is easily seen through, 
recognised, understood or detected, manifest, evident, obvious and clear.    In relation to this, 
the transparent and timeous publication of all the relevant information is thus an essential 
ingredient for efficient and free financial markets.148 Likewise, for the purposes of this sub-
heading, market transparency is defined to include the extent or degree at which the relevant 
non-public information pertaining to dealing or trading in the financial markets is accurately 
and timeously published to the financial markets by market participants and the regulatory 
authorities concerned.149  This research concurs with Kaufmann and Weber’s contribution 
that transparency in the financial markets provides legal certainty, establishes some trust 
among the stakeholders involved, promotes the good values and goals of financial policy and 
regulation, and enhances accountability of the regulatory authorities.150   The 2007 to 2009 
global financial crisis exposed some flaws in market transparency regulation.  These flaws 
were prevalent in the secondary financial markets.151  Consequently, in the wake of the global 
financial crisis, market transparency has now become a major priority among several 
regulators and other enforcement authorities globally.152  Given this background, selected 
04-07-2011); also see generally related comments by Le Vine & Malgadi “Mortgage Crises, Derivatives 
and Economic Chaos” (2009) <http://asbbs.org/files/2009/PDF/M/MalgadiA2.pdf> (accessed 17-07-
2011) & generally see Anonymous “Reason for Global Recession: In Plain Simple English” 
<http://www.theindianblogger.com/problems/reasons-for-global-recession-in-plain-simple-english> 
(accessed 07-07-2011).            
148  Kaufmann & Weber “The Role of Transparency in Financial Regulation” 2010 Journal of International 
Economic Law 779 780.   
149  International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Objectives and Principles of Securities 
Regulation May 2003 6 <http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD154.pdf > (accessed 07-07-
2011).    6; Swart The Legal Framework Pertaining to Selected Segments of the Financial Market 117. 
150    Kaufmann & Weber 2010 Journal of International Economic Law 780-786. 
151   IOSCO Objectives and Principles May 2003 6 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD154.pdf > (accessed 07-07-2011); also see similar 
discussion in the IOSCO Objectives and Principles June 2010 5 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD329.pdf > (accessed 07-07-2011).     
152    Kaufmann & Weber 2010 Journal of International Economic Law 780. 
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aspects of the International Best Practice on market transparency will be briefly highlighted 
and later contrasted with the South African anti-market abuse enforcement framework below 
to investigate whether it is comparable to such International Best Practice. 
 
4 7 1 1  Overview of the International Best Practice 
 
Financial markets are regulated by different authorities globally and there is no specific 
regulatory board that enforces market transparency principles and rules at an international 
level.153 As a result, a number of international non-binding instruments, treaties, codes, best 
practices and guidelines such as the World Trade Organisation, the International Monetary 
Fund, the Financial Stability Board, the International Accounting Standards Board, the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision and the International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions have promulgated some rules and guidelines on market transparency and other 
related aspects of financial markets regulation.154 
 
The International Organisation of Securities Commissions Objectives and Principles of 
Securities Regulation proposed that there should be post-trade transparency for structured 
financial products.155 Put simply, the International Organisation of Securities Commissions 
contends that financial markets regulation should endeavour to increase the transparency of 
trading in such markets.156  Moreover, the International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions Technical Committee Standing Committee 2 on Regulation of Secondary 
Markets submits that secondary market reporting systems for different types of structured 
finance products should be efficient and viable.157  In light of this, in order to approve the 
establishment of new trading systems or exchanges, the International Organisation of 
Securities Commissions considers the reliability of the regulatory authorities’ arrangements 
for monitoring; surveillance; supervision of their participants to promote fairness, efficiency, 
153    Kaufmann & Weber 2010 Journal of International Economic Law 786. 
154    Kaufmann & Weber 2010 Journal of International Economic Law 786. 
155   For further analysis see the IOSCO Task Force on Unregulated Financial Markets and Products Technical 
Committee Unregulated Financial Markets and Products Final Report September 2009 9 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD301.pdf > (accessed 07-07-2011); also see the 
general and other related remarks and proposals by the IOSCO Task Force on Unregulated Financial 
Markets and Products Consultation Report (05-05-2009) 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD290.pdf > (accessed 07-07-2011).     
156   IOSCO Objectives and Principles June 2010 5 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD329.pdf > (accessed 07-07-2011).                
157   The IOSCO Task Force on Unregulated Financial Markets and Products Technical Committee Final 
Report 2009 9 <http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD301.pdf > (accessed 07-07-2011).    
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transparency, confidence and investor protection in the financial markets, as well as the 
viability of the measures for compliance with the securities laws.158 The global financial crisis 
further revealed that there was a lack of transparency in the over the counter derivative 
markets.   This could have been exacerbated by the fact that over the counter derivatives are 
not traded on stock exchanges; instead they are negotiated privately between likeminded 
buyers and sellers.159  This research submits that there is still a great need for transparency in 
over the counter markets as well as in commodity derivatives markets.160  For instance, the 
majority of the credit transactions involving equities, corporate bonds, credit derivatives and 
cash market instruments are conducted on the over the counter markets where there is little or 
no centralised sharing of relevant trading information.161 This gap led to some difficulties in 
the detection of insider trading and market manipulation involving credit default swaps and 
credit derivative markets.162  In response to this gap, the International Organisation of 
Securities Commissions recommended increased transparency in credit default swaps to 
promote accurate dissemination of information pertaining to prices, trading volumes and 
trading platforms to assist regulatory authorities to combat market abuse.163 Market 
transparency will promote fairness, competitiveness, efficiency as well as investor confidence 
in the financial markets.   In this regard, the International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions further proposed the establishment of adequate secondary market trading 
reporting systems to give the relevant stakeholders more accurate information regarding the 
frequency with which certain securities trades plus the latest information on those trades.   In 
other words, these reporting systems are required to be applicable to both the secondary 
markets and over the counter transactions.164 
 
158  IOSCO Objectives and Principles May 2003 42 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD154.pdf > (accessed 07-07-2011).            
159  Paulo 2011 Fondation Robert Schuman 6 <http://www.robert-schuman.eu/frs-fichecrisefi-qe200-en.pdf> 
(accessed 04-07-2011).  
160   See further Cinquegrana The Need for Transparency in Commodity and Commodity Derivatives Markets 
ECMI Research Report 3 December 2008 14-19.      
161   The IOSCO Task Force on Unregulated Financial Markets and Products Technical Committee Final 
Report 2009 31<http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD301.pdf > (accessed 07-07-2011).     
162   The IOSCO Task Force on Unregulated Financial Markets and Products Technical Committee Final 
Report 2009 31<http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD301.pdf > (accessed 07-07-2011).      
163   The IOSCO Task Force on Unregulated Financial Markets and Products Technical Committee Final 
Report 2009 32 <http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD301.pdf > (accessed 07-07-2011).      
164   The IOSCO Task Force on Unregulated Financial Markets and Products Technical Committee Final 
Report 2009 31-32 <http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD301.pdf> (accessed 07-07-2011).      
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On the other hand, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision165 revised its Basel II 
Accord framework to provide, among other things, market transparency guidelines on 
banking regulation by adopting the Basel III Accord framework in 2010.166 Similarly, the 
Financial Stability Board167 has recently indicated in its Enhancing Market and Institutional 
Resilience Report the need for market transparency to restore and maintain confidence in the 
financial markets by encouraging financial institutions to develop appropriate rules on sharing 
trading information.168 In the same vein, the International Accounting Standards Board 
recommended the adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards to allow 
timeous disclosure of relevant financial information to the public and to all the relevant 
stakeholders.169   It is submitted that sharing such information will enable both the market 
participants and the regulatory authorities to promptly detect and prevent the occurrence of 
market abuse activities in the financial markets.170  Additionally, the World Trade 
Organisation has various general rules on transparency under the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade and the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services.171  For purposes of this sub-heading, only the General Agreement on 
Trade in Service’s rules on transparency will be briefly discussed.   The General Agreement 
on Trade in Services transparency rules, unlike those of the Bank for International 
Settlements, requires member states to publish all the relevant measures and review 
mechanisms on transparency.172  The General Agreement on Trade in Services further 
requires all market participants and relevant stakeholders to be given information on the 
applicable trade requirements before they enter into any agreement.173   Nevertheless, these 
transparency rules are not binding and they are only adopted by the World Trade Organisation 
member states on a voluntary basis. 
 
165   The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) was formed in 1974 by the Group of Ten (G10) 
central bank governors as an international cooperation forum that deals with banking supervision.    
166    Kaufmann & Weber 2010 Journal of International Economic Law 780; Paulo 2011 Fondation Robert 
Schuman 8 <http://www.robert-schuman.eu/frs-fichecrisefi-qe200-en.pdf> (accessed 04-07-2011).  
167   The Financial Stability Board replaced the Financial Stability Forum which was formed by the Group of 
Seven (G7) finance ministers and central bank governors in 1999 to promote financial stability, see Paulo 
2011 Fondation Robert Schuman 8 <http://www.robert-schuman.eu/frs-fichecrisefi-qe200-en.pdf> 
(accessed 04-07-2011).  
168   Kaufmann & Weber 2010 Journal of International Economic Law 780. 
169    Kaufmann & Weber 2010 Journal of International Economic Law 782. 
170    Kaufmann & Weber 2010 Journal of International Economic Law 782.  
171    Kaufmann & Weber 2010 Journal of International Economic Law 786. 
172     Kaufmann & Weber 2010 Journal of International Economic Law 786.  
173     Kaufmann & Weber 2010 Journal of International Economic Law 786.  
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4 7 1 2  Evaluation of the South African Anti-Market Abuse Enforcement Framework  
 
The Financial Services Board,174 the Directorate of Market Abuse, the Board of Appeal and 
the Enforcement Committee do not have specific legally binding guidelines and rules on 
financial markets transparency.175  Apparently, financial markets transparency issues are dealt 
with by the JSE.  Notably, the JSE requires all issuers of listed securities to timeously disclose 
non-public price-sensitive information relating to any securities to inter alia promote 
transparency in the regulated financial markets and to prevent market abuse practices.176 The 
JSE Listing Requirements further oblige issuers of securities to disclose information relating 
to trade statements and other activities that may affect the price of securities during or prior to 
their listing to prevent unusual price movements which could result in insider trading or 
market manipulation.177 Put differently, issuers of securities other than those who publish 
quarterly results178 are obliged to publish trading statements as soon as they are satisfied that a 
reasonable degree of certainty exists that the financial results for a period to be reported upon 
next will vary by at least 20% from the most recent of the financial results of the previous 
corresponding period or of a profit forecast previously provided to the market in relation to 
that period.179  This was probably intended at discouraging market abuse practices.   Notably, 
before its consolidation into the JSE, the Bond Exchange of South Africa had its own market 
transparency rules and obligations, especially for inter-dealer brokers.180  In fact, the Bond 
Exchange of South Africa Rules mandated inter-dealer brokers181 to disclose some 
information such as the identity, price of securities and the nature of securities transactions to 
174   The Financial Services Board (FSB) may only require the regulated markets to adopt relevant measures to 
effectively monitor and detect market abuse violations after prior consultation with such markets and it 
may disclose the status or final outcome of its investigations if such disclosure is in the public interest, see 
clause 91(2)(e) & (g) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 86(2)(e) & (g) of the Financial Markets Bill 
2012.   These Bills, like the Securities Services Act, do not expressly empower the FSB to make 
mandatory binding rules on market transparency to combat illicit trading and other market abuse activity 
in the South African financial markets.     
175    For a more detailed discussion on the role of each of this regulatory bodies, see Chapter Three of this 
thesis. 
176    S 3 of the JSE Listing Requirements; also see paragraph 3 2 5 in Chapter Three of this thesis.   
177    S 3.4 of the JSE Listing Requirements; also see paragraph 3 2 5 in Chapter Three of this thesis.   
178  These issuer must comply with s 3.4(b)(i) to (vi) of the JSE Listing Requirements while those who 
publish quarterly results must comply with s 3.4(b)(vii) and may elect to comply with s 3.4(b)(i) to (vi) of 
the JSE Listing Requirements.    It is however submitted that this disparity on the part of the issuers’ 
requirements could weaken the JSE’s market transparency regulation. 
179    S 3.4(b) of the JSE Limited Listing Requirements. 
180    Bond Exchange of South Africa (BESA) Rule D.13 
181   These are registered authourised users who act as matched principals (facilitators) in securities 
transactions between such authorised users and their clients in accordance with the relevant markets as 
provided in the BESA Rules.     
130 
                                               
enhance transparency in commodity derivatives markets.182  Additional measures were further 
employed by the Bond Exchange of South Africa to mandate a market association to enforce 
sound trading standards such as the central discovery system to increase transparency and 
stability in the financial markets.183  In spite of this, it remains to be seen whether these Bond 
Exchange of South Africa transparency rules are going to continue to be utilised and 
employed by the JSE to curb market abuse activity, especially in over the counter transactions 
and commodity derivatives markets. 
 
It is submitted that the Financial Services Board should consider establishing its own 
mandatory legally binding guidelines on market transparency to prevent relevant trading 
information asymmetry problems associated with issuers and market abuse activity. It is 
further acknowledged that the JSE Listing Requirements have addressed some aspects of 
market transparency to a fair extent but nonetheless it is suggested that the determination of a 
reasonable degree of certainty in terms of these Listing Requirements should not be only 
contingent upon the issuers of listed securities and their directors to avoid possible 
subjectivity and/or bias which could hamper the market transparency enforcement efforts of 
the JSE.184  It is also suggested that the JSE should continue to promote the Bond Exchange 
of South Africa Rules on market transparency to discourage market abuse practices in 
commodities derivatives markets. Additionally, the JSE should adopt new secondary market 
trading report systems in line with those proposed by the International Organisation of 
Securities Commissions to enable all relevant persons to timeously have accurate trading 
information relating to both listed securities and over the counter transactions.185  In relation 
to this, both the Financial Services Board and the JSE should carefully develop additional 
viable measures for the clearing of over the counter commodities and commodities derivatives 
transactions as recommended by the International Organisation of Securities Commissions.186  
182    BESA Rules D13.1.1.1.1; D13.1.1.1.2 & D13.1.1.1.3.     
183   BESA Rule C1.1.3.3; also see Swart The Legal Framework Pertaining to Selected Segments of the 
Financial Market 120.       
184    S 3.4(b)(i) of the JSE Listing Requirements. 
185    See paragraph 4 7 1 1 above. 
186   See paragraph 4 7 1 1 above; similarly in the US, the Treasury recommended the amendment of the 
federal commodities and securities laws to accommodate a clearing system of all standardised over the 
counter (OTC) derivatives by the central counterparties, see the US Treasury Financial Regulatory 
Reform, A New Foundation: Rebuilding Financial Supervision and Regulation Report 17 June 2009; see 
further the IOSCO Task Force on Unregulated Financial Markets and Products Technical Committee 
Final Report 2009 35 <http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD301.pdf > (accessed 07-07-
2011).     
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These measures could increase the sharing of trading information and market transparency in 
unregulated over the counter commodities and commodities derivatives markets.187 
 
The Securities Services Act does not have a provision that specifically enforces market 
transparency best practices in relation to over the counter commodities and derivatives 
markets. This Act does, however, require exchange rules to provide efficient, honest, 
transparent and fair measures in which, and terms and conditions subject to which 
transactions in listed securities must be effected by authorised users, whether for own account 
or on behalf of other persons.188 A similar requirement is retained in the Financial Markets 
Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012,189 but it still does not directly address issues on 
market transparency in over the counter commodities and derivatives markets.   In an attempt 
to increase financial markets transparency, the Securities Services Act obliges financial 
institutions to disclose their transactions in listed securities to the Registrar of Securities if 
they result in a change of beneficial ownership in relation to such securities or to those 
concluded not via an exchange.190  In turn, the Registrar of Securities is required to disclose 
such transactions to the relevant exchange and to the public unless if the disclosure will be 
contrary the objects of Securities Services Act.191  This provision did not, however, provide 
clear guidelines regarding the reporting of transactions which could give rise to a change of 
beneficial ownership outside of an exchange. Consequently, the Financial Markets Bill and 
the Financial Markets Bill 2012 seek to tackle this obscurity and inconsistency by providing 
that only principal trades in listed securities between financial institutions192 and corporate 
actions concluded outside of an exchange and resulting in a change of beneficial ownership of 
those securities must be reported to the Registrar of Securities by that financial institution or 
parties to the corporate action in question.193  The Financial Markets Bill and the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012 now expressly require the Registrar of Securities to disclose these 
187   Although the Securities Services Act provides for the establishment of a clearing house in terms of s 65& 
s 66 to assist an exchange with settlement and clearing services as well as the establishment of a central 
securities depository in terms of s 33 read with s 42, it does not expressly provide for market transparency 
particularly in OTC transactions.    Also see clauses 48 & 49 read with clauses 30 & 38 of the Financial 
Markets Bill & clauses 47 & 48 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
188    S 18(2)(d).  
189    Clause 17(2)(d) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 16(2)(d) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
190    S 21(1) & (2). 
191    S 21(3).  
192    As defined in see clause 1 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 1 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012 to 
include organisations such as collective schemes, pension funds, friendly societies and banks,  
193   Clause 25(1); (2) & (3)(a) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 24(1); (2) & (3)(a) of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.   
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transactions to the public only if such disclosure will promote regulatory effectiveness and/or 
market transparency.194  Despite this, both the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012, like the Securities Services Act,195 omit to impose a mandatory obligation 
on the exchange or the JSE to publish any information disclosed to it to increase transparency 
in the financial markets.196 
 
4 7 2  Investor Due Diligence 
 
Investor due diligence can be defined to include appropriate measures such as internal 
standards or code of conduct that must be observed by investors to enable them to have a 
proper understanding of the nature of transactions as well as the risks involved before they 
venture into any investment opportunity.197  Given the impact of the recent global financial 
crisis, it is prudent to investigate the gaps exposed by this crisis in relation to investor due 
diligence.198 
 
4 7 2 1  Overview of the International Best Practice  
 
Several institutions and investors did not embrace the notion of investor due diligence; instead 
they depended too much on credit rating agencies.199  This led international organisations like 
the International Monetary Fund200 to recommend that regulators should adopt strict measures 
to encourage less reliance on the credit rating agencies by investors and the relevant financial 
institutions.201  In other words, the International Monetary Fund proposed that member states 
194    Clause 25(3)(b) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 24(3)(b) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
195    S 21(4). 
196     Clause 25(4) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 24(4) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
197   The IOSCO Task Force on Unregulated Financial Markets and Products Technical Committee Final 
Report 2009 9 <http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD301.pdf> (accessed 07-07-2011); see 
further analysis and related remarks in the IOSCO The Subprime Crisis Final Report May 2008 9 & 10 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD273.pdf> (accessed 21-08-2011).          
198   The IOSCO Task Force on Unregulated Financial Markets and Products Technical Committee Final 
Report 2009 9; also see generally the IOSCO The Subprime Crisis Final Report May 2008 13 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD273.pdf> (accessed 21-08-2011) & related 
discussion by the International Monetary Fund “The Initial Lessons of the Global Financial Crisis” 2009 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/020609.pdf> (accessed 09-07-2011).   
199  Paulo 2011 Fondation Robert Schuman 13 <http://www.robert-schuman.eu/frs-fichecrisefi-qe200-
en.pdf> (accessed 04-07-2011).  
200   The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was set up by the Bretton Woods Agreements in 1944 initially to 
ensure the proper functioning of the Bretton Woods monetary regime, see Paulo 2011 Fondation Robert 
Schuman 7-8 <http://www.robert-schuman.eu/frs-fichecrisefi-qe200-en.pdf> (accessed 04-07-2011).  
201    IMF 2009 <http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/020609.pdf> (accessed 09-07-2011).     
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should develop interventions to encourage investor due diligence before commencing with the 
rescue or bailout process of the affected financial institutions.202  The Financial Stability 
Board also stipulates that the flaws in investor due diligence regulation should be 
addressed.203  Specifically, the Financial Stability Board submits that investor due diligence 
should be employed particularly in credit default swaps transactions.204  If correctly enforced, 
this recommendation could curb operational risks and market abuse activity in the financial 
markets. Other organisations like the World Bank, the Group of Thirty, the Group of Twenty 
and the United States Senate Congressional Oversight Panel have further reiterated the need 
to revisit investor due diligence rules and regulations to avert possible systemic risks and 
other related problems.205 Additionally, the International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions Technical Committee, Standing Committee 5 on Investment Management was 
formulated to review the degree at which investment managers who offer collective 
investment schemes to retail investors have invested in structured financial products.206  This 
committee was also tasked to investigate the type and degree of due diligence employed by 
such investors and investment managers.207  Lastly, this committee was mandated to review 
the measures, if any, taken by the investment managers to protect retail investors from 
incurring losses in their structured financial products during the global financial crisis.208  In 
July 2009, the International Organisation of Securities Commissions published its Good 
Practices in Relation to Investment Managers’ Due Diligence When Investing in Structured 
Finance Instruments guidelines which advocate for the establishment and enforcement of 
adequate systems by all investors in order for them to understand whatever transactions and 
202  This is might be targeted at preventing the recurrence of events and consequences that eventually led to 
the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in the US.    See Kaufmann & Weber 2010 Journal of International 
Economic Law 781.   
203    Financial Stability Board FSF Working Group on Market and Institutional Resilience Preliminary Report 
to the G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors October 2007 3, electronically available and 
accessible at <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0710a.pdf > (accessed 22-08-2011). 
204    Financial Stability Forum Financial Stability Forum on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience 
Report 7 April 2008 21; G20 Study Group G20 Study Group on Global Credit Market Disruptions 31 
October 2008 48.    
205   The IOSCO Task Force on Unregulated Financial Markets and Products Technical Committee Final 
Report 2009 12 <http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD301.pdf > (accessed 07-07-2011).    
206   The IOSCO Task Force on Unregulated Financial Markets and Products Technical Committee Final 
Report 2009 10 <http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD301.pdf > (accessed 07-07-2011).    
207   The IOSCO Task Force on Unregulated Financial Markets and Products Technical Committee Final 
Report 2009 10<http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD301.pdf > (accessed 07-07-2011).    
208   The IOSCO Task Force on Unregulated Financial Markets and Products Technical Committee Final 
Report 2009 10<http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD301.pdf > (accessed 07-07-2011).    
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investment financial products they trade in.209  Despite this, these guidelines were still 
restricted to structured financial products and other types of financial instruments remain 
unregulated.  As a result, some of the flaws that were exposed by the global financial crisis, 
for instance in the securitisation process and the barriers to effective investor due diligence 
regulation, have remained largely unresolved.210 
 
4 7 2 2  Evaluation of the South African Anti-Market Abuse Enforcement Framework 
 
The market abuse provisions contained in the Securities Services Act do not expressly 
regulate matters involving investor due diligence.211  Enforcement of investor due diligence 
standards is apparently left to the issuers of securities and investors themselves to develop 
their own guidelines and then abide by such guidelines.  Similarly, both the Financial Markets 
Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012’s market abuse provisions do not address this 
investor due diligence regulatory flaw.212  These Bills, however, merely impose some general 
requirements on clearing house license holders to ensure that the “fit and proper requirements 
prescribed by the Registrar of Securities Services are met by the applicant, its directors and 
senior management”.213  No specific provision is made for the clearing house license holders 
to mandate their applicants and/or investors to comply with investor due diligence best 
practice guidelines.   In relation to this, the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill 
and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be amended to accommodate new adequate 
provisions specifically dealing with investor due diligence to prevent insider trading, market 
manipulation and other possible financial risks in the South African financial markets.  This 
research further submits that the aforementioned provisions should be carefully drafted to 
include unambiguous and practical investor due diligence measures which must be 
mandatorily observed by all investors, issuers of securities and other relevant market 
participants.  These measures must expressly discourage financial institutions, investors, the 
209   IOSCO Good Practices in Relation to Investment Managers’ Due Diligence When Investing in Structured 
Finance Instruments July 2009 <http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD300.pdf> (accessed 
21-08-2011).         
210   The IOSCO Task Force on Unregulated Financial Markets and Products Technical Committee Final 
Report 2009 16 <http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD301.pdf > (accessed 07-07-2011).    
211    See s 73; s 75; s 76 & s 77 and other related provisions under Chapter VIII of the Securities Services Act. 
212   See clauses 82; 83; 84; 85; 86 & 87 & other related provisions under Chapter X of the Financial Markets 
Bill & clauses 80; 82; 83 & 84 & other related provisions under Chapter X of the Financial Markets Bill 
2012.  
213    See clause 48(1)(b) of the Financial Markets Bill & also see clause 47(1)(c) of the Financial Markets Bill 
2012.  
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JSE and other relevant persons from over-relying on credit rating agencies and must stipulate 
appropriate penalties to be imposed on the offenders in line with the International 
Organisation of Securities Commissions proposals.214  Giving due regard to the applicable 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions Good Practices in Relation to 
Investment Managers’ Due Diligence When Investing in Structured Finance Instruments 
guidelines,215 it is hoped that a specific statute solely dealing with market transparency, issuer 
transparency and investor due diligence will be enacted in future to enhance and enable the 
Financial Services Board and the JSE to enforce investor due diligence best practices and to 
curb systemic risks and possible cross-border market abuse activity in the South African 
financial markets.  
 
4 7 3  Issuer Transparency 
 
As opposed to market transparency,216 issuer transparency can be defined to include the 
degree or extent at which relevant non-public price-sensitive information relating to securities 
or financial instruments is accurately and timeously disclosed by the issuers of such securities 
or financial instruments to the financial markets, investors and other relevant persons.   
During the global financial crisis, the International Organisation of Securities Commissions 
published its Subprime Crisis Final Report which argued that the global financial crisis was 
caused, in part, by flawed and lax enforcement of issuer transparency rules.217  
 
4 7 3 1  Overview of the International Best Practice   
 
After the global financial crisis, the International Organisation of Securities Commissions 
established a Technical Committee, Standing Committee 1 on Multinational Disclosure and 
Accounting to review the adequacy and enforcement of issuer transparency as well as investor 
due diligence guidelines.218  This Committee recommended the development of new 
214  See further discussion by the IOSCO The Subprime Crisis Final Report May 2008 9 & 10 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD273.pdf> (accessed 21-08-2011).                  
215   See paragraph 4 7 2 1above; also see the IOSCO Task Force on Unregulated Financial Markets and 
Products Technical Committee Final Report 2009 10 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD301.pdf> (accessed 07-07-2011).     
216    See paragraph 4 7 1 above. 
217  See further discussion and analysis in the IOSCO The Subprime Crisis Final Report May 2008 7 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD273.pdf> (accessed 21-08-2011).           
218   The IOSCO Task Force on Unregulated Financial Markets and Products Technical Committee Final 
Report 2009 9 <http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD301.pdf > (accessed 07-07-2011).       
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principles pertaining to the disclosure requirements for public offerings of asset-backed 
securities in order to align the International Organisation of Securities Commissions issuer 
disclosure guidelines to the ever-changing financial economic climate and to address the 
challenges posed by the global financial crisis.219 The International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions established a Technical Committee, Standing Committee 2 on Regulation of 
Secondary Markets which also recommended that issuers should be encouraged to develop 
their own additional guidelines and internal disclosure requirements to increase post-trade 
transparency, particularly in structured financial products.220 As is the case in the United 
States of America,221 the International Organisation of Securities Commissions recommended 
that such disclosure requirements must be applicable whenever an issuer makes a public 
offering, irrespective of whether the financial products in questions are listed on a regulated 
financial market or traded in over the counter markets.  Furthermore, the International 
Organisation of Securities Commissions, on behalf of the Financial Stability Board, 
recommended that issuers and other market participants should provide full, accurate and 
prompt disclosure of their financial results, possible trading risks and any information which 
could be relevant to the investors and other interested persons.222  According to the 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions, failure to comply with any of the 
disclosure guidelines and requirements could attract appropriate administrative,223 criminal 
and civil sanctions on the part of the offenders.224  Notably, these penalties will not be 
imposed on issuers in event of their non-disclosure of certain information to protect trade 
secrets or where such disclosure could be detrimental to the investors concerned.225  The 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions further recommended that issuers 
219   The IOSCO Task Force on Unregulated Financial Markets and Products Technical Committee Final 
Report 2009 9 <http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD301.pdf > (accessed 07-07-2011).      
220   The IOSCO Task Force on Unregulated Financial Markets and Products Technical Committee Final 
Report 2009 9 <http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD301.pdf > (accessed 07-07-2011).     
221   The IOSCO Task Force on Unregulated Financial Markets and Products Technical Committee Final 
Report 2009 13 <http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD301.pdf > (accessed 07-07-2011).     
222   IOSCO Objectives and Principles June 2010 8 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD329.pdf > (accessed 07-07-2011).        
223   Administrative sanctions that could be imposed on the offenders include suspensions from trading, 
injunctions and mandatory court orders to disclose the required information to investors.     
224   IOSCO Objectives and Principles May 2003 24 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD154.pdf > (accessed 07-07-2011).               
225   IOSCO Objectives and Principles May 2003 24 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD154.pdf > (accessed 07-07-2011).                 
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should be mandated to disclose all the relevant information on securities or related financial 
transactions, including initial and ongoing information pertaining to such transactions.226    
 
The Group of Twenty published a document entitled the G-20 Working Group on Enhancing 
Sound Regulation and Strengthening Transparency227 which provided a general roadmap and 
guidelines to be adopted by issuers to promote greater transparency, particularly in the over 
the counter markets.  This could have been targeted at combating market manipulation, 
insider trading and other illegal trading practices in the over the counter markets.   Lastly, the 
European Securitisation Forum published its Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Issuer 
Principles for Transparency and Disclosure Principles228 to enhance and enforce consistency 
and ongoing transparency by issuers to investors across the European Union member states.229 
 
4 7 3 2  Evaluation of the South African Anti-Market Abuse Enforcement Framework  
 
There is no legislation that solely regulates issuer transparency standards in South Africa. 
Furthermore, the Securities Services Act’s market abuse provisions do not specifically 
stipulate any rules or regulations pertaining to issuer transparency.230  This Act nonetheless 
in-exhaustively deals with some of the issues that relate to issuer transparency.   For example, 
it requires an exchange to make listing requirements with which issuers of listed securities 
and of securities which are intended to be listed, as well as such issuers’ agents, must 
comply;231 the standards of conduct that issuers of listed securities and their directors, officers 
and agents must meet232 and the standards of disclosure and corporate governance that issuers 
of listed securities must meet.233 The same requirements are replicated in the Financial 
226   The IOSCO Task Force on Unregulated Financial Markets and Products Technical Committee Final 
Report 2009 9 <http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD301.pdf > (accessed 07-07-2011).     
227   See related proposals in the Group of Twenty (G20) London Summit Communiqué which can be accessed 
at <http://www.g20.org/Documents/g20_communique_020409.pdf> (accessed 17-06-2011);  also see the 
IOSCO Task Force on Unregulated Financial Markets and Products Technical Committee Final Report 
2009 9 <http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD301.pdf > (accessed 07-07-2011).          
228  This was largely influenced by the Ten Industry Initiatives to Increase Transparency in the European 
Securitisation Markets released by nine European and global trade associations; also see the IOSCO Task 
Force on Unregulated Financial Markets and Products Technical Committee Final Report 2009 23 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD301.pdf > (accessed 07-07-2011).   
229   Also see generally the American Securitisation Forum’s Project Restart Proposals which can be obtained 
at <http://www.americansecuritization.com/story.aspx?id=2657> (accessed 08-08-2011).   
230    See s 73; s 75; s 76 & s 77 and other related provisions under Chapter VIII of the Securities Services Act. 
231    S 12(1)(b). 
232    S 12(1)(c). 
233    S 12(1)(d). 
138 
                                               
Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012.234  Despite this, the Securities Services Act, 
the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 do not provide sufficient 
clarity on whether the stated standards of conduct and/or standards of disclosure and corporate 
governance with which the issuers of listed securities are required to comply refer also to 
issuer transparency standards.  The Securities Services Act also provides that the issuers of 
listed securities may be mandated by an exchange to disseminate certain information where 
such dissemination is necessary to achieve the objects of this Act.235  An identical provision is 
made in the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012.236 Where the issuer 
unduly withhold information or refuses to disclose information to the exchange and/or the 
registered holder of securities, the exchange may temporarily suspend trading in those 
securities until the disclosure is made.237 The same provision is stipulated in the Financial 
Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012.238  While this measure may assist the 
exchange to prevent illicit trading and possible market abuse activities, it is submitted that a 
fixed time period for such suspension of trading in the affected securities should have been 
clearly stipulated in the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 to encourage more compliance on the part of the issuers of listed 
securities.  On the other hand, when the issuer of listed securities discloses information that 
could affect the prices of securities to the registered holders of securities, the issuer concerned 
is required to make the information in question available immediately to the public.239 A 
similar provision is also made in the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 
2012.240 If successfully complied with, this provision may aid the Financial Services Board, 
the JSE and other enforcement authorities in curbing the abuse of material information 
through insider trading and market manipulation in the South African financial markets. 
 
234   Clause 11(1)(b);(c) & (d) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 10(1)(b);(c) & (d) of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.  
235   S 15(1)(a).   An exchange may oblige the issuer of securities to disclose any information pertaining to the 
securities in question and the details of the affairs or trading history of that issuer to registered holders of 
securities within a period specified by the exchange, see 15(1)(b) of the Securities Services Act and also 
see a similar provision in clause 14(1)(b) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 13(1)(b) of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.   
236    Clause 14(1)(a) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 13(1)(a) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.    
237    S 15(1)(c).   
238    Clause 14(1)(c) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 13(1)(c) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.  
239    S 15(2).   
240    Clause 14(2) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 13(2) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.  
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Additionally, issuers and other persons dealing with inside information and/or who may have 
privileged information relating to securities are prohibited from sharing or disclosing any such 
information which they may have obtained while executing their duties in terms of the 
Securities Services Act unless the disclosure will be deemed necessary as stipulated in the 
same Act.241   It is submitted that this provision does not hamper issuer transparency; instead 
it assists the Financial Services Board and other regulatory authorities in discouraging insider 
trading and market manipulation by issuers of securities and other persons who misuse non-
public price-sensitive information for their own profit.  The similar provision is made in the 
Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012, but it now only permits the 
Directorate of Market Abuse to share information concerning any market abuse or related 
matter with the Takeover Regulation Panel, the South African Reserve Bank, the Independent 
Regulatory Board for Auditors, all self-regulatory organisations, the Financial Intelligence 
Centre, the National Treasury, the Finance Minister and with the persons, whether inside the 
Republic or elsewhere, responsible for regulating, investigating or prosecuting insider trading, 
prohibited trading practices and other market abuse activities.242   In turn, the Takeover 
Regulation Panel, the South African Reserve Bank, the Independent Regulatory Board for 
Auditors, all self-regulatory organisations and the Financial Intelligence Centre are 
mandatorily required to disclose to the Financial Services Board all information in their 
possession relating to an alleged violation or market abuse offence in question.243  Although 
both the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 do not specifically 
impose this mandatory duty to disclose relevant information on the issuers of securities, it is 
submitted that the issuers’ mandatory, cautious and prompt sharing of such information with 
the Directorate of Market Abuse and other related enforcement authorities may prevent some 
dishonest issuers from engaging in market abuse activity.   The Financial Markets Bill and the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 also introduced a trade repository which is obliged to employ 
timely and efficient record-keeping procedures; publish aggregate positions of classes of 
unlisted securities reported to it, including but not limited to, classes of derivatives contracts 
reported to it and make the necessary information available to the registrar of securities 
services and other relevant supervisory authorities.244  This mandatory duty on the part of the 
trade repository, to disclose required information to the registrar of securities services and 
241    S 86 read with s 106. 
242    Clause 95(1) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 90 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
243   Clause 95(2) of the Financial Markets Bill & no similar provision is made under the Financial Markets 
Bill 2012.  
244    Clause 59 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 57 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
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where applicable, to the public may give rise to the effective transparent reporting of relevant 
trading information including over the counter derivatives transactions relating to the issuer of 
securities.  
 
In addition, the issuer transparency issues are dealt with in the Listing Requirements of the 
JSE which enables it, when it is deemed to be in the public interest, to request by notice in 
writing, that all applicant issuers publicly disclose all the information as disclosed to 
registered holders of securities and the financial markets.245  An applicant issuer is further 
required to publish and/or disseminate any other information not specified in the JSE Listing 
Requirements in appropriate format and within a specified time period.246  Failure to comply 
with this requirement will result in the JSE publishing the information in question after having 
heard the applicant issuer’s representations or after having given that issuer the opportunity to 
make representations.247   This provision was most likely targeted at discouraging issuers of 
listed securities from concealing material non-public information which, when later 
published, will have a negative effect on the price of the securities concerned, possibly 
because of market abuse activities.  The same provision does not, however, clearly stipulate 
the conditions for protecting confidential information such as trade secrets and penalties that 
could be imposed on issuers who unduly refuse to comply with its issuer disclosure 
requirements.   The JSE’s Equity Rules further require all its members to provide their clients 
with accurate,248 correct,249 unambiguous250 and adequate251 information regarding relevant 
aspects like fees, remuneration, values, charges and sums that are not objectively 
predetermined.252  Put simply, the JSE Equity members are required to disclose to their clients 
and/or investors accurate and adequate information, excluding confidential information 
acquired from other clients unless consent is given by such clients concerning charges, fees, 
prohibited disclosures or restrictions placed on certain information.253 This provision will, if 
effectively enforced, increase issuer transparency in the South African financial markets.  It is 
further suggested that the Bond Exchange of South Africa Listing Disclosure Requirements 
245     S 1.25 of the JSE Listing Requirements. 
246     S 1.26 of the JSE Listing Requirements. 
247     S 1.26 of the JSE Listing Requirements. 
248     S 8.10.3.1.2 of the JSE Equity Rules. 
249     S 8.10.3.1.1 of the JSE Equity Rules. 
250     S 8.10.3.1.2 of the JSE Equity Rules. 
251     S 8.10.3.1.3 of the JSE Equity Rules. 
252     S 8.10.3.1.4 & 8.10.3.1.5 of the JSE Equity Rules. 
253    S 8.10.3.2.1 to 8.10.3.2.3 of the JSE Equity Rules. 
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which required investors to disclose information regarding the nature and state of business 
should be carefully amended and fused with the JSE Equity Rules to promote issuer 
transparency even in the over the counter commodities derivatives transactions to combat 
market abuse practices. 
 
The Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act254 proposed the drafting and adoption 
of a code of conduct which provides for adequate disclosure of relevant information by the 
financial services providers and this code of conduct was published in 2003.255  The stated 
code of conduct requires financial services providers to disclose full and accurate information 
that would be expected to enable all investors and market participants to make informed 
decisions.256  Lastly, to remedy the flaws earlier stated above, it is suggested that a specific 
legislation should be enacted in line with the International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions and the Group of Twenty proposals,257 to deal solely with issuer transparency, 
investor due diligence and market transparency in both the regulated and unregulated 
financial markets.258  This legislation must provide a mandatory continuous disclosure 
requirement on the part of the issuers for them to disclose initial and ongoing information 
pertaining to their securities259 to enable the Financial Services Board, the JSE and other 
relevant enforcement bodies to combat insider trading, market manipulation and other related 
cross-border market abuse practices.  
 
 
 
254    37 of 2002; hereinafter referred to as the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act. 
255   Also see the General Code of Conduct for Authorised Financial Services Providers and Representatives, 
as published in the Financial Services Board Notice 80 of 2003; also see s 15(1) & 16(1) of the Financial 
Advisory and Intermediary Services Act.   
256   S 3(1)(a) read with s 7(1) of the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act.    Likewise, the 
Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008, hereinafter referred to as the Consumer Protection Act, seeks inter 
alia to protect consumers from dishonest issuers of services by requiring such issuers to disclose 
appropriate information to the members of the public to enable them to make informed decisions, s 3 of 
the same Act (a detailed discussion of all the provisions of this Act is beyond the scope of this thesis).     
Nevertheless, both  the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act and the Consumer Protection 
Act do not have provisions that expressly regulate and enforce issuer transparency standards, especially in 
the over the counter markets. 
257    See paragraph 4 7 3 1 above. 
258   This legislation should further provide adequate measures that protect investors’ confidential information 
like trade secrets as well as appropriate civil, criminal and administrative penalties that can be imposed 
against those that do not comply with such measures.   
259   The IOSCO Task Force on Unregulated Financial Markets and Products Technical Committee Final 
Report 2009 28 <http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD301.pdf> (accessed 07-07-2011); 
also see paragraph 4 7 3 1 above.     
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4 7 4  Credit Rating Agencies 
 
Credit rating agencies perform, on behalf of investors and market participants, a pivotal role 
in credit worthiness assessment and the detection of various risks relating to investment 
instruments and/or financial products in order for such investors or market participants to 
make informed and sound investment decisions.260  Put differently, credit rating agencies may 
serve as an eligibility criterion on the part of the financial institutions for accepting the rated 
organisation or company’s liquidity, solvency and financial strength.261  Despite this, during 
the global financial crisis credit rating agencies’ rating quality and models were found to be 
flawed because they could not detect risks, especially in relation to complex financial 
products and transactions in the over the counter financial markets.262 
 
4 7 4 1  Overview of the International Best Practice  
 
The International Organisation of Securities Commissions proposed that the financial 
institutions should meticulously adopt their own internal regulatory models to assess possible 
systemic financial risks and to be less dependent on credit rating agencies.263 Additionally, the 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions proposed that credit rating agencies 
should be adequately regulated to allow registration of their ratings and ongoing supervision 
so as to enhance greater oversight cooperation and information sharing among the regulatory 
260   Verhelst “Addressing the Financial Crisis: The EU’s Incomplete Regulatory Response” 2010 Egmont 
Institute for International Relations Paper 39 11 <http://www.egmontinstitute.be.ep39.pdf> (accessed 08-
07-2011); Swart The Legal Framework Pertaining to Selected Segments of the Financial Market 101.          
261    Verhelst 2010 11 <http://www.egmontinstitute.be.ep39.pdf> (accessed 08-07-2011). 
262   Verhelst 2010 11 <http://www.egmontinstitute.be.ep39.pdf> (accessed 08-07-2011); IOSCO The 
Subprime Crisis Final Report May 2008 13 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD273.pdf> (accessed 21-08-2011).   Credit rating 
agencies were reportedly falling short in relation to transparency regulation, mitigation of the conflicts of 
interest, corporate governance and the issuance of accurate and quality credit ratings, see IOSCO The 
Role of Credit Rating Agencies in Structured Finance Market Report March 2008 2 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD263.pdf> (accessed 14-06-2011); Secretariat of the 
European Banking Committee “Financial Turbulence: Following Up the October 2007 Ecofin” 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/ebc/ebc170308_en.pdf> (accessed 14-07-2011) & 
Schapiro Testimony before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Concerning the State of the 
Financial Crisis 14 January 2010 1 15-16.       
263  See further discussion and analysis in the IOSCO The Subprime Crisis Final Report May 2008 13 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD273.pdf> (accessed 21-08-2011); Paulo 2011 
Fondation Robert Schuman 13 <http://www.robert-schuman.eu/frs-fichecrisefi-qe200-en.pdf> (accessed 
04-07-2011).  
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authorities.264  The International Organisation of Securities Commissions published its Good 
Practices in Relation to Investment Managers’ Due Diligence When Investing in Structured 
Finance Instruments265 guidelines which recommended the establishment of independent 
third parties other than credit rating agencies to evaluate risks in securitised products and 
monitor the rating methodologies of credit rating agencies in relation to securitised 
products.266  In another attempt to resolve various problems posed by credit rating agencies, 
especially with regard to accountability, transparency and misleading credit ratings relating to 
some financial products, a revised Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Ratings 
Agencies was issued in 2008.267   This International Organisation of Securities Commissions 
Code of Conduct further addresses issues pertaining to the responsibility of investment 
managers (their own due diligence) when using ratings; reliability and integrity of the rating 
process and independence and avoidance of conflicts of interest in the rating of structured 
products.268 Moreover, the International Organisation of Securities Commissions has 
reportedly completed an assessment of appropriate methodology for checking compliance 
with its Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Ratings Agencies in September 2008 and 
has set out some measures to enhance the international monitoring and supervision of credit 
rating agencies.269  Likewise, the Global Joint Initiative270 recommended the adoption of 
264   The IOSCO Task Force on Unregulated Financial Markets and Products Technical Committee Final 
Report 2009 11 <http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD301.pdf> (accessed 07-07-2011); 
also see IOSCO Objectives and Principles June 2010 9 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD329.pdf > (accessed 07-07-2011).   
265  See the IOSCO Good Practices in Relation to Investment Managers’ Due Diligence July 2009 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD300.pdf> (accessed 21-08-2011).      
266   This recommendation seeks to promote less reliance on credit rating agencies by companies and other 
financial institutions by inter alia discouraging lax regulation of these agencies.  See generally the 
IOSCO Task Force on Unregulated Financial Markets and Products Technical Committee Final Report 
2009 25 <http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD301.pdf> (accessed 07-07-2011) & further 
related remarks and recommendations in the IOSCO The Role of Credit Rating Agencies Report March 
2008 2 <http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD263.pdf> (accessed 14-06-2011).      
267   See the IOSCO Task Force on Unregulated Financial Markets and Products Technical Committee Final 
Report 2009 11; 20 & 22 <http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD301.pdf> (accessed 07-07-
2011); IOSCO Objectives and Principles June 2010 9 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD329.pdf > (accessed 07-07-2011) & D’Aloisio 
speech to the Australian Corporate Lawyers Association entitled The New ASIC: Addressing Today’s 
Challenges and Building for the Longer Term 7 November 2008 15-16.   
268   D’Aloisio speech entitled The New ASIC: Addressing Today’s Challenges and Building for the Longer 
Term 7 November 2008 15 & see further analysis in the Secretariat of the European Banking Committee 
article <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/ebc/ebc170308_en.pdf> (accessed 14-07-2011).    
269   IOSCO IOSCO Urges Greater International Coordination in the Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies, 
IOSCO Media Release 011/2008 17 September 2008; D’Aloisio speech entitled The New ASIC: 
Addressing Today’s Challenges and Building for the Longer Term 7 November 2008 15-16; D’Aloisio 
Securities Markets, Participants and ASIC (2008) paper presented at the Securities & Derivatives 
Industry Association Conference 2008-05-22 18.     
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relevant measures to restore market confidence in the credit rating agencies by increasing 
transparency in their rating process.271  The European Commission has also published some 
guidelines for credit rating agencies dealing with matters that include improvement of 
transparency, corporate governance registration and the overall supervision of credit rating 
agencies.272  More specifically, these guidelines are entitled the European Union Regulation 
on Credit Rating Agencies and they are further targeted at mitigating possible conflicts of 
interest and increasing competition among the credit rating agencies.273  In addition, the 
European Commission published a document entitled Driving European Recovery274 which 
seeks to improve the confidence in the European financial markets through the enforcement of 
adequate rules that regulate credit rating agencies.  In 2009, the European Union adopted a 
specific regulation which set out certain requirements for transparency and internal review 
mechanisms which must be complied with by credit rating agencies across Europe.275  The 
initial regulation of 2009 was further revised in June 2010 to strengthen the supervision of 
credit rating agencies by giving a more central enforcement role to the European Securities 
and Markets Authority to supervise credit rating agencies across Europe.276  This proposal 
allows the European Securities and Markets Authority to obtain information from issuers of 
structured financial instruments about their credit rating agencies transactions in order to 
discourage non-disclosure of unrequested ratings; temporarily prohibit or suspend the issuing 
of credit ratings by a specific credit rating agency and to impose pecuniary penalties upon the 
offenders.277  The European Commission is reportedly proposing another revision of the 
270   Comprises of the American Securisation Forum (ASF), Securities Industry & Financial Markets 
Association (SIFMA), Australian Securitisation Forum (AuSF) & the European Securitisation Forum 
(ESF).   
271    Global Joint Initiative Report 63. 
272  See generally Bake, Hawken & Parker “The EU Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies Approved” 
<http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/articles.asp?id=6529&nid=6> (accessed 12-06-2011).  
273   See further Paulo 2011 Fondation Robert Schuman 13 <http://www.robert-schuman.eu/frs-fichecrisefi-
qe200-en.pdf> (accessed 04-07-2011).  
274   See European Commission Driving European Recovery 4 March 2009 Final Com 114 7-8; Verhelst 2010 
3 <http://www.egmontinstitute.be.ep39.pdf> (accessed 08-07-2011).    
275    See European Commission Regulation 1060/2009 of 16 September 2009, (OJ L 302), 17.11.2009 1-31; 
Verhelst 2010 11 <http://www.egmontinstitute.be.ep39.pdf> (accessed 08-07-2011).   
276    Verhelst 2010 12 <http://www.egmontinstitute.be.ep39.pdf> (accessed 08-07-2011).   
277   Verhelst 2010 12 <http://www.egmontinstitute.be.ep39.pdf> (accessed 08-07-2011); see further Paulo 
2011 Fondation Robert Schuman 13 <http://www.robert-schuman.eu/frs-fichecrisefi-qe200-en.pdf> 
(accessed 04-07-2011) & European Commission Public Consultation on Credit Rating Agencies 5 
November 2010.   
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credit rating agencies rules in a bid to resolve the financial challenges in Greece, Portugal, 
Spain, Ireland and Italy by, for instance, creating a single European Rating Agency.278 
 
The Group of Twenty has endorsed the International Organisation of Securities Commission’s 
proposals for credit rating agencies regulation and further proposed the development of new 
independent models for surveillance and coordination of the oversight regulation of credit 
rating agencies.279  In the same light, the Financial Stability Board issued its own proposal 
document entitled Principles for Reducing Reliance on Credit Rating Agencies which 
discourages the perverse complexity of credit ratings through the development of effective 
internal credit risk management policies.280 As indicated above, some investors, financial 
institutions and regulatory authorities relied too heavily on credit rating agencies without 
carefully evaluating the information given by these agencies regarding the AAA rated 
securities which eventually led to the financial collapse of Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, 
AIG and other companies.281  Flawed financial models employed by credit rating agencies 
and the overall credit rating agencies regulation, especially in the United States of America, 
contributed to the recent global financial crisis.282  Consequently, in an attempt to solve this 
278   Vander Stichele “EU Financial Reform: Some Small Steps, but no Fundamental Changes in Sight” (2010) 
<http://somo.nl/dossiers-en/sectors/financial/eu-financial-reforms/newsletters> (accessed 08-07-2011); 
Paulo 2011 Fondation Robert Schuman 13 <http://www.robert-schuman.eu/frs-fichecrisefi-qe200-
en.pdf> (accessed 04-07-2011). Other reforms introduced in the European Union include the 
establishment of three main European Supervisory Authorities namely the European Banking Authority, 
the European Insurance & Occupational Pensions Authority & the European Securities & Markets 
Authority which now oversees the enforcement of market abuse in the European Union member states.   
279  See the Group of Twenty (G20) “The Global Plan for Recovery and Reform 2 April 2009” 
<http://www.g20.org/Documents/final-communique.pdf> (accessed 27-08-2011); also see 
recommendation 5 by the G20 Working Group 1 Enhancing Sound regulation and Strengthening 
Transparency Final Report 25 March 2009 6-10.    
280   It is submitted that this proposal will reduce biased credit ratings and assist regulators in preventing illicit 
trading practices like insider trading and market manipulation.    See Financial Stability Board “Principles 
for Reducing Reliance on CRA Ratings” 
<http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_101027.pdf > (accessed 12-06-2011); Nanto The 
Global Financial Crisis: Analysis and Policy Implications Congressional Research Service Report (02-
10-2009) 34 <http://www.crc.gov/congressional/Research/Service/Report.RL34742.pdf> (accessed 12-
07-2011).       
281    United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: 
Anatomy of a Financial Collapse Majority and Minority Staff Report 13 April 2011 249-255; Mazumder 
& Ahmed “Greed, Financial Innovation or Laxity of Regulation? A Close Look into the 2007-2009 
Financial Crisis and Stock Market Volatility” 2010 Studies in Economics & Finance 110 118-119.  
282   The global financial crisis was characterised by corporate fraud, insider trading, market manipulation and 
other related market abuse practices.    For instance, Moody’s Investors Service Inc & Standard & Poor’s 
Financial Services LLC (S&P) gave misleading AAA ratings for residential mortgage backed securities 
which later plummeted and contributed in part to the global financial crisis.  See the United States Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Wall Street and the Financial Crisis 243-256; also see 
generally Buiter Lessons From the Global Financial Crisis for Regulators and Supervisors (2009) paper 
presented at the Global Financial Crisis: Lessons and Outlook Workshop, at Kiel, 2009-05-8 6-8. 
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problem, the United States of America has recently downgraded its credit rating agency 
standards from AAA to AA+. 
 
4 7 4 2  Evaluation of the South African Anti-Market Abuse Enforcement Framework  
 
There is no specific market abuse provision in the Securities Services Act283 and the 
Companies Act284 that regulates and enforces credit rating agencies standards and 
requirements.   The same gap still exists in the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012’s market abuse provisions.285 The Financial Markets Bill and the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012, however, proposes the establishment of independent clearing houses286 
and trade repositories287 to provide adequate licensing procedures, internal controls and 
general requirements with which the trade repositories and clearing house members must 
comply, so as to protect investors by increasing the reliability, confidentiality and integrity of 
the trading information they receive from all the financial markets and/or other relevant 
market participants.  Apparently, the independent clearing houses and trade repositories may 
impliedly perform some functions of credit rating agencies under the Financial Markets Bill 
and the Financial Markets Bill 2012.  However, trade repositories are precluded from 
outsourcing any of their operational functions without the prior written approval of the 
registrar of securities services.288  While this may prevent conflicts of interests, it is submitted 
that investors should not over-rely on trade repositories alone to avoid making subjectively 
influenced investment trading decisions.  Moreover, there is no specific regulatory body in 
both the Securities Services Act and the Companies Act 2008 that oversees the regulation of 
credit rating agencies.  Thus, unlike the position held in other international jurisdictions like 
the United States of America, Australia and the European Union, where the United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
and the European Securities and Markets Authority regulate and enforce credit rating agencies 
283    See Chapter VIII entitled market abuse. 
284    71 of 2008, hereinafter referred to as the Companies Act 2008. 
285   See clauses 82; 83; 84; 85; 86 & 87 & other related provisions under Chapter X of the Financial Markets 
Bill &  clauses 80; 82; 83 & 84 & other related provisions under Chapter X of the Financial Markets Bill 
2012.   
286    Clauses 50 & 53 of the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 49 & 52 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
287    Clauses 55 to 59 of the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 54 to 57 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
288   Clause 58(1) of the Financial Markets Bill & no similar provision is expressly made in clause 56(4) & 
other related clauses of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
147 
                                               
standards respectively,289 credit rating agencies are self-regulated in South Africa.290  No 
oversight regulatory body is tasked to monitor these self-regulatory organisations to check 
their compliance with the International Organisation of Securities Commissions’ Code of 
Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Ratings Agencies as earlier discussed.291  Consequently, it 
remains uncertain whether this self-regulation is comparable to the international best practices 
pertaining to credit rating agencies.  In fact, the Banking Sector Education and Training 
Authority contends that some standards provided in the International Organisation of 
Securities Commissions’ Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Ratings Agencies might 
be complexly difficult to implement in South Africa because compliance with this Code of 
Conduct is merely contingent upon the self-regulatory organisations themselves.292 In relation 
to this, notwithstanding the challenges involving the availability of adequate financial 
resources, the South African Finance Minister indicated that a Credit Rating Services Bill 
should be drafted in line with the Group of Twenty recommendations.293  Consequently, the 
legislature introduced the Credit Rating Services Bill294 on 26 July 2011, in a bid to inter alia 
improve investor protection, fairness, efficiency and transparency of financial markets, and 
reduce systemic risk.295  Nonetheless, it is submitted that both the Credit Rating Services Bill 
and the Credit Rating Services Bill 2012 should also have been drafted in accordance with the 
applicable proposals in the International Organisation of Securities Commissions’ Code of 
Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Ratings Agencies and the Financial Stability Board’s 
Principles for Reducing Reliance on Credit Rating Agencies proposals.296  However, it is 
289    See paragraph 4 7 4 1 above. 
290    Swart The Legal Framework Pertaining to Selected Segments of the Financial Market 103.       
291   See further paragraph 4 7 4 1 above.   This research submits that the Financial Services Board or any 
other independent regulatory body should be statutorily empowered to enforce the credit rating agencies 
standards in South Africa.  
292   Banking Sector Education and Training Authority “International Executive Developments Programme 
Europe 2009 Syndicate 2” 
<http://www.bankseta.org.za/downloads/ssp/bankseta_presentation_(290709)_final.pdf > (accessed 12-
06-2011). 
293   See the Financial Services Board Annual Report 2010 19; also see further remarks and discussion by the 
South African Government Information “Medium Term Budget Policy Statement 2010 Speech by Pravin 
Gordhan Minister of Finance” 
<http://www.infor.gov.za/speech/DynamicAction?pageid=461&sid=14081&tid=23297> (accessed 28-08-
2011).   
294    [B-2011], hereinafter referred to as the Credit Rating Services Bill. 
295   See clause 2 of the Credit Rating Services Bill; also see similar provisions in clause 2 of the Credit Rating 
Services Bill [B8-2012], hereinafter referred to as the Credit Rating Services Bill 2012 (I have employed 
the term “clause” to refer to the provisions of both the Credit Rating Services Bill & the Credit Rating 
Services Bill 2012 because at the time of writing this Chapter, the aforementioned Bills were not yet 
effectively passed into law).    
296    See paragraph 4 7 4 1 above. 
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important to note that both the Credit Rating Services Bill and the Credit Rating Services Bill 
2012 have some provisions that deal indirectly with credit rating agencies’ transparency and 
that prohibit such agencies from engaging in other related commercial or financial services 
activities to avoid conflicts of interest.297  It is submitted that the relevant provisions of the 
Credit Rating Services Bill or the Credit Rating Services Bill 2012 should come into force 
speedily to provide adequate requirements for the registration298 and disclosure299 of relevant 
information regarding the ratings of securities and other financial products as well as 
appropriate civil, criminal and administrative sanctions against those that do not comply.300  
Additionally, the relevant provisions of the Credit Rating Services Bill or the Credit Rating 
Services Bill 2012 should be applicable to credit ratings of securities and financial 
instruments in both the regulated and unregulated financial markets to discourage the misuse 
of price-sensitive information through market abuse activities in these markets. 
 
4 7 5  Remuneration Structures and Crisis Management 
 
Crisis management includes the development of effective and adequate methods and 
framework to regulate the rescuing of financial institutions facing bankruptcy and other 
economic-related problems without necessarily disrupting the financial markets or the 
economy of the country concerned. On the other hand, remuneration structures include long-
term and short-term measures employed by financial institutions to compensate their 
employees and other relevant stakeholders without triggering economic risks.301 During the 
global financial crisis, various gaps were highlighted in the remuneration and crisis 
management structures involving several financial institutions.302 
 
297   Clauses 12; 13; 14; 15 & 16 of the Credit Rating Services Bill & clauses 12; 13; 14; 15 & 16 of the Credit 
Rating Services Bill 2012.     
298   Clauses 5 & 6 read with clause 19 of the Credit Rating Services Bill & clauses 5 & 6 read with clause 18 
of the Credit Rating Services Bill 2012.     
299   Clauses 10; 13; 14 & 15 of the Credit Rating Services Bill & clauses 10; 13; 14 & 15 of the Credit Rating 
Services Bill 2012.     
300   Clauses 29; 32 & 33 read with clauses 20 & 31 of the Credit Rating Services Bill & clauses 28; 31 & 32 
read with clauses 19 & 30 of the Credit Rating Services Bill 2012.     
301  Bernanke “Financial Regulation and Supervision after the Crisis: The Role of the Federal Reserve” 
<http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20091023a.htm > (accessed 18-08-2011).    
302    See the Secretariat of the European Banking Committee “Financial Turbulence: Following Up the 
October 2007 Ecofin” <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/ebc/ebc170308_en.pdf> (accessed 
14-07-2011); IOSCO Objectives and Principles June 2010 11 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD329.pdf > (accessed 07-07-2011).    
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4 7 5 1  Overview of the International Best Practice  
 
In October 2010, the European Commission303 published its crisis management 
recommendations dealing with preparatory and preventative measures; provision of early 
intervention powers to supervisors when problems are detected and the adoption of 
harmonised rules relating to the resolution of a bank.304 More specifically, the European 
Commission recommended the adoption of common rules for preventative measures such as 
recovery and resolution plans for banks and allowing supervisors to request affected banks to 
change their business operations and corporate structure.  The European Commission further 
recommended that supervisors should intervene once they are certain that a bank is likely to 
fail to meet its capital requirements in order to prohibit the payment of dividends as well as to 
force the affected bank to stop some specific business activities.305 Apart from the 
harmonising rules which only apply when a financial institution in question has no prospect of 
recovery, the European Commission proposed the improvement of cross-border cooperation 
in the preparation and management of a bank crisis.306 If adopted, this proposal could prevent 
cross-border market abuse practices which might occur as a result of flawed crisis 
management structures in the European Union.  Accordingly, the European Union heads of 
states and government further proposed the establishment of a new permanent crisis 
management mechanism which will become effective in 2013.307 The International 
Organisation of Securities Commissions recommended the establishment of appropriate 
measures to address any risks that may arise in the financial markets in order to protect 
investors.308  In addition, the International Monetary Fund has, on behalf of the Group of 
Twenty, published its proposal document called Crisis Management and Resolution for a 
European Banking System which inter alia provides a cross-border regulatory and 
enforcement framework for insolvent financial institutions.309 This document recommended 
303   See the European Commission Communication on an EU Framework or Crisis Management in the 
Financial Sector 20 October 2010 Final Com 579.   
304    Verhelst 2010 15-17 <http://www.egmontinstitute.be.ep39.pdf> (accessed 08-07-2011). 
305    Verhelst 2010 16 <http://www.egmontinstitute.be.ep39.pdf> (accessed 08-07-2011). 
306    Verhelst 2010 16 <http://www.egmontinstitute.be.ep39.pdf> (accessed 08-07-2011). 
307  Paulo 2011 Fondation Robert Schuman 21 <http://www.robert-schuman.eu/frs-fichecrisefi-qe200-
en.pdf> (accessed 04-07-2011).   
308   IOSCO Objectives and Principles June 2010 11 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD329.pdf > (accessed 07-07-2011).   
309   International Monetary Fund A Fair and Substantial Contribution by the Financial Sector-Interim Report 
for the G20 2010 13; Verhelst 2010 17 <http://www.egmontinstitute.be.ep39.pdf> (accessed 08-07-2011); 
South African Reserve Bank Annual Report Bank Supervision Department 2009 24 & also see the 
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the development of an adequate crisis management regulatory framework that deals with 
failing banks and other cross-border financial institutions facing insolvency.310  It also 
stipulated that bail-out funds for banks and other institutions facing bankruptcy should 
continue to be carefully and timeously employed for crisis management to prevent them from 
being abused and used as an insurance premium by banks or financial institutions.311 
Moreover, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision recommended some cross-border 
crisis resolutions which include cross-border cooperation and information sharing; exit 
strategies and market discipline; adoption of sound national resolution powers; frameworks 
for coordinated resolution of financial groups; strengthening risk mitigation mechanisms and 
reduction of complexities and inter-connectedness of group structures and operations.312 
Nevertheless, it appears that most of these recommendations were only applicable to banks 
and no specific reference is made to other financial institutions.  Again, no reference was 
made on crisis management measures that could be employed in the event of systemic risks 
caused by market abuse practices.  Similarly, in April 2009, the Financial Stability Board 
proposed some principles that tackle poor management of crisis by promoting effective 
coordination of regulators and cross-border information sharing among likeminded regulators 
to combat cross-border market abuse activities.313   
 
With regard to remuneration structures, the European Commission recommended some 
measures to regulate the remuneration of directors in general, as well as directors of financial 
institutions across the financial industry to prevent too high bonuses being paid to these 
directors at the expense of investors.314  These recommendations were nonetheless less 
effective because they were not legally binding.  To remedy this flaw, the European Union 
International Monetary Fund Crisis Management and Resolution for a European Banking System March 
2010 1 <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/wp1070.pdf> (accessed 29-08-2011).  
310    International Monetary Fund Crisis Management and Resolution for a European Banking System March 
2010 1; 28 & 29 <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/wp1070.pdf> (accessed 29-08-2011).  
311    Verhelst 2010 17 <http://www.egmontinstitute.be.ep39.pdf> (accessed 08-07-2011). 
312   Bank for International Settlements Report and Recommendations of the Cross-border Bank Resolution 
Group September 2009 1; 2 & 3 <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs162.pdf> (accessed 28-08-2011).  
313  See the Financial Stability Forum “FSF Principles for Cross-border Cooperation on Crisis Management” 
<http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publictions/r_0904c.pdf> (accessed 28-08-2011).  
314   European Commission Recommendation on Remuneration Policies in the Financial Services Sector 
C(2009) 3159 30 April 2009 3; European Commission Recommendation Complimenting 
Recommendations 2004/913/EC and 2005/162/EC as Regards the Regime for the Remuneration of 
Directors of Listed Companies C(2009)3177 30 April 2009.  
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Capital Requirements Directive III315 adopted legally binding rules dealing with the 
governance of remuneration policies, independent control of remuneration in financial 
institutions, remuneration committee and transparency rules that mandate financial 
institutions to publish information on their remuneration polices and methodologies.316  These 
rules seek to strengthen corporate governance and remuneration standards in the European 
Union by promoting internal risk management measures and long-term transparent 
remuneration policies.317 Additionally, in 2010, the European Commission proposed 
amendments to the rules governing investor compensation schemes.  These amendments 
include introducing a fixed €50 000 compensation for financial institutions that are affected 
by risks such as fraud, negligence and market abuse, new funding arrangements, and 
compliance with Deposit Guarantee Schemes’ new rules and mandatory Insurance Guarantee 
Schemes.318 Likewise, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission adopted new 
compensation rules to promote prompt disclosure of information relating to key areas of risk, 
compensation, corporate governance and director qualifications.319  The stated new rules now 
oblige financial institutions and companies to disclose their remuneration policies and 
practices of all their employees whenever such policies or practices might have a negative 
effect on certain financial products of the company or financial institution concerned.320 
According to Schapiro, “short-term compensation incentives can drive long-term risk” and 
“management and boards of directors should be more accountable” for any asymmetric 
remuneration packages which result in their employees being paid unreasonably large sums of 
money during the short-term period, especially when such packages might give rise to market 
abuse and other long-term systemic risks to the investors.321  The International Monetary 
Fund recommended that companies and financial institutions should employ risk-based 
315   Council of the European Union Directive 2010 Amending Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC 
Regarding Capital Regarding Capital Requirements for the Trading Book, Re-securitisations and the 
Supervisory Review of Remuneration Policies 2010/EU/PE-CONS 35/10.  
316    Verhelst 2010 25-27 <http://www.egmontinstitute.be.ep39.pdf> (accessed 08-07-2011). 
317   Paulo 2011 Fondation Robert Schuman 15-16 <http://www.robert-schuman.eu/frs-fichecrisefi-qe200-
en.pdf> (accessed 04-07-2011).  
318    Verhelst 2010 20-22 <http://www.egmontinstitute.be.ep39.pdf> (accessed 08-07-2011). 
319   Schapiro Testimony before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Concerning the State of the 
Financial Crisis 14 January 2010 18.       
320   Schapiro Testimony before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Concerning the State of the 
Financial Crisis 14 January 2010 18.      
321   Schapiro Testimony before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Concerning the State of the 
Financial Crisis 14 January 2010 18-19.     
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remuneration structures.322 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision also issued its 
Compensation Principles and Standards Assessment Methodology to increase transparency 
and compliance on the part of the financial institutions.323  In the same light, the Financial 
Stability Board proposed a review of compensation structures to align them with possible 
systemic risks and promote transparent supervision and involvement of all relevant 
stakeholders in the drafting of compensation policies.324  It is reported that the Group of 
Twenty has already adopted these proposals.325  However, it remains uncertain whether these 
compensation and crisis management proposals will be successfully enforced at an 
international level, especially with regard to combating possible cross-border market abuse 
practices. 
 
4 7 5 2  Evaluation of the South African Anti-Market Abuse Enforcement Framework  
 
As is the case in some countries, the responsibility of crisis management in South Africa is 
vested in the South African Reserve Bank as opposed to the Financial Services Board.326  The 
South African Reserve Bank is reportedly in the process of enforcing the relevant FSF 
Principles for Cross-border Cooperation on Crisis Management in its own regulatory 
framework.327 However, the same cannot be said regarding other crisis management 
recommendations from the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the International 
Monetary Fund and the International Organisation of Securities Commissions.328  
Notwithstanding its ongoing enforcement efforts, the South African Reserve Bank should 
consider amending its crisis management policies in accordance with the applicable 
international best practice and other practices by similar international regulatory 
authorities.329  In this regard, it is suggested that the South African Reserve Bank should 
consider adopting the newly revised crisis management rules employed in the European 
322   Goodspeed “Global Financial Crisis: What happened and What Happens Next?” 2009 South African 
Financial Markets Journal (no pages).  
323    Bank for International Settlements Compensation Principles and Standards Assessment Methodology 
January 2010 1<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs166.pdf> (accessed 28-08-2011).  
324  See the Financial Stability Board FSF Principles for Sound Compensation Practices April 2009 2 
<http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_094b.pdf> (accessed 28-08-2011).  
325  See the G20 “The Global Plan for Recovery and Reform 2 April 2009” 
<http://www.g20.org/Documents/final-communique.pdf> (accessed 27-08-2011).  
326    South African Reserve Bank Annual Report 2009/2010 28. 
327    South African Reserve Bank Annual Report Bank Supervision Department 2008 14. 
328  It is unclear whether the South African Reserve Bank has also considered or commenced enforcing crisis 
management proposals from these organisations as discussed in paragraph 4 7 5 1 above.  
329    South African Reserve Bank Annual Report Bank Supervision Department 2008 14. 
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Union and the United States of America.330  Although the South African Reserve Bank 
pledged to create new vibrant cross-border crisis management forums and new requirements 
for crisis interventions, this research submits that the crisis management responsibility should 
be removed from the South African Reserve Bank and placed in an independent self-
regulatory body like the Financial Services Board to promote transparency, less bureaucracy 
and less governmentally induced bias.331  If effectively enforced in South Africa, this 
approach could prevent the financial risks posed by cross-border market abuse activities.  In 
relation to listed companies, the Strate Limited’s Participant Failure Manual seeks to prevent 
some of the systemic risks as part of its crisis management strategy in regulated markets.332 
There is no express provision under the market abuse Chapter VIII in the Securities Services 
Act333 and Chapter X in both the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 
2012334 which deals with market abuse-related crisis management.  Despite this, the Financial 
Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 have other provisions which may be 
enforced to prevent systemic financial risks.  For example, an exchange,335 central securities 
depository,336 clearing house337 (including an independent clearing house)338 and/or a trade 
repository339 are now required to inform the registrar of securities services or the Governor of 
the South African Reserve Bank as soon as they become aware of any matter that may pose 
systemic risks to the financial markets.  Additionally, the Financial Markets Bill now requires 
an exchange,340 central securities depository (including an external central securities 
depository),341 clearing house342 (including an independent clearing house)343 and a trade 
330    See paragraph 4 7 5 1 above. 
331   This approach is also employed in the United States of America where the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and not the Treasury Department or the Federal Reserve Bank, deals mainly with crisis 
management, see generally paragraph 4 7 5 1 above. 
332    Strate Limited Participant Failure Manual 20. 
333    See s 73; s 75; s 76 & s 77. 
334   See clauses 82; 83; 84; 85; 86 & 87 of the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 80; 82; 83 & 84 of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
335   Clause 10(1)(e) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 9(1)(e) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
336   Clause 28(1)(d) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 29(1)(d) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
337   Clause 48(1)(d) read with (e); (f) & (g) of the Financial Markets Bill & also see clause 49(1)(b) read with 
clause 47(1)(e); (f); (g) & (h) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
338   Clause 50(1)(c) read with (n) & (m) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 49(2)(c) read with clause 52 
of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
339   Clause 56(1)(b) read with (a);(d) & (e) of the Financial Markets Bill &  clause 55(1)(b) read with (a); (d) 
& (e) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
340   Clause 8(1)(e) read with (c) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 7(1)(g) read with (d) & (e) of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
341    Clause 28(1)(e) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 27(1)(h) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
342    Clause 48(1)(f) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 47(1)(g) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
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repository344 to maintain security and back-up procedures to ensure the integrity of the 
records of transactions effected, cleared or settled through them to address and prevent 
possible systemic financial crisis.  
 
With regard to remuneration measures, there is no legislation that expressly and specifically 
deals with remuneration issues in South Africa to discourage companies and other financial 
institutions from triggering systemic risks by adopting flawed remuneration policies that 
encourage market abuse practices in the financial markets. Apart from some compensation 
regulatory rules employed by the JSE,345 the market abuse provisions as contained in the 
Securities Services Act,346 the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012347 
do not expressly provide for the regulation and enforcement of compensation measures.   In 
relation to this, an adequate and comprehensive national statute should be enacted to provide 
an enforcement framework for crisis management and compensation measures across the 
financial industry and all financial markets in South Africa.  This statute should be modeled 
on the applicable proposals as earlier stated348 from the Financial Stability Board, the 
International Monetary Fund, the European Union and the Bank for International 
Settlements.349  The proposed legislation should provide: 
 
(a) appropriate minimum compliance requirements for relevant persons;  
 
(b) measures for coordination and information sharing;  
 
(c) strict capital requirements;  
 
343   Clause 50(1)(n) & (m) of the Financial Markets Bill & no similar provisions are expressly made in the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
344   Clause 56(1)(e) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 55(1)(e) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.    In 
line with the G20 recommendations, a trade repository is obliged to maintain a centralised electronic 
database of the records of transactions (including the over the counter derivative transactions) reported to 
it to enhance transparency, risk assessment and market surveillance in over the counter derivative markets 
to combat market abuse and other illicit activities, see clause 1of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 1 of 
the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
345    The JSE Annual Report 2009 39. 
346    See s 73; s 75; s 76 & s 77. 
347   See clauses 82; 83; 84; 85; 86 & 87 of the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 80; 82; 83 & 84 of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
348    See paragraph 4 7 5 1 above. 
349   Bank for International Settlements Compensation Principles and Standards Assessment Methodology 
January 2010 1<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs166.pdf> (accessed 28-08-2011).  
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(d) liability for persons who create long-term systemic risks;  
 
(e) a designated independent national regulator responsible for the enforcement of its 
provisions in both the regulated and unregulated financial markets;  
 
(f) specific provisions for compensation and crisis management dealing with possible 
financial systemic risks caused by market abuse practices;  
 
(g) a mandatory disclosure requirement on the part of companies and other financial 
institutions to disclose their quarterly remuneration policy reports; and  
 
(h) appropriate civil, criminal and administrative penalties against the offenders.350 
 
4 7 6  Management of Risk 
 
Management of risk involves identifying, evaluating, understanding and adopting appropriate 
rules and measures that help to mitigate and/or ameliorate possible risks that may negatively 
affect the integrity, safety, soundness, viability and profitability of an organisation or 
company.351 It is reported that flawed risk management and overall risk oversight measures 
employed by many financial institutions and regulatory bodies also influenced the global 
financial crisis.352 
 
4 7 6 1  Overview of the International Best Practice   
 
The European Commission has, on the basis of the Larosière group recommendations, 
proposed a new framework of European financial supervision.    This framework includes the 
development of the European Banking Authority, the European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Authority, the European Securities and Markets Authority and the European 
Systemic Risk Board to tackle systemic financial risks through enhanced macro and micro 
350  This could prevent perverse governmental incentives and asymmetric remuneration policies or bailouts 
that favour big companies facing bankruptcy over smaller companies (the so-called “too big to fail” 
phenomenon) and possible systemic risks and market abuse activities in the South African financial 
markets.  See further Schapiro Testimony before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Concerning the 
State of the Financial Crisis 14 January 2010 2.     
351   See the United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Wall Street and the Financial 
Crisis 182.  
352   Schapiro Testimony before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Concerning the State of the 
Financial Crisis 14 January 2010 2.     
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prudential supervision as well as coordinated cooperation and information sharing among the 
regulatory bodies.353   The European Commission further proposed: 
 
(a) the adoption of less complex measures and less opacity of financial products, 
especially with regard to securitisation; 
 
(b) less reliance on credit rating agencies;  
 
(c) increased transparency in regulated markets and over the counter derivatives markets 
to combat market abuse;  
 
(d) revision of remuneration schemes; and 
 
(e) measures that restore good corporate governance by reviewing the supervisory role 
of senior management and reviewing the role of shareholders, financial supervisors 
and external auditors.354   
 
Furthermore, an “early warning system” was adopted by the European Systemic Risk 
Board355 to inter alia identify dangers in the entire financial system, issue warnings and 
recommendations regarding the measures to be taken by the European Union Council as a 
whole or by a specific member state, and to publish any possible risks.  The European 
Commission also proposed the reviewing of the Market Abuse Directive in order to provide 
strict sanctions for market abuse practices and extend its scope to cover over the counter 
derivative markets and new financial instruments.356  In the United Kingdom, it is stated that 
the Bank of England will replace the Financial Services Authority in risk management357 
353   This new supervisory and enforcement framework was approved by the European Parliament and adopted 
by the European Council of Ministers on 17 November 2010.   See Paulo 2011 Fondation Robert 
Schuman 6 & 10 <http://www.robert-schuman.eu/frs-fichecrisefi-qe200-en.pdf> (accessed 04-07-2011).   
354   Paulo 2011 Fondation Robert Schuman 6 & 10 <http://www.robert-schuman.eu/frs-fichecrisefi-qe200-
en.pdf> (accessed 04-07-2011); Verhelst 2010 25-26 <http://www.egmontinstitute.be.ep39.pdf> 
(accessed 08-07-2011). 
355  The European Systemic Risk Board is mainly responsible for the overall policing of systemic risks in the 
European financial markets.     Paulo 2011 Fondation Robert Schuman 10 <http://www.robert-
schuman.eu/frs-fichecrisefi-qe200-en.pdf> (accessed 04-07-2011). 
356   Paulo 2011 Fondation Robert Schuman 15-16 <http://www.robert-schuman.eu/frs-fichecrisefi-qe200-
en.pdf> (accessed 04-07-2011); Verhelst 2010 27 <http://www.egmontinstitute.be.ep39.pdf> (accessed 
08-07-2011) & also see related comments by Nanto The Global Financial Crisis Report (02-10-2009) 30-
35 <http://www.crc.gov/congressional/Research/Service/Report.RL34742.pdf> (accessed 12-07-2011).  
357    Kaufmann & Weber 2010 Journal of International Economic Law 780-782. 
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while in the United States of America, the Unites States Securities and Exchange Commission 
introduced several changes in an attempt to revamp its risk management strategies.358 
According to Schapiro, “consistent and vigorous enforcement is a vital part of risk 
management and crisis avoidance particularly in time and areas of substantial financial 
innovation”.359  In line with this, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission was mandated to 
investigate the causes of the global financial crisis and to recommend appropriate measures to 
avoid the recurrence of such crisis in future.360 This Commission requested the United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission to enhance its securities laws enforcement to combat 
fraud and market abuse practices.361  In response to this mandate, the United States Securities 
and Exchange Commission’s Enforcement Division introduced measures such as strict 
enforcement of all securities laws and the adoption of even-handed enforcement methods to 
promote fair and proper functioning of the financial markets.362  It further enforced strict 
requirements pertaining to the transparent disclosure of possible risks and non-public material 
information to ensure timely dissemination of accurate information to investors and avoidance 
of systemic risks.363 Other measures employed by the United States Securities and Exchange 
358   Schapiro Testimony before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Concerning the State of the 
Financial Crisis 14 January 2010 2.   
359   Schapiro Testimony before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Concerning the State of the 
Financial Crisis 14 January 2010 2.   
360   Schapiro Testimony before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Concerning the State of the 
Financial Crisis 14 January 2010 2.   
361   Schapiro Testimony before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Concerning the State of the 
Financial Crisis 14 January 2010 2.     
362  Consequently, it is reported that the United States Securities and Exchange Commission opened 2 610 
investigations and brought 1 991cases involving various securities violations like fraud, insider trading, 
market manipulation and other related misconduct by broker-dealers, investment advisors and transfer 
agents in the 2009 financial year.   Additionally, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission 
reportedly brought 664 enforcement actions; ordered offenders to disgorge US$2.09 billion in ill-gotten 
gains; ordered offenders to pay penalties of about US$256 million; sought 71 emergency temporary 
restraining orders to stop ongoing misconduct and market abuse practices as well as 82 asset freezes to 
protect investors in 2009 after the global financial crisis.    See Schapiro Testimony before the Financial 
Crisis Inquiry Commission Concerning the State of the Financial Crisis 14 January 2010 2-3.   Although 
this United States Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement history alone cannot prove its 
effectiveness in risk management, this research submits that the Financial Services Board should consider 
implementing some relevant and applicable risk management measures from the United States Securities 
and Exchange Commission to improve its enforcement of market abuse in South Africa.  
363   Accordingly, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission managed to obtain some landmark 
enforcement actions involving six broker-dealer companies who allegedly misrepresented the liquidity of 
auction rate securities; brought similar actions against the managers of the Reserve Primary Fund for 
failing to disclose material facts regarding US$620 billion value of its money market fund’s investments 
in Lehman Brothers fallowing its bankruptcy on 05 May 2009; sought an enforcement action against the 
Bank of America Corporation for misleading investors about the bonuses that were being paid to Merrill 
Lynch and company executives during its US$50 billion acquisition of Merrill Lynch; Countrywide 
Financial executives were also charged with fraud and insider trading and other high profile companies 
charged with market abuse or other securities violations include Credit Suisse; Bear Stearns & 
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Commission to curb the occurrence of systemic risks include working closely with the 
Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force and the Special Inspector General for the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program and establishing an Office of Market Intelligence in its Enforcement 
Division to investigate and to address complaints or tips regarding the combating of systemic 
risks.364 
 
The International Organisation of Securities Commissions Technical Committee Standing 
Committee 3 on Regulation of Market Intermediaries recommended rigorous risk 
management and prudential supervision of the best practices by originators of assets and their 
due diligence as well as investor suitability issues with regard to the intermediaries’ 
distribution to complex financial products investors.365  This Committee further proposed the 
reviewing of liquidity risk management and liquidity standards in order to supplement the 
proposals of the Bank for International Settlements as well as the capital charges for risks 
listed in its trading book. Moreover, this Committee proposed a mandatory requirement on the 
part of service providers and issuers to maintain the currency of reports, where possible, over 
(a) the life of securitised products in question; and (b) the establishment of independent 
service providers, engaged by or on behalf of, an issuer where an opinion or service provided 
by such providers may influence investors’ decisions to acquire securitised products.366 The 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has, on behalf of the Bank for International 
Settlements, revised its risk management measures367 and in the same vein, the Technical 
Committee Standing Committee 3 on Regulation of Market Intermediaries proposed a review 
of the Senior Supervisors Group’s risk management standards.368   Similarly, the 
Brookstreet Securities Corporation.  Schapiro Testimony before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 
Concerning the State of the Financial Crisis 14 January 2010 3-7.   
364   Schapiro Testimony before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Concerning the State of the 
Financial Crisis 14 January 2010 7-12.  
365   The IOSCO Task Force on Unregulated Financial Markets and Products Technical Committee Final 
Report 2009 10 <http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD301.pdf> (accessed 07-07-2011).  
366   The IOSCO Task Force on Unregulated Financial Markets and Products Technical Committee Final 
Report 2009 21-23; 25-27 & 34-35 <http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD301.pdf> 
(accessed 07-07-2011); also see further the IOSCO-Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems 
(CPSS) CPSS-IOSCO Working Group on the Review of the Recommendations for Central Counterparties 
20 July 2009 <http://www.iosco.org/news/pdf/IOSCONEWS161.pdf> (accessed 31-08-2011).  
367  See further the Bank for International Settlements “The Basel Committee and Regulatory Reform” 
<http://www.bis.org/speeche/sp10011.pdf?frames=0> (accessed 28-08-2011).  
368   This review addressed risk management issues such as the use of appropriate incentives; corporate 
governance; reliance on effective internal controls; mitigation of risks and information sharing, see the 
Financial Stability Board Senior Supervisors Group Report on Risk Management Lessons from the Global 
Banking Crisis of 2008 March 2008 
<http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0910a.pdf?frames=0> (accessed 28-08-2011).  
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Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group-III recommended that bigger financial 
intermediaries should prevent systemic risks caused by perverse incentives by taking 
appropriate risk management measures.369 
 
4 7 6 2  Evaluation of the South African Anti-Market Abuse Enforcement Framework   
 
There is no specific provision in Chapter VIII of the Securities Services Act and Chapter X of 
both the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 which deals with risk 
management measures to expressly combat market abuse related systemic risks in all the 
South African financial markets.   However, the Securities Services Act,370 the Financial 
Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012371 stipulate that an exchange must provide 
rules that prudently deal with capital adequacy, guarantee and risk management requirements 
with which all the different categories of authorised users or different activities of an 
authorised user’s business must comply.  Unlike the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012, the Securities Services Act does not provide clear examples and/or types 
of risk management measures that could be employed by such authorised users.372 
Furthermore, the Securities Services Act’s risk management requirements are apparently 
restricted to exchange rules relating to listed securities and, as a result, possible market abuse 
systemic risks that are perpetrated in the over the counter derivative transactions are not 
covered.373  On the other hand, the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 
have,374 in line with the recommendations of the Group of Twenty and the International 
Organisation of Securities Commissions, introduced new definitions of “securities”; “external 
central securities depository” to enable cost-effective cross border settlement of securities; 
“trade repository” and two types of clearing houses, namely an “independent clearing 
369   The IOSCO Task Force on Unregulated Financial Markets and Products Technical Committee Final 
Report 2009 17 <http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD301.pdf> (accessed 07-07-2011); 
Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group III Containing Systemic Risk: The Road to Reform 6 
August 2008 27 & 89-90. 
370    S 18(2)(b). 
371   Clause 17(2)(c) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 16(2)(c) read with clause 7(1)(d) of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.   
372    S 18(2)(b). 
373   S 18(2)(b).   In this regard, policy makers should consider enacting risk management provisions that has 
clear minimum compliance requirements and that are applicable to risks in both the regulated and 
unregulated markets, in line with the European Commission risk management proposals.    See paragraph 
4 7 6 1 above.  
374    Clause 1 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 1 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
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house”375 with its own rules and clearing members, and the “associated clearing house”376 
appointed by an exchange and regulated by the rules of the relevant exchange.  Notably, an 
independent clearing house is not appointed by an exchange and may act as a central counter 
party in the clearing of unlisted securities in line with the recommendations of the Group of 
Twenty and the International Organisation of Securities Commissions in order to reduce 
systemic risks, especially in the over the counter derivatives markets.377  In addition, as earlier 
stated,378 an exchange,379 central securities depository,380 clearing house381 (including an 
independent clearing house)382 and/or a trade repository383 are now required, as soon as they 
become aware of any matter that may pose systemic risk to the financial markets, to inform 
the registrar of securities services and to maintain security and back-up procedures to ensure 
the integrity of the records of transactions which they effected, cleared or settled to address 
and prevent possible systemic financial risks.  Both the Financial Markets Bill and the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 also require the central securities depository (including an 
external central securities depository), exchange, clearing house (including an independent 
clearing house) and the trade repositories to establish and maintain effective, efficient, 
reliable, secure systems and sustainable infrastructure to perform the securities services for 
which they are licensed so as to prevent systemic financial risks.384  It is reported that the 
registrar of securities services will take appropriate administrative enforcement action against 
those that fail to comply with these requirements.385  The Companies Act provides that 
companies should have their own internal rules to assess and promote the effective 
375   Clause 53(2)(c) of the Financial Markets Bill & generally see clause 47(1)(f), nonetheless there is no 
similar provision in respect of independent clearing house under the Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
376    Clause 54 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 53 read with clause 65 of the Financial Markets Bill 
2012. 
377   Clauses 53 & 52 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 49(2) read with clause 52 of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012. 
378    See paragraph 4 7 5 2 above. 
379   Clause 10(1)(e) read with clause 8(1)(e) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 9(1)(e) read with clause 
7(1)(d) & (g) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
380   See clause 28(1)(d) read with (e) & (c) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 27(1)(d); (f); (g) & (h) of 
the Financial Markets Bill 2012.  
381   Clause 48(1)(d) read with (e); (f) & (g) of the Financial Markets Bill &  also see clause 49(1)(b) read with 
clause 47(1)(e); (f); (g) & (h) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
382   Clause 50(1)(c) read with (n) & (m) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 49(2)(c) read with clause 52 
of the Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
383   Clause 56(1)(b) read with (a);(d); (e) & (f) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 55(1)(b) read with 
(a);(d); (e) & (f) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
384   See clauses 8(1)(d); 10(1)(l); 28(1)(c); 30(1)(t); 48(1)(e); 50(1)(n) & 56(1)(d) & (e) of the Financial 
Markets Bill & clauses 7(1)(d);(e) & (f); 9(1)(a) read with (c) & (e); 27(1)(c); 29(1)(u); 47(1)(e) & (f); 
49(1)(a) & 55(1)(d) & (e) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.  
385    National Treasury Explanatory Memorandum on the Financial Markets Bill 2011 August 2011 23-24. 
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enforcement of their risk management measures.386  However, this Act does not clearly 
provide whether its risk management measures are applicable to governmental departments, 
non-governmental organisations and other institutions across the entire financial sector.  
Likewise, the Strate Limited’s Enterprise Risk Management Division offers the initial 
investigation, detection, assessment, isolation and prevention of potential systemic risks that 
could occur in the financial markets to the detriment of investors.387  Nonetheless, these risk 
management rules are only internally applicable to the functions of the Strate Limited and as 
such, they may not be legally binding on other companies.   The South African Reserve Bank 
has its own internationally comparable Risk Management Policy which provides the steps and 
procedures to be followed to prevent systemic risks in the financial markets and the economy 
at large.388  Nevertheless, it is unclear whether this Risk Management Policy is statutorily 
binding upon all the companies and relevant persons at a national level in South Africa. 
 
The JSE’s Equity Rules,389 the Derivatives Rules,390 the Yield-X Rules391 and the Equities 
Directives392 deal with the minimum requirements and internal measures to identify, control 
and curb risks such as financial loss, fraud, professional misconduct, counterparty credit risks, 
maladministration and non-disclosure of material information.  It is hoped that the JSE has 
incorporated into its own risk management framework the Bond Exchange of South Africa’s 
Rule C10.3 which provided some risk management measures like internal disclosure of 
accurate financial statements, adoption of high ethical standards and continuous monitoring of 
authorised users by appointed compliance officers.  Similarly, the Financial Services Board’s 
Audit Risk Management Committee deals with its own risk assessment and policy 
measures.393  However, unlike the United States Securities and Exchange Commission,394 the 
Financial Services Board is not statutorily empowered to oversee the issuers’ risk 
management measures to prevent market abuse related systemic risks in the South African 
386   S 94(7)(i) of the Companies Act 2008. 
387  Strate Limited “Risk Management”< 
http://www.strate.co.za/aboutstrate/overview/risk%20management.aspx> (accessed 28-08-2011).  
388   This policy was modeled in part, on the Committee of Sponsoring Organisations Enterprise Risk 
Management Framework and not on the G20 or the IOSCO recommendations, see the South African 
Reserve Bank Annual Report 2008/2009 15 & 16.  
389    Equities Rules 4.70.1 to 4.70.5. 
390    Derivative Rules 16.10.9. 
391    Yield-X Rule 10.220.9. 
392    Equities Directive DA2.1 to 2.2. 
393     Financial Services Board Annual Report 2010 93 & 94. 
394     See paragraph 4 7 6 1 above. 
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financial markets.   In relation to this, it hoped that the policy makers will, in line with the 
European Commission proposals,395 statutorily empower an independent regulatory agency to 
enforce the risk management measures across all the South African financial sectors and 
financial markets. 
 
4 7 7  Accounting Standards 
 
Accounting standards can be defined to include the issuing of financial statements, auditing 
and reporting measures and the accurate and timeous disclosure of all relevant financial 
information by companies or financial institutions to the investors.396   
 
4 7 7 1  Overview of the International Best Practice   
 
Following the Enron Corporation’s collapse, the recent bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and 
other related cases that manifested during the global financial crisis, the International 
Accounting Standards Board revised its regulations to inter alia enhance the adequacy of 
accounting standards.397  Consequently, in an attempt to effectively discourage the 
propagation of complex or misleading value of assets and liabilities held in the balance sheets 
and managerial dissimulation especially in relation to financial products that are traded 
unregulated financial markets, the International Accounting Standards Board adopted new 
regulatory standards to reclassify some securities (excluding credit default swaps derivatives) 
into investment categories when they comply with certain requirements.398  Similarly, the 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles proposed the adoption of adequate and flexible 
accounting standards to enable fair pricing of financial instruments globally.399  The Financial 
Accounting Standard Board also issued proposals for prompt disclosure and increased 
395     See paragraph 4 7 6 1 above. 
396     See generally Buiter Lessons From the Global Financial Crisis 25-26. 
397     Buiter Lessons From the Global Financial Crisis 25-26. 
398   The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) has now established three categories of securities 
or assets classification, namely the assets “held for trading”; assets “available for sale” and assets “held 
for investment”.    Nevertheless, concerns have been raised that the assets “held for investment” 
category’s market prices are rigidly disclosed only through balance sheets as opposed to the profit and 
loss account, giving rise to market manipulation by financial institutions and other related companies.   
Buiter Lessons From the Global Financial Crisis 24-26.  
399  Ceresney, Eng & Nuttall “Regulatory Investigations and the Credit Crisis: The Search for Villains” 2009 
American Criminal Law Review 225 247.   
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comparability in fair value of market prices.400 The International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions Technical Committee Standing Committee 1 on Multinational Disclosure and 
Accounting proposed that the issuer’s accounting practices pertaining to financial statements, 
balance sheets and reporting systems should be comparable to the international best 
practice.401  The European Commission proposed a review of the role of auditing companies 
in assessing the accuracy, financial position and financial statements of their audited 
companies to curb conflicts of interest and market abuse.402 It also proposed that companies 
should appoint their own supervisors who will select the auditing companies to contract and 
change such companies on a regular basis to prevent market abuse and conflict of interests.403 
Additionally, it recommended the adoption of measures that increase competition among the 
auditing companies globally in order to prevent systemic risks.404  The European Commission 
also recommended that auditing companies operating in a member state should be given a 
European passport to operate across the other European member states.405 While this could 
increase competition among auditing companies across Europe, it is submitted that the latter 
recommendation may, if not effectively enforced, create serious cross-border market abuse 
supervisory challenges for the regulatory bodies.   The Group of Twenty proposed that the 
International Financial Reporting Standards and other related accounting institutions should 
develop standardised accounting standards that are commonly applicable internationally 
400   The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) & the United States Securities and Exchange (SEC)’s 
Office of the Chief Accountant issued regulations that deal with the use of accurate fair value accounting 
standards and adequate valuation models by companies.  See the SEC’s Office of the Chief Accountant & 
the FASB “Staff Clarifications on Fair Value Accounting” (30-09-2008) 
<http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-234.htm> (accessed 01-09-2011); Ceresney, Eng & Nuttall 
2009 American Criminal Law Review 225 247; 249-250 & FASB Accounting for Certain Investments in 
Debt and Equity Securities Statement115 1993 110-111. 
401   IOSCO Objectives and Principles June 2010 8 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD329.pdf > (accessed 07-07-2011); IOSCO Task 
Force on Unregulated Financial Markets and Products Technical Committee Final Report 2009 8-9 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD301.pdf > (accessed 07-07-2011).            
402   Directive 2006/43/EC/OJ L 157 On Statutory Audits of Annual Accounts and Consolidated Accounts 17 
May 2006 87-107; European Commission Green Paper on Audit Policy Lessons from the Crisis Final 
COM (2010) 561 13 October 2010. 
403   For instance, when the contracted auditing company also offers other none auditing services to the same 
company that it audits, see Verhelst 2010 25-27 <http://www.egmontinstitute.be.ep39.pdf> (accessed 08-
07-2011).  
404   In other words this proposal discourage companies from only depending on KPMG, Deloitte, Ernst 
&Young and Pricewater House Coopers alone as this monopoly may give rise to insider trading or the 
misuse of material information relating to the securities of the companies involved. 
405   Verhelst 2010 13-14 <http://www.egmontinstitute.be.ep39.pdf> (accessed 08-07-2011); Paulo 2011 
Fondation Robert Schuman 8-13 <http://www.robert-schuman.eu/frs-fichecrisefi-qe200-en.pdf> 
(accessed 04-07-2011).   
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before the end of 2011.406  Under the impetus of the Group of Twenty, the International 
Monetary Fund recently revised its lending rules and bilateral and multilateral surveillance 
measures to promote transparent and standardised accounting standards in order to detect and 
prevent market abuse and other related financial markets risks.407  The Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision’s Guiding Principles for the Replacement of 1AS 39 recommended inter 
alia that accounting companies, supervisors and regulators should develop and enforce their 
own transparent accounting standards extra-territorially.408  It is submitted that this 
recommendation should be cautiously and effectively enforced to avoid conflicts of interest 
on the part of the regulators as well as violating the autrefois acquit or autrefois convict 
doctrine to the detriment of the offenders. 
 
4 7 7 2  Evaluation of the South African Anti-Market Abuse Enforcement Framework  
 
There is no legislation that solely and expressly provides an enforcement framework for 
market abuse-related accounting standards violations in South Africa.   However, accounting 
standards violations are generally outlawed under different legislations, for example, the 
Companies Act 2008 provides that companies must keep: (a) correct, accurate and complete 
accounting records; (b) financial statements that are consistent with the financial reporting 
standards in any of the official languages at their registered offices; and (c) annual financial 
statements that show the present state of affairs of their business transactions.409  It further 
stipulates that accounting regulations and reporting standards must be sound and comparable 
to the international best practice.410  These provisions do not seem to prohibit illicit 
accounting and auditing standards by companies that also operate their businesses in other 
jurisdictions.   This gap could be providing a safe hub for such companies to engage in cross-
border market abuse activities without incurring liability.  The Financial Advisory and 
406  See further the G20 “Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System-London 2 April 2009” 
<http://www.g20.org/Documents/Fin_Deps_Fin_Reg_Annex_020409_1615final.pdf> (accessed 27-08-
2011); Paulo 2011 Fondation Robert Schuman 7-8 <http://www.robert-schuman.eu/frs-fichecrisefi-
qe200-en.pdf> (accessed 04-07-2011).  
407  Paulo 2011 Fondation Robert Schuman 7-8 <http://www.robert-schuman.eu/frs-fichecrisefi-qe200-
en.pdf> (accessed 04-07-2011).  
408   These principles were largely influenced by the G20 proposals, see further the Bank for International 
Settlements Guiding Principles for the Replacement of IAS 39 2009 2 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs161.pdf> (accessed 28-08-2011).  
409     S 28 & s 29(1). 
410     S 29(5)(a) & (b) read with subsection (4); s 30 & s 31. 
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Intermediary Services Act411 has accounting standards that are nonetheless only applicable to 
financial services and companies that offer such services.412  Likewise, the Financial Services 
Board Act stipulates that the chief executive officer and other relevant persons should take 
appropriate measures to enforce compliance with the international accounting standards.413  
Neither of these Acts has designated regulatory agencies to enforce their accounting standards 
to combat fraud and market abuse or penalties that could be imposed on the offenders in such 
instances.   In addition, the Securities Services Act stipulates that regulated persons should 
appoint an auditor who does not deal directly or indirectly in their business affairs and who 
complies with the generally accepted auditing and accounting standards in relation to the 
disclosure of annual financial statements, accounting records and the maintenance of other 
accounting or auditing requirements prescribed by the registrar of securities services.414 
Similar provisions are also made in the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 
2012, to inter alia provide certainty as regards the accounting standards that apply in respect 
of financial statements and to mandate a clearing house and its members, nominees of 
regulated persons and trade repositories to comply with the generally accepted auditing and 
accounting standards.415  The JSE Listing Requirements obliges all listed companies to 
develop adequate and accurate reporting and accounting standards that are consisted with the 
South African Statements of Generally Accepted Accounting Practice and the International 
Financial Reporting Standards.416  It is hoped that the JSE will continue to employ the Bond 
Exchange of South Africa Listing Disclosure Requirements which provided accounting rules 
for bonds and related derivatives companies to combat commodity-based market abuse 
practices.417 Furthermore, it is hoped that a specific legislation will be enacted in future to 
enforce auditing, accounting and financial reporting standards uniformly across the financial 
industry to combat fraud and market abuse-related accounting violations in South Africa.418 
 
411     37 of 2002, hereinafter referred to as the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act. 
412     S 19. 
413     S 17. 
414    S 88; s 89 & s 90(1).  
415   Clauses 96 to 100 read with clause 56(1)(f) of the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 91 to 95 read with 
clause 55(1)(f) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012; also see s 45(1)(a);(3)(c) & similar provisions in the 
Auditing Professions Act 26 of 2005. 
416    S 18.13 of the JSE Listing Requirements. 
417    S 5.13 of the BESA Listing Disclosure Requirements. 
418    See paragraph 4 7 7 1 above. 
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4 7 8  Selected Market Abuse Practices that Occurred During the Global Financial 
Crisis 
4 7 8 1  Front Running and Quote Stuffing 
 
Front running is a technique employed by market participants like brokers to anticipate the 
effect and/or impact of upcoming trading transactions on the price of certain securities.419  
Although illegal front running is outlawed in both the United States of America and the 
United Kingdom, it became more prevalent in their financial markets during the global 
financial crisis.420 Some persons took advantage of fact that front running is not always illegal 
to engage in market manipulation by buying stock just before large institutional stock orders 
caused a quick increase in the prices of that stock.421  Prohibition on illegal front running was 
difficult to enforce in the United States of America while such prohibition was implemented 
fairly in the United Kingdom by the Financial Services Authority which investigated and 
arrested about seven persons for allegedly perpetrating unlawful front running activities 
during the global financial crisis.422  In the United Kingdom, illegal front running by 
brokerage companies, fund managers and financial analysts or advisors who were privy to 
non-public inside information was strictly outlawed and these key market participants were 
required to get permission from the Financial Services Authority’s Compliance Department 
before they buy stock for their own account.423 
 
Quote stuffing is a manipulative tactic which involves the prompt entering and withdrawing 
of large stock orders by any person in order to flood the market with quotes that other persons 
have to process, thereby causing them to lose their fair competitive advantage in such 
stocks.424 During the global financial crisis, quote stuffing transactions were executed through 
high frequency trading computerised programs that are capable of distorting and speedily 
419    Anonymous “Front Running” <http://www.wikinvest.com/wikiFront-running.htm> (accessed 04-07-
2011).  
420   Anonymous “Front Running” <http://www.wikinvest.com/wikiFront-running.htm> (accessed 04-07-
2011).  
421   Anonymous “Front Running” <http://www.wikinvest.com/wikiFront-running.htm> (accessed 04-07-
2011).  
422   Anonymous “Front Running” <http://www.wikinvest.com/wikiFront-running.htm> (accessed 04-07-
2011).  
423   Anonymous “Front Running” <http://www.wikinvest.com/wikiFront-running.htm> (accessed 04-07-
2011). 
424   Lauricella & Strasburg “Quote Stuffing” <http://www.investopedia.com/terms/q/quote-stuffing.asp> 
(accessed 04-07-2011).  
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transferring large stocks to the markets.  The so-called “flash crash” which occurred in the 
United States of America’s financial markets is a case in point.425 
 
4 7 8 1 1  Evaluation of the South African Anti-Market Abuse Enforcement Framework     
 
Trade-based market manipulation activities such quote stuffing and front running are not 
prohibited under the Companies Act 2008.  However, these activities are outlawed in the 
Securities Services Act.426  Although this Act does not directly employ the terms “quote 
stuffing” and “front running”, it has similar provisions which discourage these manipulative 
activities.427  This approach is also employed in both the Financial Markets Bill and the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.428  Nonetheless, it is submitted that these Bills should be 
amended in order for them to: (a) expressly apply to possible “quote stuffing” and “front 
running” that might occur in the over the counter commodity and commodity derivatives 
transactions; and (b) provide a mandatory requirement on the part of the financial analysts or 
advisors, brokers and other market participants to hold onto their orders openly for specific 
minimum periods in order not to prejudice investors through quote stuffing or front 
running.429  This could enable the Financial Services Board and the JSE to combat quote 
stuffing and front running in the relevant financial markets in South Africa. 
 
425   It is reported that the SEC has, after the 06 May 2010 ‘flash crash’ adopted strict measures such as 
requiring market participants to openly hold-on to their orders for specific minimum periods in order not 
to prejudice investors and by regulating the use of high frequency trading to engage in quote stuffing 
especially when large numbers of orders to buy or sell stocks are quickly placed and immediately 
cancelled thereafter, to prevent the recurrence of the effects of flash orders that contributed to the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average to tumble by about 700 points within a few minutes on 06 May 2010.   See 
further Lauricella & Strasburg “Quote Stuffing” <http://www.investopedia.com/terms/q/quote-
stuffing.asp> (accessed 04-07-2011). 
426    S 75. 
427   S 75(1) & (2); s 75(3)(b) which prohibits any person from entering an order to buy or sell a listed security 
while aware that the same or opposite order will be entered by the same or different person to create a 
false artificial market price of that security.   This is similar to front running which is also outlawed in the 
US & United Kingdom (UK) & also see s 75(3)(e) prohibits the entering of orders to buy or sell a listed 
security during auction process or pre-opening session and immediate cancellation of such orders to 
create a false demand and supply of that security in order to gain profit and an affair advantage over other 
investors.   This is similar to quote stuffing which is outlawed in the US & other developed jurisdictions.  
428    Clause 84(3)(b) & (e) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 82(3)(b) & (e) of the Financial Markets Bill 
2012. 
429    See related remarks in paragraph 4 7 8 1 above. 
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4 7 8 2  Dark Pools and Flash Orders 
 
Dark pools involve more than one person colluding to buy or sell a security in a bid to create 
an artificial market activity.  After the global financial crisis, in October 2009, the United 
States Securities and Exchange Commission proposed new rules to increase the transparency 
of dark pools of liquidity and non-public trading interest in the listed stocks by requiring 
timeous disclosure of actionable indications of interest except when specific conditions 
relating to large orders that promote size discovery are met.430  This is targeted at minimising 
market manipulation of interest indications by privately owned dark pools and selective 
trading which prejudice other investors.431  On the other hand, a flash order is a practice that 
allows a person who has not yet disclosed a stock quote to quickly view other stock orders 
before the public and other interested persons are given a chance to trade in those stocks.432  
According to Schapiro, flash orders were perpetrated through highly computerised and 
automated trading devices which gave an unfair advantage to such perpetrators.433 
 
4 7 8 2 1  Evaluation of the South African Anti-Market Abuse Enforcement Framework 
 
Trade-based market manipulation provisions contained in the Securities Services Act,434 the 
Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012435 do not specifically prohibit dark 
pools and flash orders.  Dark pools and flash orders are also not expressly prohibited in the 
Companies Act 2008.  Given the challenges posed by the computerised electronic trading in 
securities, the South African policy makers should consider enacting additional provisions to 
prohibit flash orders and dark pools expressly in all the relevant financial markets.   In 
addition, the Financial Services Board and the JSE should impose a strict mandatory 
430   It is stated that the new alternative trading systems allows the stock trading volume threshold to display 
stock orders only between 5% & 0.25%.    Anonymous “Part II: What is Meant by Market Manipulation 
and Should it be Regulated?” (29-11-2005) 6-7 
<http://www.med.govnt.nz/templates/MultipageDocumentPage6861.aspx> (accessed 14-06-2011). 
431   See further Schapiro Testimony before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Concerning the State of 
the Financial Crisis 14 January 2010 21.  
432   Schapiro Testimony before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Concerning the State of the 
Financial Crisis 14 January 2010 21.  
433   Flash orders led some investors to become sceptical about complying with the SEC’s disclosure rules 
owing to fears that they could fall victim to manipulative flash orders after they have disclosed material 
information relating to their securities, see Schapiro Testimony before the Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission Concerning the State of the Financial Crisis 14 January 2010 21-22.  
434    S 75. 
435    Clause 84 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 82 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
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requirement on the issuers of securities, brokers and other relevant market participants to 
disclose their trading interests in certain securities promptly and cautiously in order to detect 
and curb manipulative dark pools and flash orders. 
 
4 7 8 3  Hedge Funds Insider Trading and High Yield Securities Investment Fraud 
 
Securities fraud violations such as Ponzi schemes,436 asset-backed securities market 
misrepresentations, corporate accounting fraud, prime bank investment fraud involving the 
fake issuing of certain financial instruments like notes of well-known financial institutions 
and the pump and dump manipulative schemes were committed increasingly during the global 
financial crisis.437  A Ponzi scheme is a type of high yield investment fraud which attracts 
persons by low risk investment offers and a guarantee of unusually high and fast profit.  
During the global financial crisis, this scheme was used to deceive investors to unwittingly 
conclude investment deals which later made them to lose their money.   For instance, in the 
United States of America, Bernard Madoff was arrested on 11 December 2008 and charged 
with securities fraud after he admitted that he had operated a US$50 billion Ponzi scheme 
through one of his companies.438  Hedge funds439 insider trading also posed enforcement 
challenges to several regulatory agencies during the global financial crisis.  This was caused, 
in part, by the fact that hedge funds were insufficiently regulated in many jurisdictions.  For 
example, in the United States of America hedge funds were not fully subjected to any 
disclosure requirements under the federal securities laws while they were totally unregulated 
in Australia.440 Consequently, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
436    Named after an early 20th century criminal called Charles Ponzi. 
437   See related remarks by Perkins “Mortgage Fraud, Securities Fraud and the Financial Meltdown: 
Prosecuting those Responsible” (09-12-2009) <http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/mortgage-fraud-
securities-fraud-and-the-financial-meltdowm-prosecuting-those-responsible.htm> (accessed 17-06-2011). 
438   He allegedly misrepresented to his investors that they were going to get profits, yet these profits were 
principal deposits from new investors.   He was later sentenced to a 150 years’ imprisonment term on 29 
June 2009; also see SEC v Stanley Chais (2009) 09 Civ 5681(SDNY) were Stanley Chais was charged for 
misrepresenting to fund investors that he was managing their investments and, as a result, the SEC 
brought permanent injunctions, disgorgement of profits and civil penalties against him, for this and other 
related cases, see Morgan Lewis “2009 Year in Review: SEC and SRO Selected Enforcement Cases and 
Developments Regarding Broker-Dealers” 2010 56 
<http://www.morganlewis.com/lit_SECandYearlyReviewWP_Jan2010.pdf> (accessed 10-06-2011).  
439   Hedge funds are privately owned investment funds from different investors (usually wealth individuals or 
big financial institutions like banks) which are cooperatively managed by an appointed investment 
manager. Securities Law Practice Center “Spotlight on Insider Trading in Hedge Funds and M & A” 
<http://seclawcenter.edu/201106/09/spotlight-on-insider-trading-in-hedge-funds-and-ma/> (accessed 21-
06-2011).  
440   D’Aloisio speech entitled The New ASIC: Addressing Today’s Challenges and Building for the Longer 
Term 7 November 2008 17; Shadab “Mercatus on Policy, Hedge Funds and The Financial Crisis” 2009 
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Enforcement Division created a Market Abuse Unit which is, inter alia, required to combat 
fraudulent market manipulation schemes and has, together with the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority, the New York Stock Exchange, the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task 
Force and the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission begun to investigate hedge funds-related 
insider trading extensively.441  Likewise, the United Kingdom and Australia stepped up 
reforms to combat hedge funds insider trading.  For example, the United Kingdom Treasury 
published its proposal document entitled A New Approach to Financial Regulation: 
Judgement, Focus and Stability on 26 July 2010 which recommends the establishment of the 
Financial Policy Committee, the Consumer Protection and Markets Authority and the 
Prudential Regulation Authority to replace the Financial Services Authority in a bid to 
effectively combat fraud and market abuse activities.442 In Australia, although the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission is responsible for the general oversight of hedge 
funds, the debate on whether to regulate hedge funds in line with the International 
Organisation of Securities Commissions’ proposals is still ongoing.443  In the European 
Union, the Market Abuse Directive was revised to inter alia extend harsher penalties to the 
persons who engage in market manipulation and insider trading (including hedge funds 
insider trading) in over the counter derivatives markets.444  
 
 
 
 
 
Mercatus on Policy 1-4; also see generally related comments by Chossudovsky “Global Financial 
Meltdown” 2008 4 <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=10268> (accessed 17-07-2011). 
441   See SEC v Arthur J Cutillo and others (2009) 09 Civ 9208 (SDNY) were Wall Street traders and hedge 
funders gained over US20 million through insider trading by trading ahead of acquisition announcements; 
SEC v Galleon Management and others (2009) 09 Civ 8811were the perpetrators gained over US$33 
million in profits and losses avoided through insider trading ahead of corporate announcements and to 
date 21 individuals have been charged with hedge funds insider trading and seven of them pleaded guilty, 
see Morgan Lewis 2010 2-9; 19-21 
<http://www.morganlewis.com/lit_SECandYearlyReviewWP_Jan2010.pdf> (accessed 10-06-2011); also 
see Bray “The Galleon Case: Kumar Says He Was Paid for Tips” 2010 The Wall Street Journal C3. 
442   These new regulatory bodies are expected to come into force in 2012.   Generally see related analysis by 
Dyer “Overhauling the Regulation of Global Financial Services” 2010 
<http://www.dorsey.com/dyer.caroline.pdf> (accessed 07-07-2011).  
443   In relation to this, insider trading and market manipulation cases for example the Tricom & Allco & 
Rubicom cases were successfully enforced in Australia during the global financial crisis, see the ASIC’s 
Annual Report 2007-2008; D’Aloisio speech entitled The New ASIC: Addressing Today’s Challenges and 
Building for the Longer Term 7 November 2008 17.  
444   Paulo 2011 Fondation Robert Schuman 6 & 10 <http://www.robert-schuman.eu/frs-fichecrisefi-qe200-
en.pdf> (accessed 04-07-2011).  
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4 7 8 3 1  Evaluation of the South African Anti-Market Abuse Enforcement Framework   
 
The Securities Services Act’s market abuse provisions do not expressly prohibit hedge funds 
insider trading and high yield investment fraud.445  Nevertheless, the Securities Services Act 
provides that a central securities depository may hold securities of the same kind collectively 
in a separate central account,446 similar to hedge funds which are also separately managed.447 
A similar provision is also contained in the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets 
Bill 2012.448 However, apart from mandating the central securities depository to disclose 
certain information from its participants to the registrar of securities services and to conduct 
its services in a prudent manner, the Securities Services Act,449 the Financial Markets Bill and 
the Financial Markets Bill 2012450 do not expressly empower the Financial Services Board to 
combat hedge funds insider trading and commodities derivatives insider trading.  The 
Companies Act 2008 does not expressly prohibit hedge funds insider trading and high yield 
securities investment fraud but it does, however, prohibit companies from engaging in 
reckless trading and executing their business under insolvent circumstances and/or with gross 
negligence in order to defraud investors.451  No clarity is given as regards the types of 
companies that are specifically targeted by this anti-fraud provision.  Accordingly, it is hoped 
that additional provisions will be enacted in accordance with other applicable reforms and 
proposals that were introduced elsewhere452 to expressly prohibit hedge funds market abuse 
activities and other securities violations, especially in over the counter markets. 
 
4 7 8 4  High Frequency Trading 
 
High frequency trading is a manipulative practice that involves persons like brokers, issuers 
and financial analysts who act in a proprietary capacity to employ sophisticated computerised 
algorithmic decision-making systems in order to obtain advantage from some minute 
discrepancies in the financial markets stock prices and then quickly trade in such stocks in 
445    See s 73; s 75; s 76 & s 77. 
446    S 33(e).   
447    See paragraph 4 7 8 3 1 above. 
448    Clause 30(1)(f) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 29(1)(h) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
449    S 33. 
450    Clause 30 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 29 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
451    S 22(1). 
452    See paragraph 4 7 8 3 above. 
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large quantities to gain profit.453  It is stated that high frequency trading by investment banks 
and hedge funds contributed about 60% to 70% of all stock trades in the United States of 
America’s financial markets during the global financial crisis and in relation to this, high 
frequency trading profits between US$8 billion and US$21 billion were recorded in 2008.   
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission 
formed a committee which recommended the adoption of minimum regulatory requirements 
such as restrictions on direct access and co-location, the imposition of penalties for rapid 
order cancellation and basic quoting requirements for high frequency trading related 
practices.454  However, it is reported that the enforcement of high frequency trading 
regulations remains challenging for many regulators because the offenders usually have 
highly sophisticated and automated algorithmic trading mechanisms that are capable of 
offering high speed stock order responses and to trade on such stock price movements after a 
certain threshold is reached.  It is submitted that lax or inconsistent regulation of high 
frequency trading can unfairly allow large financial institutions to engage in market abuse 
activities and related financial markets systemic risks to the detriment of small investors.  The 
financial markets flash crash of 06 May 2010 is a case in point.   In response to this flash 
crash, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission proposed rules to combat risks 
associated with high frequency trading related practices like erroneous flash orders and naked 
accesses.455  Nonetheless, as is the case in the European Union and Australia,456 the United 
States Securities and Exchange Commission has not yet adopted a specific rule to curb high 
frequency trading related market abuse activities.  
 
453    Bhupathi “Technology’s Latest Market Manipulator? High Frequency Trading: The Strategies, Tools, 
Risks and Responses” 2010 North Carolina Journal of Law and Technology 377 386; Wagner & Bhala 
“Is High Frequency Trading Ethical?” <http://sevenpillarsinstitute.org/case-studies-high-frequency-
trading> (accessed 04-07-2011); also see analysis by Anonymous “High Frequency Trading Regulation” 
(17-05-2011) <http://www.marketsreformwiki.com/mktreformwiki/index.php/High-Frequency-Trading-
Regulation> (accessed 04-07-2011).  
454   See Anonymous “The Impact of High Frequency Trading: Manipulation, Distortion or a Better-
Functioning Market?” <http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2345> (accessed 17-
06-2011).    
455   Also see SEC Rule 15c3-5 which requires a broker-dealer that has market accesses to establish, document 
and maintain risk management controls and supervisory measures designed to manage the financial, 
regulatory and other legal or operational risks related to such market access; also see Bhupathi 2010 
North Carolina Journal of Law and Technology 391-393; 397 & 400.  
456  See the comments and analysis by Anonymous “High Frequency Trading Regulation” (17-05-2011) 
<http://www.marketsreformwiki.com/mktreformwiki/index.php/High-Frequency-Trading-Regulation> 
(accessed 04-07-2011).  
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4 7 8 4 1  Evaluation of the South African Anti-Market Abuse Enforcement Framework  
 
Notwithstanding their fairly wide market abuse prohibition, the Securities Services Act,457 the 
Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012458 do not specifically discourage 
high frequency trading, Internet-based market manipulation, program trading and other 
related technologically perpetrated market abuse activities.   Likewise, the Companies Act 
2008 does not specifically discourage the high frequency trading and other related practices.  
Although the Securities Services Act,459 the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets 
Bill 2012460 provide inexhaustible instances where some practices may be deemed to be trade-
based market manipulation, it is submitted that additional provisions should be enacted to 
expressly prohibit high frequency trading, Internet-based market manipulation and program 
trading to enable the Financial Services Board to combat technologically related market abuse 
activities in the South African financial markets.  The JSE has reportedly boosted its 
information technology department to enhance its efficiency especially with regard to its 
clearing systems, Yield-X interest transactions and Equities derivatives by requiring its 
members to use the Broker Deal Accounting system461 to enable it to detect market abuse 
practices involving certain beneficial ownership trades.   Nonetheless, it is suggested that the 
JSE and the Financial Services Board should consider employing practically applicable 
proposals from other jurisdictions such as the back testing process, real-time risk monitoring 
and market surveillance measures to combat high frequency trading related market abuse 
activities. 
 
4 7 8 5  Credit Default Swaps 
 
Credit default swaps are “bilateral contracts designed for credit hedging or speculative 
investment and issues relating counterparty risk, operational risk and market transparency”.462 
During the global financial crisis most of the credit default swaps derivatives were traded on 
the over the counter markets by bond holders to transfer debt default risk from the buyer to 
457    See s 73; s 75; s 76 & s 77. 
458    Clauses 82 to 87 of the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 80 to 84 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
459    S 75(3). 
460    Clause 84(3) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 82(3) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
461   This system keeps the securities records and books of brokerage companies; also see further Loubser 
“CEO’s Statement” <http://www.jse.co.za/ceo/statement/public.JSE.pdf> (accessed 10-10-2008).   
462    IOSCO Task Force on Unregulated Financial Markets and Products Technical Committee Final Report 
2009 8-5 <http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD301.pdf > (accessed 07-07-2011).     
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the seller.463 It is further argued that the complexity and opaqueness of credit default swaps 
exacerbated systemic risks involving market manipulation and insider trading, particularly in 
the over the counter markets during the global financial crisis.464  Both the Group of Thirty 
and the International Organisation of Securities Commissions submit that credit default swaps 
were largely used for speculative purposes giving rise to market abuse activities, increased 
counterparty risk, operational risk and lack of transparency in the over the counter credit 
default swaps derivatives markets.465  In response to these challenges the International 
Organisation of Securities Commissions proposed the establishment of an adequate central 
counterparties’ regulatory framework to: (a) promote cooperation and relevant information 
sharing among the regulators; and (b) mandatorily require financial institutions and market 
participants to work on standardised credit default swaps to facilitate central counterparties 
clearing.466  In the same light, on 08 June 2010 the European Commission president, Jose 
Manuel Barosso, submitted that member states should consider prohibiting naked short selling 
and naked credit default swaps in order to empower their regulators to prevent market abuse 
activities.467 The European Commission further proposed that regulators should require all 
market participants to disclose relevant information in order to increase transparency and to 
ensure that sellers of credit default swaps are in actual possession of the asset to be sold at the 
463  This created counterparty risk especially with regard to defaults involving mortgage related securities 
asset-backed securities which affected a number of financial institutions such as AIG, Merrill Lynch, 
Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and General Motors. See Mazumder & 
Ahmed 2010 Studies in Economics & Finance 116-118; Shadab “Guilty by Association? Regulating 
Credit Default Swaps” 2010 Entrepreneurial Business Law Journal 408 441-452. 
464   See the IOSCO Task Force on Unregulated Financial Markets and Products Technical Committee Final 
Report 2009 13-14 <http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD301.pdf> (accessed 07-07-2011); 
the G20 Working Group 1 on Enhancing Sound Regulation and Strengthening Transparency 25 March 
2009; Whalen What is to Be Done With Credit Default Swaps paper presented to Institutional Risk 
Analytics, at the American Enterprise Institute (23-02-2009) <http://www.rcwhalen.com/pdf/cds_aei.pdf> 
(accessed 07-07-2011) and also see the related remarks and discussion by the G20 London Summit 
Communiqué which can be accessed at <http://www.g20.org/Documents/g20_communique_020409.pdf> 
(accessed 17-06-2011); the Bank for International Settlements Credit Risk Transfer: Developments From 
2005 to 2007 The Joint Forum July 2008 21.        
465   Group of Thirty Financial Reform: A Framework for Financial Stability 15 January 2009 53; IOSCO 
Task Force on Unregulated Financial Markets and Products Technical Committee Final Report 2009 29 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD301.pdf> (accessed 07-07-2011); According to the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association, the total mark to market counterparty risk exposure 
involving over the counter credit default swaps derivatives was approximately US$600 trillion; also see 
the Bank for International Settlements Quarterly Review Statistical Annex June 2009 A10. 
466    IOSCO Task Force on Unregulated Financial Markets and Products Technical Committee Final Report 
2009 32-38 <http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD301.pdf> (accessed 07-07-2011). 
467  Vander Stichele 2010 25-31 <http://somo.nl/dossiers-en/sectors/financial/eu-financial-
reforms/newsletters> (accessed 08-07-2011); Buiter Lessons From the Global Financial Crisis 8-11.  
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time when it will be due to be delivered.468 In Australia, the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission and other regulators formed a working group to study international 
developments in order to review the Australian credit default swaps market in line with such 
developments to promote transparency and to curb counterparty risk and market abuse 
activity.469  In the same light, in July 2009 the United States Treasury proposed: (a) the 
implementation of data repositories for uncleared transactions to enhance transparency by 
mandating central counterparties to report or disclose relevant information to a regulated trade 
repository, regulators and the public; (b) the establishment of a central counterparty to clear 
standardised over the counter credit default swaps derivatives.470  Credit default swaps are not 
regulated under federal commodities laws but are nonetheless, partially regulated in 
accordance with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission’s restricted 
jurisdiction over security-based swaps and federal bank regulators.471  Accordingly, the 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission adopted exemptions requirements to 
allow local credit default swaps users to employ central counterparties and exchange traded 
credit default swaps.472   Nevertheless, these requirements are merely contingent upon the 
central counterparties and/or market participants to choose whether or not to comply with 
them. 
 
4 7 8 5 1  Evaluation of the South African Anti-Market Abuse Enforcement Framework   
 
The Financial Markets Bill, the Financial Markets Bill 2012 and the Securities Services Act’s 
market abuse provisions apply only to trades conducted on a regulated market and they do not 
directly or indirectly prohibit illicit or naked credit default swaps derivatives transactions in 
468   Paulo 2011 Fondation Robert Schuman 14-16 <http://www.robert-schuman.eu/frs-fichecrisefi-qe200-
en.pdf> (accessed 04-07-2011); Verhelst 2010 27-29 <http://www.egmontinstitute.be.ep39.pdf> 
(accessed 08-07-2011).  
469   D’Aloisio speech entitled The New ASIC: Addressing Today’s Challenges and Building for the Longer 
Term 7 November 2008 16.  
470   The IOSCO Task Force on Unregulated Financial Markets and Products Technical Committee Final 
Report 2009 35-36 <http://www.iosco.org/library/pbdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD301.pdf> (accessed 07-07-2011); 
Anonymous Letter From Participants to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Other National 
Regulators (02-06-2009) <http://www.ny.frb.org/newsevents/news/markets/2009/ma090602.html> 
(accessed 07-06-2011); Shadab 2010 Entrepreneurial Business Law Journal 410. 
471   Only security-based swaps (a type of credit default swaps) are subject to anti-fraud and market 
manipulation contained in s 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 15 USC 77q(a) (2006) as amended by PL-
111-229 (approved 11-08-2010) & Rule 10b-5; s 9(a)(2) to (5) & s 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 15 USC 78i(a)(2)-(5) (2006) as amended by PL-111-257 (approved 05-10-2010); In relation to this, 
contract law private rights of action can be imposed on over the counter (OTC) market trades (including 
credit default swaps), see Shadab 2010 Entrepreneurial Business Law Journal 419-421. 
472    Shadab 2010 Entrepreneurial Business Law Journal 452. 
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the over the counter markets.473  These provisions, unlike the position in Australia and the 
United States of America,474 do not specifically empower the Financial Services Board and 
the JSE to develop their own measures to clear standardised credit default swaps and to 
cautiously allow exchange traded credit default swaps in the regulated markets to prevent 
market abuse related counterparty risk.  Likewise, the Companies Act 2008 does not prohibit 
naked credit default swaps.475 On the contrary, the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012 provide some general provisions which require an exchange,476 central 
securities depository (including an external central securities depository),477 a trade 
repository,478 participant479 and clearing house480 to employ security and back-up procedures 
and necessary measures to ensure that market participants will use an independent clearing 
house481 as a central counterparty to clear unlisted securities as suggested by the Group of 
Twenty and the International Organisation of Securities Commissions.   Nonetheless, it is not 
clear whether the unlisted securities that can be cleared by an independent clearing house will 
also include credit default swaps derivatives.  On the other hand, the JSE now regulates both 
the Equities and commodity derivatives markets.482  However, in contrast to the position in 
other jurisdictions,483 the JSE uses a non-standardised derivative instruments system called 
Can-Do Derivatives which is largely dependent on the terms of investors but traded and/or 
valued by the JSE and cleared by its own clearing house called Safcom (Proprietary) 
Limited.484  It is suggested that the JSE should combat naked credit default swaps by allowing 
over the counter credit default swaps derivatives to be standardised and cleared by an 
independent central counterparty. 
 
473  S  73; s 75; s 76 & s 77 of the Securities Services Act & clauses 82 to 87 of the Financial Markets Bill & 
clauses 80 to 84 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
474    See paragraph 4 7 8 5 above. 
475    This is the same position under the National Credit Act 34 of 2005. 
476    Clauses 8 & 10 of the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 7 & 9 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
477    Clause 28 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 27 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
478    Clauses 55 to 59 of the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 54 to 58 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
479    Clause 32(h) & (i) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 31(h) & (i) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
480    Clause 48 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 47 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
481   Clause 50 read with clause 54 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 49(2) read with clause 53 of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
482   All commodities including metals and oil are now traded on the JSE and this was made through 
cooperation with related bodies like the Chicago Board of Trade and the CME Group (world’s largest 
derivatives exchange).   
483    See paragraph 4 7 8 5 above. 
484    Loubser “CEO’s Statement” <http://www.jse.co.za/ceo/statement/public.JSE.pdf> (accessed 10-10-
2008).   
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4 7 8 6  Short Selling 
 
Short selling is a practice which involves selling securities or assets such as derivatives by the 
seller without owning them at the time of the transactions, with the intention of buying them 
back at a later stage but at a much lower price.485  Where the value of the asset or security in 
question depreciates during the period between the time of the sale and its actual delivery, the 
seller will illicitly gain profit.486 This is sometimes referred to as “covered” short selling.  An 
overview of how short selling transactions are executed is reflected in the figure 1 that 
follows, which shows that the short seller usually borrows the securities to be sold and later 
buys them back from the relevant persons or financial markets in order to return such 
securities to the initial lender.   The short seller will then make a profit when the price of 
securities in question falls and loses when the price of securities rises to new margins than 
were previously anticipated.487   The parties involved in short selling may include an initial 
lender (original owner of the securities), a broker, a short seller (borrower of the securities), a 
buyer, securities lender or an exchange and a clearing agency which oversees the clearing of 
all the securities transactions as indicated in figure 1 below:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
485  Paulo 2011 Fondation Robert Schuman 15 <http://www.robert-schuman.eu/frs-fichecrisefi-qe200-
en.pdf> (accessed 04-07-2011); see further discussion by Gruenewald, Wagner & Weber “Short Selling 
Regulation After the Financial Crisis-First Principles Revisited” 2009 Swiss Finance Institute Research 
Paper Series 09-28 4 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1439652> (accessed 08-07-2011); see similar remarks by 
Verhelst 2010 28 <http://www.egmontinstitute.be.ep39.pdf> (accessed 08-07-2011).  
486  Paulo 2011 Fondation Robert Schuman 15 <http://www.robert-schuman.eu/frs-fichecrisefi-qe200-
en.pdf> (accessed 04-07-2011).  
487  See Gruenewald, Wagner & Weber 2009 Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 09-28 5-6 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1439652> (accessed 08-07-2011); also see Gatev, Goetzmann & Rouwenhorst 
“Pairs Trading: Performance of a Relative-Value Arbitrage Rule” 2006 Review of Financial Studies 797 
799-827.  
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Figure 1: Overview of the equity loan and “covered” short selling structure. 
 
 
 
Adapted from Gruenewald, Wagner & Weber.488 
 
In contrast to covered short selling as illustrated above, “naked” short selling occurs when a 
seller agrees to short sell a security within a stipulated period without taking prior measures to 
repurchase it at a later stage.489  Comparatively speaking, it is submitted that naked short 
selling is riskier than covered short selling because the seller is not assured of getting the 
security sold back at a later period.490 There has not been any consensus regarding the 
regulation of short selling. Some commentators argue that short selling is detrimental to 
financial markets stability491 while others maintain that prohibiting short selling negatively 
affects the liquidity and efficiency of the financial markets.492  Be that as it may, this research 
488  See Gruenewald, Wagner & Weber 2009 Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 09-28 5 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1439652> (accessed 08-07-2011) for further analysis.  
489    Verhelst 2010 28 <http://www.egmontinstitute.be.ep39.pdf> (accessed 08-07-2011).  
490   Verhelst 2010 28 <http://www.egmontinstitute.be.ep39.pdf> (accessed 08-07-2011); also see similar 
sentiments in Gruenewald, Wagner & Weber 2009 Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 09-28 
5-10 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1439652> (accessed 08-07-2011) for further analysis.  
491   Allen & Gale “Arbitrage, Short Sales and Financial Innovation” 1991 Econometrica 1041 1041-1068; 
also see Shkilko, Van Ness & Van Ness “Price-Destabilizing Short Selling” 2009 SSRN Working Paper 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=971210> (accessed 05-09-2011).   
492  Gruenewald, Wagner & Weber 2009 Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 09-28 13-17 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1439652> (accessed 08-07-2011); Bris; Goetzmann & Zhu “Efficiency and the 
Bear: Short Sales and Market Around the World” 2007 Journal of Finance 1029 1029-1079; Boehmer & 
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submits that naked short selling should be adequately prohibited to prevent market abuse 
related systemic risks.   In the United States of America short selling has been regulated as 
early as the 1938 through the price test prohibition (uptick rule).493 Before the global financial 
markets crisis, broker-dealers were restricted from short selling through the Regulation 
SHO.494  In September 2008 the United States Securities and Exchange Commission enforced 
a temporary short selling ban on options markets to combat naked short selling and other 
market abuse activities.495 Moreover, the Regulation SHO was amended to permanently 
extend the short selling restrictions, especially with regard to equity securities to discourage 
naked short selling and other market abuse activities.496  The European Commission also 
proposed reforms to: (a) increase transparency in short selling practices; (b) harmonise rules 
regarding whether to ban short selling permanently; and (c) discourage short selling across the 
European Union member states.497  The European Commission further submitted that short 
sellers must now be in actual possession of the security or asset which they intend to sell and 
that the European Securities and Markets Authority may, in exceptional cases, impose a 
restriction or absolutely prohibit naked short selling to curb speculative market 
manipulation.498  The researcher concurs with Culp and Heaton,499 Goldstein and Guembel500 
Wu “Short Selling and the Informational Efficiency of Prices” 2008 SSRN Working Paper 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=972620> (accessed 06-09-2011), who argues that 
the SEC’s temporary ban on short selling resulted in share price increase and high liquidity in about 1000 
financial stocks that were covered by this ban; Beber & Pagano “Short-Selling Bans Around the World: 
Evidence from the 2007-09 Crisis” 2009 CSEF Working Paper 241 who maintains that the temporary 
short selling bans adopted during the global financial crisis reduced the liquidity of the financial markets 
in many countries as empirically proven by a survey they conducted from 01 January 2008 to 23 June 
2009  using  about 17 040 stocks from 30 countries & also see Ofek & Richardson “DotCom Mania: The 
Rise and Fall of Internet Stock Prices” 2003 Journal of Finance 1113 1115-1137. 
493   Formerly Rule 10a-1 of the Securities Exchange Act of 193415 USC 78i(a)(2)-(5) (2006) as amended by 
PL-111-257.  
494  Gruenewald, Wagner & Weber 2009 Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 09-28 31-33 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1439652> (accessed 08-07-2011). 
495   See Rule 10b-21 (a naked short selling anti-fraud Rule) which is also a final Rule under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 15 USC 78i(a)(2)-(5) (2006) as amended by PL-111-257; also see Gruenewald, 
Wagner & Weber 2009 Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 09-28 31-33 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1439652> (accessed 08-07-2011). 
496  See Gruenewald, Wagner & Weber 2009 Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 09-28 34-41 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1439652> (accessed 08-07-2011). 
497    Verhelst 2010 28-29 <http://www.egmontinstitute.be.ep39.pdf> (accessed 08-07-2011).  
498  Paulo 2011 Fondation Robert Schuman 15 <http://www.robert-schuman.eu/frs-fichecrisefi-qe200-
en.pdf> (accessed 04-07-2011).  
499   Culp & Heaton “The Economics of Naked Short Selling” 2008 Regulation 46 46-51. 
500  Also see Goldstein & Guembel “Manipulation and the Allocational Role of Prices” 2008 Review of 
Economic Studies 133 135-164.  
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and Shkilko, Van Ness and Van Ness501 that naked short selling may increase market abuse 
activity in the financial markets502 and further submits that short selling must be regulated by 
independent bodies to maintain financial markets efficiency and stability. 
 
4 7 8 6 1  Evaluation of the South African Anti-Market Abuse Enforcement Framework 
 
The current South African anti-market abuse enforcement framework primarily deals only 
with insider trading and market manipulation.503  Accordingly, there are no market abuse 
provisions which explicitly prohibit short selling under the Securities Services Act,504 the 
Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012.505  Therefore, in contrast to the 
position in the United Kingdom,506 the United States of America and Europe,507 the decision 
to ban short selling has not yet been statutorily considered in South Africa.  It is submitted 
that this gap could give some devious persons an easy conduit to commit market abuse 
offences without incurring liability. After the global financial crisis, the JSE, in addition to its 
Broker Deal Accounting system and other surveillance systems, introduced some restrictions 
on short selling in September 2008.508 These restrictions were targeted at restoring investor 
confidence in the JSE Equity derivatives and securities by combating possible short selling 
related market abuse activities.509  However, it remains uncertain whether these short selling 
restrictions are enforced by the JSE itself, or by the courts and the Financial Services Board.  
Given this obscurity, it is hoped that the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill 
and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 will be fastidiously amended, giving regard to relevant 
applicable developments in other jurisdictions510 to expressly prohibit naked short selling. 
501   Shkilko, Van Ness & Van Ness 2009 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=971210> 
(accessed 05-09-2011).  
502  See Gruenewald, Wagner & Weber 2009 Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 09-28 21-23 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1439652> (accessed 08-07-2011). 
503    Paragraph 2 5 in Chapter Two of this thesis; clauses 82 to 87 of the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 80 
to 84 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.    
504    See s 73; s 75; s 76 & s 77. 
505    Also see clauses 82 to 87 of the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 80 to 84 of the Financial Markets Bill 
2012.  
506   See Gruenewald, Wagner & Weber 2009 Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 09-28 13-14; 21 
& 41-44 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1439652> (accessed 08-07-2011).  
507    See paragraph 4 7 8 6 above. 
508    Loubser “CEO’s Statement” <http://www.jse.co.za/ceo/statement/public.JSE.pdf> (accessed 10-10-
2008).   
509    Loubser “CEO’s Statement” <http://www.jse.co.za/ceo/statement/public.JSE.pdf> (accessed 10-10-
2008).   
510    See paragraph 4 7 8 6 above. 
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4 8  Concluding Remarks  
 
Although South Africa, like several other countries, has made numerous efforts to combat 
market abuse practices, a lot may still need to be done to reduce and eradicate the negative 
effects caused by such practices in the South African financial markets.511  As discussed 
above, significant progress has been made with regard to the co-operation between the 
Financial Services Board and other local enforcement bodies like the JSE.512 Nevertheless, 
the same cannot be said regarding the co-operation of the Financial Services Board with listed 
companies and similar international regulatory bodies.513  Moreover, the Financial Services 
Board does not provide private rights of action for the prejudiced persons and other 
enforcement measures like bounty rewards and whistle-blowing immunity to encourage all 
the relevant stakeholders to bona fide report any suspected market abuse activities to itself or 
to other relevant enforcement authorities.514 Moreover, it was noted that the Financial 
Services Board does not seem to be using other detection strategies like engaging more 
brokerages and companies that tape or digitally record telephonic orders and other 
transactions from clients to their agencies in order to isolate all possible market abuse 
activities timeously.515 It was acknowledged that another challenge associated with the 
enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in South Africa is that insider trading and market 
manipulation offences are inconsistently defined and treated separately and differently.516  It 
was further noted that market manipulation and insider trading cases are inherently difficult to 
prosecute.517 It was also acknowledged that the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets 
Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 do not provide specific provisions for a separate 
maximum criminal penalty for individuals and juristic persons, with a much higher maximum 
penalty to be imposed on such juristic persons.518  It was further noted that there is no specific 
provision in the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets 
Bill 2012 which expressly provides for awareness and extensive education on market abuse 
from the grassroots level in order to change the illicit norms and attitudes among all the 
511   Cassim “An Analysis of Market Manipulation under the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004 (part 1)” 2008 
SA Merc LJ 33 33-36. 
512    See paragraph 4 3 1 above. 
513    See paragraphs 4 3 2 & 4 3 3 above. 
514     See paragraphs 4 2; 4 4 7 & 4 5 read with paragraph 4 3 3 above. 
515     See paragraph 4 4 2 above. 
516     See paragraph 4 4 4 above. 
517     See paragraph 4 4 3 above. 
518     See paragraph 4 4 5 above. 
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market participants in South Africa.519  It was noted that the legislature, the Financial Services 
Board, the JSE and other relevant stakeholders did not adopt a holistic approach with regard 
to the development of a strong anti-market abuse culture in South Africa.520  Moreover, it was 
acknowledged that apart from relying on its powers to make market abuse rules and the JSE’s 
Surveillance Division to detect and prevent market abuse, the Financial Services Board does 
not seem to employ other preventative methods like public censure to discourage market 
abuse practices in South Africa.521 Moreover, it was submitted that the Financial Services 
Board should consider establishing its own mandatory legally binding guidelines on market 
transparency to prevent relevant trading information asymmetry problems associated with 
issuers and market abuse activity.522  It was also submitted that the determination of a 
reasonable degree of certainty in terms of the JSE Listing Requirements should not be only 
contingent upon the issuers of listed securities and their directors to avoid possible 
subjectivity which could hamper the JSE’s market transparency enforcement efforts.523  In 
addition, it was noted that the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 do not have provisions that specifically enforce market 
transparency best practices in relation to over the counter commodities and derivatives 
markets.524  It was noted that the market abuse provisions contained in the Securities Services 
Act, the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 do not expressly regulate 
matters involving investor due diligence.525 In relation to this, it was stated that the Securities 
Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be 
amended to accommodate new adequate provisions specifically dealing with investor due 
diligence to prevent market abuse-related financial risks in the South African financial 
markets.526 It was also submitted that another option could be the enacting of a specific statute 
that solely deals with market transparency, issuer transparency and investor due diligence to 
enable the Financial Services Board and the JSE to curb systemic risks and possible cross-
border market abuse activity in the South African financial markets.527  Moreover, it was also 
suggested that such legislation should be enacted in line with the International Organisation of 
519     See paragraph 4 4 6 above. 
520     See paragraph 4 4 7 above. 
521     See paragraph 4 5 above. 
522     See paragraph 4 7 1 2 above. 
523     See paragraph 4 7 1 2 above. 
524     See paragraph 4 7 1 2 above. 
525     See paragraph 4 7 2 2 above. 
526     See paragraph 4 7 2 2 above. 
527     See paragraph 4 7 2 2 above. 
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Securities Commissions and the Group of Twenty proposals.528 It was further submitted that 
such legislation should provide a mandatory continuous disclosure requirement on the part of 
the issuers for them to disclose initial and ongoing information pertaining to their securities to 
enable the Financial Services Board and the JSE to combat cross-border market abuse 
practices.529   
 
It was further acknowledged that there are no specific market abuse provisions in the 
Securities Services Act, the Companies Act 2008, the Financial Markets Bill and the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 that regulate and enforce credit rating agencies standards and 
requirements.530  Moreover, there is no specific regulatory body in the Securities Services 
Act, the Companies Act 2008, the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 
that oversees the regulation of credit rating agencies.531  It was accordingly submitted that the 
Credit Rating Services Bill and/or the Credit Rating Services Bill 2012 should be applicable 
to credit ratings of securities and/or financial instruments in both the regulated and 
unregulated financial markets to discourage market abuse activities in these markets.532  
Likewise, it was noted that the responsibility of crisis management in South Africa is vested 
in the South African Reserve Bank as opposed to the Financial Services Board.533  In relation 
to this, it was submitted that the crisis management responsibility should be removed from the 
South African Reserve Bank and placed in an independent self regulatory body like the 
Financial Services Board to promote transparency, less bias and less bureaucracy.534 It was 
additionally stated that an adequate and comprehensive statute should be enacted to provide 
an effective enforcement framework for crisis management and compensation measures 
across the financial services industry and all financial markets in South Africa to curb market 
abuse activities.535 
 
It was noted that there is no specific provision in the Securities Services Act, the Financial 
Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012, which deals with the enforcement of risk 
528     See paragraph 4 7 3 2 above. 
529     See paragraph 4 7 3 2 above. 
530     See paragraph 4 7 4 2 above. 
531     Paragraph 4 7 4 2 above. 
532     See paragraph 4 7 4 2 above. 
533     See paragraph 4 7 5 2 above. 
534    See paragraph 4 7 5 2 above. 
535     See paragraph 4 7 5 2 above. 
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management measures to expressly combat market abuse related systemic risks in all the 
South African financial markets.536  It was accordingly submitted that the policy makers 
should, in line with the European Commission proposals,537 statutorily empower an 
independent regulatory agency to enforce the risk management measures across all the South 
African financial sectors and financial markets.538 Moreover, it was noted that there is no 
legislation that solely and expressly provides an enforcement framework for market abuse 
related accounting standards violations in South Africa.539  However, it was stated that 
accounting standards violations are generally outlawed under different legislations, for 
example, the Companies Act 2008, the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act and 
the Financial Services Board Act.540  It was also noted that these Acts neither have designated 
regulatory agencies to enforce their accounting standards to combat fraud and market abuse 
nor penalties that could be imposed on the offenders in such instances.541 It was further 
acknowledged that there is no uniformity as regards the adopted accounting and auditing 
standards.  Accordingly, it is hoped that a specific legislation will be enacted in future to 
uniformly enforce auditing, accounting and financial reporting standards across the financial 
industry to combat fraud and market abuse-related accounting violations and to enhance 
comparability with international accounting best practice.542  It was suggested that the 
Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 
should be amended in order to enact provisions that directly and expressly apply to possible 
quote stuffing and front running that might occur in the over the counter commodity and 
commodity derivatives transactions.543  It was further submitted that the Securities Services 
Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be amended to 
provide a mandatory requirement on the part of the financial analysts or advisors, brokers and 
other market participants to openly hold onto their orders for specific minimum periods in 
order not to prejudice investors through quote stuffing or front running.544  Moreover, it was 
noted that the Companies Act 2008, the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill 
and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 do not specifically prohibit dark pools and flash 
536     See paragraph 4 7 6 2 above. 
537     See paragraph 4 7 6 1 above. 
538     See paragraph 4 7 6 2 above. 
539     See paragraph 4 7 7 2 above. 
540     See paragraph 4 7 7 2 above. 
541     See paragraph 4 7 7 2 above. 
542     See paragraph 4 7 7 2 above. 
543     See paragraph 4 7 8 1 1 above. 
544     See paragraph 4 7 8 1 1 above. 
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orders.545  It was submitted that additional provisions should be enacted to expressly prohibit 
flash orders and dark pools in all the relevant financial markets.546  In addition, it was 
submitted that the Financial Services Board and the JSE should strictly impose a mandatory 
requirement on the issuers of securities, brokers and other relevant market participants to 
disclose their trading interests in certain securities promptly and cautiously in order to detect 
and curb manipulative dark pools and flash orders.547  It was further noted that the Securities 
Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012’s market abuse 
provisions do not expressly prohibit hedge funds insider trading and high yield investment 
fraud.548  It was accordingly noted that the Companies Act 2008, the Securities Services Act, 
the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 do not expressly empower the 
Financial Services Board to combat hedge funds insider trading and commodities derivatives 
insider trading.549  It was also submitted that additional provisions should be enacted in 
accordance with other applicable reforms and proposals that were introduced elsewhere to 
expressly prohibit hedge funds market abuse activities and other securities violations, 
especially in the South African over the counter markets.550  Furthermore, it was stated that 
the Companies Act 2008, the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 do not specifically discourage high frequency trading, Internet-
based market manipulation, program trading and other related technologically perpetrated 
market abuse activities.551  It was further suggested that the JSE and the Financial Services 
Board should consider employing practically applicable proposals from other jurisdictions 
such as the back testing process, real-time risk monitoring and market surveillance measures 
to combat high frequency trading-related market abuse activities.552  It was noted that the 
Companies Act 2008, the Financial Markets Bill, the Securities Services Act and the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012’s provisions do not directly or indirectly prohibit naked credit 
default swaps derivatives transactions in the over the counter markets.553   In line with this, it 
was submitted that the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 should 
be amended in order to provide a specific prohibition on naked credit default swaps and 
545     See paragraph 4 7 8 2 1 above. 
546     See paragraph 4 7 8 2 1 above. 
547     See paragraph 4 7 8 2 1 above. 
548     See paragraph 4 7 8 3 1 above. 
549     See paragraph 4 7 8 3 1 above. 
550     See paragraph 4 7 8 3 1 above. 
551     See paragraph 4 7 8 4 1 above. 
552     See paragraph 4 7 8 4 1 above. 
553     See paragraph 4 7 8 5 1 above. 
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appropriate penalties against the offenders.554  It was also noted that the Securities Services 
Act, the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012’s market abuse provisions 
do not explicitly prohibit short selling.555  Consequently, it was suggested that the Securities 
Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be 
fastidiously amended, giving regard to relevant applicable developments in other 
jurisdictions556 to prohibit naked short selling expressly.557  Although the JSE was rated as the 
number one stock exchange by the World Federation of Exchanges with regard to regulation 
in 2010,558 it is submitted that the various gaps in the enforcement of the market abuse 
prohibition in relation to some specific aspects of the South African financial markets and in 
relation to some selected market abuse practices that occurred during the global financial 
crisis as earlier discussed559 could weaken the stability and integrity of the South African 
financial markets in future.   In line with this, it was submitted that some flaws in the 
detection, prosecution and the general enforcement of the market abuse prohibition could 
have, to some extent, contributed to poor reputation and low of investor confidence to be 
associated with some South African companies and financial markets.560  In this regard, it is 
hoped that the market abuse problems as stated in this chapter will be appropriately resolved 
for the purposes of combating market abuse activities in South Africa.   
 
Now that the current gaps and problems associated with the enforcement of market abuse 
laws in South Africa have been highlighted, the next chapter will comparatively focus on the 
enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in the United States of America in order to 
recommend, where applicable, measures or principles that could be incorporated in the South 
African anti-market abuse enforcement framework. 
554    See paragraph 4 7 8 5 1 above. 
555    See paragraph 4 7 8 6 1 above. 
556    See paragraph 4 7 8 6 above. 
557    See paragraph 4 7 8 6 1 above. 
558    National Treasury Reviewing the Regulation of Financial Markets in South Africa: Policy Document 
Explaining the Financial Markets Bill 2011 August 2011 5.  
559    See the discussion in sub-paragraphs under paragraph 4 7 above. 
560    See sub-paragraphs under paragraph 4 4 above & also see paragraph 4 6 above. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE ENFORCEMENT OF MARKET ABUSE PROVISIONS IN UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
5 1  Introduction   
 
The United States of America has developed one of the most progressive and effective anti-
market abuse enforcement frameworks in recent years.1  Notably, market abuse is outlawed 
both at a federal and state level.  Consequently, a brief overview of the enforcement of the 
market abuse prohibition in California, Delaware and Washington states will be undertaken 
first and thereafter more emphasis will be focused on the discussion of the federal position.  
The aforementioned states are selected not only because of their unique and relatively 
consistent anti-market abuse enforcement approaches,2 but also because of the potential 
enforcement lessons that could be adopted from such approaches.  On the other hand, at a 
federal level, the anti-market abuse enforcement framework involves self-regulatory 
organisations as well as private actions that enhance compliance with the law and facilitate 
the levying of sanctions against offenders.3  Steinberg argues that rigorous enforcement is the 
key component of the United States of America’s market abuse regulation that makes it 
unique from similar regulation in other countries.4  As a result, the United States of America’s 
anti-market abuse enforcement approaches have influenced the regulation of market abuse in 
a number of countries, including South Africa.5  
 
This chapter will examine whether the integration of some of the United States of America’s 
anti-market abuse enforcement approaches like bounty rewards and whistle-blower immunity 
will improve the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in South Africa.   Furthermore, 
the detection, prosecution and preventative measures adopted in the United States of 
1   Steinberg “Insider Trading Regulation–A Comparative Perspective” 2003 The International Lawyer 153 
169-171. 
2    Crandall “State Securities Regulation and the Internet” 2001 Legislation & Public Policy 23 24-31; 
Langevoort “Federalism in Corporate/Securities Law: Reflections on Delaware, California, and State 
Regulation of Insider Trading” 2006 University of San Francisco Law Review 879 880-892.   
3       Steinberg 2003 The International Lawyer 169.  
4       Steinberg 2003 The International Lawyer 169. 
5      Botha “Control of Insider Trading in South Africa: A Comparative Analysis” 1991 South African 
Mercantile Law Journal 1 1. 
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America6 will be discussed and, where necessary, contrasted with similar enforcement 
methods in South Africa.  Relevant provisions and cases from the United States of America 
will be contrasted with similar provisions and cases in South Africa in order to identify and 
recommend, where necessary, possible anti-market abuse enforcement approaches that could 
be incorporated in the South African enforcement framework.  
 
5 2  Overview of the State Prohibition on Market Abuse7 
5 2 1  Prohibition on Insider Trading in California 
 
Insider trading is statutorily prohibited under the California Corporations Code.8   Put 
differently, an issuer or any other person who is an officer, director or controlling person of 
such issuer or any person who knowingly has access directly or indirectly, to material non-
public information that relates to any securities by virtue of his relationship with the issuer is 
prohibited from dealing in such securities in order to prevent insider trading.9  Notably, there 
is a requirement of knowledge on the part of the accused person that the material non-public 
information he obtained will significantly affect the market price of the securities in question 
before incurring any insider trading liability.10  Moreover, such liability can only be imposed 
upon the accused if he fails to prove that the affected person was aware of the non-public 
information in question; or that the affected person would have purchased or sold the 
securities in question at the same price even if the material non-public information was made 
public.11 
 
California’s insider trading prohibition is limited only to officers, directors, controlling 
shareholders of an issuer (primary insiders) and/or any other person who obtains non-public 
6   In relation to this, the discussion on the prohibition, penalties and enforcement of insider trading will be 
done separately from market manipulation practices.  
7      Notably, this overview of the market abuse prohibition in selected states will be briefly undertaken ahead 
of the federal position because this chapter is focused mainly on the prohibition and combating of market 
abuse practices in the United States of America at a federal level.   
8      Also known as the Corporate Securities Law of 1968 (California Statutes 1968, Chapter 88), hereinafter 
referred to as the California Corporations Code.     See s 25402 & 25502.5 read with s 25502.  
9       S 25402 California Corporations Code. 
10    S 25402 read with s 25110; s 25210 & s 25230 (which prohibits investment advisors and broker-dealers 
from dealing in securities without licensure or exemption) of the California Corporations Code.   
11    S 25402 read with s 25502.5 & s 25502 of the California Corporations Code.    Also see generally related 
remarks by Bingham McCutchen Securities Litigation Group “California’s Unique Treble Damages 
Insider Trading Law Applied to Corporations Incorporated Outside of California” 2006 Securities 
Litigation Alert 1-3 <http://www.bingham.com.01.2006/03> (accessed 26-10-2011).    
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material information by virtue of his relationship with primary insiders.12  Consequently, 
violations by other persons who fortuitously obtain non-public material information not on the 
basis of their relationship with any of the primary insiders are not expressly covered under 
California’s insider trading prohibition.13  Nonetheless, California’s insider trading 
prohibition has an extra-territorial application that covers any violations that are perpetrated in 
California by primary insiders of a corporation incorporated in another state or country 
(foreign corporations).14  In relation to this, accessorial liability can also be imposed on 
individuals who tip, induce or assist others to contravene any California’s insider trading 
provisions.15 
 
5 2 2  Prohibition on Market Manipulation in California  
 
Disclosure-based market manipulation, trade-based market manipulation, Internet-based 
market manipulation and commodity-based market manipulation practices are statutorily 
prohibited under the California Corporations Code.   Trade-based market manipulation 
practices include:  
 
(a) the use of a device, scheme or artifice to defraud or manipulate the price of a 
security;16  
 
(b) effecting a transaction in a security which involves no change in the beneficial 
ownership;  
 
(c) entering orders for the sale or purchase of any security with the knowledge that 
similar orders have been entered at the same price and/or at the same time for that 
security by the same or different persons; and  
 
12    S 25402 of the California Corporations Code.   Also see Langevoort 2006 University of San Francisco 
Law Review 886.     
13     S 25402 of the California Corporations Code. 
14    Friese v Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal Rptr 3d 558 (Cal Ct App) 563-568, where it was held that although 
the internal affairs doctrine (as codified under s 2116) stipulates that only the state of incorporation may 
adjudicate on insider trading and/or any other violations, the defendants’ breach of s 25502.5 of the 
California Corporations Code did not merely give rise to fiduciary duties violations but to insider trading 
and as such it was not rigidly subject to the internal affairs doctrine.         
15     S 25403 of the California Corporations Code. 
16      S 25541 of the California Corporations Code. 
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(d) effecting alone, or with other persons, a series of transactions in any security to 
create actual or apparent active trading in such security in order to raise or depress 
the price of that security for the purposes of inducing its sale or purchase by others.17   
 
Disclosure-based market manipulation practices include the dissemination of false or 
misleading material information pertaining to the sale or purchase of a security by a broker-
dealer or any other person so that the price of such security will or is likely to rise or fall 
(raising or depressing its market price) for the purposes of inducing others to purchase or sell 
that security.18  In line with this, disclosure-based market manipulation practices also include 
the oral or written communication of false or misleading statements that relate to the sale or 
purchase of securities by any offenders.19  Liability for both disclosure-based market 
manipulation and trade-based market manipulation requires proof on the part of the 
prosecution that the offenders wilfully participated, directly or indirectly in the effecting of a 
manipulative transaction or in the making or dissemination of a false and misleading 
statement of a material fact relating to any security; or that they omitted to state such material 
fact in order to make the statement, in light of the circumstances it was made, not 
misleading.20  
 
Commodity-based market manipulation practices that are outlawed include: 
 
(a) wilful engagement by any person, in the making of a false report; 
 
(b) entering any false record or untrue statement of a material fact and/or omitting to 
make the material fact in order to make any statement relating to a commodity, 
commodity contract or option false and misleading.21    
Additionally, engaging in any transaction, act, practice or course of business which operates 
or would operate as fraud or deceit upon commodities investors and the employing of any 
17      S 25400(a) & (b) of the California Corporations Code. 
18      S 25400(d) read with s 25400(c) & (e) & s 25401 of the California Corporations Code. 
19      S 25400 & s 25401 read with s 25404 of the California Corporations Code. 
20      S 25400; s 25401; 25541 read with s 25404; 25500 & 25501 of the California Corporations Code. 
21   S 29536(b) of the California Commodity Law of 1990 (hereinafter referred to as the California 
Corporations Code).     
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device, scheme or artifice to defraud or manipulate the sale or purchase of any commodity is 
prohibited.22 
 
Internet-based market manipulation as well as franchise-related touting and manipulative 
practices are statutorily prohibited in California.23  For example, the intentional making of any 
untrue statement of a material fact relating to the sale or purchase of a franchise is a felony 
under the California Corporations Code.24 Moreover, the California Department of 
Corporations established the Internet Compliance and Enforcement Team to oversee the 
prohibition of Internet-based market manipulation by inter alia requiring all persons to obtain 
a permit before issuing any securities.25 
 
5 2 3  Available Market Abuse Penalties and Remedies in California 
 
An issuer or any person who wilfully engages in insider trading or market manipulation and 
fails to rely on the defences as earlier discussed26 will be liable for a fine not more than $10 
million upon conviction or be imprisoned in a state prison (or pursuant to the California Penal 
Code)27 for a period between two and five years, or be liable for both the fine and 
imprisonment.28  Moreover, an issuer as defined in the Public Company Accounting Reform 
and Investor Protection Act of 200229 who commits insider trading, market manipulation or 
who violates any rule or order that prohibits market abuse will be criminally liable for a fine 
not more than $25 million upon conviction, or imprisonment in a state prison, or in terms of 
22     S 29536(a); (c) & (d) of the California Corporations Code read with s 29520; 29535 & 29538 of the same 
Code,   which prohibits any person from purchasing or selling commodities without licensure or 
exemption and/or from concealing evidence or making untrue statements to the California Department of 
Corporations.    
23     S 31200 to 31204 of the California Corporations Code. 
24     S 31200 to 31204 read with s 31210; 31211 & 31220 of the California Corporations Code. 
25    S 25111 to s 25113; s 25140(c) read with s 25400 & 25401 of the California Corporations Code.   Also 
see California Department of Corporations “Internet Investments Ordered to Stop Selling” Press Release 
98-11 (10-06-1998) <http://www.corp.ca.gov/pressrel/nr9811.htm> (accessed 27-10-2011); California 
Department of Corporations “Department of Corporations Files Internet Market Manipulation Actions” 
Press Release 00-11 (20-06-2000) <http://www.corp.ca.gov/pressrel/nr0011.htm> (accessed 27-10-2011) 
& Crandall 2001 Legislation & Public Policy 23-31.    
26      See paragraph 5 2 1 above. 
27      S 1170(h) of the California Penal Code. 
28      S 25540(b) of the California Corporations Code. 
29     Public Law 107-204, 116 Stat 745 (as codified in scattered sections of 15; 28 USC), hereinafter referred 
to as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and its relevant provisions will be referred to only where necessary.   See s 
2 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act; also see Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations (2005) 
23.    
192 
                                               
the California Penal Code,30 for a period between two and five years and/or be liable for both 
such fine and imprisonment.31  The California Corporations Code specifically imposes a fine 
not exceeding $10 million, or imprisonment in a state prison for a period between two and 
five years, or both such fine and imprisonment upon any person who wilfully employs, 
directly or indirectly, a device, scheme or artifice to defraud or manipulate the offer, purchase 
or sale of securities.32   Similarly, an issuer as defined in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act33 who 
wilfully employs, directly or indirectly, a device, scheme or artifice to defraud or manipulate 
the offer, purchase or sale of a security will be liable for a fine not exceeding $25 million, or 
imprisonment in a state prison for a period between two and five years, or both such fine and 
imprisonment.34 
 
Persons who violate the insider trading provisions will be directly liable to the person who 
sold or purchased the affected security for the damages equal to the difference between the 
price at which such security was sold or purchased and the market value which such security 
would have acquired at the time of the purchase or sale if the information known to the 
defendant had been publicly disseminated prior to that time.35  This civil liability also 
includes interest at a legal rate accruing to the plaintiff (affected person) provided that a 
reasonable period of time has lapsed for the market to absorb the publicly disclosed material 
information, or that the defendant failed to rely on any available defences.36  In addition, any 
person other than the issuer who commits insider trading will be liable to the issuer or anyone 
acting derivatively on behalf of the issuer for civil damages of up to three times the profit 
gained or loss avoided as a result of the insider trading in question.37    
Any person (defendant) who commits market manipulation will be liable for compensatory 
damages to any other person (plaintiff) who purchased or sold securities at an affected or 
30     S 1170(h) of the California Penal Code. 
31     S 25540(c) read with s 25540(a) of the California Corporations Code. 
32     S 25541(a) of the California Corporations Code. 
33     S 2 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
34     S 25541(b); s 25542 of the California Corporations Code read with s 1170(h) of the California Penal 
Code. 
35     S 25502 of the California Corporations Code. 
36    S 25502 of the California Corporations Code.    It is important to note that this provision gives private 
rights of action to the affected persons in order for them to recover their insider trading damages directly 
from offenders.      
37   S 25502.5 of the California Corporations Code.   These treble insider trading damages are determined by 
calculating the difference between the price at which the security was purchased or sold and the market 
value that it would have gained at the time of the sale or purchase if the non public information known to 
the defendant or the offender was publicly disseminated; Friese v Superior Court 563-568.    
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manipulated price as a result of such defendant’s illicit act or transaction.38  This civil liability 
seems not to be limited to the plaintiff who initially bought or sold the securities that were 
affected by the defendant’s market manipulation.39   In the same vein, any person who 
wilfully disseminates false or misleading statements which relate to any securities will be 
liable to the affected person, for rescission or compensatory damages.40   It is not required that 
the plaintiff should have actually relied on the false or misleading statements in question 
before the defendant is held liable for such recessionary or compensatory damages plus 
interest at a legal rate.41 Furthermore, there is secondary civil liability for controlling persons, 
aiders and abettors who participated in disclosure-based market manipulation.42        
 
The California Corporations Code further imposes separate criminal penalties on any person 
who commits commodities-based market manipulation offences.43  Such a person will be 
liable for a fine not more than $250 000 or imprisonment in a state prison, or pursuant to the 
California Penal Code for a period between two and five years or for both such fine and 
imprisonment.44  With regard to civil liability, there are no private rights of action for the 
affected persons to recover their damages directly from those who commit commodities-based 
market manipulation offences.45 Nevertheless, any person who aids or assists another person 
to contravene any commodities-based market manipulation provisions will be jointly and 
severally liable with any such person for damages.46 
 
Any person who wilfully engages in franchise-related touting and market manipulation will 
be liable to a fine not exceeding $100 000 or imprisonment in a state prison for a period not 
exceeding one year, or imprisonment pursuant to the California Penal Code,47 or both such 
38     S 25500; 28900 & 28901 of the California Corporations Code. 
39    On the other hand, market manipulation offenders are apparently exempted from any liability that could 
arise from routine statements such as press releases and quarterly reports that are not intended to induce 
others to sale or purchase any securities, see s 25500 read with s 25400 of the California Corporations 
Code.       
40     S 25501 read with s 25501.5 of the California Corporations Code.       
41     S 25501 read with s 25501.5 of the California Corporations Code.       
42     S 25501 read with s 25504 & 25504.1 of the California Corporations Code.       
43     S 29550 of the California Corporations Code. 
44    S 29550(b) & (c); read with s 29551 of the California Corporations Code, which stipulates that the 
California State may also bring criminal charges against the offenders under any other statute.    Also see 
s 1170(h) of the California Penal Code.      
45     S 29555 of the California Corporations Code. 
46     S 29552 read with s 29553 & 29554 of the California Corporations Code. 
47     S 1170(h) of the California Penal Code.     
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fine and imprisonment.48  Such a person will also be liable to the franchisee, franchisor or any 
other affected person for compensatory damages.49 A controlling person or every partner in a 
company who aids or abets another person to commit franchise-related touting and market 
manipulation offences will be jointly and severally liable with such person for actual damages 
suffered by the affected person and/or a temporary and permanent injunctive relief.50  
 
The California Department of Corporations can also impose administrative penalties such as 
public censure, suspension, revocation of licenses, civil injunctions and administrative orders 
against any person who engages in fraudulent and manipulative Internet-based offering of 
investments and financial services.51 Additionally, the California Department of Corporations 
can impose remedies such as rescission, restitution, civil penalties and administrative 
penalties against any person who commits Internet-based market manipulation offences.52 
Lastly, the California Department of Corporations can issue investigation orders against 
Internet-based market manipulation offenders and/or refer any such related criminal matters to 
the relevant courts for further investigation or prosecution.53  
 
5 2 4  Analysis and Evaluation of the California Anti-Market Abuse Enforcement 
Framework 
 
The California Department of Corporations, the Commissioner of Corporations and the 
relevant courts are responsible for the enforcement of market abuse provisions in California.54   
As earlier stated,55 California employs criminal, civil and administrative sanctions to combat 
market abuse activities.  These sanctions are enforced by the California Department of 
Corporations through the Commissioner of Corporations and the courts.  In relation to this, it 
is must be noted that there is no specific regulatory body established to oversee the 
enforcement of market abuse laws in California.  Consequently, the Commissioner of 
Corporations has a variety of powers which include:  
48     S 31410; 31411 read with s 31412 of the California Corporations Code. 
49     S 31300 read with 31301 of the California Corporations Code. 
50     S 31302 & 31302.5 of the California Corporations Code. 
51     S 25530 to 25534 of the California Corporations Code; also see Crandall 2001 Legislation & Public 
Policy 30 & related remarks by the California Department of Corporations “Fighting Internet ‘Cyber 
Investment Fraud’” <http://www.corp.ca.gov/pub/cyber.htm> (accessed 28-10-2011).   
52     S 25535 of the California Corporations Code; also see Crandall 2001 Legislation & Public Policy 30. 
53     S 25533 of the California Corporations Code; also see Crandall 2001 Legislation & Public Policy 30. 
54     Crandall 2001 Legislation & Public Policy 28-30. 
55     See paragraph 5 2 3 read with paragraphs 5 2 1; 5 2 2. 
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 (a) imposing fees and penalties;  
 
(b) cease and desist orders;  
 
(c) revocation orders;  
 
(d) restitution orders;  
 
(e) civil injunction orders;  
 
(f) investigation orders;  
 
(g) public censure against the offenders; and 
 
(h) issuing permits to all persons who seek to offer or sell investments, commodities or 
securities in California.56  
 
The Commissioner of Corporations has further powers to make, amend or rescind any rules 
and/or orders for the purposes of effectively enforcing the securities and market abuse 
provisions.57  Similarly, the Financial Services Board is empowered to make market abuse 
rules in South Africa.58  Notwithstanding the fact that the there is no specific regulatory body 
that policies the enforcement of market abuse laws in California, it is submitted that the 
Commissioner of Corporations has, from time to time, consistently exercised his powers to 
curb market abuse activities.59 
 
With regard to Internet-based market manipulation, the California Department of 
Corporations relies on the Internet Compliance and Enforcement Team to investigate and 
prosecute any activities that amount to unlicensed securities, franchises or commodities 
56     S 25111 to 25113 of the California Corporations Code; also see Crandall 2001 Legislation & Public 
Policy 28-30.    
57     S 31502 & 31503 of the California Corporations Code. 
58    S 82(2)(g) of the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004 (hereinafter referred to as the Securities Services 
Act); also see clause 91(2)(f) of the Financial Markets Bill [B-2011],  hereinafter referred to as the 
Financial Markets Bill & clause 86(2)(f) of the Financial Markets Bill [B12-2012], hereinafter referred to 
as the Financial Markets Bill 2012 (I have employed the term “clause” to refer to the provisions of both 
the Financial Markets Bill & the Financial Markets Bill 2012 because at the time of writing this Chapter, 
the aforementioned Bills were not yet effectively passed into law). 
59     Crandall 2001 Legislation & Public Policy 29-30. 
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offerings, and fraud and market manipulation.60  The Internet Compliance and Enforcement 
Team also ensures that there is extensive investigation and surveillance of Internet-based 
market manipulation.61  Accordingly, if any violation is detected, it will be reported to the 
Commissioner of Corporations who then determines whether it was fair and justifiable.62 Put 
differently, when the Commissioner of Corporations receives some leads from the Internet 
Compliance and Enforcement Team’s surveillance, junk mail and public complaints and 
referrals from other enforcement bodies, he may impose damages or other applicable 
remedies against the offenders.63  In contrast to this, there is no specific regulatory body that 
prohibits and investigates Internet-based market abuse practices in South Africa.64 
 
The district courts have to date enabled the California Department of Corporations to enforce 
the market abuse prohibition consistently in California.  For example, the California 
Department of Corporations has successfully filed for a number of civil remedies such as the 
disgorgement of profits, damages and civil injunctions in the courts.65   
As briefly highlighted above, one can conclude that California has managed to develop a 
relatively consistent market abuse enforcement framework that effectively discourages a 
60     S 25000 to 31516 of the California Corporations Code; also see Mariano “Stock Fraud Spurs Regulators 
to Look Online” (21-06-2000) <http://news.cnet.com/news/01-1005-200-2126256.html> (accessed 29-
10-2011).  
61     Crandall 2001 Legislation & Public Policy 24. 
62     S 25140(c) of the California Corporations Code; Crandall 2001 Legislation & Public Policy 24. 
63    S 25535 of the California Corporations Code; also see paragraph 5 2 3 above.    This has enabled 
California to curb Internet-based market manipulation successfully since 1998 to date, see Crandall 2001 
Legislation & Public Policy 26-31.      
64   In other words, all Internet-based market abuse practices are not expressly prohibited under the Securities 
Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill & the Financial Markets Bill 2012 as well as the Consumer 
Protection Act 68 of 2008; also see the discussion in Chapters Two, Three & Four of this thesis.     
65    Friese v Superior Court 561, where the court held that the civil derivative cause of action for 
disgorgement of insider trading profits was also applicable to companies that were not incorporated in 
California; also see   Langevoort 2006 University of San Francisco Law Review 886-887; Medifast v 
Minkow (2011) 10 CV 382 (JLS BGS), where the court held that defendants were not liable for civil 
remedies for their alleged market manipulation; Louisiana Pacific Corporation v Money Market 
1Institutional Investment Dealer and others (2011) 09-CV-03529 (JSW), where market manipulation 
damages were granted against the defendants; Williams v Gaylord (1902) 186 US 157, where it was inter 
alia held that a corporation that issues securities in any State is protected from possible market abuse 
liability that may arise from another State under the internal affairs doctrine; Clothesrigger Inc v G T E 
Corporation (1987) 191 Cal App 3d 605, where it was held that California’s market abuse laws may be 
enforced whenever necessary to prevent fraud and other deceptive or manipulative practices; Diamond 
Multimedia Systems Inc v Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal 1036, the court held that California’s securities 
and market abuse laws should be consistently enforced to promote financial markets that are fair and free 
from fraud and market abuse practices; Desai, Lamb, Long and Christopher Long v Deutsche Bank 
Securities Limited,  Deutsche Bank Securities Inc and others (2009) 08-55081 US App Lexis 16704 (US 
App 9th Cir), the court held inter alia that the defendants were not liable for stock price manipulation 
because the appellants failed to establish a motion for class certification in terms of Rule 23(b)(3) of the 
federal rules.    
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number of market abuse practices (including franchise-related, capital markets related as well 
as Internet-related market abuse violations).  
 
5 2 5  Prohibition on Insider Trading in Delaware 
 
Insider trading is mainly outlawed as a breach of fiduciary duties by directors, officers or 
other employees (primary insiders) of an issuer who sell or purchase the issuer’s securities or 
commodities on the basis of non-public inside information.66  Apparently, this fiduciary-
related insider trading liability may be imposed upon any offenders who violate Delaware’s 
securities and market abuse laws even if the issuer or any other affected persons did not suffer 
actual damages as result of the offender’s alleged insider trading.67  Likewise, a corporation 
may not repurchase its own shares if such repurchase will affect its payment of debts or cause 
capital impairment.68 
 
In addition, any sale or purchase of securities on the basis of non-public material information 
by a beneficial owner, director or officer of an insurer is also treated as insider trading.69  This 
prohibition on insurance-related insider trading allows the insurer to recover any damages 
suffered within a period of less than six months unless the sale or purchase of the affected 
securities was done in good faith.70   Intention on the part of the offenders is not required for 
the purposes incurring insurance-related insider trading liability.71 On the other hand, there is 
66   See generally s 144 read with s 160 to s162; s 122(17); s 271 & s 174 under Title 8 of the Delaware 
General Corporation Law (hereinafter referred to as the Delaware General Corporation Law); s 73-202 
read with s 73-203 & s 73-204 in Title 6 of the Delaware Code, under Chapter 73 of the Delaware 
Securities Act as amended (hereinafter referred to as Delaware Securities Act); also see Langevoort 2006 
University of San Francisco Law Review 881 & Brophy v Cities Service Co (1949) 70 A2d 5 (Del Ch), 
where it was inter alia held that the defendants’ breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty was tantamount to 
insider trading.      
67    Brophy v Cities Service Co 5; Kahn v Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co LP (2010) CA No 436 (Del SC) & 
Guth v Loft Inc (1939) 5A2d 503 (Del) 510, where it was held that an employee occupying a position of 
trust and confidence towards his employer who nonetheless abuses non-public material information 
relating to the employer’s securities to gain profit will be liable for insider trading regardless of whether 
the employer suffered actual loss.    
68    In other words, a corporation may not repurchase its own shares while in possession of non public 
material information that relates to any securities to prevent insider trading, see s 160 of the Delaware 
General Corporation Law.      
69    S 5104 & 5105 in Title 18, under Chapter 51of the Delaware Insurance Code (hereinafter referred to as 
the Insurance Code).         
70     S 5104 (a) of the Insurance Code.         
71     S 5104 (a) read with 5104(b) & (c) of the Insurance Code.         
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no provision that specifically prohibits insurance-related insider trading in the Securities 
Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012.72 
 
5 2 6  Prohibition on Market Manipulation in Delaware 
 
Any person who employs a device, scheme or artifice to defraud or manipulate the offer, sale 
or purchase of a security will be liable for market manipulation.73  In addition, any person 
who make or omits to make a statement of a material fact in order to deceive or mislead 
others to purchase or sale a security will be liable for fraud and/or market manipulation.74  In 
the same light, any persons who are not registered with the Securities Commissioner are 
prohibited from offering to sell or purchase any securities.75 Moreover, misleading filings and 
unlawful purchase or sale of securities by broker-dealers, shareholders or any other person are 
prohibited.76  This was probably targeted at preventing securities or stock price market 
manipulation by professional persons like broker-dealers, investment advisors, shareholders 
and other relevant stakeholders. 
 
Under the Delaware courts, a breach of fiduciary duty of disclosure by directors who issue 
misstated financial statements or misleading public statements to defraud, induce or 
manipulate others to purchase or sell any securities may give rise to monetary damages 
against such directors.77 
72    See Chapter VIII entitled “Market Abuse” of the Securities Services Act; Chapter X entitled “Market 
Abuse” of the Financial Markets Bill & Chapter X entitled “Market Abuse” of the Financial Markets Bill 
2012.    Moreover, in South Africa, insurance-related insider trading is not expressly prohibited under 
both the Long-Term Insurance Act 52 of 1998 as amended and the Short-Term Insurance Act 53 of 1998 
as amended.    
73     This indicates that trade-based market manipulation practices are also prohibited in Delaware, see s 73-
201(1) of the Delaware Securities Act.      
74     S 73-201(2) & (3) of the Delaware Securities Act.    
75      S 73-202 read with s 73-203 & 73-204 of the Delaware Securities Act.    
76     S 73-209; s 73-301of the Delaware Securities Act & s 610 read with s 612 & 616 in Title 8 (Delaware 
General Corporation Law) under Chapter 6, which is also known as the Delaware Professional Service 
Corporations Act (hereinafter referred to as the Professional Service Corporations Act).         
77   S generally s 220(d) read with s 220(b) & (c) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, which gives 
shareholders the right to seek and/or inspect financial statements in order to inter alia prevent fraud and 
market manipulation; also see Malone v Brincat (1998) CA No 15510 WL 919123 (Del Supr. Ct); 
Malone v Brincat (1998) 722 A2d 5 (Del) where it was held that the director or defendant who filed or 
disseminated false information in a financial statement could be held liable for a breach of general 
fiduciary duties of care, loyalty or good faith and not for common law prohibited fraudulent and market 
abuse activities & Seinfield v Verizon Communications Inc (2006) 909 A2d 717 (Del), the court held that 
shareholders are entitled to inspect or seek relevant information from a corporation to detect and prevent 
fraud and disclosure-based market manipulation.   
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Although it appears that there is no statutory provision that expressly prohibits commodities-
based market manipulation in Delaware, a number of deceptive or unfair commerce, trade and 
insurance practices are outlawed to inter alia combat market abuse activities.78  Delaware also 
prohibits racketeering and other forms of organised crime in order to discourage all persons 
from engaging in market abuse activities.79  In contrast to this, there is no provision that 
specifically prohibits racketeering and/or commerce and trade-related market abuse activities 
in South Africa.80 
 
5 2 7  Available Market Abuse Penalties and Remedies in Delaware  
 
Any person who engages in fraudulent market manipulation which results in investors losing 
$50 000 or more will be liable per violation to a fine not exceeding $200 000 upon conviction, 
or imprisonment for a period not more than five years at level V incarceration, or both such 
fine and imprisonment.81  In the same way any person who engages in fraud or market 
manipulation which results in investors losing $10 000 or more but less than $50 000, will be 
liable per violation for a fine not more than $100 000 upon conviction, or imprisonment for a 
period not more than three years at level V incarceration, or both such fine and 
imprisonment.82  Furthermore, any person who wilfully violates any related fraud or securities 
provisions of the Delaware Securities Act will be liable for a fine of not more than $100 000, 
or imprisonment for a period no more than two years, or both such fine and imprisonment.83 
The Securities Commissioner may impose injunctions, administrative remedies and stop 
orders to prohibit market abuse violations by the offenders by suspending or revoking the 
purchase or sale of any affected security.84 
 
78    S 2303 & s 2304(1) to (12) in Title 18, under Chapter 23 of the Insurance Code; also see s 2532(a) to (c) 
in Title 6, under Chapter 25 of the Delaware Code which is also known as the Delaware Uniform 
Deceptive Trade Practices Act (hereinafter referred to as the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act).    
79     S 1503 in Title 11, under Chapter 15 of the Delaware Criminal Code. 
80    See s 73; s 75; s 76 & s 77 of the Securities Services Act; clauses 82; 84; 85; 86 & 87 of the Financial 
Markets Bill & clauses 80; 82; 83 & 84 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.     
81     S 73-604(a) of the Delaware Securities Act.     
82     S 73-604(b) of the Delaware Securities Act.   
83    S 73-604(c) of the Delaware Securities Act.   The Supreme Court may also order the offenders to restitute 
any profits they obtained from the affected investors, see s 73-604(d) & (e) of the Delaware Securities 
Act.   
84     S 73-206 read with s73-601 & s 73-602 of the Delaware Securities Act. 
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A broker-dealer, broker-dealer agent, issuer agent, investment advisor, investment advisor’s 
representative or any other person who offers, sells or purchases securities by means of an 
untrue statement or any other market manipulation practices will be liable for civil 
compensatory damages.85 Moreover, the courts may impose upon the insider trading 
offenders, orders for damages, disgorgement of illicit profits and other applicable remedies.86  
The courts may further impose a fine of up to $5 million or imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding 20 years upon the insider trading offenders.87 
 
With regard to prohibited manipulative trade practices, the offenders may be ordered by the 
relevant courts through an injunction to pay legal costs, compensatory damages or to disgorge 
any profits gained to the affected persons.88  Moreover, any persons who engage in insurance 
related market abuse activities will be ordered by the courts to disgorge any profits they 
gained at the expense of the insurers.89  The Commissioner of Insurance may also issue cease 
and desist orders and penalty orders against any person who commits insurance-related 
market abuse offences.90 
 
5 2 8  Analysis and Evaluation of the Delaware Anti-Market Abuse Enforcement 
Framework  
 
Like California,91 Delaware does not have a specific regulatory body that enforces its market 
abuse laws.  Nonetheless, Delaware has established a consistent system of reliance on judicial 
law standards, as well as well-developed common law and private enforcement measures to 
combat market abuse activities.92 Consequently, the Delaware Supreme Court, the Delaware 
Chancery Court, the Delaware General Assembly, the Delaware Corporate Law Council, the 
85     S 73-605(a) & (b) of the Delaware Securities Act. 
86    Brophy v Cities Service Co 5; Kahn v Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co LP 436, where the defendants 
were mandated to pay damages and to disgorge their  insider trading profits to the affected persons 
(plaintiffs) even if such persons did not suffer actual damages.   
87   The United States Department of Justice District of Delaware “Newark Man Pleads Guilty to Insider 
Trading Charges” Press Release 25 March 2011, where Jeffery Temple of Newark DE was convicted of 
insider trading in March 2011 and was consequently liable for a fine not exceeding $5 million or 
imprisonment for a period of up to 20 years. 
88     S 2533(b) & (c) read with subsections (d) & (e) of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act.    
89     S 5104 of the Insurance Code.         
90     S 2308 read with s 2311 of the Insurance Code.         
91     Paragraph 5 2 4 above. 
92    See related remarks by Bebchuk & Hamdani “Federal Corporate Law: Lessons from History” 2006 
Harvard Law School John M Olin Center for Law, Economics & Business Discussion Paper Series 558 
35-37 <http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin/558> (accessed 03-11-2011).      
201 
                                               
Delaware Division of Securities and the Delaware Division Corporations bear the 
responsibility of enforcing the Delaware’s securities and market abuse laws.93  
 
As stated earlier,94 Delaware generally treats any securities dealing that is based on non-
public inside information by primary insiders as a breach of fiduciary duties that also amounts 
to insider trading.  Thus, although Delaware does not have a statutory provision that expressly 
prohibits insider trading, it has to date successfully relied on common law principles on 
fiduciary duties to combat insider trading.95 This success has prompted other commentators to 
conclude that Delaware was effectively combating insider trading and market manipulation 
because it cedes other areas of its laws that involve insider trading enforcement to the federal 
government.96 Unlike the position in Delaware, insider trading liability is not limited to 
instances where there is a breach of a fiduciary duty by primary insiders in South Africa.97 
 
On the other hand, Delaware’s fiduciary-related insider trading remedies were controversially 
applied in some few cases.98  Be that as it may, one fact which is certain is that Delaware 
93    Roe “Washington and Delaware as Corporate Lawmakers” 2009 Harvard Law School John M Olin 
Center for Law, Economics & Business Discussion Paper Series 638 8-12 
<http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin/638> (accessed 03-11-2011); Jones “Dynamic Federalism: 
Competition, Cooperation and Securities Enforcement” 2005 Boston College Law School Faculty Paper 
36  2 <http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/lsfp/36> (accessed 04-11-2011) & Wilson “Climate Change: The 
Real Threat to Delaware Corporation Law, Why Delaware Must Keep A Watchful Eye on The Content of 
Political Change in the Air” 2010 Entrepreneurial Business Law Journal 481 484-490.  
94     Paragraph 5 2 5 above. 
95    Brophy v Cities Service Co 5, the defendants were ordered to pay compensatory insider trading remedies 
to the plaintiffs regardless of whether such plaintiffs suffered actual damages; Kahn v Kohlberg, Kravis, 
Roberts & Co LP 436, where the plaintiffs (stockholders) were allowed to institute a derivative action 
against the defendants (corporate fiduciaries) for their alleged insider trading violations without proof of 
any actual damages suffered by such plaintiffs or their corporation & Guth v Loft Inc 503-510, the court 
held that any breach of fiduciary duties through insider trading was against public policy.   
96    Hamermesh “How We Make Law in Delaware and What to Expect from Us in the Future” 2007 Journal 
of Business & Technology Law 409 413-414.     
97    See s 73 & s 77 of the Securities Services Act; clauses 82 & 86 of the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 80 
& 84 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
98   In re Oracle Corporation Derivative Litigation (2003) WL 21396449 (Del Ch); In re Oracle Corporation 
Derivative Litigation (2004) 867 A2d 904 (Del Ch) 934; In re Oracle Corporation Derivative Litigation 
(2005) 872 A2d 960 (Del Ch), the court held that the fiduciaries (defendants) should have traded on the 
basis of non public inside information they possessed to the detriment of their corporation before any 
disgorgement of profits can be paid to the affected plaintiff.    Nonetheless, the court denied the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s derivative action for breach of fiduciary duties and/or insider 
trading; Guttman v Huang (2003) 823 A2d 492 (Del Ch) 499-507; In re American International Group 
Inc (2009) 965 A2d 763 (Del Ch) 813; Paddy Wood v Baum, Berndt, Brown & others (2007) CA 621 
(Del Supr. Ct); Pfeiffer v Toll Brother Inc & others (2010) 989 A2d 683 (Del Ch), where the court inter 
alia held that the plaintiff must prove that he suffered actual harm as a result of the defendant’s breach of 
fiduciary duty through insider trading. This ruling was later reversed by the Delaware Supreme Court 
citing its unduly restricted approach and the defendants were ordered to pay compensatory damages 
regardless of whether the plaintiff suffered actual loss through breach of fiduciary duties or insider trading 
202 
                                               
relies heavily on its courts’ judicial law standards and private enforcement to monitor and 
enforce its insider trading prohibition.99 
 
In addition to the Delaware specialised corporate bar, courts and judicial law standards,100 the 
Delaware Division Corporations’ Securities Commissioner has powers to investigate, 
subpoena any suspects and issue stop orders, injunctions and other administrative remedies 
against any persons who commit insider trading or market manipulation.101  Likewise, the 
Commissioner of Insurance may issue investigation orders, cease and desist orders, penalty 
orders and judicial review orders against any market abuse offenders.102 This has enabled 
Delaware Division Corporations to effectively complement the relevant courts in tackling and 
addressing market abuse challenges.103 Unlike California,104 Delaware further has a 
specialised commercial court and whistle-blower immunity provisions to encourage 
employees or any person to report any securities and market abuse violations without fear of 
reprisals from their employers or other offenders.105  In relation to this, South Africa relies 
mainly on the Financial Services Board rather than judicial law standards to enforce its 
market abuse prohibition.  Moreover, South Africa’s market abuse laws do not have a specific 
whistle-blower immunity provision to encourage all persons to report market abuse violations 
& Milbank Corporate Governance Group “Delaware Supreme Court Rejects Narrow Reading of Brophy” 
(27-07-2011) Client Alert 1-4 <http://www.milbank.com.cl/al.pdf> (accessed 27-07-2011), apparently, 
this so-called Brophy claim for insider trading damages is contingent upon the courts’ interpretation of 
the violation in question.   Similarly, in Zapata Corporation v Maldonado (1981) 430 A2d 779 (Del Ch), 
it was held that affected persons will only recover their insider trading damages if prior investigations 
were objectively conducted and such objectivity is discretionally determined by the courts.  
99     Kahan & Rock “Symbiotic Federalism and The Structure of Corporate Law” 2005 Vanderbilt Law 
Review 1573 1604-1609 & 1620; Ott “Delaware Strikes Back: Newcastle Partners and The Fight for State 
Corporate Autonomy” 2007 Indiana Law Journal 159 171-173; Cary “Federalism and Corporate Law: 
Reflections upon Delaware” 1974 Yale Law Journal 663 666-670; Roe 2009 Harvard Law School John 
M Olin Center for Law, Economics & Business Discussion Paper Series 638 8-9 
<http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin/638> (accessed 03-11-2011); Bebchuk & Hamdani 2006 Harvard Law 
School John M Olin Center for Law, Economics & Business Discussion Paper Series 558 23-25 
<http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin/558> (accessed 03-11-2011) & Roe “Delaware’s Competition” 2003 
Harvard Law School John M Olin Center for Law, Economics & Business Discussion Paper Series 432 
3-4 <http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin/432> (accessed 03-11-2011).    
100    Wilson 2010 Entrepreneurial Business Law Journal 484; 486 & 490. 
101     S 73-206; 73-601; 73-602 & 73-401 to 73-404 of the Delaware Securities Act. 
102    S 2306 to 2309 & 2311 of the Insurance Code. 
103   Nacco Industries Inc v Applica (2009) 997 A2d 1 (Del Ch) 23, the court held that common law remedies 
were available against those who engage in Schedule 13D misstatements filing and other related 
disclosure-based market manipulation practices.  
104    Paragraph 5 2 4 above. 
105  See S 1703 & 1704 in Title 19, under Chapter 17 of the Delaware Code, also known as the Delaware 
Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (hereinafter referred as the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act).  
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to the Financial Services Board or other relevant authorities without any fear of 
victimisation.106 
 
Given the above analysis, one can conclude that Delaware has to date managed to flexibly and 
consistently develop effective and robust common law as well as judicial law standards to 
increase the private enforcement of its market abuse prohibition.  Perhaps this explains why 
some commentators allude to the fact that Delaware is the “corporate haven” of the United 
States of America107   
 
5 2 9  Prohibition on Insider Trading in Washington 
 
Unlike California,108 Washington does not have a specific provision that directly and 
expressly prohibits insider trading.  Nevertheless, insider trading is indirectly outlawed by 
discouraging directors, officers or employees from using non-public information filed with or 
106   See s 73; s 75; s 76 & s 77 of the Securities Services Act; clauses 82; 84; 85; 86 & 87 of the Financial 
Markets Bill & clauses 80; 82; 83 & 84 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.  Put differently, although s 
159 of the Companies Act 71 of  2008; the Protected Disclosures Act 26 of  2000; s 9 of the South 
African constitution & the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 
can be employed to protect shareholders, directors and other employees from occupational reprisals, there 
are no specific provisions in the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill & the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012 that can be used to encourage and/or protect market abuse whistleblowers from such 
reprisals.     
107   See Bebchuk & Hamdani 2006 Harvard Law School John M Olin Center for Law, Economics & Business 
Discussion Paper Series 558 1-5 <http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin/558> (accessed 03-11-2011); Wilson 
2010 Entrepreneurial Business Law Journal 481-493; Ott 2007 Indiana Law Journal 159-162; Ahdieh 
“From ‘Federalization’ to ‘Mixed Governance’ in Corporate Law: A Defence of  Sarbanes-Oxley” 2005 
Buff Law Review 721 736; Cary 1974 Yale Law Journal 664-702;  Pritchard “London as Delaware?” 2009 
University of Michigan Law School John M Olin Center for Law, Economics & Working Paper 09-008 1-
2 <http://www.law.umich.edu/centersandprograms/olin/papers.htm> (accessed 04-11-2011) (seemingly, a 
John M Olin Center for Law & Economics is also established in the Harvard University Law School); 
Kahan & Rock 2005 Vanderbilt Law Review 1574 & 1620; Hamermesh 2007 Journal of Business & 
Technology Law 409-414; Jones 2005 Boston College Law School Faculty Paper 36 1-4 
<http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/lsfp/36> (accessed 04-11-2011); Roe 2003 Harvard Law School John 
M Olin Center for Law, Economics & Business Discussion Paper Series 432 2-44 
<http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin/432> (accessed 03-11-2011); Roe “Delaware’s Politics” 2005 Harvard 
Law School John M Olin Center for Law, Economics & Business Discussion Paper Series 511 1-8 
<http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin/511> (accessed 03-11-2011); Thompson “Collaborative Corporate 
Governance: Listing Standards, State Law and Federal Regulation” 2003 Wake Forest Law Review 961; 
Strine “The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the New Challenges We (and 
Europe) Face” 2005 Del J.Corp.L 673 673-683; Fisch “The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the 
Competition for Corporate Charters” 2000 U.Cin.Law Review 1061 1064; Rock “Saints and Sinners: How 
Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?” 1997 UCLA Law Review 1009 1024; Jones “Rethinking 
Corporate Federalism in Era of Corporate Reform” 2004 Journal of Corp. Law 625; Stevelman 
“Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum and Delaware’s Stake in Corporate Law” 2009 Del J.Corp.L 
57 66 & Gorris, Hamermesh & Strine “Delaware Corporate Law and The Model Business Corporation 
Act: A Study in Symbiosis” 2011 Law & Contemporary Problems 107 112-116.  
108    Paragraph 5 2 1 above. 
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obtained from the Department of Financial Institutions to deal in any security or commodity 
for personal gain.109  In contrast to the position in Delaware,110 liability for insider trading is 
apparently not restricted only to instances where there is a breach of fiduciary duties by 
primary insiders in Washington.   Moreover, Washington does not clearly provide whether it 
is required that the offenders should have profited or benefited from their alleged insider 
trading before incurring any liability.111  The prohibition on insider trading is primarily 
restricted to directors, officers or other employees of a company.112  Despite this, Washington 
prohibits broker-dealers, investment advisors and any other person from offering or selling 
any security or commodity without being registered to prevent insider trading and other 
related illicit practices.113 
 
5 2 10  Prohibition on Market Manipulation in Washington  
 
Any person who employs a device, scheme or artifice to manipulate the offer, sale or purchase 
of securities will be liable for fraud and/or market manipulation.114 Similarly, any person who 
received a consideration from another person is prohibited from employing a scheme, device, 
an act, practice or course of business and/or a dishonest practice for the purposes of 
influencing or advising other persons to purchase or sale any security.115  Accordingly, an 
investment advisor, broker-dealer or any other person who knowingly and manipulatively 
purchases or sells any security for his own account or for another person will be liable for 
market manipulation.116   This also indicates that trade-based market manipulation practices 
are statutorily outlawed in Washington. 
 
109    See s 21.30.160 in Title 21, under Chapter 21.30 of the Revised Code of Washington Commodity 
Transactions 1986 c 14, s 46 (hereinafter referred to as the Commodity Transactions Act) & s 21.20.480 
in Title 21, under Chapter 21.20 of the Revised Code of Washington 1951 c 5, s 2 as amended by 1959 c 
282, s 69 (hereinafter referred to as the Securities Act of Washington); also see s 21.20.140 of the 
Securities Act of Washington, which requires all persons to register with the Department of Financial 
Institutions before offering to sell any security or commodity.  
110    Paragraph 5 2 5 above. 
111    S 21.20.480 of the Securities Act of Washington & s 21.30.160 of the Commodity Transactions Act. 
112   See s 21.20.480 read with s 21.20.140 of the Securities Act of Washington & s 21.30.160 of the 
Commodity Transactions Act.  
113    S 21.20.030; s 21.20.035 & s 21.20.140 of the Securities Act of Washington & s 21.30.050 of the 
Commodity Transactions Act.  
114    S 21.20.010(1) & (3) of the Securities Act of Washington. 
115    S 21.20.020 of the Securities Act of Washington.                   
116    S 21.20.020(2) read with s 21.20.030 & s 21.20.035 of the Securities Act of Washington.  
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Likewise, disclosure-based market manipulation practices such as the making of false or 
misleading statements of a material fact or omitting to make a material fact in relation to any 
filed documents for the purposes of influencing the purchase or sale of any securities are 
prohibited.117  In relation to this, offering or selling unregistered securities by any person is 
expressly prohibited in Washington.118  This prohibition is mainly aimed at discouraging all 
persons from deliberately engaging in unlawful fraudulent or market manipulation activities. 
 
Commodity-based market manipulation is also prohibited in Washington.  For example, no 
person may directly or indirectly employ a device, scheme or artifice to defraud or influence 
others to purchase or sale any commodity contract or commodity option.119  Additionally, any 
person who engages in a transaction, act, practice, or course of business that will deceive 
others,120 or who makes a false or misleading report, record or statement of a material fact by 
omission or otherwise121 in order to induce others to purchase or sell any commodity or 
commodity option will be liable for market manipulation.  Notably, any person who 
deliberately omits to state a material fact in relation to the purchase or sale of any commodity 
contract or commodity option will be liable for such omission and/or market manipulation.122  
Moreover, no person may purchase or sell a commodity contract or commodity option, or 
engage in a trade, business or other act as a commodity merchant unless he is registered, 
licensed or exempted by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.123 This preventative 
measure is employed to combat commodity-based market manipulation.  In contrast to 
Washington, South Africa’s market abuse laws do not have a specific provision that directly 
and expressly prohibits commodities-based market abuse practices.124  
 
5 2 11  Available Market Abuse Penalties and Remedies in Washington 
 
Any person who commits insider trading, market manipulation or other related securities 
violations will be liable upon conviction for a fine not exceeding $5 000, or imprisonment for 
117     S 21.20.010(2) & 21.20.350 of the Securities Act of Washington. 
118     S 21.20.140 read with s 21.20.040; s 21.20.180 & s 21.20.210 of the Securities Act of Washington. 
119     S 21.30.060(1) of the Commodity Transactions Act.  
120     S 21.30.060(3) of the Commodity Transactions Act.  
121     S 21.30.060(2) of the Commodity Transactions Act.  
122     S 21.30.070 read with s 21.30.080 & s 21.30.090 of the Commodity Transactions Act. 
123     S 21.30.050 read with s 21.30.020; s 21.30.030 & s 21.30.040 of the Commodity Transactions Act. 
124   See s 73; s 75; s 76 & s 77 of the Securities Services Act; clauses 82; 84; 85; 86 & 87 of the Financial 
Markets Bill & clauses 80; 82; 83 & 84 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.        
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a period of not more than ten years, or both such fine and imprisonment.125  Similarly, any 
person who alters, destroys, shreds or conceals a record or document and/or who knowingly 
attempts to make a false or misleading statement of a material fact will be liable for a class B 
felony or a fine not exceeding $500 000, or both such fine and class B felony.126  The Director 
of Financial Institutions may refer any criminal matters to the attorney general for further 
investigation and prosecution.127  
 
Furthermore, any person who commits fraud, market manipulation or other related securities 
violations will be liable to the person buying or selling the affected securities for civil 
damages and reasonable legal costs plus 8% interest per annum.128  Every person who directly 
or indirectly controls another person and who commits or aids another person to commit 
market manipulation and other related securities violations will be jointly and severally liable 
with such person for civil damages and reasonable legal costs plus 8% interest per annum.129 
 
The Director of Financial Institutions may also institute administrative actions such as 
restraining orders, administrative fines, injunctions, orders for judicial review and stop orders 
against the securities and market abuse offenders.130 Accordingly, any person who filed a 
false or misleading report or statement of a material fact in order to engage in market abuse 
activities or any other related securities violations will be liable to the affected persons for 
damages and reasonable legal costs.131  The Director of Financial Institutions may further 
suspend the sale or trading of the affected securities by or through a broker-dealer, until the 
false or misleading statements or reports are corrected.132  
 
Persons who perpetrate commodity-based market abuse and other related violations will be 
liable to a fine not exceeding $20 000 upon conviction, or imprisonment for a period not more 
than ten years, or both such fine and imprisonment.133  However, no liability will be imputed 
125    S 21.20.400 (as amended by 2003 c 53) of the Securities Act of Washington. 
126   S 21.20.400 (as amended by 2003 c 288) of the Securities Act of Washington & s 9A.20.021(1)(b) of the 
Revised Code of Washington which deals with the punishment of the class B felony.  
127    S 21.20.410 read with s 21.20.420 of the Securities Act of Washington. 
128    S 21.20.430(1) & (2) of the Securities Act of Washington. 
129    S 21.20.430(3) of the Securities Act of Washington. 
130     S 21.20.280 read with s 21.20.290; s 21.20.390 & 21.20.395 of the Securities Act of Washington. 
131     S 21.20.745 of the Securities Act of Washington. 
132     S 21.20.750 of the Securities Act of Washington. 
133     S 21.30.140 of the Commodity Transactions Act. 
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upon any accused person if he proves that he had no knowledge of the violated rule or order 
or that he acted in good faith.134  The prosecuting attorney may further impose criminal 
proceedings against any person who wilfully commits fraud, market manipulation or any 
other commodities-related violations.135 The Director of Financial Institutions may, through 
the courts, issue compliance orders, declaratory judgments, cease and desist orders, summary 
orders, suspension orders, restitution orders, order for civil penalties, injunctions and other 
civil or administrative remedies against those who contravene the commodities provisions 
through fraud or market abuse practices.136 
 
5 2 12  Analysis and Evaluation of the Washington Anti-Market Abuse Enforcement 
Framework  
 
The Director of Financial Institutions, courts (including the attorney general’s office) and the 
Department of Financial Institutions share the responsibility of enforcing the market abuse 
prohibition in Washington.137  As stated earlier,138 Washington does not have a specific 
provision that prohibits insider trading.  Accordingly, this could be creating some 
enforcement challenges for both the courts and the Department of Financial Institutions.   For 
instance, it is extremely difficult to prove whether the accused person has knowingly 
committed any insider trading violations because the insider trading offence is not clearly 
defined.139 
 
A number of civil, criminal and administrative penalties may be employed by the Director of 
Financial Institutions against any market abuse offenders.  For example, the Director of 
Financial Institutions may impose administrative penalties such as public censure, suspension 
or revocation of the license of any broker-dealer, salesperson, investment advisor’s 
representative, investment advisor or any other person who commits market abuse and other 
related securities violations.140  Remarkably, unlike the position in Washington, the Financial 
134     S 21.30.140 read with s 21.30.150 of the Commodity Transactions Act. 
135     S 21.30.360 read with s 21.30.370 of the Commodity Transactions Act. 
136     S 21.30.110; s 21.30.120; s 21.30.130; s 21.30.200 & s 21.30.350 of the Commodity Transactions Act. 
137   Conspicuously, Washington does not have a specific regulatory body that enforces its market abuse 
prohibition. 
138     Paragraph 5 2 9 above. 
139   Notwithstanding the advantages of this broad and unrestricted insider trading enforcement approach, it is 
submitted that Washington should consider enacting an adequate provision that expressly define and 
prohibit the insider trading offence to enhance enforcement.        
140    S 21.20.110(1) read with (2) to (9); s 21.20.120 & s 21.20.130 of the Securities Act of Washington. 
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Services Board is not statutorily and expressly empowered to use public censure against the 
market abuse offenders in South Africa.141 The Director of Financial Institutions has further 
powers to investigate (publicly or privately) market abuse and other related violations.142   In 
line with this, the Director of Financial Institutions may subpoena witnesses in relation to any 
ongoing investigation which pertains to securities or market abuse violations.143 Unlike 
Delaware,144 Washington statutorily empowers its Director of Financial Institutions to 
publicly disseminate any information concerning an ongoing market abuse investigation 
and/or any other securities or commodities violations, if such dissemination is in the public 
interest.145 The Director of Financial Institutions may also impose administrative sanctions 
like injunctions, mandamus, cease and desist orders, restraining orders and restitution orders 
against any person who commits market abuse offences or violates any provision of the 
Securities Act of Washington.146 
 
The Director of Financial Institutions relies on the relevant courts to enforce its administrative 
sanctions or other court actions against the market abuse offenders and those who violate the 
relevant rules.147  The courts play a key role in judicial review hearings involving any person 
aggrieved by an order or decision of the Director of Financial Institutions.148 
 
Unlike Delaware149 and California,150 Washington statutorily empowers the Director of 
Financial Institutions to cooperate with other State and federal enforcement authorities in 
order to effectively combat fraud, market abuse and other related securities or commodities 
violations.151 Another advantage of Washington is the statutory availability of non-exclusive 
common law penalties and private rights of action for the prejudiced persons to claim their 
141   See s 82 of the Securities Services Act; clause 91 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 86 of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.        
142    S 21.20.370 & s 21.20.700 of the Securities Act of Washington. 
143   S 21.20.380 & s 21.20.700 of the Securities Act of Washington; also see s 21.30.100 & s 21.30.110 of the 
Commodity Transactions Act.     
144    Paragraph 5 2 8 above. 
145    S 21.20.370(1) & (2) of the Securities Act of Washington & s 21.30.170 of the Commodity Transactions 
Act. 
146    S 21.20.390 of the Securities Act of Washington. 
147    S 21.30.120 & s 21.30.140 of the Commodity Transactions Act. 
148   S 21.20.440 of the Securities Act of Washington & s 21.30.400 of the Commodity Transactions Act, 
which states that the Director of Financial Institutions has powers to make, amend or rescind any rules, 
forms and orders relating to commodities transactions.     
149     Paragraph 5 2 8 above. 
150     Paragraph 5 2 4 above. 
151     S 21.20.450 of the Securities Act of Washington & 21.30.180 of the Commodity Transactions Act. 
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damages directly from the market abuse offenders.152  This has enabled Washington to have 
some influence on corporate law making (including the development and enforcement market 
abuse laws) both at State and federal levels in the United States of America.153 On the 
contrary, the Securities Services Act does not have any provision that directly empowers the 
Financial Services Board to cooperate with other local and international regulatory bodies in 
order to enhance the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in South Africa.154   In 
relation to this, it is hoped that this flaw will be ameliorated by the Financial Markets Bill 
and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 which seeks to empower the Financial Services Board 
to assist foreign regulators with investigations pertaining to any cross-border market abuse 
cases.155  
 
5 3  Historic Overview of the Federal Prohibition on Market Abuse156 
5 3 1  Overview of the Development of the Insider Trading Prohibition 
 
The regulation of insider trading at a federal level in the United States of America was 
introduced by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.157  Before the Securities Exchange Act, 
cases dealing with insider trading were reportedly inconsistently decided on the basis of 
existing common law.158  The Securities Exchange Act discouraged insider trading and other 
related practices in the United States of America both directly159 and indirectly.160  
Nonetheless, its direct prohibition on insider trading applied only to directors or officers 
152   S 21.20.420 read with s 21.20.430 of the Securities Act of Washington & s 21.30.370 of the Commodity 
Transactions Act.  
153    Roe 2009 Harvard Law School John M Olin Center for Law, Economics & Business Discussion Paper 
Series 638 5-9 <http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard_olin/638> (accessed 03-11-2011).    
154    See paragraph 3 2 1 in Chapter Three as well as paragraphs 4 2; 4 3 1 & 4 3 3 in Chapter Four of this 
thesis. 
155    Clause 91(2)(b) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 86(2)(b) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.     
156   The overview of the market abuse prohibition at a federal level is undertaken after the States position 
because this Chapter is focused mainly on the prohibition and combating of market abuse practices in the 
United States of America at a federal level.   
157    Public Law 73-291, 48 Stat 881 15 USC 78a-78ll as amended (hereinafter referred to as the Securities 
Exchange Act).  See s 16(a) & (b) as well as s 10(b); also see Hazen Federal Securities Law (2003) 1-4. 
158   Godwin v Agassiz (1933) 186 NE 659 (Mass), where the plaintiff who had ignorantly sold his own shares 
to his detriment after having read a newspaper report stating that the company had stopped operating as a 
result of insider trading was denied relief by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts. 
159  S 16(b) prohibited short-swing profits (profits obtained in less than 6 months) by corporate insiders in the 
corporation’s stock except when it was in the best interests of that corporation or its shareholders. 
160   S 10(b) prohibited any person to use or to employ in the purchase or sale of any securities registered on a 
securities exchange or any unregistered securities, a deceptive device for the purpose of contravening any 
rules and regulations of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
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(primary insiders) of a company who held more than a 10% stake in the company.161  In other 
words, this prohibition did not apply to other persons like tippees.   Moreover, the Securities 
Exchange Act’s indirect prohibition on insider trading was generally employed as an anti-
fraud provision which prohibited insiders from defrauding other innocent investors by trading 
in their own company’s stock while in possession of advance knowledge of a forthcoming 
earnings disclosure.162 Notably, the Securities Exchange Act imposed a mandatory disclosure 
requirement on all insiders.163  They had to file with the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission any requested statements and/or transactions, including those that 
could amount to insider trading, within ten days after they were concluded.   
 
The initial insider trading provisions of the Securities Exchange Act were, however, flawed in 
some respects.  For example, they did not give sufficient authority to the United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission164 to enforce and recover profits that were illegally 
obtained by those who practised insider trading.165  This function was merely left to a 
company’s own managers, directors and shareholders.166 Additionally, the United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission introduced other anti-fraud provisions such as Rule 
10b-5167 but they nonetheless remained deficient.  Neither section 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5 
expressly prohibited illicit insider trading by insiders or other unscrupulous persons.  The 
successful prosecution or settlement of insider trading cases was contingent upon the 
interpretation of the courts.168   It is clear that non-disclosure by an insider of material facts 
that were not known to the other party during the negotiations could probably amount to other 
market abuse practices like market manipulation.  In 2000 the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission adopted Rule 10b5-1169 in an attempt to define insider trading and 
provide defences to any person charged with insider trading if such person purchases or sells 
161    S 16(b) read with subsection (a). 
162   S 10(b) read with subsection (a).   Also see generally related remarks in SEC v Lipson (2001) No 97–CV-
2661 129F Supp.2d 1148. 
163    S 16(a). 
164   This body was established in 1934 as an independent board to enforce the federal securities laws so as to 
combat market practices like insider trading in the United States of America. 
165    S 16(a) & (b). 
166    Steinberg 2003 The International Lawyer 169-171. 
167    17 CFR, s 240.10b-5 (2007); Rule 10b-5 can be downloaded at <http://www.sec.gov> (accessed 01-10-
2009). 
168   As demonstrated in Cady, Roberts and Company [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed Sec L Rep 76. 
803 81. 016 & Chiarella v United States (1980) 445 US 222-230.  
169    17 CFR, 240.10b5-1; Rule 10b5-1 can be downloaded at <http://www.sec.gov> (accessed 01-10-2009).   
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securities before acquiring material non-public information.170  The United States Securities 
and Exchange Commission further adopted Rule 10b5-2171 to provide clarity on when a 
breach of a fiduciary duty or otherwise gives rise to liability under the misappropriation 
theory of insider trading in order to increase the consistent enforcement of the federal insider 
trading prohibition.172 In the same light, the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission adopted Rule 100 and Regulation Fair Disclosure173 in a bid to discourage 
companies from selectively disclosing material non-public information to market 
professionals and favoured shareholders in another attempt to combat insider trading.  
 
The Securities Exchange Act was amended and introduced provisions that granted the United 
States Securities and Exchange Commission the authority to make rules that are appropriate 
and necessary174for the enforcement of the securities laws.175   Therefore, the United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission adopted Rule 14e-3176  which applied only in tender 
offer situations. Rule 14e-3 prohibited “any person who has obtained directly or indirectly, 
material confidential information” regarding a tender offer from the offeror (bidder), target 
company or an intermediary, to trade or tip another person to trade in that offer before making 
an adequate public disclosure of such information.  Furthermore, a tippee who knew or should 
have known that such information had come from an insider was prohibited from trading with 
it until an adequate public disclosure was made.  Rule 14e-3 applied to all persons (even 
juristic persons) but nevertheless it was not easily enforced in practice.  Besides being a basis 
for some of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission’s enforcement actions, 
170   Horwich “The Origin, Application, Validity and Potential Misuse of Rule 10b5-1” 2007 The Bus. Lawyer 
913 922-923.  
171   17 CFR, 240.10b5-2; Rule 10b5-2 can be downloaded at <http://www.sec.gov> (accessed 01-10-2009).   
172   Pearson “When Hedge Funds Betray A Creditor Committee’s Fiduciary Role: New Twists on Insider 
Trading in the International Financial Markets” 2009 Review of Banking & Financial Law 165 204.  
173   Securities Exchange Act Release Number 43154 [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed Sec L Rep CCH 86 319.   
These rules and regulations can be downloaded at <http://www.sec.gov> (accessed 01-10-2009); also see 
<http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.htm#P22_3882> (accessed 01-10-2009); also see related 
analysis by Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations 371 & Morrison & Foerster 
“Insider Trading” 2010 Year End Review 1 1-6.   
174    S 23(a)(1). 
175    S 14(e).  
176   17 CFR, s 240.14e-3 (2007); Rule 14e-3 can be downloaded at <http://www.sec.gov> (accessed 01-10-
2009).  See further Arshadi & Eyssell The Law and Finance of Corporate Insider Trading: Theory and 
Evidence (1993) 46; Gaillard (ed) Insider Trading: The Laws of Europe, the United States and Japan 
(1992) 296; Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations (2005) 368; Ryan “Rule14e-3’s 
Disclose or Abstain Rule and Its Validity under Section 14(e)” 1991 U. Cin. Law Review 449 453-454 & 
Pearson 2009 Review of Banking & Financial Law 191-204.  
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Rule 14e-3 has been very difficult to enforce and in some instances it is confusingly 
interpreted to create an implied private action against the offenders.177 
 
Various shortcomings of the Securities Exchange Act led the Congress to enact the Insider 
Trading Sanctions Act of 1984178 at the request of the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission.   This Act for the first time empowered the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission to bring a civil action in the federal districts courts against persons 
who engage in insider trading activities.179  Therefore, the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission could impose civil penalties on anyone who practised insider trading 
through tipping or other related practices to pay an amount of up to three times the profit 
made or loss avoided for the benefit of all the persons who were prejudiced by it.  The Insider 
Trading Sanctions Act further empowered the courts to impose a criminal penalty on any 
person who violated the insider trading provisions.180  In spite of these developments, the 
Insider Trading Sanctions Act still failed to provide a lasting solution to the enforcement 
problems in the United States of America.   It did not expressly define insider trading and its 
provisions applied only to a few persons (primary insiders); other persons like “controlling 
persons”181 were not specifically prohibited from committing insider trading offences.182 
 
In a bid to improve the regulation of insider trading, the Congress passed the Insider Trading 
and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988.183  This Act stipulated that public companies, 
broker-dealers and investment advisors should adopt appropriate policies to monitor and 
prohibit their employees from practising insider trading.184  Moreover, the Securities Fraud 
Enforcement Act modified the wording of section 21A to make it clear that tippers could be 
liable for civil penalties when their tip resulted in insider trading, even if they are not 
177    Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations 368.   Also see United States v O’Hagan 
(1997) 117 (SCt) 2199; United States v Chestman (1991) 947 F2d 551 (2d Cir). 
178    Public Law 98-376, 98 Stat.1264 (1984), hereinafter referred to as the Insider Trading Sanctions Act. 
179   Gilson & Kraakman “The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency” 1984 VA.L.REV 549 & Friedman “The 
Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988” 1990 North Carolina Law Review 465 
466-494. 
180    S 21A. 
181   A “controlling person” includes not only employers but also any person with the power to influence or 
control the direction or the management policies or activities of another person.   Gaillard Insider 
Trading: The Laws of Europe, the United States and Japan 308.    
182    Pearson 2009 Review of Banking & Financial Law 194.  
183    Public Law 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677, hereinafter referred to as the Securities Fraud Enforcement Act. 
184    Arshadi & Eyssell The Law and Finance of Corporate Insider Trading 51 & Pearson 2009 Review of 
Banking & Financial Law 195.  
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technically aiders and abettors.185 The Securities Fraud Enforcement Act broadened the treble 
penalty for insider trading186 and further imposed liability on “controlling persons” for insider 
trading activities of their employees.187 This Act also permitted the United States Securities 
and Exchange Commission to pay bounties to informants of up to 10% of the civil penalties 
recovered in order to promote and enhance the enforcement of insider trading in the United 
States of America.188 These bounties were not paid to members, officers or employees of 
federal regulatory agencies, Department of Justice and self-regulatory organisations.189  The 
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act further empowered the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission to investigate upon the request of similar regulatory bodies elsewhere 
any insider trading practices, regardless of whether such practices violated the United States 
of America’s federal insider trading laws.190  In spite of the notable improvements brought by 
the Securities Fraud Enforcement Act, some persons were still able to contravene its insider 
trading provisions.   For example, as a result of poor auditing and insider trading activities on 
the part of Enron’s directors, its net income was reduced by $600 million and its debt 
increased to about $628 million.191  
 
In 2000, the Commodities Futures Modernization Act192 was enacted to inter alia repeal the 
ban on single-stock futures, enhance the regulation futures exchanges and empower both the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission to share the responsibility of regulating insider trading in the single-stock futures 
markets.193 This Act, unlike the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936,194 further enabled the 
185    S 21A(d). 
186    Pearson 2009 Review of Banking & Financial Law 195. 
187    S 21A as amended. 
188   Kaswell “An Insider’s View of the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act” 1989 Bus.Law 
145 152-164 & Fisher, Harshman, Gillespie, Ordower, Ware & Yeager “Privatizing Regulation: Whistle-
blowing and Bounty Hunting in the Financial Services Industries” 2000 Dick.J. Int’L. L 117 135-136 & 
Pearson 2009 Review of Banking & Financial Law 195.  
189    Friedman 1990 North Carolina Law Review 466-494.  
190   See s 6(b)(2) of the Securities Fraud Enforcement Act, which amended s 21(a)(2) of the Securities 
Exchange Act; also see Pearson 2009 Review of Banking & Financial Law 195.  
191    Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations 24. 
192   Public Law 106-554, 114 Stat.2763A-365, hereinafter referred to as the Commodities Futures 
Modernization Act.     
193   Knepper “Examining the Merits of Dual Regulation for Single-Stock Futures: How the Divergent Insider 
Trading Regimes for Federal Futures and Securities Markets Demonstrate the Necessity for (and Virtual 
Inevitability of) Dual CFTC-SEC Regulation for Single-Stock Futures” 2004 Pierce Law Review 33 34-
45.   
194   7 USC 1 et seq. (1994).    Hereinafter referred to as the Commodity Exchange Act and it came into effect 
on 15 June 1936.   
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Commodity Futures Trading Commission to prohibit insider trading by discouraging market 
regulators’ employees and other professionals like brokers from trading ahead of a client or 
other investors while in possession of non-public material information.195   The 
aforementioned insider trading prohibition was, however, not extended to other persons who 
are not market professionals or employees per se.196 
 
In 2002 the Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act197 in response to several landmark 
corporate scandals like World Com and Enron.198  This Act brought a more rigorous 
regulatory and enforcement structure for accounting companies and professionals to combat 
corporate fraud, insider trading and other market abuse practices.199  For example, in order to 
prevent insider trading, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act prohibits employees (primary insiders) from 
trading in their company’s stock relating to its pension plan funds during closed periods.200  
 
In the wake of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, the Congress recently enacted the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010201 to inter alia enhance and 
broaden the United States Securities and Exchange Commission’s ability to enforce insider 
trading and other securities laws.202 For instance, this Act now allows the United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission and/or the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to 
institute appropriate proceedings against any employee or agent of an agency or department of 
the federal government who purchases or sells a commodity while in possession of non-public 
material information which relates to that commodity.203  In relation to this, the Dodd-Frank 
Act empowers the United States Securities and Exchange Commission to enforce the federal 
195   See the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Regulation 1.59, 17 CFR, 1.59 (2004); also see 
Markham “‘Front-Running’-Insider Trading under the Commodity Exchange Act” 1988 Cath.U.Review 
69 94; 110 & Knepper 2004 Pierce Law Review 40--45.    
196   Knepper 2004 Pierce Law Review 42-45; also see the Commodity Futures Trading Commission & the 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission “A Joint Report of the SEC and the CFTC on 
Harmonization of Regulation” Report 16 October 2009 1 6-7; 59-61.   
197    See further Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations 23.   
198    Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse: A Legal and Economic Analysis (2005) 449.  
199   This heading discusses mainly the United States of America’s federal statutes on insider trading.   Other 
statutes that specifically regulate and prohibit fraud such as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organization Act of 1970 (RICO) will not be discussed for purposes of this thesis because it is limited 
only to the enforcement of the insider trading and market manipulation prohibition.     
200    S 306(a). 
201   Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat.1376 (codified at 12 USC, s 5301 et seq.), hereinafter referred to as the 
Dodd-Frank Act.       
202    Morrison & Foerster 2010 Year End Review 11-13.   
203    S 746 of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
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anti-fraud securities and insider trading prohibition extra-territorially.204  The Dodd-Frank Act 
now provides incentives of up to 30% and immunity to whistleblowers who report insider 
trading and related violations to the United States Securities and Exchange Commission or the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission.205 
 
5 3 2  Available Penalties for Insider Trading  
 
The United States of America’s enforcement framework uses civil, criminal and 
administrative penalties to discourage insider trading.   This can be traced back to the 
Securities Act of 1933206 which provided that any person who contravened its provisions was 
criminally liable for a fine of $10 000, or imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years, 
or both such fine and imprisonment.207  Moreover, the Securities Exchange Act allows the 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission to impose any other appropriate 
administrative penalties on broker-dealers who involve themselves in insider trading 
practices.208  As earlier stated,209 the United States Securities and Exchange Commission was 
empowered to impose treble civil penalties on insider trading offenders for the profit made or 
loss avoided as a result of their illicit trading.210 However, these sanctions were still 
insufficient for deterrence purposes and it was generally assumed that many persons benefited 
from insider trading without any fear of incurring liability. This might have been influenced 
by the fact that insider trading activity is inherently difficult to detect and enforce.211 
 
Additionally, the Congress introduced the Insider Trading Sanctions Act to improve inter alia 
the enforcement of the insider trading ban.  The Insider Trading Sanctions Act imposed 
separate criminal penalties for natural and juristic persons. This Act further increased the 
204    S 929P(b) read with (c) of the Dodd-Frank Act; also see Morrison & Foerster 2010 Year End Review 14-
15.   
205   See s 922 of the Dodd-Frank Act which enacted s 21F to repeal and replace s 21A(e) of the Securities 
Exchange Act; see further  Morrison & Foerster 2010 Year End Review 12-14.  
206   Public Law 22, 48 Stat.74 15 USC 77a-77mm et seq. (2000) as amended, hereinafter referred to as the 
Securities Act.   
207   S 24 of the Securities Act; see further Kaswell 1989 Bus.Law 169-170 & Friedman 1990 North Carolina 
Law Review 466-494. 
208   For example the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was permitted to impose the 
so-called “watchdog” penalties on offenders. Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations 
370. 
209    See paragraph 5 3 1 above. 
210    S 21A of the Securities Exchange Act. 
211   Steinberg 2003 The International Lawyer 169-171; Kaswell 1989 Bus.Law 169-170; Friedman 1990 
North Carolina Law Review 466-494 & Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations 370.   
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criminal penalties for insider trading to a fine of $100 000 for natural persons and $500 000 
for juristic persons.212  The maximum imprisonment term for natural persons remained five 
years and the civil penalties were unchanged, in spite of the broad powers conferred upon the 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission to claim treble damages from the 
offenders. These penalties did not deter all persons from knowingly practising insider trading.  
It remained possible for some unscrupulous persons to benefit from their insider trading 
practices after paying the stipulated fine or after serving their imprisonment terms.   
 
The Securities Fraud Enforcement Act was adopted and a further amendment especially to 
criminal sanctions was made in order to improve the enforcement of the insider trading 
prohibition.213  The maximum criminal penalties were increased to a fine of $1 million for 
natural persons and to $2, 5 million for juristic persons.214 Furthermore, the imprisonment 
sentence was significantly increased to a period not exceeding ten years.215  Notably, the prior 
version of the criminal fines for insider trading applied only to matters relating to stock 
exchanges.216  The Securities Fraud Enforcement Act enabled the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission to continue paying bounty rewards to anyone who bona fide provided 
information leading to civil penalties in order to encourage all persons to expose insider 
trading activities.217  The Securities Fraud Enforcement Act further expanded civil penalties 
to cover not only insiders or tippers, but also to apply to “controlling persons” to prevent 
potential insider trading and tipping by their employees.218  In other words, this Act 
empowered the United States Securities and Exchange Commission to impose civil penalties 
on “controlling persons” who are not broker-dealers per se or investment advisors like banks, 
accounting firms and financial publishers.219  Civil penalties imposed on “controlling 
persons” could differ to some extent from those that may be imposed on “controlled 
212    Hazen Federal Securities Law 134-136. 
213    Hazen Federal Securities Law 137-138; also see s 32(a) of the Securities Exchange Act as amended. 
214    Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations 370.   
215    Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations 370.   
216   Friedman 1990 North Carolina Law Review 466-494; Hazen Federal Securities Law 134-136 & also see 
s 32(a) of the Securities Exchange Act as amended.         
217   S 21A(e) which was later repealed and replaced by s 21F of the Securities Exchange Act as amended.    
Also see Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations 370; Hazen Federal Securities Law 
137-138 & Morrison & Foerster 2010 Year End Review 12-14.    
218   S 21A(a)(3) read with subsection (2) of the Securities Exchange Act as amended. Also see Friedman 1990 
North Carolina Law Review 466-494 & Hazen Federal Securities Law 137-138. 
219  S 21A(a)(1); (2) & (3) read with s 21A(b) of the Securities Exchange Act as amended.   Also see 
Friedman 1990 North Carolina Law Review 466-494 & Hazen Federal Securities Law 137-138. 
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persons”.220  The civil or administrative penalties that could be imposed on “controlling 
persons” were generally limited to a fine not exceeding $1 million.221 
 
Furthermore, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act222 increased the insider trading sanctions to a maximum 
fine of $5 million for natural persons and up to $25 million for juristic persons and a 
maximum imprisonment sentence of 20 years.223  The criminal sanctions and the civil 
remedies are enforced by the Department of Justice and the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission respectively.  This resulted in more successful criminal prosecutions 
and civil settlements to be obtained by the courts and the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission respectively.224   
 
In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act empowered the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission to recover monetary penalties in cease-and-desist administrative proceedings 
involving commodities or securities (including insider trading) violations.225  Nonetheless, the 
Dodd-Frank Act does not have specific penalties for insider trading practices.226 
 
 
 
 
220    This usually refers to employees or any other persons influenced or managed by another person. 
221   See Friedman 1990 North Carolina Law Review 466-494; Hazen Federal Securities Law 137-138 & also 
see s 21A(a)(3) of the Securities Exchange Act as amended.     
222   Notably, this Act was named after its sponsors Senator Paul Sarbanes and the United States of America 
Representative, Michael G Oxley.  Moreover, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted in response to major 
corporate and accounting scandals involving companies such as Enron, Tyco International, Adelphia, 
Peregrine Systems and WorldCom.  In addition, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted in bid to restore 
public investor confidence, especially after the aforesaid scandals had caused the share prices of the 
affected companies to collapse, giving rise to a number of investors losing their profits.  Also see 
generally related analysis by Anonymous “History and Context of the Events Contributing to the 
Adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act” 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sarbanes%E2%80%93Oxley_Act#History_and_context:_events_contributi
ng_to_the_adoption_of_Sarbanes.E2.80.93Oxley> (accessed 12-06-2012). 
223    S 306(a); s 1348 to s 1350.     Also see Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations 369-
370. 
224   The increase in settlements and prosecutions were also enhanced in part by the fact that the courts have 
the discretion to impose, in light of the facts and relevant circumstances other additional penalties.   See 
for example SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur Company (1968) 401 F2d 833 (2d Cir); Dirks v SEC (1983) 463 
US 646-655; United States v O’Hagan 2199; United States v Falcone [2001 Transfer Binder] 91 489 Fed 
Sec L Rep CCH (2d Cir) & SEC v Yun (2003) 327 F3d 1263 (11th Cir). 
225   Morgan Lewis “2009 Year in Review: SEC and SRO Selected Enforcement Cases and Developments 
Regarding Broker-Dealers” 2010 14 
<http://www.morganlewis.com/lit_SECandYearlyReviewWP_Jan2010.pdf> (accessed 10-06-2011).  
226    See s 746 of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
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5 3 3  Available Remedies for Insider Trading 
 
One of the most far reaching insider trading regulatory developments in the United States of 
America is the availability of a wide range of remedies to all the affected persons.227  For 
example, a private right of action is available to contemporaneous purchasers or sellers of 
securities against insider trading offenders.228  The affected persons may claim damages not 
exceeding the profit gained or loss avoided by the defendant (offender) or his tippees.229   It is 
clear that tippers and tippees are jointly and severally liable for insider trading damages.230  
Nevertheless, any losses incurred or amounts used in a United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission injunction action relating to any civil penalty transaction for contemporaneous 
traders are deducted from the damages recovered.231   No limit or condition is imposed on any 
person who brings an action to enforce the provisions of the Securities Exchange Act or on 
the availability of any implied right of action under the same Act.232 
 
In addition, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission can bring a judicial 
enforcement action seeking a court order that enjoins insiders or tippees from indulging in 
insider trading activity and that mandates them to return or disgorge all the profits gained or 
losses avoided.233   
 
Another remedy available in the United States of America is the civil action for recovery or 
compensation for “defrauded” owners of non-public confidential information.   Such persons 
are statutorily allowed to take a private action against any persons who practise insider trading 
227   Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations 369-370 & Friedman 1990 North Carolina 
Law Review 466-494.  
228    S 20A of the Securities Exchange Act as amended by s 5 of Securities Fraud Enforcement Act.    Also see 
Blue Chip Stamps v Manor Drug Stores (1975) 421 US 723, where the actual affected persons were 
allowed to bring a private action in terms of Rule 10b-5 against the insider trading offenders. 
229   Elkind v Liggett and Myers Inc (1980) 635 F2d 156(2d Cir) 172-173; FMC Corp v Boesky (1988) 852 
F2d 981 (7th Cir), the court held that the affected company was entitled to claim its damages from the 
insider trading offenders, but nevertheless the tippee was controversially not found guilty because such 
company did not suffer actual loss.    Also see Friedman 1990 North Carolina Law Review 466-494.   
230    S 20A(c) of the Securities Exchange Act; also see Friedman 1990 North Carolina Law Review 466-494. 
231   S 20A(b)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act; also see Friedman 1990 North Carolina Law Review 466-
494 & Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations 369. 
232    Kaswell 1989 Bus.Law 167-169. 
233   SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur Company 833.   In this case it was inter alia postulated that a separate fund be 
established from which the prejudiced shareholders and other contemporaneous traders could recoup their 
losses or be compensated from any money recovered from the offenders.   Also see generally Palmiter 
Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations 369-370. 
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and other similar activities.234  The entities like companies are also allowed to recover any 
losses suffered as a result of insider trading from the offenders.235  There is no explicit 
statutory limitation that applies to the period on which private actions may be instituted under 
Rule 10b-5.  Instead, the courts have been required to determine the appropriate limitation 
periods on private civil actions giving regard to any other relevant factors.236 
 
The United States Securities and Exchange Commission may also claim treble civil damages 
from any person who violates its insider trading rules.237 These damages, like any other 
remedies, are usually paid into the federal treasury.    It is possible for offenders to disgorge 
their profits in a private or United States Securities and Exchange Commission action and still 
pay a treble damage penalty without any concerns of double jeopardy violation.238   The 
Dodd-Frank Act further allows the United States Securities and Exchange Commission to pay 
bounty rewards to whistle-blowers who report insider trading and related violations that 
results in the successful disgorgement of profits, monetary penalties and prejudgment interest 
exceeding $1 million in any judicial or administrative proceedings.239 
 
5 3 4  Prohibition on “Market Manipulation” 
 
Although the concept of market abuse is not expressly and statutorily defined in the United 
States of America,240 the regulation and prohibition of market abuse practices can be linked 
back to the so-called “New Deal” legislation that was enacted after a heavy crash occurred in 
its stock markets in 1929.241  The most important “New Deal legislation” was the Securities 
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  
 
234    Rule 10b-5.    See further Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations 369. 
235    Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations 369.  Also see FMC Corp v Boesky 981.   
236    Friedman 1990 North Carolina Law Review 466-494. 
237    Rules 10b-5 & 14e-3. 
238    Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations 370.   See further SEC v Levine (1986) 86 
Civ 3726 (SDNY) (RO) & SEC v Boesky (1986) 86 Civ 8767. 
239   S 922(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act; also see Morrison & Foerster 2010 Year End Review 13-14 & Morgan 
Lewis 2010 14 <http://www.morganlewis.com/lit_SECandYearlyReviewWP_Jan2010.pdf> (accessed 10-
06-2011).  
240    Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 104. 
241    Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 174-175. 
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The Securities Act prohibits the making of corporate misstatements that will lead to the 
defrauding of innocent investors.242  This is mainly done to protect investors against corporate 
false or misleading statements in the context of new issues and to safeguard the adequate and 
continuous flow of issuer-specific information.243 
 
In addition, the Securities Exchange Act expressly prohibits market manipulation.   This Act, 
for instance, prohibits any person from willingly creating misleading appearances of active 
trading in securities listed on a stock exchange.244  Put differently, the Securities Exchange 
Act discourages and prohibits a number of activities that create or that might create a 
misleading appearance of trading in listed securities like wash sales and matched orders 
(when the same person or affiliate is essentially both the buyer and the seller of the securities 
in question), a series of transactions to induce the purchase or sale by others and the false or 
reckless “touting” or spreading of rumours by broker-dealers or other traders to induce trading 
in such securities.245  
 
The Securities Exchange Act further prohibits any person from directly or indirectly using 
manipulative and other deceptive devices to purchase or sell any listed securities to the 
detriment of investors.246  In addition, any such persons who violate the rules and regulations 
proscribed by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission will also be liable for 
an offence.247  In relation to this, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission is 
authorised to make any other appropriate rules and regulations to combat market manipulation 
in the United States of America.248 The United States Securities and Exchange Commission 
introduced a rule that discourages any person from employing any device, scheme or artifice 
to defraud or to engage in an act, practice or course of business that will deceive other 
242    S 17. 
243    Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 174. 
244    S 9(a).   Also see Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations 266. 
245    S 9(a). 
246   S 10(b) read with subsection (a).  See further Friedman 1990 North Carolina Law Review 466-494; 
Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 104.   
247    S 9(b) & (c) read with subsection (a) of the Securities Exchange Act. 
248   For example the United States Securities and Exchange Commission promulgated Rule 10b-5 in order to 
effectively enforce the provisions of s 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.   See further Avgouleas The 
Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 104.    
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persons.249 This rule further prohibits all persons from making untrue and misleading 
statements relating to the material facts of any securities.250 
 
Moreover, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission introduced Regulation 
M251 which, among other aspects, prohibits market manipulation during a public distribution 
(public offering of securities) and allows price-stabilisation activities only in some specific 
circumstances.  The United States Securities and Exchange Commission further adopted Rule 
10a-1 (the so-called up-tick rule) to prevent market manipulation and free falls in stock prices 
due to short selling in a falling market.252  This rule has been criticised as too narrow because 
it did not cover short sales and other manipulative activities in over the counter markets and in 
sales of derivatives.   Regulation SHO was then enacted to combat naked short selling and 
market manipulation in all the United States of America’s financial markets and in broker-
dealer transactions.253 
 
The Securities Exchange Act further prohibits the making of false or misleading statements of 
any material fact or engagement in any fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative practices in 
connection with tender offers.254  Additionally, the Securities Exchange Act allowed the 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission to define “fraudulent, deceptive or 
manipulative practices” and to make appropriate rules designed to prevent such manipulative 
practices.255   This Act does not expressly prohibit market manipulation in over the counter 
markets.256   
 
249   See Rule 10b-5 which prohibits three types of market manipulation, namely false dissemination of 
material information relating to securities, distortion and misleading behaviour and the use of 
manipulative devices that negatively affect the price of securities and create a false appearance in the 
market activity.    Also see Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations 316-317 & 
Barnes Stock Market Efficiency, Insider Dealing and Market Abuse (2009) 132. 
250    Rule 10b-5.  Also see Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations 306; 308-309. 
251   17 CFR, s 241.100-240.105 (2007); The United States Securities and Exchange Commission normally 
relies on its wide powers as conferred by s 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.   Palmiter Securities 
Regulation: Examples and Explanations 267-268 & Hazen Federal Securities Law 89-91.  
252    Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations 268-269. 
253    Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations 269. 
254    S 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act. 
255   For example the United States Securities and Exchange Commission adopted Rule 14e-3 to enhance the 
enforcement of the provisions of s 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act and a number of measures that 
discourage market manipulation were introduced.  Rule 14e-3(a) & (d).  Also see Friedman 1990 North 
Carolina Law Review 466-494. 
256    Nelemans “Redefining Trade-Based Market Manipulation” 2008 Valparaiso University Law Review 1169 
1171-1172.   
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In an effort to avoid the recurrence of corporate scandals257 and to reassure investors that the 
United States of America financial markets will be free from market abuse practices, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted.258  This Act prohibits any person (including a juristic 
person) or employee from engaging in an act or practice that will improperly influence the 
conduct of audits or the falsification of books, records and accounts.259  The Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act further prohibits senior officers of a company from selling stocks during certain pension 
“black-out” periods if they received that stock as compensation during their employment with 
the company in question in order to prevent possible market abuse activities like insider 
trading and market manipulation.260 
 
The United States Securities and Exchange Commission enacted a specific rule that prohibits 
officers, directors and persons acting under their direction from knowingly coercing, 
manipulating, misleading or fraudulently influencing the auditor of the issuer’s financial 
statements.261 
 
5 3 4 1  Prohibition on Commodity Market Manipulation 
 
Market manipulation with respect to commodities futures and other kinds of derivatives is 
principally regulated under the Commodity Exchange Act.262  Thus, the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission, and not the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, is the 
main regulatory body that deals with the enforcement of commodity market manipulation in 
the United States of America.263  Actual or attempted market manipulation of any commodity 
257    SEC v WorldCom Inc (2003) 02 Civ 4963(JSR). 
258   Mossos “Sarbanes-Oxley goes to Europe: A Comparative Analysis of United States and European Union 
Corporate Reforms after Enron” 2004 Currents International Trade Law Journal 9 9-10. See Anonymous 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sarbanes%E2%80%93Oxley_Act#History_and_context:_events_contributi
ng_to_the_adoption_of_Sarbanes.E2.80.93Oxley> (accessed 12-06-2012), who also submits that the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was inter alia enacted in bid to restore public investor confidence in the aftermath of 
several corporate and accounting scandals which affected companies such as Enron, Tyco International, 
Adelphia, Peregrine Systems and WorldCom in the United States of America. 
259    S 303(a). 
260    S 306(a)(1). 
261   The Sarbanes-Oxley Act empowers the United States Securities and Exchange Commission to make 
further rules that it may deem necessary for the purposes of enforcing the market abuse provisions, see 
Rule 13b-2; Rule 13b2-2(b)(1). Also see Mossos 2004 International Trade Law Journal 9-11.  
262   See the Commodity Futures Trading Commission & the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission Report 16 October 2009 56-57.   
263   The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) was established pursuant to the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-64, 88 Stat. 1398).  Avgouleas The Mechanics 
and Regulation of Market Abuse 106. 
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or future or option is prohibited under the Commodity Exchange Act as amended.264   
Consequently, any conduct or practice that results in the misleading of investors and the 
creation of an artificial price of commodities is prohibited.265 The Commodity Exchange Act 
further prohibits intentional aiding, abetting and inducement of other persons to commit 
market abuse offences.266  Under this Act, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
could bring a civil action or any other appropriate action against the offenders if it has a 
reason to believe that such offenders have a specific intent to create an artificial price or to 
influence the price of the commodities or that an artificial price that exists has been caused by 
their manipulative practices.267  
 
The Commodities Futures Modernization Act prohibits commodities-based market 
manipulation in the single-stock futures markets and over the counter derivative 
transactions.268  Accordingly, under this Act both the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission and the United States Securities and Exchange Commission have the authority to 
institute appropriate proceedings against any person who commits market manipulation and 
other related activities.269  Notably, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
authority is only limited to violations relating to single-stock futures transactions, not “broad-
based” security futures transactions which are exclusively covered by the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission.270  Nonetheless, if there is a rule violation or market manipulation in 
the sale or purchase of a single-stock future, either the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission or the United States Securities and Exchange Commission may, after 
consultation, bring an enforcement action against the offenders.271  
 
264    S 9(a)(2). 
265   All persons are prohibited from entering into or confirming the execution of a transaction that is 
misleading in nature (wash sales) to create a fictitious sale of any commodities. s 4(c).  Also see Swan 
Market Abuse Regulation (2006) 192-194. 
266    S 13(a); s 6(c) to (d) & 9(a)(2).  Also see Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 104. 
267    Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 104; Swan Market Abuse Regulation 192-
194.   
268    Knepper 2004 Pierce Law Review 36-37. 
269   See generally s 251 of the Commodities Futures Modernization Act; also see Knepper 2004 Pierce Law 
Review 36.  
270    S 201 of the Commodities Futures Modernization Act; also see Knepper 2004 Pierce Law Review 37. 
271    S 204; 251 of the Commodities Futures Modernization Act; also see Knepper 2004 Pierce Law Review 
37-38. 
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Recently, the Dodd-Frank Act broadened the authority of the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission to make appropriate rules272 and prohibit both trade-based market manipulation 
and disclosure-based market manipulation practices.273   In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act 
introduced the prohibition on fraud-based market manipulation practices in relation to any 
purchase or sale of a swap or commodity contract in interstate commerce or for future 
delivery and/or subject to the rules of any registered entity.274   The Dodd-Frank Act further 
introduced a broad prohibition on direct or indirect swap or commodity-based market 
manipulation as well as attempted swap or commodity-based market manipulation.275 
 
5 3 5  Available Penalties for Market Manipulation 
 
A variety of penalties such as criminal, civil and administrative sanctions are used to combat 
market manipulation practices in the United States of America.  
 
The Securities Act imposes criminal penalties of up to five years imprisonment and a $10 000 
fine on any person who knowingly violates its anti-fraud and market manipulation 
provisions.276 Furthermore, the Securities Exchange Act imposes a maximum criminal 
penalty fine of $100 000, or imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years, or both on 
natural persons who wilfully engage in prohibited trade practices and other related market 
manipulation offences.277  The Securities Exchange Act further imposes a separate fine not 
exceeding $5 million, or imprisonment for a period of up to 20 years on individuals as well as 
a $25 million fine for juristic persons (companies and other entities) that intentionally engage 
in disclosure-based market manipulation and other related practices.278  This distinction is 
believed to have been made to increase deterrence and improve the general enforcement of 
272   See the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Proposed Rules 180.1 & 180.2; also see Morrison & 
Foerster 2010 Year End Review 15.   
273    S 753 of the Dodd-Frank Act which amended s 6(c) of the Commodity Exchange Act.    It is stated that s 
753 of the Dodd-Frank Act was originally modeled upon the Derivatives Market Manipulation Prevention 
Act of 2009 which was introduced by Senator Cantwell in 2009, see Cantwell “Senate Passes Cantwell 
Anti-Manipulation Amendment” (06-05-2010) <http://cantwell.senate.gov/news/record.cfm?id=324761> 
(accessed 26-11-2011).   
274    S 753 of the Dodd-Frank Act which amended s 6(c) of the Commodity Exchange Act. 
275   S 753 of the Dodd-Frank Act which amended s 6(c) of the Commodity Exchange Act; also see Morrison 
& Foerster 2010 Year End Review 15.  
276    S 24.    Also see Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations 452.   
277   S 32(c)(2)(A) read with subsection (a) of the Securities Exchange Act; also see Palmiter Securities 
Regulation: Examples and Explanations 451-454.     
278   These criminal penalties are mainly enforced by the Department of Justice.    S 32(a) of the Securities 
Exchange Act as amended by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.    
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the market abuse provisions in the United States of America.279  Importantly, both the 
Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act criminalised false and misleading registration 
statements and the filing of misleading documents with the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission respectively.280  
 
With regard to civil penalties, the Securities Exchange Act has empowered the United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission to impose civil penalties on any person who wilfully or 
recklessly aided, abetted, counseled, commanded or induced another person to commit market 
abuse practices like filing false and misleading documents with the United States Securities 
and Exchange Commission.281  Although there is no explicit provision for a civil penalty for 
the contravention of Rule 10b-5, a private right of action for such contravention is available to 
all prejudiced actual purchasers and sellers of securities on the basis of equity.282  
 
In relation to administrative penalties, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission 
is further authorised to administer and impose unlimited administrative penalties upon the 
market manipulation offenders.   It may issue a refusal or stop order (cease and desist orders) 
to prevent an already existing registration statement from being effective or to stop the filing 
of a false or misleading statement.283  The United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission may also claim the disgorgement of any profits made by a person who violates 
the securities and market abuse provisions.284  In addition, the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission may impose a judicial order for civil monetary penalties on the alleged 
offenders if it reasonably believes that such penalties will be in the public interest. 285  
 
279    Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations 451- 455.   
280   S 32 of the Securities Exchange Act & s 24 of the Securities Act; also see Palmiter Securities Regulation: 
Examples and Explanations 452- 453.     
281    S 21(d)(3) of the Securities Exchange Act; see further s 20(d) of the Securities Act.  
282   Cassim “An Analysis of Market Manipulation under the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004 (part 2)” 2008 
SA Merc LJ 177 192-193.       
283   For example, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission may impose a cease and desist 
order compelling any alleged offender to stop committing further market abuse violations.    S 8A; 8(b) & 
(d) of the Securities Act & s 21C of the Securities Exchange Act.   Also see Palmiter Securities 
Regulation: Examples and Explanations 436-444.   
284   S 8A(e) of the Securities Act; s 21B(e) of the Securities Exchange Act.   Also see further Palmiter 
Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations 438.   
285   S 21(d)(3) of the Securities Exchange Act; see further s 20(d) of the Securities Act; also see Palmiter 
Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations 441-442.    
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On the other hand, the Commodities Futures Modernization Act provides criminal penalties 
against any commodities-based market manipulation offenders in the single-stock futures 
markets, over the counter commodities derivatives and other related markets in the United 
States of America.  Similarly, the Commodity Exchange Act imposes a criminal penalty fine 
of up to $100 000 on individuals and up to $500 000 on entities that indulge in fraudulent 
and/or other prohibited commodities-based market manipulation practices.   Individuals could 
also be liable to imprisonment for up to five years, or both such fine and imprisonment.286  In 
addition, the Commodity Exchange Act imposes civil penalties against any commodities-
based market manipulation offenders.  This Act allows the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission to take appropriate civil action against any persons who aids, abets, counsels, 
induces or procures the commission of market manipulation offences.287  The Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission may, therefore, claim any disgorgement profits and civil 
monetary penalties of up to $1 million or three times the profits gained by offenders and 
distribute them to the affected persons.288  
 
Additionally, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act introduced significantly higher criminal penalties for 
market manipulation and other related offences.  It imposes a maximum criminal fine of $5 
million and imprisonment sentence of up to 20 years for individuals.289 A separate maximum 
criminal fine not exceeding $25 million is also imposed on entities that are involved in market 
manipulation and other related activities.290 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act further provides civil 
penalties against any person who knowingly executes or attempts to execute a scheme or 
artifice to defraud or to manipulate by means of false pretenses, representations or promises, 
any money or property in connection with the securities of a public company.291  This 
suggests that there is an attempted market manipulation offence in the United States of 
America.   The Sarbanes-Oxley Act permits the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission to seek civil compensatory penalties against any person who presents 
manipulative, fraudulent, false or misleading statements with regard to the conduit of audits, 
286    See generally s 13(a) read with subsection (c)(a) of the Commodity Exchange Act. 
287    S 25(a)(1). 
288    S 6(c)(10)(C) as amended by s 753(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act.  The profits disgorged and the penalties 
recovered are normally kept in a fund or trust controlled by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
for purposes of offering compensatory aid to all the prejudiced persons. 
289    S 807. 
290    Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations 452.   
291    Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 458. 
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books, records and accounts of a company.292  The United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission may impose other civil and administrative penalties necessary to enforce and 
discourage market manipulation activities.293  
 
5 3 6  Available Remedies for Market Manipulation 
 
A wide range of remedies such as criminal, civil and administrative remedies are available to 
all the persons affected by market manipulation in the United States of America.   Apart from 
these remedies, a private right of action, damages, injunctions, disciplinary sanctions and 
suspension orders may be employed by the victims of market manipulation to recover their 
losses from the offenders. 
 
Criminal remedies may be obtained from any person who contravenes market manipulation 
provisions or the United States Securities and Exchange Commission rules, including the 
making of a false or misleading statement in a filing submitted to the United States Securities 
and Exchange Commission.294  If the offenders refuse or delay to pay up their fines, the 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission will refer such cases to the Department of 
Justice for further criminal prosecution.295 
 
In addition, a statutory derivative civil remedy for market manipulation violations is permitted 
in the United States of America on grounds of equity.296  The United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission may, therefore, claim disgorgement of profits and other civil 
compensatory remedies from any person who contravenes its rules or other market 
manipulation provisions.297  Likewise, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission may 
292    S 303(a).     See further Rule 13b2-2(b)(1) & Rule 13b2-2(b)(2).   
293   There is no express statutory limitation on United States Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
enforcement actions.    Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations 436-444.   
294    The affected persons may obtain criminal remedies of up to $5 million and $25 million fines for 
individuals and entities respectively from the offenders.   See 32(a) of the Securities Exchange Act (as 
amended); s 24 of the Securities Act.    Also see Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and 
Explanations 452-454.           
295   The fines or monetary remedies recovered by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission or 
the Department of Justice are paid into the treasury account for distribution to all the persons who fall 
victim to market manipulation and other related market abuse practices.    Palmiter Securities Regulation: 
Examples and Explanations 370; 441.           
296    Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 192-193.   
297   The offenders will be liable to pay the United States Securities and Exchange Commission civil remedies 
of up to three times the profit gained or loss avoided as a result of their illicit practices.   See s 308 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.   Also see FMC Corp v Boesky (1987) 673 F2d 272 (ND I11); Blue Chip Stamps v 
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institute court orders for civil monetary fines, restitution, disgorgement of profits, rescission 
and actual damages against any commodities-based market manipulation offenders.298   
 
The United States Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission are further empowered to take appropriate administrative action against any 
persons who violate the relevant market manipulation provisions in the United States of 
America.  In relation to this, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission may 
issue cease and desist orders compelling any alleged offenders to stop or refrain from 
violating its market abuse rules.299   If the alleged offender fails to comply with the cease and 
desist order, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission may enforce the order in 
a federal court.300   Furthermore, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission may 
impose a compliance order with regard to any misleading tender offer statements or where a 
registrant’s filing is defective, manipulative or misleading.301 The United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission can further suspend trading and offering of securities traded publicly 
for up to ten days pending a hearing.302  In line with this, the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission can take disciplinary action against broker-dealers and other persons 
who contravene the market abuse provisions.303 In the same way, the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission may seek rescission or permanent injunction orders against persistent 
commodities-based market manipulation offenders.304   
Manor Drug Stores (1975) 421 US 723; also see Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and 
Explanations 369-370.     
298   S 13a-1(a); (b) & (d)(1) read with s 22 & 25 of the Commodity Exchange Act; see further s 6(c)(10)(C) as 
amended by s 753(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act.   
299   S 8A of the Securities Act; s 21C of the Securities Exchange Act.   Also see WHX Corp v SEC (2004) 362 
F3d 854 (DC Cir); Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations 437.     
300   The federal courts may impose their own additional civil monetary penalties for non-compliance.    The 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission may further impose a cease and desist order to 
prevent the registration or filing of any documents which contains false, deceptive or misleading 
statements, see Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations 437.      
301    S 15(c)(4) read with s 15(b)(1)(B) & s 15(b)(4) of the Securities Exchange Act. 
302   S 12(k) of the Securities Exchange Act.   The United States Securities and Exchange Commission can 
suspend trading in the affected securities for up to twelve months or revoke the registration of the alleged 
offender in cases of persistent market abuse violations and non-compliance, see s 12(j) of the Securities 
Exchange Act; also see SEC v Sloan (1978) 436 US 103 & Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and 
Explanations 437.      
303  Such action includes claiming monetary administrative fines, revocation of registration and temporary 
suspension. See further s 21B read with s 21C of the Securities Exchange Act.   The United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission may also seek temporary restraining orders, preliminary 
injunctions, temporary judicial asset freeze of up to 45 days as well as permanent asset freeze against any 
alleged offenders.   See generally s 21(a) to (i) of the Securities Exchange Act.    Also see Palmiter 
Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations 438-439; 441.      
304    S 13a-1(a) & (b); 13a-1(d)(1) of the Commodity Exchange Act. 
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As stated earlier,305 a private right of action is available to all the persons who are prejudiced 
by market manipulation, insider trading and other related practices to claim their damages 
directly from the offenders.306  For instance, any prejudiced person may have a private right 
of action against brokers, exchanges and related organisations that commit commodities-
based market manipulation offences.  Nonetheless, where the costs of bringing such action are 
too high, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission may claim remedies on behalf of the 
prejudiced persons.307  It is possible that the offenders who engage in trade-based or 
disclosure-based market manipulation and/or commodities-based market manipulation may be 
subjected to the United States Securities and Exchange Commission or Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission action as well as another private action from the actual prejudiced 
persons.308  
 
5 4  Detection, Prosecution and the Enforcement of the Market Abuse Prohibition 
5 4 1  The Role of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission    
 
The responsibility for civil and administrative enforcement of the market abuse prohibition 
rests primarily with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission.309  Nevertheless, 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission has the prerogative to oversee and enforce the 
prohibition relating to commodities derivatives and futures market abuse practices.310 
 
305    See paragraph 5 3 5 above. 
306   S 20A read with s 21A; s 27A & s 28 of the Securities Exchange Act; s 22 & s 25 of the Commodity 
Exchange Act. Also see Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 192-193.  
307   S 25(a) of the Commodity Exchange Act.   Although the actual damages that may be imposed against the 
offenders are not clearly stipulated, it is generally believed that such offenders will be liable to pay the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission compensatory damages for the actual loss avoided or profit 
gained.  Therefore, in successful cases, the affected persons will recover their damages from offenders 
through the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.   See Comm`n v Heffernan (2003) 274 FSupp2d 
1375 (SDGa); also see Pearce “Broadening Actual Damages in the Context of the Commodities Exchange 
Act” 2007 Journal of Law and Policy 449 449; 480 & 483. 
308   This is not viewed as a violation to the double jeopardy clause of the United States of America 
constitution which asserts that no person may be subjected to multiple prosecutions or punishment of the 
same conduct.  See Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations 460-461.      
309   Ashe & Counsell Insider Trading: The Tangled Web (1990) 7-12; Langevoort & Gulati “The Muddled 
Duty to Disclose under Rule 10b-5” 2004 Vand L Rev 1639.     
310   For the purposes of this sub-heading, the discussion will be mainly focused on the roles of the United 
States Securities and Exchange Commission regarding the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in 
the United States of America.   Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 104; 106.      
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Notwithstanding the fact that there are several other regulatory bodies,311 the United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission was established as an independent quasi-judicial and 
legislative regulatory board responsible for the enforcement of federal securities laws through 
the regulation of the stock market and securities industry in the United States of America.312   
The United States Securities and Exchange Commission’s legislative powers include 
promulgating rules and regulations that have the force of law.313  The United States Securities 
and Exchange Commission may, for instance, issue interpretive letters and the so-called no-
action letters to express its views and provide guidance to all the relevant persons regarding 
any market abuse violations.314 Moreover, the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s judicial functions include acting as an original tribunal regarding disciplinary 
actions against securities professionals subject to its supervision who violate securities laws or 
commit market abuse offences.315 
 
In addition to its quasi-judicial and legislative functions, the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission further exercises administrative and supervisory authority over the key 
participants in the securities industry to prevent and combat market abuse activities in the 
United States of America.316  The United States Securities and Exchange Commission is also 
responsible for protecting investors, maintaining fair, orderly and efficient financial markets 
through facilitating capital formation and effectively enforcing securities laws to curb fraud, 
insider trading, market manipulation and other related market abuse practices.   For purposes 
of effectiveness, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission is divided into four 
311  Such regulatory bodies include the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and other self-regulatory 
organisations.     
312   S 4 of the Securities Exchange Act.   Apart from enforcing the provisions of the Securities Exchange Act, 
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission enforces the relevant provisions of the Securities 
Act, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, the Investment Company Act of 1940, the Investment Advisors Act 
of 1940, the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and other related 
statutes.    The United States Securities and Exchange Commission does not work in isolation.    Other 
institutions under its authority include the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) as well as self-regulatory 
organisations like the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and the Municipal Securities 
Rule Making Board (MSRB).  Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations 402-415.      
313    S 4; s 4A & 4C of the Securities Exchange Act, also see Hazen Federal Securities Law 4-7. 
314   Generally see s 14(a) to (e) of the Securities Exchange Act. Also see Palmiter Securities Regulation: 
Examples and Explanations 29; 415; 433-444.               
315   Furthermore, United States Securities and Exchange Commission may act as an appellate tribunal to 
review disciplinary decisions or actions taken by the stock exchanges, the National Association of 
Securities Dealers (NASD) and other self-regulatory organisations against their members.  Palmiter 
Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations 29; 415; 433-444.           
316    Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations 29.      
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main divisions, namely the Corporate Finance, Market Regulation, Investment Management 
and Enforcement Divisions.  
 
The Corporate Finance Division polices compliance with the mandatory disclosure 
requirement as well as registration by public companies of transactions such as mergers.  It 
additionally operates an online Electronic Data Gathering Analysis and Retrieval system to 
ensure equal access to non-public inside information for all relevant persons. This system has 
been successfully utilised to prevent possible insider trading and market manipulation in the 
United States of America’s financial markets.317 
 
Moreover, the Market Regulation Division regulates the New York Stock Exchange, the 
National Association of Securities Dealers, the Municipal Securities Rule Making Board and 
other self-regulatory organisations.  In relation to this, Market Regulation Division interprets 
any proposed changes to regulations, publicises investment-related topics for public education 
and monitors operations of the industry.  In practice, the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission delegates most of its enforcement and rulemaking authority to the 
New York Stock Exchange and the National Association of Securities Dealers.318 Notably, 
these two self-regulatory organisations merged to form the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority in 2007.319 
 
The Investment Management Division oversees investment companies and their advisory 
professionals.  It further administers federal security laws to improve the disclosure of non-
public inside information and to minimise prejudice to investors without imposing an undue 
burden on regulated companies. Therefore, the United States Securities and Exchange 
317   The Electronic Data Gathering Analysis and Retrieval system has been used in a number of instances to 
assess, review and obtain misleading, manipulative or deceptive information regarding any filings with 
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission.    Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and 
Explanations 31.      
318   Consequently, all trading persons or companies not regulated by other self-regulatory organisations are 
obliged to be registered with the National Association of Securities Dealers in order to curb all possible 
market abuse activities. 
319   Notwithstanding the existence of this merger, it is stated that the New York Stock Exchange still 
maintains its autonomous oversight and enforcement responsibility regarding any securities and market 
abuse violations which are effected on its facilities and systems by the offenders.  See generally Morgan 
Lewis 2010 4-6 <http://www.morganlewis.com/lit_SECandYearlyReviewWP_Jan2010.pdf> (accessed 
10-06-2011).  
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Commission can interpret such laws and make rules to reduce the occurrence of market abuse 
practices in the relevant financial markets as much as possible.320  
 
Likewise, the Enforcement Division investigates any violation of the laws and rules that 
govern insider trading, market manipulation and other related practices.  Its extensive 
investigatory powers include issuing subpoenae for the production of relevant evidence such 
as documents, and compelling suspects and others to testify in the courts.   Furthermore, it has 
powers to:  
 
(a) enforce civil remedies;  
 
(b) institute administrative orders; 
 
(c) recover any illegally obtained profits from guilty persons (disgorgement of profits); 
 
(d) extra-territorially enforce the federal anti-fraud securities and market abuse 
prohibition;321  
 
(e) provide greater incentives and immunity to whistle-blowers who report market abuse 
violations to the United States Securities and Exchange Commission;322 and 
 
(f) impose punitive penalties on such persons and refer criminal matters to the 
Department of Justice.323    
 
In 2009, the Enforcement Division created the Office of Market Intelligence, the Asset 
Management Unit, the Market Abuse Unit, the Structured and New Products Unit, the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act Unit and the Municipal Securities and Public Pensions Unit.   This 
enabled the Enforcement Division to successfully minimise securities law violations by inter 
alia analysing and monitoring tips, complaints or referrals received by the United States 
320    Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations 28-31.      
321    S 929P(b) read with (c) of the Dodd-Frank Act; also see Morrison & Foerster 2010 Year End Review 14-
15.   
322   See s 922 of the Dodd-Frank Act which enacted s 21F to repeal and replace s 21A(e) of the Securities 
Exchange Act; see further  Morrison & Foerster 2010 Year End Review 12-14.  
323   Dooley “Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions” 1980 Virginia Law Review 1 60-83; Carlton & 
Fischel “The Regulation of Insider Trading” 1983 Stanford Law Review 857 500-895 & Bainbridge 
Corporation Law and Economics (2002) 571-573.  
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Securities and Exchange Commission each year and to obtain enforcement actions and/or 
settlements consistently in a number of market abuse cases as indicated in the table 1 
below.324  
 
Table 1: Overview of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission’s annual anti-
market abuse enforcement statistics from 2001 to 2010. 
 
 
 
Adapted from the United States Securities and Exchange Commission website.325 
 
In order to combat cross-border market abuse activities, the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission entered into non-binding co-operative agreements (Memoranda of 
Understanding) with similar foreign securities regulatory bodies.  These Memoranda of 
Understanding permit the United States Securities and Exchange Commission to request such 
foreign regulators to investigate and provide it with certain information in circumstances in 
324   Notably, this table was adapted from the United States Securities and Exchange Commission website 
<http://www.sec.gov/about/secstats2010.pdf> (accessed 30-11-2011).   Over and above, the aforesaid 
consistent enforcement of the market abuse prohibition is supported, in part, by the fact that the United 
States Securities and Exchange Commission has established eighteen offices and eleven of these offices 
are regional and district offices throughout the United States of America with approximately 3100 
competent staff.    Over half of the estimated 3100 United States Securities and Exchange Commission 
employees are in the Enforcement Division.   This suggests that the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission gives top priority to the effective enforcement of securities laws and combating of 
market abuse practices.     As a result a significant number of settlements and prosecutions have to date 
been obtained in some landmark market abuse cases like SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur Company 833; Dirks 
v SEC 646-655; Chiarella v United States  222; US v Martha Stewart and Peter Bacanovic (2006) 433 
F3d 273; SEC v Galleon Management & others (2009) 09 Civ 8811(SDNY); SEC v Arthur J Cutillo & 
others (2009) 09 Civ 9208 (SDNY) & SEC v Anthony Fareri & others (2009) 09 Civ 80360 (SDFla); 
generally see further related analysis and/or discussion of the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s enforcement statistics as summarised in Morgan Lewis 2010 2-4 & 7-13 
<http://www.morganlewis.com/lit_SECandYearlyReviewWP_Jan2010.pdf> (accessed 10-06-2011).   
325    <http://www.sec.gov/about/secstats2010.pdf> (accessed 30-11-2011). 
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which the United States Securities and Exchange Commission will not be able to do so 
itself.326  
 
Likewise, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission can also aid other foreign 
regulators’ investigations even when no United States of America legislation would have been 
violated by the occurrence of the illicit conduct in question in the United States of America’s 
financial markets.327  The United States Securities and Exchange Commission may further 
sanction market participants who engage in activities that are deemed illegal in other 
countries, even if such activities are not illegal or deemed manipulative, misleading or 
deceptive in the United States of America.328  Additionally, the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission’s international co-operation and extra-territorial enforcement powers 
are enhanced by the fact that it is a member of the International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions.329 
 
As indicated above, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission has been very 
instrumental in the enforcement of the market abuse ban in the United States of America.   
For instance, apart from being tasked with the responsibility to enforce the civil and 
administrative sanctions, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission supervises 
other participants in the securities industry and the self-regulatory organisations.  This enabled 
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission to score a number of victories in the 
civil enforcement of market abuse in the United States of America to date.330   Moreover, the 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission recently tightened and improved its 
326   This co-operative enforcement at an international level has allowed the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission to track down illicit trading and market abuse practices like offshore insider 
trading, secret and manipulative bank accounts in other foreign jurisdictions.    See Palmiter Securities 
Regulation: Examples and Explanations 501-502.            
327    S 21(a)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act.  
328   See generally the International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act of 1990; s 15(b)(4)(G) of the 
Securities Exchange Act.     Also see Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations 502. 
329   The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) was founded in 1974 and is an 
organisation which provides guidelines on various aspects of securities enforcement and regulation to its 
more than 170 members.   The United States Securities and Exchange Commission’s IOSCO membership 
has equipped it to investigate and combat Internet-based fraud, insider trading, market manipulation and 
other illicit cross-border market abuse practices.   See Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and 
Explanations 502.         
330  The United States Securities and Exchange Commission recovered civil penalties and disgorgement fines 
of about $3.3 billion from the market abuse offenders in 2006.   During the period between 2002 and 
2005, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission recovered total monetary sanctions in civil 
cases for market abuse ranging from approximately $5.3 billion to $11.5 billion.    Coffee “Law and the 
Market: The Impact of Enforcement” 2007 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 229 230-311.  
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enforcement in the aftermath of the World Com, Enron and other related market abuse cases.   
For example, it imposed a civil monetary fine of $2, 25 billion on World Com in 2005 for the 
misuse of inside information and other related securities law violations, like corporate 
financial fraud.331 The United States Securities and Exchange Commission further imposed 
civil monetary fines of $250 million on Qwest Communications, $100 million on the Royal 
Dutch/Shell company and $100 million in the Bristol-Myers Squibb case for insider trading 
and other related securities law violations like financial misrepresentation.332  The United 
States Securities and Exchange Commission further imposed 987 administrative sanctions 
(cease or desist orders, censures and suspension orders) against market abuse offenders during 
the period between 1978 and 2004.333   The United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission has also successfully and consistently managed to bring several enforcement 
actions against the insider trading offenders during the period between 2004 and 2010 as 
evidenced in figure 1 below.334 
 
Figure 1: Overview of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission’s annual 
insider trading enforcement statistics from 2004 to 2010.  
 
Adapted from the United States Securities and Exchange Commission website.335  
331   In re World Com Inc Sec. Litig (2005) 388 F Supp 2d 319 322-335 (SDNY), where the total settlement 
amount for market abuse and other related securities law violations was approximately $6 133 000  000 
plus interest. See further Coffee 2007 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 230-311.  
332    Coffee 2007 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 230-311. 
333   As earlier stated, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission has, on a number of instances, 
relied on its MOUs and help from fellow IOSCO member countries to track and impose appropriate 
sanctions against market abuse offenders in the United States of America and other jurisdictions.     See 
Coffee 2007 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 230-311 & Karpoff, Lee & Martin “The Legal 
Penalties for Financial Misrepresentation” (2007) <http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=933333> (accessed 28-
09-2009).   
334    Figure 1 was adapted from <http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/insidertrading.shtml> (accessed 30-11-2011). 
335  <http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/insidertrading.shtml> (accessed 30-11-2011); notably, figure 1 indicates a 
relatively high number of insider trading enforcement actions that were successfully and consistently 
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5 4 2  The Role of the Department of Justice and the Courts     
 
The Department of Justice or the federal courts have the prerogative to enforce the criminal 
sanctions for market abuse in the United States of America.336  Notably, the Department of 
Justice may only prosecute any criminal cases for market abuse referred to it by the United 
States Securities and Exchange Commission.337  
 
In spite of this referral procedure, the Department of Justice and the federal courts play a very 
important role in the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in the United States of 
America.   This is supported in part by the current rigorous enforcement and prosecution of 
such practices in the United States of America’s competent courts.   In other words, the 
significant number of reported cases indicates that such courts are effectively enforcing the 
market abuse prohibition in the United States of America.  For example, in the Drexel 
Burnham Lambert scandal of 1990, Kimba Wood J sentenced Michael Milken to ten years 
imprisonment or a criminal fine of $200 million and ordered him to pay a $400 million civil 
disgorgement of profits fine.   Dennis Levine was sentenced to two years in prison, or a fine 
of $11, 5 million while Ivan F. Boesky was sentenced to three years imprisonment, or a fine 
of $50 million.  Milken eventually paid the criminal fine of $200 million and $400 million 
civil disgorgement profits fine.   Dennis Levine paid the $11, 5 million civil disgorgement of 
profits fine and Ivan F. Boesky later paid the $50 million civil disgorgement fine and an 
additional $50 million civil penalty.338  
 
In US v O’Hagan339 the accused person’s plea of not guilty to insider trading charges was 
rejected and it was held that the breach of a fiduciary duty by corporate insiders could further 
instituted against the offenders each year, from 2004 to 2010.    Also see Fons & Rowe “The SEC Speaks: 
Aggressive Enforcement to Intensify in 2011” Morrison & Foerster Client Alert 09 February 2011 1-5 & 
Morgan Lewis 2010 7-13 <http://www.morganlewis.com/lit_SECandYearlyReviewWP_Jan2010.pdf> 
(accessed 10-06-2011).  
336   Put differently, the Department of Justice oversees the enforcement of the criminal sanctions for market 
abuse by the competent federal courts.    Such competent courts include the United States of America’s 
federal district courts, High courts and Supreme courts.    Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and 
Explanations 370.             
337  This implies that the Department of Justice may only institute criminal proceedings against any person 
who knowingly engages in market abuse practices on a referral basis.   See further s 32(a) of the 
Securities Exchange Act.   
338   Tomasic “Insider Trading in the USA and United Kingdom” 1991 Australian Studies in Law, Crime and 
Justice Series 31 35-39.  
339   (1997) 521 US 642, O’Hagan was convicted on all counts of fraud, securities violation and money 
laundering and sentenced to prison.    Nonetheless, this conviction was later reversed by the Supreme 
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involve the breach of a duty of trust and confidence on the part of such insiders or other 
shareholders of a corporation whose securities are traded.   Moreover, in The Trane Company 
v O’Connor Securities340 it was held that market manipulation should be discouraged and 
prohibited to promote open and free markets which allow natural forces of supply and 
demand to determine the prices of securities.  This was also echoed in United States v 
Brown,341 which postulated that market manipulation negatively affects the price of listed 
securities and, in so doing, it misleads and prejudices outside investors.   
 
The successful prosecution of market abuse practices involving World Com, Martha Stewart, 
Tyco, Parmalat and Enron cases is further testimony of the effectiveness and competence of 
the United States of America’s federal courts.342   For example, the former Enron Executives, 
Jeffrey Skilling and Ken Lay, were convicted for insider trading and other market abuse 
violations.   On 26 May 2006 Ken Lay was convicted on six counts of conspiracy and fraud 
and sentenced to 45 years in prison while Jeffrey Skilling was found guilty on 19 counts of 
conspiracy, fraud, making false statements and insider trading and sentenced to 185 years in 
prison.343  On 23 October 2006, Skilling was criminally convicted on further counts of insider 
trading and sentenced to an additional imprisonment term of 25 years.  The effectiveness of 
these courts has been made possible, in part, by the necessary governmental support and the 
availability resources, as well as the fact that competent personnel were allocated to them.344     
 
As highlighted above, the Department of Justice and the competent courts play a major role in 
enforcing the market abuse ban in the United States of America.345   Federal courts have to 
date managed to radically and rigorously prosecute a number of cases involving market abuse 
Court on the basis that misappropriation did not violate Rule 10b-5; see further Palmiter Securities 
Regulation: Examples and Explanations 361-362.        
340   (1983) 561 F Supp 301 (SDNY) 304.    See further Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 37.      
341   (1933) 5 F Supp 81 (SDNY) 85; 325.   It was further held that the use of “wash sales” should be 
discouraged because it usually involves the publication of information regarding the buyer and the seller’s 
securities transactions (share prices) which would be deceptive, false or misleading.    See further Santa 
Fe Industries Inc v Green (1977) 430 US 462 476. 
342    Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 171; 210. 
343   See the judgement of the United States District Court SD Texas Houston Division in the case of in re 
Enron Corporation Securities Derivative and “ERISA”Litigation Plaintiffs v Enron Corp Oregon 
Corporation Defendants (2006) WL 2795321 (SD Tex).     
344   The federal courts have also successfully prosecuted market manipulation practices.    See US v Milken 
(1990) 759 F Supp 109 (SDNY); US v Mulheren (1991) 938 F2d 364 (2nd Cir). 
345    Also see paragraph 5 5 1.     
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practices like insider trading and market manipulation.346  The courts have further imposed 
about 2262 permanent injunctions against individuals and another 321 injunctions against 
companies (juristic persons) between the years 1978 and 2004.347  About 574 executive 
persons were barred from working as officers and directors of public corporations and 415 
were barred from serving as financial professionals by both the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission and the courts during the same period.348  Furthermore, about 755 
individuals and 40 companies were indicated, 543 of the individuals were convicted and only 
ten were acquitted.    In the same vein, the Department of Justice formed the Corporate Fraud 
Task Force and consequently, a number of market abuse activities have been successfully 
detected and prosecuted to date.349   In light of this, one can conclude that the United States of 
America has so far been fairly successful in combating market abuse and other illicit 
practices.  Nonetheless, there is no empirical evidence that explicitly indicates that market 
abuse activities have either been significantly reduced or completely eradicated in the United 
States of America’s financial markets as a result of deterrence and/or effective 
enforcement.350 
 
5 4 3  The Role of Other Selected Self-Regulatory Organisations 
 
Although individual persons are entitled to claim their damages directly from the offenders in 
private litigation, the self-regulatory organisations have to date played a key role in the civil 
enforcement of the market abuse prohibition and speedy provision of appropriate remedies to 
all the affected persons in the United States of America.   
 
346   This is evidenced in part, by the successful criminal prosecution of the World Com case, where the 
Department of Justice recovered a criminal fine of $27 million and prosecuted its CEO (Bernard Ebbers), 
its CFO (Scott Sullivan) and four others, resulting in combined in imprisonment terms of 32.4 years and 
$49.2 million in restitution.     
347    Coffee 2007 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 230-311. 
348    Coffee 2007 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 230-311.       
349   The Corporate Fraud Task Force was formed in 2002 and since its inception over 1300 persons have been 
charged with insider trading, fraud or other related market abuse activities and about1000 were convicted.  
Coffee 2007 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 230-311; also see related comments and analysis 
contained in the press release by the Department of Justice “US Department of Justice, Fact Sheet: 
Corporate Fraud Task Force” (2006) <http://www.usdoj.gov.opa/pr/2006/August/06_odag_525.html> 
(accessed 12-09-2009).      
350    Coffee 2007 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 230-311.  
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As stated earlier,351 the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, through its 
Market Regulation Division, has a broad Congressional mandate to oversee the day-to-day 
regulation of securities market participants by the self-regulatory organisations like the New 
York Stock Exchange, the National Association of Securities Dealers, the Municipal 
Securities Rule Making Board and other broker-dealer companies and investment houses.352  
Therefore, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission inspects the self-regulatory 
organisations and performs targeted oversight examinations of their broker-dealer members to 
determine whether such self-regulatory organisations are effectively supervising the financial 
regulations and business practices of their members.353 
 
The National Association of Securities Dealers administers the registration of new issuers of 
securities and has the authority to promulgate rules governing voluntary membership of 
broker-dealers in over the counter markets such as the National Association of Securities 
Dealers Automated Quotation System.354  In order to improve the enforcement of securities 
laws and to curb market abuse activity among its members, the National Association of 
Securities Dealers divided itself into two subsidiaries, namely the National Association of 
Securities Dealers Regulation Inc355 and the National Association of Securities Dealers 
Automated Quotation System Public Market Inc.356  Each of these subsidiaries has its own 
independent board of directors.357  The National Association of Securities Dealers has further 
authority to make rules aimed at preventing market abuse activities by market participants like 
research and financial market analysts.358 
 
351    See paragraph 5 4 1 above. 
352    Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations 31; Hazen Federal Securities Law 5-9.        
353   In other words, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission may approve or amend the rules 
of the self-regulatory organisations in accordance with the public interest and/or to enhance the 
combating of illicit market abuse activities like insider trading, market manipulation and the deceptive or 
misleading filing with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, of any statements, 
documents or accounts.    Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations 433-434 & 439.             
354  S 15(b)(8) read with s 15A of the Securities Exchange Act (as amended).  Also see Palmiter Securities 
Regulation: Examples and Explanations 404.                
355   The National Association of Securities Dealers Regulation Inc oversees the regulatory functions of the 
National Association of Securities Dealers.   
356   Likewise, the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation System Public Market Inc 
runs the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation System.  
357   See Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations 404; Lastra “The Governance Structure 
for Financial Regulation and Supervision in Europe” 2003 Colum J Eur L 49 53.  
358   National Association of Securities Dealers Rule 2711.   Also see Palmiter Securities Regulation: 
Examples and Explanations 414.                 
240 
                                               
Moreover, the New York Stock Exchange is the largest securities exchange in the United 
States of America responsible for monitoring the public trading of listed securities to 
minimise the occurrence of potential market abuse practices in the United States of America’s 
financial markets.  This is done by operating special computerised devices and surveillance 
systems to detect and prevent market abuse practices.  The New York Stock Exchange is 
further empowered to make rules or to take other action reasonably necessary to discourage 
market abuse activities in the United States of America’s financial markets.359  
 
The New York Stock Exchange and the National Association of Securities Dealers merged to 
form the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority in 2007.360  In 2009, the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority created the Office of Fraud Detection and Market Intelligence, the 
Office of the Whistle-blower, the Office of Disciplinary Affairs and the Central Review 
Group for the speedy investigation of any suspected violations and to review tips from 
whistle-blowers in order to root out fraud, insider trading, market manipulation and other 
related market abuse practices in the United States of America’s financial markets.361 
 
The Municipal Securities Rule Making Board was established in 1975 to supervise the 
companies involved in the underwriting and trading of municipal securities.  Although its 
rules are usually monitored and enforced by the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission, the Municipal Securities Rule Making Board is authorised to make its own 
additional market abuse enforcement rules and to impose any appropriate action against the 
securities laws (including State Blue Sky Laws) and market abuse violators.362  
 
As highlighted above, it is clear that the self-regulatory organisations have contributed 
immensely towards the effective enforcement of securities laws to curb market abuse and 
other illicit trading practices in the United States of America.  In addition to the self-
359   New York Stock Exchange Rule 472.   Also see Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and 
Explanations 414; 492.  
360  Morgan Lewis 2010 4-6 & 65-68 
<http://www.morganlewis.com/lit_SECandYearlyReviewWP_Jan2010.pdf> (accessed 10-06-2011).  
361   Accordingly, about 1103 enforcement actions were successfully instituted against the offenders; 20 
companies were expelled; 363 individuals were suspended and several monetary fines were recovered by 
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority in over 73 cases during the period between 2008 and 2009.    
See further Morgan Lewis 2010 4-6 & 65-69 
<http://www.morganlewis.com/lit_SECandYearlyReviewWP_Jan2010.pdf> (accessed 10-06-2011); see 
further the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority “2008 Year in Review and Annual Financial Report” 
(2008) 9 <http://www.finra.org> (accessed 02 December 2011). 
362    Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations 34-35. 
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regulatory organisations, there are currently more than ten federal, state and industry 
regulatory bodies in the United States of America.   This suggests that there is good 
competition among the regulators to regulate certain securities products and the industry 
effectively and efficiently.363  Accordingly, self-regulatory organisations like the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission, the National Association of Securities Dealers, the New York 
Stock Exchange and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority may impose their own civil 
or administrative penalties against any person who violates the federal securities laws by 
engaging in market abuse and other illegal activities.364  This allows the United States of 
America’s market abuse regime to bring multiple enforcement actions against the offenders in 
all its financial markets.365   
 
5 5  Co-operation between Enforcement Authorities and the Adoption of Adequate 
Preventative Measures     
5 5 1  Co-operation between the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, 
Department of Justice and the Courts 
 
The success and effectiveness of the United States of America’s market abuse regime has 
been attributed to a number of factors including inter alia the excellent co-operative 
enforcement effort of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Department of 
Justice and the courts.   As earlier discussed,366 the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission and the Department of Justice are mainly responsible for the civil and criminal 
enforcement of the market abuse prohibition respectively.367  The Department of Justice may 
prosecute all criminal cases of market abuse referred to it by the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission.  This prima facie indicates that there is some co-operation between 
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission and the Department of Justice.    The 
363   This multi-functional regulatory approach has to date resulted in far greater market abuse enforcement in 
the United States of America. 
364    Paragraph 5 5 2 above; also see Coffee 2007 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 230-311. 
365   In relation to this, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission has to date managed to impose a variety 
of sanctions on the perpetrators of commodities-based market abuse practices in the United States of 
America.  See the Commodity Futures Trading Commission “About the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission” (2006) <http://www.cftc.gov/cftcabout.htm> (accessed 07-10-2009); also see paragraphs 5 
3 4; 5 3 4 1; 5 3 5 & 5 3 6 above.  Also see the United States Securities and Exchange Commission “SEC, 
2006 Performance and Accountability” (2006) Report 8 
<http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2006.pdf> (accessed 21-10-2009) & United States Securities 
and Exchange Commission “SEC, 2005 Performance and Accountability” (2005) Report 7 
<http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2005.pdf> (accessed 21-10-2009).        
366    Paragraph 5 4 2 above. 
367  The Department of Justice and/or the relevant courts are further required to prosecute any criminal cases 
involving market abuse in private litigation. 
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competent courts in the United States of America have, in most instances and on the advice of 
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, successfully instituted criminal 
proceedings against the persons accused of committing market abuse offences.368 
 
The Department of Justice revised its rules of engagement for pursuing suspected securities 
law offenders in 2003 and its focus was now mainly on improving the skills and expertise of 
prosecutors and other officials of the courts, especially with regard to the combating of 
corporate crimes such as market abuse.   Furthermore, the Department of Justice revised its 
co-operation-credit policies to enhance co-operation with the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission and to guide its members of staff on how to investigate, charge or 
prosecute securities law violations and market abuse cases referred to it by the United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission.369  The United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission further released its enforcement manual in 2008370 which, inter alia, seeks to 
increase the investigations and prosecutions of market abuse cases by both the Department of 
Justice and the United States Securities and Exchange Commission.  This eventually 
improved the sharing of information between the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission and the Department of Justice as well as the parallel enforcement of the market 
abuse prohibition in the United States of America.371 
 
Although the Department of Justice has the exclusive authority over the criminal enforcement 
of the federal securities laws, it often acts with the guidance and assistance from the United 
States Securities and Exchange Commission.  In relation to this, the United States Securities 
and Exchange Commission’s staff members are sometimes assigned to the Department of 
Justice or the courts to facilitate and help in the preparation of market abuse or other corporate 
criminal cases for trial.372 
368     Paragraph 5 4 2 above. 
369    Prior to this, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission released the so-called Seaboard 
Report in 2001 in order to inter alia improve the disclosure of information regarding the results of any 
investigation carried by itself or by the Department of Justice. Saikin “SEC, DOJ Clarify Cooperation” 
<http://www.executivelegaladvisor.com/docs/SEC-DOJ-Clarify-Cooperation.htm> (accessed 28-09-
2009). 
370    This is commonly referred to as “The Red Book”. 
371   Nevertheless, this co-operative relationship does not allow either the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission or the Department of Justice to circumvent the enforcement actions employed by 
other regulatory bodies like the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. 
372   This clearly shows that the United States Securities and Exchange Commission and the Department of 
Justice have a good co-operative relationship towards the curbing and prevention of all possible federal 
securities law violations in the United States of America.    As a result the United States of America has 
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5 5 2  Co-operation between the United States Securities and Exchange Commission 
and Self-Regulatory Organisations  
 
In order to curb illicit trading practices, the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission has entered into several co-operative relationships with similar enforcement 
bodies both at a local and international level.373  As stated earlier,374 the United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission supervises the regulation and enforcement of securities 
laws by the self-regulatory organisations in the United States of America.  The United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission has authority to approve, amend or revoke any rule or 
enforcement action imposed by the self-regulatory organisations.  This could indicate that the 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission and the self-regulatory organisations have 
some co-operative relationship which focuses mainly on the enforcement of the federal 
securities laws to combat market abuse and other related illicit activities. 
 
The United States Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission have both entered into a co-operative agreement with the futures and securities 
self-regulatory organisations regarding the joint in-field examinations and sharing of relevant 
information in a bid to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of securities law enforcement 
in the United States of America.   This agreement provides, on a voluntary basis, the 
opportunity for the United States Securities and Exchange Commission and the self-
regulatory organisations to review each other’s work papers and to share and exchange certain 
work papers or final investigation reports on any suspected market abuse and/or securities law 
violations.    Likewise, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission and the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission have both proposed to operate a Joint Advisory 
Committee, a Joint Agency Enforcement Task Force, a Joint Information Technology Task 
Force and a joint cross-agency training programme for their staff members.375  This is aimed 
at increasing the sharing of relevant information and/or market surveillance data to enhance 
been fairly successful in investigating and prosecuting several securities law violations and market abuse 
cases to date. 
373   Hopt & Wymeersch (eds) European Insider Dealing–Law and Practice (1991) 340-361. 
374   Paragraph 5 4 3 above. 
375   The Commodity Futures Trading Commission & the United States Securities and Exchange Commission 
Report 16 October 2009 10-11 & 14-15.   
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enforcement and market oversight by developing solutions to emerging and ongoing 
regulatory risks in the futures and securities markets.376 
 
Furthermore, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission has forged a co-
operation agreement with the Intermarket Financial Surveillance Group377 to enhance and 
expand co-operation among all the self-regulatory organisations and the United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission in order to combat market abuse in both securities and 
futures markets.  This co-operative agreement has to date increased the financial surveillance 
and investigation of illicit trading activities by the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission, self-regulatory organisations and other regulatory agencies in the United States 
of America and abroad. 
 
As indicated earlier,378 the United States Securities and Exchange Commission is a member 
of the International Organisation of Securities Commissions and has further adopted and 
signed international co-operative agreements (Memoranda of Understanding) with regulators 
and self-regulatory organisations in various foreign countries to discourage and combat illegal 
cross-border securities violations.379   The United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission has also entered into approximately 20 bilateral enforcement Memoranda of 
Understanding with countries in other jurisdictions to enhance its ability to gather the relevant 
foreign-based information necessary to any ongoing investigation or prosecution regarding 
securities law violations.380  Although these Memoranda of Understanding are non-binding 
376   The Commodity Futures Trading Commission & the United States Securities and Exchange Commission 
Report 16 October 2009 10-11 & 14-15.   
377   The Intermarket Financial Surveillance Group (IFSG) was formed in 1987 as an independent body 
comprising the self-regulatory organisations of the United States of America’s securities and commodities 
exchanges. 
378    Paragraph 5 4 1 above. 
379   The countries include the United Kingdom, Japan, Italy, Brazil, Switzerland, Netherlands, France, 
Mexico and Canada.     Hopt & Wymeersch European Insider Dealing–Law and Practice 354. 
380  These bilateral Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) are largely used by the United States Securities 
and Exchange Commission to share bank or audit work papers, Internet service provider information, 
brokerage records, beneficial ownership records and other relevant information regarding the 
investigation and enforcement of illicit securities law violations.   See s 24(d) read with subsection (f) of 
the Securities Exchange Act which allows the United States Securities and Exchange Commission to keep 
confidential any information it obtains from similar foreign regulatory bodies or self-regulatory 
organisations.  Furthermore, the International Organisation of Securities Commissions Multilateral MOU 
permits the United States Securities and Exchange Commission to share with other regulatory bodies 
elsewhere specific information relating to an ongoing civil, administrative or criminal investigation of 
cross-border market abuse cases.   This implies that the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission may rely on other foreign regulatory bodies to investigate any suspected cross-border 
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statements of intent between like-minded regulators, the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission has fairly managed to utilise them to track and combat market abuse 
practices which are perpetrated in other countries.381 
 
5 5 3  Adoption and Establishment of a Good Enforcement Ethics Culture 
 
As several other countries, the United States of America has made numerous efforts to 
develop a strong anti-market abuse culture among the relevant persons in all its securities and 
financial markets.  Various methods like the use of civil, criminal and administrative 
sanctions have been employed to discourage market abuse practices in the United States of 
America.382 
 
Apart from relying on appropriate sanctions as earlier discussed, the United States of America  
employs other methods like incentives and bounty rewards to encourage all persons to report 
any suspected illicit trading practices to the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission or other relevant enforcement agencies.383  Furthermore, in the wake of the 
Enron scandal, the United States of America introduced more incentives and whistle-blower 
immunity provisions to enable all persons with information regarding securities market 
manipulation, insider trading or other market abuse practices to register such information with 
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission without any fear of reprisals or 
victimisation.384 
 
securities law contraventions and to assist it where necessary with information which could be used in a 
criminal prosecution.   See Hopt & Wymeersch European Insider Dealing–Law and Practice 351. 
381   See for example SEC v Levine 3276, where the United States Securities and Exchange Commission 
managed to track Levine’s insider trading activities involving securities of about 54 companies and other 
illicit trading in securities relating to secret accounts and in the names of Panamanian corporations located 
in the Bahamian branch of Bank Leu International Limited.   The United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission was, through the help of other foreign regulators, able to detect and identify Levine as the 
beneficial owner of these accounts and he was consequently charged with insider trading.     See further 
SEC v Kerherve (1988) No 88 Civ 0227 (SDNY); Hopt & Wymeersch European Insider Dealing–Law 
and Practice 348-351. 
382    Paragraphs 5 3 5 & 5 3 6 above. 
383   As earlier highlighted, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission may pay bounty rewards 
of up to 30% of the civil compensatory penalties recovered to all bona-fide informants.    See s 21F of the 
Securities Exchange Act; also see paragraph 5 3 1 above & Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and 
Explanations 370.  
384   S 21F of the Securities Exchange Act; s 922 of the Dodd-Frank Act & s 806 & s 406 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act which requires all issuers of securities and companies to disclose their code of ethics to detect 
reporting violations and to ensure compliance and fairness in the United States of America’s securities 
markets. Also see Mossos 2004 Currents International Trade Law Journal 9-11. 
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The United States of America also tightened and improved its corporate governance laws 
through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act385 to discourage and avoid a recurrence of the Enron, World 
Com and Arthur Andersen cases.386  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, for instance, prohibits a public 
company to give a personal loan directly or indirectly to a director or an executive officer of 
that company in order to discourage fraud and insider trading.387  In addition, this Act 
provides some guidelines on the supervision of the relationship between issuers and auditors 
to prevent market abuse practices.388 Moreover, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act introduced the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board to supervise the activities of the accounting profession 
in order to combat fraud and other market abuse practices.   
 
Moreover, the United States of America’s market abuse regime is based on the so-called 
multi-functional regulatory model.  This multi-functional regulatory model entails that the 
federal securities law enforcement and regulatory authority does not rest on the United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission alone.389  Thus, apart from the United States Securities 
and Exchange Commission, other self-regulatory organisations also have the authority to 
make their own rules and to enforce the federal securities laws.390   As a result, the United 
States of America has so far been able to investigate and prosecute a number of market abuse 
cases.391  
  
In addition to the enforcement by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, the 
Department of Justice or the self-regulatory organisations, the United States of America’s 
market abuse regime allows the prejudiced persons to bring the so-called class actions and 
claim their damages directly from the offenders in private litigation.  This parallel 
385  This Act requires all companies registered with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission to 
comply with its anti-market abuse provisions.    See s 406(c) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
386   Mossos 2004 Currents International Trade Law Journal 9-11; also see Palmiter Securities Regulation: 
Examples and Explanations 390-392. 
387    S 402(a) read with s 306(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
388   The Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires all the United States Securities and Exchange Commission filings to 
provide accurate and detailed financial information.   See s 302 & s 201 to s 209.    The Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act further requires all companies to develop their own standards or measures (code of ethics) that are 
designed to deter all persons from engaging in illicit trading activities.    See s 406 & s 407.   
389   It comprises other enforcement agencies like the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Department 
of Justice, Federal Reserve Board and other self-regulatory organisations.   See paragraphs 5 4 1; 5 5 1 & 
5 5 2 above.  
390    This has been so crucial to the effectiveness of the United States of America’s anti-market abuse laws in 
that the United States Securities and Exchange Commission as well as other regulatory bodies may take 
any appropriate enforcement action against the market abuse offenders.  
391    Paragraphs 5 4 1; 5 5 1 & 5 5 2 above.   
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enforcement permits the imposition of multiple sanctions (civil, criminal or administrative 
penalties) on a certain defendant in a private litigation or in the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission and/or the Department of Justice enforcement action.392  It is worth 
noting that during the period between 2004 and 2005, the civil monetary penalties awarded in 
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement actions and private class 
actions of the affected persons ranged from about $5, 3 billion to $11, 5 billion.393  In many 
instances, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission’s enforcement actions were 
accompanied by a private class action.  For example, in the World Com scandal, a parallel 
private settlement was approximately $6, 2 billion.  Furthermore, in 2005 alone, private class 
actions for market abuse violations produced settlements between $3, 5 billion and $9, 7 
billion.394 
 
5 6  Concluding Remarks 
 
The impropriety of market abuse in the United States of America is generally accepted by the 
public, judiciary, market participants and all the relevant stakeholders in that country both at a 
State and federal level.395 This is supported, in part, by the fact that the regulation and 
enforcement of market abuse is a co-operative effort involving the United States Securities 
and Exchange Commission, private litigants, self-regulatory organisations, the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission and the Department of Justice at a federal level396 as well as the 
relevant financial or corporation departments at the states level.397  
 
392   See SEC v Palmisiano (1998) 135 F3d 860 (2d Cir) the court held that the offender was guilty of 
defrauding clients in a false investment scheme and sentenced him to fifteen years in jail and to pay $3, 8 
million restitution to the actual prejudiced persons (in private litigation) plus $700 000 criminal fines.   
The same offender was also liable to disgorge profits of $9, 2 million plus interest and to pay a $500 000 
civil penalty to the United States Securities and Exchange Commission.  See further Palmiter Securities 
Regulation: Examples and Explanations 440-441; 459-461.   
393    Coffee 2007 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 230-311. 
394    Coffee 2007 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 230-311. 
395   See the discussion under paragraphs (including sub-paragraphs) 5 2; 5 3; 5 4 & 5 5 above; also see 
Steinberg 2003 The International Lawyer 169-171.  
396   In other words, the prevalent attitudes in the United States of America favour a rigorous enforcement of 
the market abuse prohibition.   Paragraphs (including sub-paragraphs) 5 4 1; 5 4 2; 5 4 3 & 5 5 above; 
SEC v Sargent (2000) 229 F 3d 68-75 (1st Cir) which display the determination of the judiciary in 
enforcing insider trading provisions by upholding convictions based on circumstantial evidence.    See s 
32(a) of the Securities Exchange Act.   Also see Bergmans Inside Information and Securities Trading: A 
Legal and Economic Analysis of the Foundations of Liability in the US and the European Community 
(1991) 41-60. 
397    See the discussion under paragraphs (including sub-paragraphs) 5 2 above. 
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As earlier discussed, it is clear that both the United States of America and the South African 
market abuse regimes maintain similar enforcement goals and missions.398   In spite of this, 
they adopt and implement very different approaches to achieve their enforcement goals or 
targets. Notably, the most important characteristic of the regulatory framework in the United 
States of America,399 namely a co-ordinated (joint) effort between the courts, self-regulatory 
organisations and the United States Securities and Exchange Commission to combat illicit 
practices like insider trading is relatively minimal or absent in South Africa due to the 
differences in relation to the financial markets sizes and enforcement approaches.400  Put 
differently, the United States of America’s anti-market abuse enforcement framework 
employs the multi-functional regulatory approach which offers competition among the 
regulatory authorities at a federal level401 as well as the relevant financial or corporation 
departments at a state level,402 but nevertheless resulting in far greater and effective 
enforcement.   Moreover, the United States of America’s anti-market abuse enforcement 
framework provides the much needed resources, competent personnel in the courts and the 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission as well as better technological 
surveillance mechanisms to detect illicit trading practices.403 On the other hand, the South 
African market abuse regime relies mainly on the Financial Services Board to police and 
enforce the market abuse ban.  This approach has so far not been able to achieve more 
settlements and prosecutions in cases involving market abuse in South Africa.404 
 
Although the South African market abuse legislation was relatively influenced by the 
corresponding legislation in the United States of America, it sometimes lacks a rigorous 
practical enforcement approach and infrastructure to combat insider trading and other related 
398   Generally see paragraphs 5 3 1; 5 3 4; & 5 3 4 1above; also see paragraphs under 5 2 above & relevant 
comparative analysis in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
399    See paragraphs 5 4 1; 5 5 1 & 5 5 2 above; also see paragraphs 5 3 1 & 5 3 4 above. 
400   See the discussions that will be assumed later in Chapter Nine of this thesis, highlighting that there is 
little or no co-operation between the courts and the Financial Services Board (FSB) and very few 
successful prosecutions or civil claims that have been obtained, especially in the courts.  
401    See paragraphs under 5 3 above. 
402    See paragraphs under 5 2 above. 
403   This enhanced and contributed significantly to the success achieved by the United States of America in 
the enforcement of the market abuse laws as indicated by a considerable number of cases that were 
reported and successfully settled or prosecuted to date.    See further SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur Company 
833; Dirks v SEC 646-655; United States v O’Hagan 2199; United States v Falcone 91 489 & SEC v Yun 
1263; SEC v One or more purchasers of call options for the Common Stock of CNS INC (2006) US 
District Court 3004875 WL (EDPa) & Dolgopolov “Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread: A Critical 
Evaluation of Adverse Selection in Market Making” 2004 Capital University Law Review 83 84.   
404   Paragraphs 3 2 1 & 4 2 in Chapters Three & Four of this thesis & relevant comparative analysis in 
Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
249 
                                               
activities.    This could be evidenced in part, by many delays in investigations, settlements and 
the inherent paucity of successful criminal prosecutions obtained in market abuse cases in 
South Africa to date.405  While the adoption of some principles from the United States of 
America’s anti-market abuse enforcement framework shows a significant effort by the 
legislature to provide an adequate market abuse proscription in South Africa, deficiencies 
such as the inconsistent application of the market abuse provisions and the use of few 
enforcement measures have directly impeded these efforts.406  
 
It was submitted that the South African legislature should not have blindly adopted some of 
the United States of America’s market abuse regulatory principles without proper measures in 
place to enforce them.407 Notably, the current South African market abuse legislation does not 
explicitly empower the Financial Services Board to operate its own separate and specific 
technological surveillance machinery in order to supplement the significant surveillance 
efforts of the JSE.   Moreover, the Financial Services Board is still to employ sufficient 
measures for the training of competent personnel and educational awareness programmes in 
order to prevent market abuse practices in the South African financial markets.408   
Furthermore, it was noted that unlike the position in the United States of America,409 most of 
the market abuse rules that could be made by the Financial Services Board are only limited to 
the general manner in which its administrative powers and roles should be conducted.410 
 
On the other hand, in California, it was noted that when the Commissioner of Corporations 
receives some leads from the Internet Compliance and Enforcement Team’s surveillance, junk 
mail and public complaints, and referrals from other enforcement bodies, he may impose 
damages or other applicable remedies against the offenders.411  It was further acknowledged 
that California has managed to develop a relatively consistent anti-market abuse enforcement 
405   See paragraphs 4 2; 4 4 3; 4 4 4 & other related remarks in Chapter Four of this thesis; also see relevant 
comparative analysis in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
406   See paragraphs 4 2; 4 4 3; 4 4 4 & other related remarks in Chapter Four of this thesis; also see relevant 
comparative analysis in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
407   See relevant comparative analysis in Chapter Nine of this thesis.  
408   See paragraphs 4 2 & 4 5 in Chapter Four of this thesis; also see relevant comparative analysis in Chapter 
Nine of this thesis.  
409   See paragraph 5 4 1 above. 
410   S 82(2)(g) of the Securities Services Act; clause 91(2)(f) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 86(2)(f) 
of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.  See further paragraphs 3 2 1 & 4 2 in Chapters Three & Four of this 
thesis respectively.   
411    See paragraphs 5 2 3 & 5 2 4 above.       
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framework that effectively discourages a number of market abuse practices (including 
franchise-related, capital markets-related as well as Internet-based market abuse 
violations).412 
 
Likewise, it was noted that, although Delaware does not have a statutory provision that 
expressly prohibits insider trading, it has to date successfully relied on common law principles 
on fiduciary duties to combat insider trading.413  It was accordingly noted that this success has 
prompted other commentators to conclude that Delaware was effectively combating insider 
trading and market manipulation because it cedes other areas of its laws that involve insider 
trading enforcement to the federal government.414 
 
Furthermore, in Washington, it was noted that the Director of Financial Institutions may 
impose administrative penalties such as public censure and suspension or revocation of the 
license of any broker-dealer, salesperson, investment advisor’s representative, investment 
advisor or any other person who commits market abuse and other related securities 
violations.415   It was further noted that the advantage of Washington is inter alia the statutory 
availability of non-exclusive common law penalties and private rights of action for the 
prejudiced persons to claim their damages directly from the market abuse offenders.416 
 
It was acknowledged that, like the United States of America,417 South Africa also prohibits 
three main forms of market abuse, namely insider trading, trade-based market manipulation 
and disclosure-based market manipulation.418  It was also noted that, like the United States of 
America,419 South Africa relies on civil, criminal and administrative sanctions to deter and 
discourage unscrupulous persons from engaging in market abuse activities.420 Nevertheless, 
unlike the position in the United States of America,421 the Securities Services Act’s market 
412    See paragraph 5 2 4 above. 
413    See paragraph 5 2 8 above. 
414    See paragraph 5 2 8 above. 
415    See paragraph 5 2 12 above. 
416    See paragraph 5 2 12 above. 
417    See paragraphs 5 3 1; 5 3 4 & 5 3 4 1 above. 
418   Cassim “An Analysis of Market Manipulation under the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004 (part 1)” 2008 
SA Merc LJ 33 34-35.   
419    Paragraphs 5 3 2; 5 3 5; 5 3 6 & 5 5 3above. 
420   See the relevant comparative analysis in Chapter Nine of this thesis & see further paragraph 4 4 7 in 
Chapter Four of this thesis.  
421    Paragraphs 5 3 2; 5 3 5; 5 3 6 & 5 5 3above. 
251 
                                               
abuse civil sanctions are only limited to cases involving insider trading.422 This flaw could be 
addressed by the Financial Markets Bill as it now extends civil sanctions to market 
manipulation offences.423  However, no similar provision was made in the Financial Markets 
Bill 2012.424  It was further noted that, unlike the position in the United States of America 
where there are no specific statutory limitations for criminal actions,425 the competent courts 
in South Africa do not seem to have express statutory authority or discretion to impose any 
other additional penalties (apart from those stipulated in the Securities Services Act, the 
Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012) upon the market abuse 
offenders without violating the autrefois acquit or autrefois convict doctrine.426      
 
It was also noted that in contrast to the position in the United States of America,427 little or no 
consideration was given to the introduction of specific civil penalties for commodities-based 
market manipulation practices in South Africa.428  It was further noted that, unlike the United 
States Securities and Exchange Commission,429 the Financial Services Board does not have a 
specific unit that prohibits Internet-based market abuse activities.430   
 
Furthermore, in light of the flaws indicated above, it is submitted that the recommendations431 
stipulated and summarised below could improve the enforcement of the market abuse ban in 
South Africa: 
 
Firstly, it is submitted that the Financial Services Board should enter into specific binding co-
operation agreements with more local self-regulatory organisations such as the JSE and the 
422    See s 77 of the Securities Services Act; also see relevant comparative analysis in Chapter Nine of this 
thesis.  
423   Clause 87 read with clauses 84 & 85 of the Financial Markets Bill; also see related remarks and 
comparative analysis in Chapter Nine of this thesis.  
424    Generally see clauses 82 & 83 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.     
425    Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations 451-454; 460-461; also see paragraphs 5 3 2 
& 5 3 5 above & relevant comparative analysis in Chapter Nine of this thesis.  
426   S 115(a) of the Securities Services Act; clause 115(a) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 111(a) of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012; also see paragraph 5 3 2 & 5 3 5 above & relevant comparative analysis in 
Chapter Nine of this thesis.  
427    Paragraph 5 3 5 above. 
428   S 75; s 76 & s 115(a) of the Securities Services Act; see further clauses 84; 85; 87 & 115(a) of the 
Financial Markets Bill & clauses  82 & 83 read with clause 111(a) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.     
429    The United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) introduced the Office of Internet 
Enforcement to combat internet based market abuse practices.     
430    See further Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 182-183.    
431    Notably, a detailed analysis of these recommendations is earmarked for the last Chapter.     
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Securities Regulation Panel to combat market abuse practices in the South African financial 
markets;  
 
Secondly, it is submitted that the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or 
the Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be amended to enact specific provisions for separate 
and distinct criminal penalties that can be imposed upon any juristic person or individual who 
commit or attempts to commit insider trading or market manipulation offences in South 
Africa (with higher criminal penalties being imposed on such juristic persons); 
 
Thirdly, it is suggested that the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be amended to provide specific market abuse whistle-
blower immunity provisions and bounty rewards for the purposes of encouraging all the 
persons to report market abuse activities to the Financial Services Board and/or other relevant 
enforcement authorities in South Africa; 
 
Fourthly, it is suggested that the Securities Services Act should be amended to statutorily and 
expressly empower the Financial Services Board to use public censure against the market 
abuse offenders in South Africa; or  the provisions of the Financial Markets Bill and/or the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 which seeks to empower the Financial Services Board to publish 
by notice on its official website or by means of other appropriate public media, any outcome, 
status or details of market abuse investigations (public censure or name and shame approach) 
if such publication is in the public interest should speedily come into force;  
 
Fifthly, it is submitted that the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be amended to establish a specific regulatory body that 
prohibits and investigates Internet-based market abuse practices in South Africa; 
 
Sixthly, it is submitted that the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be amended to enact provisions that specifically prohibit 
insurance-related insider trading in South Africa; 
 
Seventhly, the Securities Services Act should be amended to enact a provision that expressly 
empowers the Financial Services Board to cooperate with other local and international 
regulatory bodies in order to enhance the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in 
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South Africa; or the provisions of the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 
2012 which seeks to empower the Financial Services Board to assist foreign regulators with 
investigations pertaining to any cross-border market abuse cases should speedily come into 
force; 
 
Eighthly, the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets 
Bill 2012 should be amended to explicitly provide a statutory private right of action for the 
aggrieved or prejudiced persons to claim their market abuse damages directly from the 
offenders;   
 
Ninthly, the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets 
Bill 2012 should be amended to enact provisions that statutorily define the concept of market 
abuse in South Africa; 
 
In the tenth place, it is submitted that the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill 
and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be reviewed to enact provisions that expressly 
prohibit a person who inadvertently aided or abetted another person to make or publish a 
false, misleading or deceptive statement, promise or forecast that relates to any security in 
South Africa; 
 
In the eleventh place, it is suggested that the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets 
Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be reviewed to enact provisions that 
expressly prohibit commodity-based market manipulation in South Africa;  
  
In the twelfth place, the Securities Services Act should be reviewed to expressly provide civil 
penalties for market manipulation offences and/or the provisions of the Financial Markets Bill 
which now empowers the Financial Services Board to claim from the market manipulation 
offenders, legal costs and civil compensatory penalties of up to three times the profit gained 
or loss avoided plus interest should speedily come into force;     
 
In the thirteenth place, the Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act,432 the Securities 
Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be 
432      28 of 2001 as amended, hereinafter referred to as the Protection of Funds Act.   
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reviewed to enact provisions that expressly empower the Enforcement Committee to make or 
enact its own market abuse rules to enhance the combating of market abuse practices in South 
Africa; 
 
In the fourteenth place, the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be amended to introduce a specific commodities-based 
anti-market abuse enforcement commission or a regulatory body like the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission,433 to deal effectively and exclusively with the commodities-based 
market manipulation violations in South Africa;   
 
In the fifteenth place, the Director of Public Prosecutions should introduce more specialised 
courts or tribunals that are staffed with judges and other persons with the relevant expertise to 
hear and/or prosecute market abuse cases in South Africa timeously and effectively;  
 
In the sixteenth place, notwithstanding the potentially negative effects of bureaucracy, 
balkanisation, conflict of interests and confusion that may be associated with many regulatory 
bodies, it is submitted that more self-regulatory organisations should be statutorily 
empowered to impose their own penalties or take any other appropriate action against market 
abuse offenders in South Africa;   
 
In the seventeenth place, it is submitted that the Financial Services Board should be statutorily 
mandated to assist the Director of Public Prosecutions and the relevant courts with the 
necessary information regarding ongoing market abuse cases in South Africa, by assigning 
certain persons with the relevant expertise to assist the Director of Public Prosecutions and/or 
the relevant courts in the prosecution of such cases in South Africa;  
 
In the eighteenth place, it is submitted, as is the position in Delaware (where there is a system 
in place for periodic revisions of the Delaware Codes), that the South African policy makers 
should seriously consider appointing a National Market Abuse Commission to examine and 
review all the matters and laws pertaining to market abuse in South Africa;  
 
433      See paragraphs 5 3 4 1 & 5 4 1 above. 
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In the nineteenth place, the South African policy makers should consider introducing 
provincial market abuse statutes to: (a) create regulatory competition among the provinces to 
attract investors by effectively combating market abuse activities (b) promote dual or 
concurrent regulation and enforcement of the market abuse ban both at a provincial and 
national level.   This should, however, be managed well to avoid creating potential problems 
such as balkanisation and/or violating the autrefois acquit or autrefois convict doctrine; 
 
In the twentieth place, the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be reviewed to enact provisions that mandate companies 
and all the relevant persons to have market abuse codes of conduct and to appoint market 
abuse compliance officers; 
 
In the twenty-first place, it is submitted that the legislature should consider enacting specific 
provisions which empower the Financial Services Board and the JSE to jointly form, fund, 
and operate a Joint Market Abuse Advisory Committee that would be tasked with considering 
and developing solutions to emerging and ongoing market abuse issues of common interest 
involving commodity and commodity derivatives and futures or securities traded in both the 
regulated and over the counter markets in South Africa.  In other words, the afore-mentioned 
Joint Market Abuse Advisory Committee should identify emerging regulatory risks, assess 
and quantify their implications for investors and other market participants, and recommend 
possible solutions to the Financial Services Board and the JSE; 
 
In the twenty-second place, it is suggested that the legislature should consider enacting 
specific provisions which empower the Financial Services Board, the Securities Regulation 
Panel, the JSE and other relevant stakeholders to create a Joint Anti-Market Abuse 
Enforcement Task Force in order to harness synergies from shared market surveillance data, 
to improve market oversight, to enhance enforcement and to reduce duplicative regulatory 
burdens and/or balkanisation.  The Joint Anti-Market Abuse Enforcement Task Force should 
prepare and offer training programmes for the employees of all the relevant enforcement 
authorities, develop practical market abuse investigation and enforcement measures, and 
timeously coordinate the sharing of relevant market abuse information. Moreover, the Joint 
Anti-Market Abuse Enforcement Task Force should oversee the general execution of the day-
to-day duties by the employees of all the relevant enforcement agencies to enhance the 
enforcement of the market abuse ban in South Africa; 
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In the twenty-third place, it is submitted, as is the position in the United States of America, 
that regulatory agencies such as the Financial Services Board and the JSE should establish a 
Joint Market Abuse Cross-Agency Training Programme for their employees to increase the 
enforcement of the market abuse provisions in South Africa.  This could be achieved by 
developing a training programme to increase the consistent and/or regular sharing of relevant 
information and rotating of employees between the Financial Services Board and the JSE.  
This programme, could each year, give the employees of both the Financial Services Board 
and the JSE the opportunity to work at the other agency temporarily for a specified period of 
time to enhance greater collaboration and coordination between these two agencies; 
 
Lastly, it is submitted, as is the position in the United States of America, that the Financial 
Services Board and the JSE should consider developing a Joint Market Abuse Information 
Technology Task Force to link their relevant information pertaining to on-going market abuse 
investigations if they consider such information to be jointly useful and/or in the public 
interest.   This could promote transparency and facilitate the use and understanding of such 
information by providing a comprehensive, consolidated database on persons and entities 
investigated by both the Financial Services Board and the JSE in order to combat market 
abuse activities in the South African regulated financial markets.  
 
Now that the position in the United States of America has been discussed, the next chapter 
will, from a comparative perspective, focus on the enforcement of the market abuse 
prohibition in the European Union in order to recommend, where possible, measures and/or 
principles that could also be incorporated in the South African market abuse laws to enhance 
the curbing of market abuse practices in the relevant financial markets. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE ENFORCEMENT OF MARKET ABUSE PROVISIONS IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
6 1  Introduction   
 
The increasingly global market has given rise to increased interaction and interdependence 
among national regulators as well as investors in different jurisdictions.1  As a result, cross-
border trading in securities has caused a great number of challenges among various national 
regulators, especially with regard to the enforcement of market abuse laws.  Accordingly, the 
need for strong co-operation and co-ordination between such regulators became crucial and 
inevitable.2   Consequently, the European Union3 became the first body to establish 
multinational market abuse laws in order to enhance the detection and combating of cross-
border market abuse practices.4 
 
Following a series of consultations which dates back to as early as 1976, the Commission of 
the European Union proposed that a common insider trading legislation be adopted by all the 
member states.5  The European Union Insider Dealing Directive6 was subsequently adopted in 
1989 and was the first law that harmonised the insider trading ban among the European Union 
member states.  However, owing to various concerns from the member states that the Insider 
Dealing Directive was not applicable to other forms of market abuse, the so-called 
Lamfalussy process and the Committee of the Wiseman were launched to implement the 
European Union’s Action Plan for Financial Services and to enhance a further level of 
harmonisation with regard to the enforcement of market abuse laws across the European 
1      Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley Market Abuse and Insider Dealing (2009) 263.    
2       Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 263-266. 
3       Hereinafter referred to as the EU. 
4      Hazen “Defining Illegal Insider Trading-Lessons from the European Community Directive on Insider 
Trading” 1992 Law and Contemporary Problems 231 236 & Warren III “The Regulation of Insider 
Trading in the European Community” 1991Washington and Lee LR 1037 1037. 
5     Van Zyl & Joubert “The European Union Directive on Insider Trading: A Model for South Africa?” 1994 
SA Merc LJ 291 291.   
6      Council Directive 89/592/EEC of 13 November 1989, OJ 1989 L334/30 (hereinafter referred to as the 
Insider Dealing Directive or the IDD). Also see the article by Pingel “The EC Directive of 1989” as 
posted in Gaillard (ed) Insider Trading: The Laws of Europe, the United States and Japan (1992) 5 & 
Van Zyl & Joubert 1994 SA Merc LJ 291. 
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Union member states.   As a result, the European Union Directive on Insider Dealing and 
Market Manipulation7 was adopted in a bid to combat all the forms of market abuse in the 
European Union’s securities and financial markets. 
 
It is against this background that the European Union’s market abuse laws will be carefully 
analysed in this chapter.  Moreover, the European Union’s anti-market abuse enforcement 
framework will be scrutinised in order to isolate and identify relevant principles which could 
also be employed in South Africa, especially with regard to the coordination and co-operation 
between the regulatory authorities in the European Union member states as well as the 
detection and prosecution of cross-border market abuse activities.8 
 
6 2  Historical Overview of Insider Trading Prohibition  
 
As stated earlier,9 the Insider Dealing Directive offered the pioneering insider trading 
provisions which were applicable in the European Union member states.   Put differently, 
insider trading practices were expressly outlawed under the Insider Dealing Directive to 
include any conduct by an insider who took advantage of inside information with full 
knowledge of the facts by acquiring or disposing of, for his own account or for the account of 
a third party, either directly or indirectly, transferable securities10 of the issuer or issuers to 
which that information relates.11   Therefore, other related violations like fraud could not give 
rise to insider trading.  Seemingly, the prohibition on insider trading under the Insider Dealing 
Directive was not solely based on a fiduciary duty but rather on the actual tipping12 or dealing 
7     See the Directive of the European Parliament and Council of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and 
market manipulation (market abuse) 2003/6/EC [2003] OJ L96/16 (hereinafter referred to as the EU 
Market Abuse Directive).  See further Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley Market Abuse and Insider 
Dealing 72-73; Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse: A Legal and Economic 
Analysis (2005) 307 & Russen Financial Services Authorisation, Supervision and Enforcement: A 
Litigator’s Guide (2006) 206. 
8       Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 263-266.   
9       See further paragraph 6 1 above.    
10    The Insider Dealing Directive broadly defined transferable securities to include shares, debt securities, 
financial futures, futures contracts, options and index contracts in respect of securities.   Thus, 
transferable securities could further include any rights related to such securities and/or any rights in 
respect of fixed term financial instruments, when admitted to trading on a market which is regulated and 
supervised by public authorities and which operates regularly and is accessible directly or indirectly to the 
public.    Article 1(2) of the IDD.   
11     Article 2(1) of the IDD.   
12   Tipping constituted inter alia the recommending or disclosure of inside information by an insider to any 
third party, to acquire or dispose of transferable securities unless such disclosure is made in the normal 
course of the exercise of his employment, profession or duties.    Article 3 of the IDD.    
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in the affected securities by an insider while in possession of inside information.13 Selected 
disclosure and other related tipping activities were also prohibited under the Insider Dealing 
Directive. 
 
In addition, the provisions of the Insider Dealing Directive were heterogeneously 
implemented in most member states either through the promulgation of administrative 
regulations like voluntary codes of conduct or the enactment of legislation that outlaws insider 
trading.14   For instance, the United Kingdom enacted the Criminal Justice Act 199315 to 
implement the provisions of the Insider Dealing Directive.   Thus, although the United 
Kingdom already had legislation in place to combat insider trading as early as 1980, the 
amendments necessary to implement the provisions of the Insider Dealing Directive were 
only adopted in 1993.16  Specifically, Part V of the Criminal Justice Act implemented the 
provisions of the Insider Dealing Directive and treated insider trading as an abuse of the 
market rather than a breach of an insider’s fiduciary obligations to the company.17  
Furthermore, any violation of the insider trading provisions attracted only criminal sanctions 
under the Criminal Justice Act.  Furthermore, the enforcement of the provisions of the Insider 
Dealing Directive did not give rise to similar (harmonised) regulations in some member 
states.  Notably, one of the main inconsistencies was found in relation to the definition of 
“insider”, where other member states such as the United Kingdom maintained that a person 
would be an insider only if he knew (the so-called requirement of knowledge) that he had 
inside information either by virtue of being a director, shareholder or employee of a 
company.18   
 
Similarly, there were different approaches in some European Union member states with 
regard to the way in which “inside information” was defined, especially in relation to the 
required degree of publicity before information could be said to have been made public and in 
13   Article 2(1); (2) & (3) read with articles 3 & 4 of the IDD; also see generally Hazen 1992 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 236.   
14    In light of this, this sub-heading will briefly discuss the implementation of the Insider Dealing Directive 
mainly in the United Kingdom.   
15     The Criminal Justice Act 1993 (c 36), hereinafter referred to as the Criminal Justice Act.   
16     See the related discussion in Chapter Seven of this Thesis. 
17     See further related analysis in Chapter Seven of this Thesis. 
18     On the other hand, a different approach was employed in other member states like France, Germany, 
Spain and the Netherlands. Welch, Pannier, Barrachino, Bernd & Ledeboer “Comparative 
Implementation of the EU Directives (I)–Insider Dealing and Market Abuse” 2005 British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law City Research Series 1 8-9; 16-17 & 19.    
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determining whether inside information was price-sensitive in nature for the purposes of the 
Insider Dealing Directive.   The Insider Dealing Directive did not give clear guidelines as to 
when information was regarded as having been made public.19  As a result some member 
states like the United Kingdom regarded that inside information could be considered as 
having been made public even though it was published only to a section of the public or if it 
could be acquired only by persons exercising due diligence and/or expertise.20  There was 
further discord regarding the actual degree of specificity and/or required effect of inside 
information on the price of the affected securities for the purposes of the Insider Dealing 
Directive among some member states.21   
 
Member states also differed on some elements (requirements) of the insider trading offence 
itself.22   For instance, while the Insider Dealing Directive required the insider to take 
advantage of inside information with the full knowledge of the facts when dealing, an insider 
could only incur liability if he knowingly dealt in the affected securities on the basis of inside 
information in the United Kingdom.23  Furthermore, the Insider Dealing Directive left it up to 
the member states to provide appropriate sanctions24 and to establish competent regulatory 
bodies that oversee the enforcement of the insider trading prohibition.  In nutshell, despite the 
fact that the Insider Dealing Directive defined key terms like “inside information”, 
“transferable securities”, “tipping” and “insider”, there were confusingly different types of 
sanctions and enforcement approaches adopted in all the member states.25  Consequently, the 
Insider Dealing Directive was repealed and replaced by the EU Market Abuse Directive. 26    
 
19    Welch, Pannier, Barrachino, Bernd & Ledeboer 2005 British Institute of International and Comparative 
Law City Research Series 10-11.    
20   S 58(3) of the Criminal Justice Act.  On the other hand, other member states like France did not regard 
the publication of inside information to a section of the public or market professionals alone as sufficient.   
Article 1 of the Commission des Operations de Bourse Regulation 90-08; also see Welch, Pannier, 
Barrachino, Bernd & Ledeboer 2005 British Institute of International and Comparative Law City 
Research Series 10-11 & 44.   
21    For instance, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and the Netherlands employed different approaches 
in this regard.  See Welch, Pannier, Barrachino, Bernd & Ledeboer 2005 British Institute of International 
and Comparative Law City Research Series 10-11.    
22     For instance, there was confusion especially around the interpretation of articles 2(4) & 7 of the IDD.   
23    S 57 read with s 52 of the Criminal Justice Act; also see Welch, Pannier, Barrachino, Bernd & Ledeboer 
2005 British Institute of International and Comparative Law City Research Series 11; 16-17 & 19.    
24   The IDD failed to provide specific types of penalties (criminal, civil or administrative sanctions) as well 
as the severity of such penalties for the purposes of its insider trading ban.   
25    For example, there was confusion regarding the interpretation and enforcement of article 13 of the IDD.   
26    Consequently, the implementation of the provisions of the IDD will not be analysed in detail.      
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6 3  Overview of Selected Definitional Concepts under the Market Abuse Directive  
6 3 1  Inside Information 
 
The EU Market Abuse Directive offers a more comprehensive definition of inside information 
than the one which was contained in the Insider Dealing Directive.27  In line with this, it 
should be noted that under the Insider Dealing Directive, inside information was only defined 
as information which has not been made public and is of a precise nature relating directly or 
indirectly to one or several issuers of transferable securities or to one or several transferable 
securities and which, if it were made public, would be likely to have a significant effect on the 
price of the transferable security or securities in question.28 Accordingly, information was 
required to meet three main requirements, namely, not to have been made public, to be precise 
in nature and to give rise to a significant effect on the price of the securities which it concerns, 
for it to be regarded as inside information.   Put differently, the publication of inside 
information was required to be consistent with the Insider Dealing Directive and other similar 
legislation in the European Union member states.  In this regard, it must be noted that the 
Insider Dealing Directive imposed a mandatory disclosure requirement on all the issuers of 
securities that were publicly traded in regulated markets to disclose to the public as soon as 
possible any inside information which relates to such issuers.29   Moreover, inside information 
was required not only to be confidential but also to be accurate and precise in nature.    Thus, 
rumours, speculations and other inauthentic information could not be regarded as inside 
information.  Lastly, inside information was required to have a significant effect on the price 
of the affected securities. Therefore, not all information unknown to the public was treated as 
inside information for the purposes of the Insider Dealing Directive.30  On the other hand, the 
EU Market Abuse Directive gives a general definition of inside information and other two 
special or complementary definitions which relate to trading in derivatives on commodities 
and to persons charged with the execution of orders concerning financial instruments.31 
Accordingly, inside information is generally defined as information of a precise nature which 
27    Article 1(1) of the IDD. 
28    Article 1(1) of the IDD. 
29    Article 7 of the IDD & also see Salbu “Regulation of Insider Trading in a Global Marketplace: A 
Uniform Statutory Approach” 1992 Tulane LR 837 865.      
30     Pingel “The EC Directive of 1989”as posted in Gaillard (ed) Insider Trading 8-9. 
31    Article 1(1) of the EU Market Abuse Directive; also see Wood Regulation of International Finance (The 
Law and Practice of International Finance Series Volume 7) (2007) 162-163; Avgouleas The Mechanics 
and Regulation of Market Abuse 253-259 & Avgouleas “A Critical Evaluation of the New EC Financial 
Market Regulation: Peaks, Troughs and the Road Ahead” 2004-2005 The Transnational Lawyer 179 203-
204.     
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has not been made public, relating, directly or indirectly to one or more issuers of financial 
instruments or to one or more financial instruments and which, if it were made public, would 
be likely to have a significant effect on the prices of such financial instruments or on the price 
of related derivative financial instruments.32 
 
In relation to derivatives on commodities, inside information is defined in the EU Market 
Abuse Directive, as information of a precise nature which has not been made public, and 
which relates directly or indirectly, to one or more such derivatives and which users of 
markets on which such derivatives are traded would expect to receive in accordance with the 
accepted market practices on those markets.33 
 
With regard to the persons charged with the execution of orders concerning financial 
instruments, inside information means information conveyed by a client and related to the 
client’s pending orders, which is of a precise nature and which relates directly or indirectly to 
one or more issuers of financial instruments, or to one or more financial instruments and 
which, if it were made public, would be likely to have a significant effect on the prices of 
those financial instruments or on the price of related derivative financial instruments.34 
 
Seemingly, the general definition of inside information is broadly applicable to all persons 
who have inside information and to classes of financial instruments other than commodity 
derivatives.  On the other hand, the first special or complementary definition of inside 
information applies only to derivatives on commodities and is consequently not applicable to 
other classes of financial instruments.35  The second special or complementary definition of 
inside information applies to intermediate or executing brokers (or any other person charged 
with the execution of orders concerning financial instruments) who have client information 
32     Article 1(1) of the EU Market Abuse Directive.    
33    Article 1(1) & (5) of the EU Market Abuse Directive; also see article 4 of the Commission Directive 
2004/72/EC of 29 April 2004 on accepted market practices; definition of inside information in relation to 
derivatives on commodities; the drawing up of lists of insiders and the notification of managers’ 
transactions and suspicious transactions [2004] OJ L162/70 (hereinafter referred to as the Accepted 
Market Practices Directive), which states that users of the markets on which commodity derivatives are 
traded are deemed to expect to receive inside information, when it relates directly or indirectly to one or 
more commodity derivatives and when it is routinely made available to those users of the markets and/or 
is required to be disclosed in accordance with any regulatory provisions, market rules, contracts or 
customs on the relevant underlying commodity market or commodity derivatives market.   See further 
Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 254; 307-308.      
34     Article 1(1) of the EU Market Abuse Directive.   
35     Article 1(1) of the EU Market Abuse Directive.   
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regarding their pending orders.  This definition seem to be targeting the so-called front 
running and other related market abuse practices by intermediate and/or executing brokers, 
who use privileged information contained in client orders by placing orders to be executed 
ahead of the relevant client orders in order to achieve their own manipulative benefits at the 
detriment of such clients.36   However, the second special or complementary definition of 
inside information has been criticised as constituting a duplication of requirements that are 
already regulated by other member states and thus creating the overlapping of some 
definitions and unnecessary confusion in relation to its application.37 
 
In addition, the general definition of inside information and the second special or 
complementary definition relating to persons charged with the execution of orders concerning 
financial instruments contains an element of price sensitivity, namely, that the relevant 
information must further have a significant effect on the prices of financial instruments or on 
the price of related derivative financial instruments.38  In contrast to this criterion, the first 
special or complementary definition relating to trading on derivatives on commodities 
substitutes the element of price-sensitivity with relevant information that the users of 
commodity derivatives markets would expect to receive in accordance with accepted 
practices.39 
 
6 3 2  Insider 
 
An insider is defined as any person who possesses inside information by virtue of his 
membership of the administrative, management or supervisory bodies of the issuer;40 or by 
virtue of his holding in the capital of the issuer;41 or by virtue of having access to the 
information through the exercise of his employment, profession or duties;42 or by virtue of his 
criminal activities.43  As enumerated above, this definition clearly provides approximately 
36     Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 263.      
37     Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 263.      
38     Article 1(1) of the EU Market Abuse Directive.   
39     Article 1(1) of the EU Market Abuse Directive; also see Avgouleas 2004-2005 The Transnational Lawyer 
204.      
40     Article 2(1)(a) of the EU Market Abuse Directive.   
41     Article 2(1)(b) of the EU Market Abuse Directive.   
42     Article 2(1)(c) of the EU Market Abuse Directive.   
43     Article 2(1)(d) of the EU Market Abuse Directive.   
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four categories of the so-called primary insiders.44 In addition, if a primary insider is a legal 
person, the prohibition extends to the natural persons (corporate insiders) who take part in the 
decision to carry out any transactions on behalf of the legal person concerned.45 
 
The aforementioned categories of primary insiders are almost identical to the classes of 
primary insiders that were provided under the Insider Dealing Directive.46  Notably, under the 
Insider Dealing Directive the term “insider” was defined to include any person who, with full 
knowledge of the facts, acquired inside information as a result of his employment, profession, 
duties or other direct positional access to the original source of the information (primary 
insider)47 or otherwise than as a result of a special relationship from the original source or 
from a source who is, directly or indirectly a primary insider (secondary and/or corporate 
insiders).48  Precisely, this definition of insider extends to all outsiders who possessed inside 
information by virtue of their status or position and who would include, apart from primary 
insiders, all persons who accessed such information by any other means.49  However, the 
Insider Dealing Directive was unclear on the question of whether the mere fact that a person 
was an executive or director could suffice as sufficient proof to presume that such person 
possessed inside information or whether insider trading required proof on the part of the 
prosecuting authorities that the director or the executive person in question was actually in 
possession of inside information.50   Be that as it may, the EU Market Abuse Directive has 
nonetheless added a new category of primary insiders who acquire inside information by 
virtue of their criminal activities.51 This new category was probably introduced to curb 
organised crime and to discourage terrorist market abuse activities in the European Union 
securities markets.52  On the other hand, the term “insider” could also mean any person other 
than the persons who fall in the primary insiders’ category, who possess inside information 
44   Article 2(1) of the EU Market Abuse Directive; also see generally Avgouleas 2004-2005 The 
Transnational Lawyer 202; see further Wood Regulation of International Finance 166.     
45     Article 2(2) of the EU Market Abuse Directive.   
46     Article 2(1) of the IDD.   
47      Article 2(1) of the IDD.   
48   Articles 4 & 2(2) of the IDD; also see Van Zyl & Joubert 1994 SA Merc LJ 293-294 & Warren III 
1981Washington and Lee LR 1070-1071.   
49     Articles 2 & 4 of the IDD.   
50     Pingel “The EC Directive of 1989”as posted in Gaillard (ed) Insider Trading 12-13. 
51     Article 2(1)(d) of the EU Market Abuse Directive.   
52   Such activities could include theft of inside information and the running of extortion rackets aimed at the 
acquisition of inside information.   See generally Avgouleas 2004-2005 The Transnational Lawyer 202.       
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while that person knows or ought to have known that it is inside information.53   This category 
is usually referred to as secondary insiders.   In relation to this, it appears as if secondary 
insiders may be exempted from any liability if they prove that they did not know or should 
not have known that they were in possession of inside information.54   Nevertheless, this 
defence of lack of actual knowledge or of lack of an objective obligation to know that the 
information in question was inside information is not expressly available to primary 
insiders.55   However, it should be noted that the prosecution and regulatory authorities do not 
have to prove that the person under investigation had an intention to use inside information 
for personal gain or for the benefit of another person.56   
 
6 3 3  Insider Trading 
 
The concept of insider trading is not expressly defined under the EU Market Abuse Directive.  
However, the EU Market Abuse Directive enumerates various practices that could give rise to 
insider trading to include dealing (acquiring or disposing or attempting to acquire or dispose 
of financial instruments) directly or indirectly in financial instruments on the basis of inside 
information, for own account or for account of a third party, by primary insiders or any other 
person who possesses such information and who knows or ought to have known that it is 
inside information;57 or the disclosure of inside information by a primary or secondary insider 
to third parties, unless such disclosure is made in the normal course of his employment, 
profession or duties;58 and the recommendation or inducement of another person by primary 
or secondary insiders on the basis of inside information, to deal (acquiring or disposing of 
financial instruments) in financial instruments to which the information relates.59  This 
prohibition does not, however, apply to any transactions conducted by a person in the 
discharge of an obligation that has become due to acquire or dispose of financial 
53     Article 4 of the EU Market Abuse Directive.   
54     Article 4 of the EU Market Abuse Directive.   
55    For example, article 2(1) & (2) & article 3 of the EU Market Abuse Directive do not have such a defence 
for primary insiders.   
56     See generally Avgouleas 2004-2005 The Transnational Lawyer 202.       
57     Article 2(1) read with subsection (2) & article 4 of the EU Market Abuse Directive.   
58     Article 3(a) read with article 4 of the EU Market Abuse Directive.   
59   Article 3(b) read with article 4 of the EU Market Abuse Directive. Also see Avgouleas 2004-2005 The 
Transnational Lawyer 201; Wood Regulation of International Finance 552-555.               
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instruments60 where that obligation results from an agreement conducted before the person 
concerned possessed inside information.61  
 
It is therefore clear that the prohibition on insider trading under the EU Market Abuse 
Directive expressly discourages approximately three main types of conduct, namely (a) actual 
dealing (acquiring or disposing or attempting to acquire or dispose of financial instruments) in 
financial instruments by primary insiders on the basis of inside information; (b) improper 
disclosure of inside information by either primary or secondary insiders to other persons 
(third parties); and (c) recommending or inducement (tipping) of other persons by primary or 
secondary insiders to deal in financial instruments on the basis of inside information.62  In 
relation to this, the EU Market Abuse Directive extends the prohibition on insider trading to 
financial instruments if they are admitted to trading on a regulated market in at least one 
member state or when a request for admission to trading on such market has been made, 
regardless of whether the transaction in question occurred on a regulated market or on over 
the counter markets.63  Furthermore, the prohibition on insider trading under the EU Market 
Abuse Directive applies to over the counter financial instruments which are not admitted to 
trading on a regulated market in a member state and for which no request for admission to 
trading has been made, if their value depends on admitted financial instruments or instruments 
for which admission is pending.64 
 
6 3 4  Market Manipulation 
 
The concept of market manipulation is expressly defined in the EU Market Abuse Directive to 
include: 
60   The financial instruments are defined to include inter alia transferable securities as defined in the Council 
Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 OJ L141/27, 11/6/1993 (as amended by European Parliament and 
Council Directive 2000/64/EC OJ L290/27, 17/11/2000) on investment services in the securities field; 
money market instruments; forward interest rate agreements; interest-rate, currency and equity swaps; 
units in collective investment undertakings; derivatives commodities, and financial-futures contracts, 
including equivalent cash-settled instruments.    Article 1(3) of the EU Market Abuse Directive.   
61     Article 2(3) of the EU Market Abuse Directive.   
62     Wood Regulation of International Finance 552-555.   
63    Articles 1(3) & 9 of the EU Market Abuse Directive; also see Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation 
of Market Abuse 262.       
64    Such instruments could include over the counter (OTC) stock index contracts or contracts of differences, 
where the underlying or reference financial instrument is traded or is about to be traded on a regulated 
market in the European Union.  Articles 1(3) & 9 of the EU Market Abuse Directive; also see Avgouleas 
The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 262-263.               
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 (a) transactions or orders to trade which give or are likely to give false or misleading 
signals as to the supply of, demand for or price of financial instruments or which 
secure, by a person or persons acting in collaboration, the price of one or several 
financial instruments at an abnormal or artificial level, unless the person who entered 
into the transactions or issued the orders to trade establishes that his reasons for so 
doing are legitimate and that these transactions or orders to trade conform with the 
accepted market practices65 on the regulated market concerned;66  
 
(b) transactions or orders to trade which employ fictitious devices or any other form of 
deception or contrivance;67 and  
 
(c) the dissemination of information through the media, including the Internet, or by any 
other means which gives or is likely to give false or misleading signals as to financial 
instruments, including the dissemination of rumours and false or misleading news, 
where the person who made the dissemination knew or ought to have known that the 
information was false or misleading.68 
 
A closer look at the aforementioned definition of market manipulation shows that the EU 
Market Abuse Directive has attempted, as much as possible, to dispense with the rigid 
requirement of proving intent (on the part of offenders) for the purposes of the market 
manipulation offence in order to enhance and increase the number of successful prosecutions 
and settlements by the relevant regulatory authorities in the member states.69  Seemingly, 
market manipulation is treated as an objective (effect-based) offence.70 
 
65     Accepted practices are defined as practices that are reasonably expected in one or more financial markets 
and are accepted by the competent authority in accordance with the guidelines adopted by the 
Commission in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 17(2) of the EU Market Abuse 
Directive.  See further Article 1(5) & read with subsection (3) of the EU Market Abuse Directive.      
66     Article 1(2)(a) of the EU Market Abuse Directive.   
67     Article 1(2)(b) of the EU Market Abuse Directive.   
68     Article 1(2)(c) of the EU Market Abuse Directive.   
69    Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 104-111; Avgouleas 2004-2005 The 
Transnational Lawyer 206.       
70    Article 1(2) of the EU Market Abuse Directive; also see Avgouleas 2004-2005 The Transnational Lawyer 
206; Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 104-111; Hansen “The New Proposal 
for a European Union Directive on Market Abuse” 2002 U.Pa.J Int’l Econ. L 241 260-262.       
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In addition, the EU Market Abuse Directive outlines a number of practices which could 
amount to market manipulation as defined above, to include inter alia: 
(a) conduct by a person or persons acting in collaboration to secure a dominant position 
over the supply of, or the demand for a financial instrument which has the effect of 
fixing, directly or indirectly, the purchase or sale prices or creating other unfair 
trading conditions;  
 
(b) the buying or selling of financial instruments at the close of the market with the 
effect of misleading investors who act on the basis of closing prices; and 
 
(c) taking advantage of occasional or regular access to the traditional or electronic media 
by voicing an opinion about a financial instrument while having previously taken 
positions on that financial instrument and profiting subsequently from the impact of 
the opinions voiced on the price of that instrument, without having simultaneously 
disclosed that conflict of interest to the public in a proper and effective way.71 
 
Accordingly, as highlighted above, it is clear that the EU Market Abuse Directive discourages 
about three main forms of market manipulation, namely (a) artificial (fictitious) transactions 
and wash sales; (b) disclosure-based manipulations effected by disseminating false and 
misleading information;72 and (c) trade-based (misleading trades) manipulations.73  
 
6 4  Overview of the Implementation of the Market Abuse Directive   
 
71    Article 1(2)(c) of the EU Market Abuse Directive.  Other examples of market manipulation activities that 
are prohibited under the EU Market Abuse Directive includes a conspiracy to defraud, which the relevant 
market does not know about; fictitious (wash sales) transactions that are conducted to create a misleading 
appearance of active trading; false maintenance of the price by guarantees, indemnities or loss-sharing 
agreements unknown to the market in order to distort the price of financial instruments; short sales done 
with the intention to deceive and induce others to buy certain financial instruments; dishonest statements 
of financial prospects issued with a view to deceive innocent purchasers and false recommendations by 
financial analysts, journalists and others holding the stock (the so-called scalping) done to deceive and 
make a profit.    See further Wood Regulation of International Finance 534-544.    
72    Notably, the Commission Directive 2003/124/EC of 22 December 2003 on the definition and public 
disclosure of inside information and the definition of market manipulation [2003] OJ L339/70 (hereinafter 
referred to as the Directive on the Public Disclosure of Inside Information) enumerates a number of key 
objective (market) events and trading situations which could be employed by regulatory authorities in the 
member states and other market participants to identify and isolate market manipulative practices.    See 
article 4 of the Directive on the Public Disclosure of Inside Information; also see Avgouleas The 
Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 278-279; Swan Market Abuse Regulation (2006) 76-77. 
73     Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 276-279.      
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An analysis of the implementation of the EU Market Abuse Directive in selected European 
Union member states will be carried out under this sub-heading.   This will be done by, inter 
alia, discussing the approaches or methods employed in such member states to enforce and 
implement the provisions of the EU Market Abuse Directive.   In addition, the role of the 
Forum of European Securities Commissions, the Committee of European Securities 
Regulators, the Committee of the Wise Men, the Lamfalussy Process and the European 
Union’s Action Plan for Financial Services will be briefly discussed below. 
 
6 4 1  The Role of the Forum of European Securities Commissions 
 
The Forum of European Securities Commissions was introduced in December 1997 as an 
independent organisation which oversees the public supervisory (regulatory bodies) 
authorities in the European Union member states.74  The Forum of European Securities 
Commissions was among the first proponents for a common administrative regime on market 
abuse across the European Union capital markets.75  
 
However, the Forum of European Securities Commissions was replaced by the Committee of 
European Securities Regulators.76 Consequently, the role of the Forum of European Securities 
Commissions will not be discussed in much detail here, as more emphasis will be focused on 
the role of its successor, the Committee of European Securities Regulators, which will be 
analysed below. 
 
6 4 2  The Role of the Committee of European Securities Regulators 
 
Unlike its predecessor, the Committee of European Securities Regulators was formed in June 
2001 by the European Commission as an independent committee which policies the 
enforcement of the EU Market Abuse Directive’s market abuse provisions by the relevant 
74   See the Forum of European Securities Commissions (FESCO) “Forum of European Securities 
Commissions, Market Abuse: FESCO’s Response to Call for Views from the Securities Regulators under 
the EU’s Action Plan for Financial Services COM (1999) 232” (1999) 2 
<http://www.europefesco.org/documents/recentpub/99-0961.pdf> (accessed 20-02-2007); Hansen 2002 
U.Pa.J Int’l Econ. L 243. 
75     Hansen 2002 U.Pa.J Int’l Econ. L 243.   
76     FESCO (1999) 2-17<http://www.europefesco.org/documents/recentpub/99-0961.pdf> (accessed 20-02-
2007).   
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securities regulators in the European Union member states.77 Moreover, the Committee of 
European Securities Regulators is one of the committees which were incorporated in the final 
report of the Committee of the Wise Men, on the regulation of the European Union securities 
markets.78 
 
The functions of the Committee of European Securities Regulators are outlined in its Charter, 
and they include, among others, to improve co-ordination between different securities 
regulators in the member states. This further involves developing effective operational 
network mechanisms to improve the day-to-day consistent supervision and enforcement of the 
single market for financial services in the member states.   In relation to this, it should be 
pointed out that the Committee of European Securities Regulators has been instrumental in 
the signing by all member states of a Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding regarding, 
inter alia, the sharing of relevant information and the co-operation between the regulatory 
authorities in order to combat cross-border market abuse activities.79 
 
In addition, the Committee of European Securities Regulators acts as an advisory group that 
assists the European Union Commission. Thus, the Committee of European Securities 
Regulators advises the European Union Commission on its preparatory draft implementing 
measures for the European Union framework directives relating to securities.   This has, in a 
way, enhanced the integration and harmonisation of the European Union securities markets 
and the promotion of flexible adjustment of the relevant laws in the member states to conform 
to the requirements of the EU Market Abuse Directive.80 
77   See the European Commission’s decision of 6 June 2001/527/EC which was repealed and replaced by the 
Commission’s decision of 23 January 2009 (2009/77/EC).    
78    This committee was chaired by Baron Alexandre Lamfalussy and its final report was adopted by the 
Heads of State in the European Council (Stockholm) conference on 23 March 2001 and the European 
Parliament (European Parliament Resolution of 5 February 2002); also see the article by the Committee 
of European Securities Regulators (CESR) “The Committee of European Securities Regulators” 
<http://www.cesr-eu.org/index.php?page=cesrinshort> (accessed 09-02-2010).   
79   The policing of the implementation of legislation consistent with the EU Market Abuse Directive is 
usually carried by the Review Panel chaired by the CESR vice chairman, the CESR-Pol and CESR-Fin.   
The chair and vice-chair of the CESR are elected from the member states for a period of two years.     
80   The CESR implements the so-called Level 2 measures which deal with some of the technical 
requirements necessary to achieve objectives of the EU Market Abuse Directive and other related 
securities legislation as well as the Level 3 measures which are aimed at ensuring the common and 
uniform enforcement of the requirements of the EU Market Abuse Directive in the member states.  See 
CESR’s Advice on Level 2 Implementing Measures for the Proposed Market Abuse Directive, CESR/02-
089d (CESR, Paris, December 2002) 34; also see Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market 
Abuse 264-265; Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 83-84 & see 
further CESR article <http://www.cesr-eu.org/index.php?page=cesrinshort> (accessed 09-02-2010).   
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 The Committee of European Securities Regulators also runs some operational groups and 
special expert groups which carry out certain mandates on behalf of the European 
Commission.   Specifically, such operational groups include the Committee of European 
Securities Regulators-Pol which promotes co-operation between the supervisory authorities of 
the European Union member states.  The Committee of European Securities Regulators-Pol 
has people with specialist skills and ensures that securities regulators exchange relevant 
confidential information.  On the other hand, the Committee of European Securities 
Regulators-Fin provides guidance on the harmonised supervision of accounting standards in 
the European Union and the Review Panel promotes the effective implementation of the 
requirements of the Committee of European Securities Regulators in the member states.81 
 
In a nutshell, the Committee of European Securities Regulators has to date played a key role 
in the formulation of a number of harmonised approaches for the European Union securities 
regulators in order for them to implement the relevant securities legislation and in the 
promotion of a common interpretation and application of the provisions of the EU Market 
Abuse Directive in all member states.82 For example, the Committee of European Securities 
Regulators has successfully enumerated a number of administrative sanctions and measures 
applicable to all the member states.83 The Committee of European Securities Regulators has, 
on a number of occasions, invited competent regulatory bodies from the member states and 
other relevant stakeholders (academics and market participants) to exchange and share their 
experience and views regarding the practical implementation of the EU Market Abuse 
Directive.84  This enabled the role of the European Securities Committee to be reviewed and 
replaced by the European Securities and Markets Authority which now oversees the 
81    See CESR’s Public Statement of Consultation Practices, Ref. CESR/01-007c, December 2001; CESR’s 
Report on Accepted Market Practices and Common Approach for Reporting Suspicious Transactions, 
CESR/04-505b; see further 
<http://www.ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/transposition/index_enhtm> (accessed 21-02-2009) 
& the European Securities Markets Expert Group (ESME)’s Report on Market Abuse EU Legal 
Framework and its Implementation by Member States: A First Evaluation, Brussels, 06 July 2007 1 2-3.    
82    Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 266 & Swan Market Abuse 
Regulation 111-112.  CESR Report “CESR Members’ Powers and Level 3 Guidelines and Information on 
Common Operation of the MAD to the Market” <http://www.cesr.eu/index.php?docid=4853> (accessed 
24-02-2010) & CESR Report “Market Abuse Additional Level 2 Implementing Measures (CESR 
Consultation Document)” 03 102b <http://www.cesr.eu/index.php?docid=4853> (accessed 27-02-2010).   
83     See <http://www.cesr.eu/index.php?page=document_details&id=4852> (accessed 24-02-2010).          
84    For example, in February 2008, member states were invited to a conference in order for them to respond 
to various concerns regarding the operation of the EU Market Abuse Directive; also see  
<http://www.ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/esme/mad_070706_en.pdf> (accessed 24-02-
2009),  for further information regarding the role of the CESR.         
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regulation and enforcement of the market abuse ban by the European Union member states.85  
In addition, on 2 November 2006 the Committee of European Securities Regulators published 
a comprehensive Level 3 consultation document addressing various concerns regarding the 
definition of inside information, client orders constituting inside information and the 
recording of insider lists.86 
 
6 4 3  The Role of the European Union’s Action Plan for Financial Services 
 
The European Union’s Action Plan for Financial Services was perhaps one of the most 
ambitious programmes of legislative activity, aimed at formulating a common securities 
capital market in Europe.87  Accordingly, the European Union’s Action Plan for Financial 
Services was formally proposed by the European Union Commission in 1998.88   
 
Consequently, due to the fact that a larger part of the financial services activity in the 
European Union has been effected in different jurisdictions (on a cross-border basis) and the 
fact that some investors have taken advantage of opportunities offered by the Internet to trade 
in the financial instruments directly or through an intermediary regulated market (including 
Alternative Trading Systems) based in other member states to engage in cross-border market 
abuse practices, the European Union’s Action Plan for Financial Services recommended the 
adoption of the EU Market Abuse Directive.89 
 
The European Union’s Action Plan for Financial Services further recommended the 
integration of the European Union financial markets, the combating of cross-border market 
abuse activities and the repealing of the Investment Services Directive of 1996.90  Substantial 
85     See similar remarks in paragraph 6 4 4 of this Chapter. 
86     See CESR Level 3 Consultation Document CESR/06-562. 
87    Blair & Walker Financial Services Law (2006) 760-761, where the EU Commission realised even 40 
years after the Treaty of Rome that the legislation dealing with the capital markets remained very 
different in all the member states.  Also see generally Ferrarini “The European Market Abuse Directive” 
2004 Common Market Law Review 711 737-741. 
88    See the European Union Commission Communication, Financial Services: Building a Framework for 
Action, COM (1998) 625; Maloney “New Frontiers in EC Capital Markets Law: From Market 
Construction to Market Regulation” 2003 CMLR 809 811-813 & Avgouleas “The Harmonization of 
Rules of Conduct in EU Financial Markets: Economic Analysis, Subsidiarity and Investor Protection” 
2000 ELJ 72 77-78 & 80-81.      
89    Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 245-246 & 250-251. 
90   Blair & Walker Financial Services Law 760-761; Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market 
Abuse 245-246 & 250-251.  
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amendments were therefore introduced by the EU Market Abuse Directive, especially in 
relation to: 
 
(a) the regulation of listed securities; 
(b) dissemination of investment recommendations;  
 
(c) disclosure of documents regarding public offers;  
 
(d) prohibition of market manipulation;  
 
(e) prohibition of insider trading;  
 
(f) the measures for Alternative Trading Systems;  
 
(g) the required conduct for periodic and continuous disclosures by the issuers of listed 
securities; and  
 
(h) the required conduct for stabilisations of new issues and share buy-backs.91 
 
6 4 4  The Role of the Lamfalussy Process and the Committee of the Wise Men 
 
In order to fully implement the European Union’s Action Plan for Financial Services, the 
Committee of the Wise Men92 recommended the establishment of the European Securities 
Committee and the Committee of European Securities Regulators93 which have regulatory 
and advisory functions respectively.   The European Securities Committee was later replaced 
by the European Securities and Markets Authority.94  In line with this, the European 
Securities and Markets Authority was given a more central enforcement role to supervise 
credit rating agencies across Europe in June 2010.95 This allows the European Securities and 
Markets Authority to obtain information from issuers of structured financial instruments 
91    Avgouleas 2004-2005 The Transnational Lawyer 184-185. 
92    As earlier stated in paragraph 7 5 2 above, this Committee was chaired by Baron Alexandre Lamfalussy. 
93    These Committees were introduced in June 2001. 
94    Verhelst “Addressing the Financial Crisis: The EU’s Incomplete Regulatory Response” 2010 Egmont 
Institute for International Relations Paper 39 5-6; 27 <http://www.egmontinstitute.be.ep39.pdf> 
(accessed 08-07-2011); Paulo “Europe and the Global Financial Crisis Explained in 10 Sheets: Taking 
Stock of the EU’s Policy Response” April 2011 Fondation Robert Schuman 14-15 <http://www.robert-
schuman.eu/frs-fichecrisefi-qe200-en.pdf> (accessed 04-07-2011) & also see related remarks in 
paragraph 4 7 4 1 in Chapter Four of this thesis. 
95     See related remarks in paragraphs 4 7 4 1 & 4 7 6 1 in Chapter Four of this thesis. 
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about their credit rating agencies transactions in order to prevent possible market abuse 
practices by discouraging the non-disclosure of unrequested ratings and temporarily 
prohibiting or suspending the issuing of credit ratings by a specific credit rating agency 
offender.96  Furthermore, the Committee of the Wise Men proposed the adoption of the so-
called Lamfalussy process in an attempt to fast-track the enactment and implementation of the 
legislation that deals with the securities and market abuse regulation in the European Union97 
in order to comply with the European Union’s Action Plan for Financial Services.98 
Consequently, a four-level regulatory approach was introduced under the Lamfalussy process, 
namely: 
 
(a) Level 1 which consists of the framework measures and objectives that the securities 
legislation in the member states must achieve;99  
 
(b) Level 2 which contains some technical requirements and implementing measures 
necessary to attain the objectives enumerated in Level 1;100  
 
(c) Level 3 contains measures, guidelines and standards agreed by regulators as 
stipulated in the requirements of the Committee of European Securities Regulators.   
In addition, such measures are intended to enhance co-operation and common 
interpretation of the accepted market practices as well as the format for reporting 
suspicious transactions by regulatory authorities in member states;101 and  
 
96     See related remarks in paragraphs 4 7 4 1 & 4 7 6 1 in Chapter Four of this thesis. 
97     Avgouleas 2004-2005 The Transnational Lawyer 185-186; the Committee of the Wise Men Final Report 
on the Regulation of European Securities Markets, Brussels, 15 February 2001; the same report is 
available at <http://www.europa.eu/int/comm/internal_market/en/finances/general/lamfalussyen.pdf> 
(accessed 24-02-2012) & also see Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 246-248.     
98     See paragraph 6 4 3 above. 
99     Such measures include enacting and enforcing the provisions of the Market Abuse Directive. 
100  The examples of such implementing measures include the Directive on the Public Disclosure of Inside 
Information; Commission Regulation (EC) of 22 December 2003 implementing the EU Market Abuse 
Directive as regards the exemptions for buy-back programmes and stabilisation of financial instruments 
[2003] OJ L336/33 (hereinafter referred to as Regulation on Share Buy-backs and Stabilisations); 
Commission Directive 2003/125/EC of 22 December 2003 on the fair presentation of investment 
recommendations and the disclosure of conflicts of interest [2003] OJ L339/073 (hereinafter referred to as 
the Directive on Fair Presentation and Disclosure) and the Accepted Market Practices Directive. 
101   CESR’s Report on Accepted Market Practices, CESR/04-505b; see paragraph 6 4 2 above & also see 
further <http://www.ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/transposition/index_enhtm> (accessed 21-
02-2009). 
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(d) Level 4 deals with the actual consistent enforcement and implementation of the 
enacted securities and market abuse legislation in the member states.102  
 
The Lamfalussy process has so far been utilised to draft the provisions of the EU Market 
Abuse Directive, the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive,103 the Transparency 
Directive104 and the Public Offers and Prospectus Admissions Directive.105   
 
6 4 5  Synopsis of the Implementation of the Market Abuse Directive in Selected 
Member States   
 
About 27 member states have successfully enacted laws to implement the requirements of the 
EU Market Abuse Directive.106  However, for the purposes of this sub-heading, a comparative 
overview of the implementation of the EU Market Abuse Directive in the United Kingdom as 
well as the new EU Market Abuse Proposals which were introduced in 2011 in a bid to inter 
alia improve such implementation will be briefly discussed below.107 
 
The United Kingdom enacted the Financial Services and Markets Act108 and the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000 (Market Abuse Regulations 2005)109 to implement the 
provisions of the EU Market Abuse Directive.  The United Kingdom market abuse regime has 
102   Avgouleas 2004-2005 The Transnational Lawyer 185-186; Blair & Walker Financial Services Law 760-
763 & generally see Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 245-251.   
103  Directive 2004/39/EC of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives 
85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC & Directive 2000/12/EC repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC, [2004] OJ 
L145/1 (hereinafter referred to as the MiFID or the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive).    
104   Directive 2004/109/EC of 15 December 2004 on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in 
relation to information about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market and 
amending Directive 2001/34/EC, [2004] O.J L390/38 (hereinafter referred to as the Transparency 
Directive).    
105    Directive 2003/71/EC of  4 November 2003 on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered 
to the public or admitted to trading and amending Directive 2001/34/EC [2003] OJ L345/64 (hereinafter 
referred to as the Public Offers and Prospectus Admissions Directive).   
106   See the report and analysis by the European Commission entitled “Call for Evidence: Review of Directive 
2003/6/EC on Insider Trading and Market Manipulation (Market Abuse Directive)” (2009) 2-16 
<http://www.ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/transpositionindex_en.htm> (accessed 22-02-2010).   
107   Despite the current Euro-zone debt crisis, it is important to note that the United Kingdom is among the 
biggest economies in the European Union and as such a brief overview of its implementation of the EU 
Market Abuse Directive will be considered under this sub-heading.   For further related analysis on how 
the EU Market Abuse Directive was implemented in the United Kingdom, see Chapter Seven of this 
thesis. 
108   2000 (c 8), hereinafter referred to as the Financial Services and Markets Act; see s 118 of the Financial 
Services and Markets Act & see further analysis in paragraph 7 3 in Chapter Seven of this thesis.  
109   2005 SI 2005/381 (hereinafter referred to as the Market Abuse Regulations 2005); also see related 
remarks in paragraph 7 3 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
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not only enacted the provisions that are similar to those of the EU Market Abuse Directive in 
relation to insider trading, but its prohibition has, in some instances, gone beyond the 
requirements of the EU Market Abuse Directive in an attempt to discourage all the forms of 
market abuse activities.110  The definition of inside information in the Financial Services and 
Markets Act111 is almost identical to the definition of inside information provided in the EU 
Market Abuse Directive.112 However, the Financial Services and Markets Act defines inside 
information as information which is not generally available113 as opposed to a similar 
definition in the EU Market Abuse Directive which refers to inside information as information 
of a precise nature which has not been made public.114 The EU Market Abuse Directive115 and 
the Financial Services and Markets Act116 also have relatively similar definitions of inside 
information in relation to commodity derivatives.  Likewise, the EU Market Abuse 
Directive117 and the Financial Services and Markets Act118 have an almost identical definition 
of inside information in relation to agents and/or intermediaries, which is mainly aimed at 
combating front running (dealing ahead of investors’ orders).   Moreover, in line with Recital 
31 of the EU Market Abuse Directive, the Financial Services Authority issued its Code of 
Market Conduct which, inter alia, enumerates a number of factors which must be considered 
to determine whether information is generally available.119 
 
There is no material difference between the definition of insider contained in both the EU 
Market Abuse Directive120 and the Financial Services and Markets Act.121   Notably, both the 
110   S 118B & 118C read with s 118A of the Financial Services and Markets Act; read with articles 2; 3 & 4 
of the EU Market Abuse Directive; article 4 of the Accepted Market Practices Directive & paragraph 6 3 
3 above. 
111    S 118C of the Financial Services and Markets Act. 
112    Article 1(1) of the EU Market Abuse Directive & also see paragraph 6 3 1 above. 
113    S 118C of the Financial Services and Markets Act. 
114    Article 1(1) of the EU Market Abuse Directive & also see paragraph 6 3 1 above. 
115    Article 1(1) & also see article 4 of the Accepted Market Practices Directive. 
116    S 118C(3) read with s 118C(7). 
117    Article 1(1). 
118    S 118C(4). 
119   This indicates that s 118C of the Financial Services and Markets Act fully implements article 1(1) of the 
EU Market Abuse Directive and the Directive on the Public Disclosure of Inside Information.  See further 
Welch, Pannier, Barrachino, Bernd & Ledeboer 2005 British Institute of International and Comparative 
Law City Research Series 21.          
120    Article 2(1); also see paragraph 6 3 2 above. 
121    S 118B. 
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EU Market Abuse Directive122 and the Financial Services and Markets Act123 distinguish 
primary insiders from secondary insiders.   Likewise, both the EU Market Abuse Directive124 
and the Financial Services and Markets Act125 prohibit corporate insiders (legal or juristic 
persons) from indulging in market abuse offences.  Both the EU Market Abuse Directive126 
and the Financial Services and Markets Act127 specifically prohibit insider trading and market 
manipulation.   Be that as it may, the United Kingdom has somewhat delayed and/or 
inconsistently implemented the provisions pertaining to the financial instruments that are 
covered by the EU Market Abuse Directive.128 
 
In other words, as evidenced above, the EU Market Abuse Directive was adopted to ensure 
that a common approach as regards the co-operation and enforcement of the market abuse 
prohibition is employed across the European Union member states.129  Subsequently, the 
general concepts and practices regarding the combating of market abuse have to date been 
adopted into the relevant national legislation by most member states, including the United 
Kingdom.   In relation to this, it is reported that there have been relatively few suspicious 
transactions before issuers’ regulatory announcements over the last few years in the United 
Kingdom.130  
 
122    Article 2(1) applies to primary insiders & article 4 applies to secondary insiders; also see paragraph 6 3 2 
above. 
123    S 118B(a) to (d) applies to primary insiders and it is not necessary for such insiders to know that the 
information in their possession is inside information before they can incur market abuse liability and s 
118B(e) applies to secondary insiders and such persons will incur market abuse liability if they know or 
ought to have known that they obtained information from a primary insider and/or if they know or ought 
to have known that it is inside information.  See further Welch, Pannier, Barrachino, Bernd & Ledeboer 
2005 British Institute of International and Comparative Law City Research Series 25.          
124    Article 2(2) which applies directly to corporate insiders. 
125    S 118B which applies to both individuals and bodies corporate (companies) as opposed to the provisions 
of the Criminal Justice Act which only applies to individuals.  
126    Articles 1(2); 2; 3; 4 & 5. 
127    S 118. 
128   For instance, most of the key amendments such as the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
(Prescribed Markets and Qualifying Investments) Order 2001, SI 2001/1996 as amended by Regulation 
10 of the Market Abuse Regulations 2005, to include all financial instruments as stated in article 1(3) the 
EU Market Abuse Directive & to include all regulated markets as defined in article 1(13) of the 
Investment Services Directive 93/22/EEC [1993] OJ L141/27, were only introduced after year 2000.    
129    See Recital 12 of the EU Market Abuse Directive; also see the report and analysis by the European 
Commission (2009) 3 <http://www.ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/transpositionindex_en.htm> 
(accessed 22-02-2010).     
130  Generally see the Financial Services Authority’s Report “The FSA: Measurement of Market Cleanliness” 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/occupapers/op25.pdf> (accessed 26-02-2010).     
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Notwithstanding the remarks above, there are some flaws which could still impede the 
implementation of the EU Market Abuse Directive in the United Kingdom and other 
European Union member states.   For instance, the provisions of the EU Market Abuse are 
mainly limited to market manipulation and insider trading in financial instruments that are 
admitted to trading on regulated markets in the European Union or for which a request for 
admission to trading on such markets has been made, irrespective of whether the transaction 
itself actually took place on those markets.131 With regard to insider trading, the EU Market 
Abuse Directive’s prohibition further applies to financial instruments not admitted to trading 
on a regulated market, but the value of which depends on the value of the financial 
instruments admitted to trading on a regulated market.132  However, due to the significant 
increase in the volume of, and/or the varied nature of transactions traded on the multilateral 
trading facilities,133 organised trading facilities and the over the counter markets (outside the 
regulated markets) and the entry into force of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
some European Union member states like the United Kingdom have already extended the 
application of the EU Market Abuse Directive to certain non-regulated markets.134 This has 
created confusion and different approaches regarding the implementation of the EU Market 
Abuse Directive across the member states.   For example, the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive, unlike the EU Market Abuse Directive, applies to a much broader 
spectrum of financial instruments that are traded on the regulated markets as well as on the 
multilateral trading facilities.135  In other words, the EU Market Abuse Directive does not 
apply to other financial instruments such as derivatives and credit risk transfers instruments, 
spot commodity contracts, emission allowances, broker crossing systems and credit default 
swaps that are traded outside the regulated markets.136  Moreover, the United Kingdom and 
other European Union member states have developed various and different interpretations as 
regards the actual types of financial instruments that should be covered in terms of the EU 
131   Articles 1(3) & 9 of the EU Market Abuse Directive; also see the analysis by the European Commission 
(2009) 4-5 <http://www.ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/transpositionindex_en.htm> (accessed 
22-02-2010).     
132    See paragraph 6 3 3 above, for further related analysis. 
133    See generally articles 4(15) & 26(2) of the MiFID. 
134   This is also the case for example, the Alternext in France; unofficial markets in Germany; Spain & 
Luxembourg.  
135  See generally article 26(2) of the MiFID; also see the analysis by the European Commission (2009) 4-7 
<http://www.ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/transpositionindex_en.htm> (accessed 22-02-2009) 
& the European Securities Markets Expert Group (ESME)’s Report on Market Abuse EU Legal 
Framework Brussels, 06 July 2007, 10; 16-18 & 20.      
136   Article 1(3) of the EU Market Abuse Directive. 
279 
                                               
Market Abuse Directive, especially considering the fact that the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive has broadly defined financial instruments to, inter alia, include credit 
default swaps, climatic derivatives, contract for differences and emission allowances 
derivatives.137 Accordingly, some European Union member states have proposed that the 
scope of application of the EU Market Abuse Directive in relation to the financial instruments 
currently traded in the European Union financial markets should be broadened to cover the 
financial instruments as stipulated under the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive.138 
Whether the definition of the financial instruments under the EU Market Abuse Directive 
should be amended, the fact remains that the EU Market Abuse Directive has, in this regard, 
been flawed and inconsistently enforced in the financial markets in the United Kingdom and 
across the European Union member states.139  Consequently, it is suggested that the EU 
Market Abuse Directive’s market abuse prohibition should be carefully amended, not only to 
enable it to be applicable to all the financial instruments that are traded outside the regulated 
markets but also to ensure that adequate practical measures are put in place to promote its 
uniform application by the member states to avoid balkanisation and/or other potential 
overregulation problems. 
 
There is also discord among the European Union member states regarding the interpretation 
of the definition of inside information for commodity derivatives purposes.   This could be 
caused by the fact that the definition of inside information for commodity derivatives140 does 
not expressly apply to emission allowances, spot commodity contracts and derivative 
contracts. Moreover, market participants and regulatory bodies in some European Union 
member states have taken divergent approaches in relation to the operation and interpretation 
of the general definition of inside information for the purposes of the EU Market Abuse 
Directive.141   This is caused by the fact that the EU Market Abuse Directive’s general 
definition of inside information does not expressly provide whether it is required that the 
137    See the MiFID Level 2 Regulation 1287/2006. 
138   See the analysis on the scope of the EU Market Abuse Directive, by the European Commission (2009) 4-
7 <http://www.ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/transpositionindex_en.htm> (accessed 22-02-
2010).     
139   Particularly regarding the meaning of, and/or what constitutes financial instruments for the purposes of 
article 1(3) of the EU Market Abuse Directive.   
140    Article 1(1) of the EU Market Abuse Directive. 
141   Article 1(1) of the EU Market Abuse Directive; also see article 1 of the Directive on the Public Disclosure 
of Inside Information, which deals with the definition and public disclosure of inside information and the 
definition of market manipulation.   See related analysis on the definition of inside information as adopted 
in the United Kingdom above; also see Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
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offenders should have the knowledge of the inside information which they possess and/or the 
intention to commit market abuse offences before they can incur any liability.142  As a result 
some countries, like the United Kingdom, have advocated that it is not necessary to prove the 
intention on the part of the offenders while other countries, like Spain, argue that only proof 
of the intention or use of inside information on the part of the market abuse offenders should 
suffice.143 Furthermore, the EU Market Abuse Directive’s general definition of inside 
information does not clearly distinguish between inside information for the purposes of 
determining when (actual time) issuers have an obligation to make such information public 
and inside information as it is applies to the obligation on the part of such issuers to stop 
committing market abuse offences.144  In this regard, it is suggested that the  EU Market 
Abuse Directive’s general definition of inside information should be amended to provide 
more clarity on the use and interpretation of inside information across the European Union 
member states to enable issuers and other relevant persons to execute their mandatory 
disclosure obligations effectively without intentionally or erroneously committing market 
abuse offences. 
 
The dissemination of inside information has been another complex and problematic matter in 
the United Kingdom and other European Union member states, especially with regard to the 
requirements for the prompt and/or deferred disclosure obligation which is imposed on the 
issuers.145  The mandatory duty on the part of the issuers of financial instruments to inform 
the public as soon as possible of any inside information which specifically concerns the said 
issuers146 as well as the deferred disclosure of inside information only in certain conditions,147 
could be welcomed as a giant step towards combating market abuse activities in the European 
Union financial markets.  However, national regulatory bodies in some European Union 
142    Article 1(1) of the EU Market Abuse Directive 
143   This debate is worsened by the controversial decision that was employed in Spector Photo Group NV, 
Chris Van Raemdonck v Commissie voor het Bank, Financie-en Assurantiewezen [2009] EUECJ C-45/08 
(CBFA), where the court held that article 1(1) read with articles 2; 3; 4 & 5 of the EU Market Abuse 
Directive merely prohibited insiders from using inside information to commit market abuse offences and 
therefore proof of intention on the part of offenders was not required; also see Shearman & Sterling 
“Twice as MAD: Legislative Proposals to Amend the European Regulation of Market Abuse” 2011 
Financial Institutions Advisory & Financial Regulatory Client Publication 1 3-4. 
144   Article 1(1) of the EU Market Abuse Directive; also see further the European Securities Markets Expert 
Group (ESME)’s Report on Market Abuse EU Legal Framework Brussels, 06 July 2007, 5-7.      
145   Article 6(1) & (2) of the EU Market Abuse Directive; also see Article 3 of the Directive on the Public 
Disclosure of Inside Information.  
146    Article 6(1) of the EU Market Abuse Directive. 
147    Article 6(2) of the EU Market Abuse Directive. 
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member states like the United Kingdom have been struggling to enforce the aforementioned 
issuer’s mandatory duty of disclosure consistently.148  In particular, the challenge is around 
the specific conditions under which the disclosure of inside information should be 
immediately disclosed and requirements which must be met by issuers to ensure that their 
deferred disclosure would not mislead the public and that the confidentiality of the inside 
information in question is preserved.149  It appears as if this issuer’s mandatory duty of 
disclosure employs the same broad definition of inside information that is used for the 
purposes of the insider trading prohibition under the EU Market Abuse Directive.150  
Accordingly, different approaches have been adopted in the United Kingdom and other 
European Union member states.151   In view of the flaws stated above, it is submitted that the 
EU Market Abuse Directive should be amended to provide a specific definition of inside 
information for the purposes of the issuers’ prompt and/or deferred disclosure obligation.  
Such definition should provide clear guidelines on the conditions under which price-sensitive 
information may be required to be deferred or promptly disclosed to the public for the 
purposes of combating market abuse activities across the European Union member states 
without imputing undue pressure on the issuers.  
 
European Union member states have also taken varying approaches regarding the definition 
and prohibition on insider trading and market manipulation.152  The United Kingdom has 
extended the prohibition on insider trading to any insider who actually trades or attempts to 
trade in the qualifying investments on the basis of the non-public inside information he 
knowingly possess.153  On the other hand, some countries have interpreted the EU Market 
Abuse Directive’s insider trading prohibition to be applicable whenever a person in 
148   See the European Securities Markets Expert Group (ESME)’s Report on Market Abuse EU Legal 
Framework Brussels, 06 July 2007, 7-10; also see the analysis by the European Commission (2009) 9-11 
<http://www.ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/transpositionindex_en.htm> (accessed 22-02-2010).   
149   See the European Securities Markets Expert Group (ESME)’s Report on Market Abuse EU Legal 
Framework Brussels, 06 July 2007, 7-10.   
150    Article 1(1) of the EU Market Abuse Directive. 
151   For example, in Spain issuers are required to seek permission before they can defer any disclosure of 
inside information from the regulatory authorities.  On the other hand, some European Union member 
states like France do not require issuers to seek any formal permission to delay or defer the disclosure of 
inside information from the regulatory authorities, provided that such delay is necessary to protect or 
maintain the confidentiality of the financial transactions in question.   See the European Securities 
Markets Expert Group (ESME)’s Report on Market Abuse EU Legal Framework Brussels, 06 July 2007, 
8.   
152    Articles 1(2); 2; 3; 4 & 5 of the EU Market Abuse Directive. 
153   See related remarks in paragraphs 6 2 above; also see Welch, Pannier, Barrachino, Bernd & Ledeboer 
2005 British Institute of International and Comparative Law City Research Series 9-11; 24-25 & 27. 
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possession of inside information trades or attempts to trade in the financial instruments to 
which such information relates.154 With regard to the prohibition on market manipulation, 
attempted market manipulation is not expressly outlawed in the EU Market Abuse 
Directive.155 This has forced the United Kingdom and several other the European Union 
member states to adopt the definition of market manipulation which is similar to that 
contained in the EU Market Abuse Directive although it is somewhat restricted because it 
does not cover attempted market manipulation practices. Moreover, different interpretations 
have been adopted in the United Kingdom and other European Union member states, 
especially with regard to what constitutes accepted market practices as opposed to prohibited 
market manipulation practices, for the purposes of the EU Market Abuse Directive.156  It is 
submitted that the EU Market Abuse Directive should be amended to outlaw attempted 
market manipulation activities.  The EU Market Abuse Directive should also be amended to 
enact a specific provision which clearly enumerates the market practices or conduct that will 
be uniformly regarded as accepted market practices across the European Union financial 
markets to avoid unjustifiably imputing market abuse liability upon the issuers who deal in 
the financial instruments that are traded in more than one country (dual listed issuers).  
 
Notwithstanding some general interpretation problems, the requirement that issuers or their 
agents must draw up and update their insider lists,157 report suspicious transactions158 and the 
right on the part of the regulatory bodies to access telephone and existing data traffic 
records159 have been fairly utilised in the United Kingdom and other European Union member 
154   For example in Spain; also see Welch, Pannier, Barrachino, Bernd & Ledeboer 2005 British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law City Research Series 9-12; 66-69. 
155   Articles 1(2) & 5 of the EU Market Abuse Directive; also see the report and analysis by the European 
Commission (2009) 15-16 
<http://www.ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/transpositionindex_en.htm> (accessed 22-02-2010).     
156   Articles 1(2)(a) & (5) of the EU Market Abuse Directive; see further CESR’s Report on Accepted Market 
Practices, CESR/04-505b; the European Securities Markets Expert Group (ESME)’s Report on Market 
Abuse EU Legal Framework Brussels, 06 July 2007, 16 & the report and analysis by the European 
Commission (2009) 15-16 
<http://www.ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/transpositionindex_en.htm> (accessed 22-02-2010). 
Consequently, very few member states, namely France; Spain; Austria and Portugal have to date 
successfully formulated such accepted market practices.             
157    Article 6(3) of the EU Market Abuse Directive; also see article 5 of the Accepted Market Practices 
Directive. 
158   See article 6(9) of the EU Market Abuse Directive; also see article 7(11) of the Accepted Market 
Practices Directive. 
159    Article 12(2)(d) of the EU Market Abuse Directive. 
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states to detect and combat market abuse activities.160  Nevertheless, the managers of the 
issuers and other relevant persons’ transaction reporting and/or disclosure to the regulatory 
authorities, of any information pertaining to their own transactions which relates to the said 
issuers’ financial instruments or derivatives161 has caused unnecessary administrative burden 
on the part of such managers and other regulatory authorities in some countries.162 It is 
submitted that the EU Market Abuse Directive should be reviewed to increase the threshold 
for transactions that must be reported by issuers, managers of issuers and/or their agents to 
prevent the risk of the regulatory bodies negatively interfering with the proper execution of 
their duties.   It is further submitted that the EU Market Abuse Directive should be reviewed 
to provide greater clarity on the issuers’ obligation to draw up lists of their insiders 
(employees) in order to minimise the risk of imposing excessive administrative burden, 
particularly on large multinational companies.     
 
Seemingly, with regard to the exemption of buy-back programmes and stabilisation activities, 
the United Kingdom has followed the EU Market Abuse Directive approach.163  Nonetheless, 
a wide range of approaches (measures) have been adopted by some European Union member 
states on whether short selling should be prohibited.164  It is submitted that the EU Market 
Abuse Directive should be amended to provide a uniform prohibition on short selling as well 
as adequate guidelines on share buy-back programmes and stabilisation activities that may be 
exempted from the market abuse prohibition by the European Union member states. 
 
As discussed above, it is evident that the implementation of the EU Market Abuse Directive 
in the United Kingdom was relatively successful.   Precisely, Levels 1, 2 and 3 of the 
Lamfalussy process have so far been successfully implemented by almost all the European 
Union member states.  However, divergent approaches and some inconsistencies still exist, 
especially with regard to the interpretation and enforcement of some provisions of the EU 
160   See the CESR The 3rd set of CESR Guidance and Information on the Common Operation of the MAD to 
the Market, Consultation Paper, May 2008; the CESR Report “CESR-Pol Statistics shared with DG 
Market Services” <http://www.cesr.eu/index.php?docid=4853> (accessed 24-02-2010).       
161    Article 6(4) of the EU Market Abuse Directive; also see article 6 of the Accepted Market Practices 
Directive. 
162  Also see further related discussion and analysis by the European Commission (2009) 13-14 
<http://www.ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/transpositionindex_en.htm> (accessed 22-02-2010).   
163    Article 8 of the EU Market Abuse Directive; also see the European Commission Regulation on Share 
Buy-backs and Stabilisations. 
164  Generally see further related discussion and analysis by the European Commission (2009) 17 
<http://www.ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/transpositionindex_en.htm> (accessed 22-02-2010).   
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Market Abuse Directive and the imposition of market abuse penalties by other European 
Union member states.165 This has consequently culminated in the drafting of various 
proposals aimed at repealing the EU Market Abuse Directive in 2011.166   To this end, the 
European Commission167 has isolated some gaps168 in the EU Market Abuse Directive which 
inter alia include: 
 
(a) gaps in the regulation of new markets, trading platforms (including multilateral 
trading facilities and organised trading facilities) and over the counter instruments; 
 
(b) gaps in the regulation of commodities and commodity derivatives; 
 
(c) regulators lacking certain information and powers; 
 
(d) scope of the EU Market Abuse Directive mainly restricted to financial instruments 
traded on regulated markets; 
 
(e) sanctions either inadequate or less dissuasive for market abuse deterrence purposes; 
 
(f) lack of clarity on certain key concepts giving rise to legal uncertainty; and 
 
165   See the European Securities Markets Expert Group (ESME)’s Report on Market Abuse EU Legal 
Framework Brussels, 06 July 2007, 3; Swan Market Abuse Regulation 111-113.  
166   See the European Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and  of the Council 
on Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation (Market Abuse) COM (2011) 651 Final, 2011/0295 (COD), 
Brussels, 20 October 2011 (hereinafter referred to as the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal), which will 
be directly effective in the EU member states from two years after the date when it is passed or when it 
enters into force, on a par with national laws & the European Commission Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and  of the Council on Criminal Sanctions for Insider Dealing and Market 
Manipulation (Market Abuse) COM (2011) 654 Final, 2011/0297 (COD), Brussels, 20 October 2011 
(hereinafter referred to as the Criminal Sanctions Market Abuse Directive Proposal), which will require 
separate national implementing legislation in each EU member state within two years of its coming into 
force.   
167   See generally the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal 2-75 & the Criminal Sanctions Market Abuse 
Directive Proposal 2-14.   
168   See the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal’s Explanatory Memorandum  2-13 & the Criminal Sanctions 
Market Abuse Directive Proposal’s Explanatory Memorandum 2-6; also see related discussions by the 
High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the European Union Report of the High-Level Group on 
Financial Supervision in the EU, Brussels, 25 February 2009 23; European Commission Communication 
on Reinforcing Sanctioning Regimes in the Financial Sector COM (2010) 716, 8 December 2010; 
European Commission Communication on Review of the "Small Business Act" for Europe COM (2011) 
78, 23 February 2011; European Commission Communication on Driving Economic Recovery COM 
(2009) 114, 4 March 2009 & European Commission Communication on Ensuring Efficient, Safe and 
Sound Derivatives Markets COM (2009) 332, 3 July 2009.   
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(g) excessive administrative burdens for issuers whose financial instruments are 
admitted to trading on small and medium-sized growth markets. 
 
Accordingly, the European Commission’s key proposals to combat the gaps stated above will 
be briefly discussed below. 
The Market Abuse Regulation Proposal seeks to extend the scope of the EU Market Abuse 
Directive169 to cover a wide range of: 
 
(a) financial instruments admitted to trading on a regulated market or for which a request 
for admission to trading on a regulated market has been made;170 
 
(b) financial instruments traded on a multilateral trading facility or other new types of 
organised trading facilities in at least one member state;171 and 
 
(c) other behaviour or transactions involving financial instruments whose value relate to 
or depend on the financial instruments traded on a regulated market, multilateral 
trading facility or organised trading facilities, irrespective of whether the behaviour 
or transactions actually take place on a regulated market, multilateral trading facility 
or organised trading facility.172 
 
This is aimed at combating market abuse activities involving credit default swaps, climatic 
derivatives, contract for differences, derivatives and credit risk transfers instruments, spot 
commodity contracts, emission allowances and broker crossing systems traded in new 
markets, platforms (including multilateral trading facilities and organised trading facilities) 
and over the counter markets.173  The researcher acknowledges and supports the fact that 
169    Article 1(3) read with article 1(1). 
170    Article 2(1)(a) of the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal. 
171    Article 2(1)(b) of the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal. 
172    Article 2(1)(c) read with (d) & subsections (2); (3) & (4) of the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal. 
173    Also see the European Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and  of the 
Council on Markets in Financial Instruments Repealing Directive 2004/39/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council (Recast) COM (2011) 656 Final, 2011/0298 (COD), Brussels, 20 October 
2011 (hereinafter referred to as the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive Proposal), which also inter 
alia seeks to amend the organisational requirements for trading venues, authorisation and ongoing 
obligations applicable to data services providers and powers of regulators to enable them to combat 
market abuse involving a wide range of financial instruments in new markets and trading platforms, see 
further the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive Proposal’s Explanatory Memorandum 1-11 & 
articles 16 to 20; 32 to 34; 53 to 54; 27; 59 & 60 Markets in Financial Instruments Directive Proposal; 
also see the European Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and  of the 
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these amendments are necessary to prevent market abuse and regulatory arbitrage in over the 
counter markets and/or other trading platforms.174  Nonetheless, it is suggested that the 
Market Abuse Regulation Proposal should be further reviewed so that it provides adequate 
practical measures or guidelines regarding the uniform application of its extended scope in the 
European Union member states to avoid balkanisation and other potential overregulation 
problems.   In relation to this, it is further submitted that the Market Abuse Regulation 
Proposal’s extended scope should be carefully revised to reduce as much as possible the risk 
of creating new transaction reporting administrative burdens and/or cross-border enforcement-
related problems for regulators and other relevant stakeholders in the European Union 
member states.  Notwithstanding these concerns, it is submitted that adopting a similar and 
adequate extended scope of the market abuse ban in South Africa could, if consistently 
enforced, enable its relevant regulatory authorities to combat market abuse challenges posed 
by high frequency trading and other related illicit practices that are generally associated with 
the new trading platforms.   
 
In order to ensure legal certainty, provide adequate information for investors and remedy the 
gaps in the regulation of commodities and commodity derivatives, the Market Abuse 
Regulation Proposal enacted a new definition of inside information for commodity 
derivatives175 to enable the regulators to have powers to request relevant information on spot 
commodity markets.176 This allows the regulators to combat market abuse in spot commodity 
derivatives or related spot commodity contracts.177 However, it remains to be seen whether 
this new definition for commodity derivatives will be successfully utilised by regulators to 
Council on Markets in Financial Instruments and amending Regulation [EMIR] on OTC Derivatives, 
Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories  COM (2011) 652 Final, 2011/0296 (COD), Brussels, 20 
October 2011 (hereinafter referred to as the Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation Proposal), 
which sets out new requirements for the disclosure of trade transparency data to the public and transaction 
data to competent authorities, mandatory trading of derivatives on organised venues, specific supervisory 
actions regarding financial instruments and positions in derivatives and the provision of services by third-
country firms without a branch; also see the Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation Proposal’s 
Explanatory Memorandum 2-13; articles 1; 3 to 6; 13 to 20 & 21 to 27 of the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Regulation Proposal & Shearman & Sterling “A Changing Landscape: The MiFID II 
Legislative Proposal”  2011 Financial Institutions Advisory & Financial Regulatory Client Publication 1 
1-14. 
174   See the definitions of multilateral trading facilities and organised trading facilities in article 2(1)(6) & (7) 
of the Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation Proposal respectively.  
175   Article 6(1)(b) read with article 2(3) of the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal; however, this definition 
does not clearly provide whether an issuer or market participant’s own bona fide privileged measures and 
strategies for trading should be regarded as inside information for market abuse purposes.   
176    Article 17(2)(c) & (3) read with article 16 of the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal. 
177    Articles 8 & 10 of the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal. 
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curb market abuse without discouraging legitimate derivative and spot commodity contracts 
transactions.178   It is submitted that the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal should be 
reviewed to ensure that it provides specific guidelines on how regulators in the European 
Union member states can oversee the regulation of spot commodity markets and derivative 
markets without imposing undue excessive pressure on the issuers or other relevant market 
participants.  Moreover, the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal does not expressly apply to 
insider trading relating to underlying derivative and spot commodity contracts transactions179 
and wholesale energy products admitted to trading in the European Union member states’ 
trading platforms.180  Seemingly, the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal targets cross-market 
manipulation between derivative markets and spot commodity markets.181 The enactment of 
the Wholesale Energy Market Integrity and Transparency Regulation is a positive step 
towards combating market abuse in the physical commodities markets across the European 
Union member states.182  Be that as it may, it is submitted that this Wholesale Energy Market 
Integrity and Transparency Regulation should be amended so that it may provide a clear 
roadmap on its application in the European Union member states and how it will dovetail with 
the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal and the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
Proposal to prevent potential negative effects of overregulation and/or double jeopardy on the 
part of the market abuse offenders.  Despite these shortcomings, it is further submitted that the 
Securities Services Act,183 the Financial Markets Bill184 and/or the subsequent provisions of 
178   Cadwalader “The Proposed Revision of the Market Abuse Directive” 2011 Clients & Friends Memo 1 2-
3; Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer European Market Abuse News 2011 1 2-3. 
179   Article 2(3) read with articles 8 & 10 of the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal; Clifford Chance Markets 
Abuse: European Commission Proposes New EU Regime 2011 1 3-4.  
180   Such products are covered under the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 
October 2011 on wholesale energy market integrity and transparency 1227/2011/EU [2011] OJ L326/7-9 
(hereinafter referred to as the Wholesale Energy Market Integrity and Transparency Regulation); see 
article 3 read with article 4 of the Wholesale Energy Market Integrity and Transparency Regulation; 
Clearly Gottlieb EU Regulation on Energy Market Integrity and Transparency, Alert Memo, Brussels, 26 
September 2011 1 1-4 & Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) Guidance on the 
Application of the Definitions Set Out in Article 2 of Regulation (EU) No 1227/27 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on Wholesale Energy Market Integrity and 
Transparency, 1st Edition, Slovenia, 20 December 2011 1 6-24. 
181  For example, instances where a person concludes derivative transactions on derivative markets in order to 
manipulate the price of related spot commodity contracts transactions that are concluded on spot 
commodity markets or engaging in spot commodity contracts transactions for the purposes of 
manipulating the price of related commodity derivatives that are traded on derivative markets; also see 
Katz & Millar “Amendments to the Market Abuse Directive-10 Key Points” 2011 Orrick European 
Financial Markets Alert 1 1-2. 
182    See the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal’s Explanatory Memorandum 7. 
183    36 of 2004, hereinafter referred to as the Securities Services Act. 
184    [B-2011], hereinafter referred to as the Financial Markets Bill. 
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the Financial Markets Bill 2012185 should be amended in line with the Market Abuse 
Regulation Proposal and the Wholesale Energy Market Integrity and Transparency Regulation 
to provide a specific definition of inside information for commodity derivatives, spot 
commodity derivatives and related spot commodity contracts to curb insider trading and 
cross-market manipulation in the South African physical (non-financial markets) commodities 
markets.  In relation to this, another option is enacting separate, adequate and specific 
commodity derivatives regulations or legislation that targets market abuse activities involving 
commodity derivatives, spot commodity derivatives and related spot commodity contracts in 
the South African commodities markets.  
 
The Market Abuse Regulation Proposal introduced a new specific definition of inside 
information for emission allowances.186  This is aimed at extending the market abuse 
prohibition to financial instruments covered under the Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive Proposal187 and to address concerns that the scope of the EU Market Abuse 
Directive is mainly restricted to financial instruments traded on regulated markets.188  The 
prohibition on emission allowances is also targeted at curbing market abuse activities in the 
spot secondary markets and the European Union emission allowances markets.189  
Accordingly, emissions allowance markets participants who hold the relevant information 
suitable for ad-hoc and/or periodic disclosure will now have a duty to create insider lists, 
report managers’ transactions and publicly disclose inside information.190 Apparently, these 
obligations are not imposed on small participants (emitters) whose transactions may not 
significantly affect the market price of emission allowances in question and/or give rise to 
market abuse and issuers of emission allowances that holds responsibilities for development 
185    [B12-2012], hereinafter referred to as the Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
186    Article 6(1)(c); also see the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal’s Explanatory Memorandum  8-9. 
187    Section C of Annex 1 of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive Proposal; also see articles 
2(1)(8); 9; 17 & 20 of the Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation Proposal & the Markets in 
Financial Instruments Regulation Proposal’s Explanatory Memorandum 12.   
188    Article 1(3) of the EU Market Abuse Directive. 
189   See the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive Proposal’s Explanatory Memorandum 11; the Markets 
in Financial Instruments Regulation Proposal’s Explanatory Memorandum 12 & also see the Directive of 
the European Parliament and Council of 25 October 2003 on European Union emissions trading system 
2003/87/EC on establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the 
Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC, [2003] OJ L275 (hereinafter referred to as the EU 
Emissions Trading System Directive), as last amended by Directive 2009/29/EC OJ L140/63.   
190    Articles 12; 13 & 14 of the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal. 
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and implementation of European Union’s climate policies.191  It is, however, submitted that 
the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal should be reviewed in accordance with the Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive Proposal and the EU Emissions Trading System Directive192 
so that it may provide an optimal threshold for emissions or thermal input or a combination 
thereof, to enhance the effective combating of market abuse in spot carbon markets, and to 
prevent the potential risk of smaller emission allowances participants circumventing their 
market abuse liability unjustifiably.  Not giving less regard to the stated shortcoming, the 
adoption of a similar prohibition on emission allowances should be considered in South 
Africa to discourage market abuse activities in the spot secondary markets and/or related 
emission allowances markets in line with the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
Additionally, the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal provides a new broad definition of 
market manipulation to cover all actual manipulative and attempted manipulative conduct 
involving strategies such as algorithmic trading (including high frequency trading) and related 
activities like quote stuffing, layering and spoofing of spot commodity derivatives or 
contracts and other financial instruments.193  This suggests that cancelling or amending 
pending transactions by any person who has price-sensitive inside information is now 
prohibited and consequently the possibility of such person relying on a defence based on 
accepted market practices (subject to a one year transitional period for previously notified 
practices) is removed.194 Additionally, a number of instances that are deemed to constitute 
market manipulation are enumerated to empower the regulators to consistently adopt a 
common approach for the enforcement of the market manipulation provisions and to address 
concerns that the EU Market Abuse Directive lacked clarity on certain key concepts such as 
the elements of the attempted insider trading, actual and/or attempted market manipulation 
offences, giving rise to legal uncertainty.195  In view of this, it is submitted that the Securities 
Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be 
191   Articles 12(2); (3) & (8); 13(2) & (3) & 14(3) of the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal; Shearman & 
Sterling “Twice as MAD: Legislative Proposals to Amend the European Regulation of Market Abuse” 
2011 Financial Institutions Advisory & Financial Regulatory Client Publication 7; Shearman & Sterling 
2011 Financial Institutions Advisory & Financial Regulatory Client Publication 1 8-9 & Clifford Chance 
Markets Abuse 2011 3.    
192   Another option is to put all the provisions dealing with emission allowances in a single rulebook or 
legislation to minimise problems associated with the overlapping of related provisions and to efficiently 
discourage market abuse activities in emission allowances markets.  
193   Articles 8 &10 of the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal. 
194     Articles 8 &10 of the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal. 
195     See the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal’s Explanatory Memorandum 8. 
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amended to enact adequate, separate and specific provisions for both attempted insider trading 
and attempted market manipulation offences to enhance market integrity and improve the 
combating of market abuse in South Africa. 
 
The Market Abuse Regulation Proposal gives regulatory bodies in the European Union 
member states the power to enter private premises, search and seize documents after having 
obtained permission from the relevant courts, where a reasonable suspicion exists that such 
documents are relevant to an ongoing market abuse investigation.196 The regulatory bodies are 
also given powers to request existing telephone and data traffic records held by 
telecommunication operators if a reasonable suspicion exists that such records are required in 
an ongoing market abuse investigation.197  For the purposes of this and other related 
functions, the regulatory bodies are obliged to cooperate with the European Securities and 
Markets Authority, other relevant authorities and with each other.198  The regulatory bodies’ 
supervisory and sanctioning powers were revamped; for example, such bodies are now able to 
impose upon the market abuse offenders, civil or administrative pecuniary sanctions of not 
less than the profit made or loss avoided from the market abuse transactions in question 
and/or a maximum fine of not less than twice the value of any such profit gained or loss 
avoided.199  As a result, the regulatory bodies may impose a maximum fine of not less than 
five million euros on natural persons200 and civil or administrative pecuniary sanctions of up 
to 10% of the total annual turnover in the preceding business year, on legal persons.201  The 
regulatory bodies may further impose other additional higher sanctions upon the market abuse 
offenders.202  The European Union member states are also required to put in place adequate 
mechanisms to encourage whistle-blowers to report suspected market abuse activities to the 
regulatory bodies and/or other relevant authorities without the fear of being victimised.203 All 
these new developments are, among other things, targeted at addressing the fears that the 
regulators were lacking certain information and powers under the EU Market Abuse 
Directive, especially with regard to spot commodity markets and over the counter markets.204  
196     Article 17(2)(e) read with articles 16; 18 to 20 of the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal. 
197     Article 17(2)(f) read with articles 16; 18 to 20 of the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal. 
198     Articles 18 to 20 of the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal. 
199     Article 26(1)(k) of the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal. 
200     Article 26(1)(l) of the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal. 
201     Article 26(1)(m) of the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal. 
202     Article 26(2) read with article 27 of the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal. 
203     Article 29 of the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal. 
204     See the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal’s Explanatory Memorandum 10-13. 
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It is, however, submitted that the new regulators’ investigatory powers and whistle-blower 
immunity provisions should be utilised carefully and uniformly in the European Union 
member states to minimise the risk of discouraging or deterring potential investors, which is 
generally associated with overregulation.  Even so, it is submitted that the Securities Services 
Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be amended in 
accordance with the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal to provide specific market abuse 
whistle-blower immunity provisions205 for the purposes of encouraging all the persons to 
report market abuse activities to the Financial Services Board and/or other relevant 
enforcement authorities in South Africa. 
 
The Criminal Sanctions Market Abuse Directive Proposal provides new criminal sanctions for 
market abuse206 in a bid to address concerns that the EU Market Abuse Directive’s market 
abuse sanctions are either inadequate or less dissuasive for deterrence purposes.207   This also 
follows the European Commission’s submission that criminal sanctions, especially 
imprisonment, could be able to increase the dissuasiveness and/or deterrent effect of the 
market abuse sanctions across the European Union member states.208 Consequently, the 
Criminal Sanctions Market Abuse Directive Proposal requires the European Union member 
states to impose “effective, proportionate and dissuasive” criminal sanctions upon any person 
who intentionally engage or attempts to engage in insider trading or market manipulation 
activities.209  This might also have been targeted at clarifying the concerns raised in Spector 
Photo Group NV, Chris Van Raemdonck v Commissie voor het Bank, Financie-en 
205     Put differently, although s 159 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008; the Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 
2000; s 9 of the South African constitution & the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 can be employed to protect shareholders, directors and other employees 
from occupational reprisals, there are no specific provisions in the Securities Services Act, the Financial 
Markets Bill & the Financial Markets Bill 2012 that can be used to encourage and/or protect market abuse 
whistle-blowers from such reprisals.   
206   Articles 1 to 8 of the Criminal Sanctions Market Abuse Directive Proposal; these provisions does not 
apply to buy backs and stabilisation programmes, monetary policy and debt management activities and  
emission allowances activities conducted in pursuit of climate policy, see article 1(2) of the Criminal 
Sanctions Market Abuse Directive Proposal.  
207   See the Criminal Sanctions Market Abuse Directive Proposal’s Explanatory Memorandum 2-6.  
208    European Commission Towards an EU Criminal Policy-Ensuring the Effective Implementation of EU 
Policies Through Criminal Law COM (2011) 573 Final, 20 September 2011; also see related assessment 
reports <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/abuse/12112008_conference_en.htm> (accessed 
10-03-2012); <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2009/market_abuse_en.htm> (accessed 
10-03-2012); <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/mad/consultation_paper.pdf> 
(accessed 10-03-2012); <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2010/mad_en.htm> (accessed 
10-03-2012); <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/ abuse/index_en.htm> (accessed 10-03-
2012) & the Criminal Sanctions Market Abuse Directive Proposal’s Explanatory Memorandum 2-3. 
209    Articles 3 & 4 read with article 6 the Criminal Sanctions Market Abuse Directive Proposal. 
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Assurantiewezen,210 on whether it was required to prove the intention of the accused person 
involved who used inside information in his possession to engage in market abuse practices.  
Criminal sanctions can also be imposed upon any person who incites, aids and abets or 
attempts to incite, aid and/or abet another person to commit insider trading and market 
manipulation offences.211  This implies that legal persons can now incur criminal liability for 
insider trading and market manipulation.212  It is submitted that the Securities Services Act, 
the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be amended to enact 
provisions for separate and specific criminal sanctions that can be imposed upon any juristic 
person or individual who commits or attempts to commit insider trading or market 
manipulation offences in South Africa.  It is further submitted that the Securities Services Act, 
the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be amended to enact 
provisions for separate and specific criminal sanctions that can be levied against any person 
(including juristic persons) who incites, aids and abets or attempts to incite, aid and abet 
another person to commit market abuse offences in South Africa.  After the entry into force of 
the Criminal Sanctions Market Abuse Directive Proposal, the European Union member states 
are given two years to transpose its provisions into their respective national laws213 while the 
European Commission is given four years to report to the European Parliament and the 
Council on the application and effectiveness of the criminal sanctions.214  Nevertheless, it is 
submitted that the Criminal Sanctions Market Abuse Directive Proposal should be amended to 
remove the requirement of intention215 on the part of the offenders because it is very difficult 
to prove and this may, if not properly enforced, give rise to the ineffective enforcement of its 
criminal sanctions.   It is further submitted that the Criminal Sanctions Market Abuse 
Directive Proposal should be reviewed to ensure that it clearly provides separate and different 
criminal sanctions for natural and juristic persons that will be homogeneously enforced across 
the European Union member states. 
210   [2009] EUECJ C-45/08 (CBFA), in this case the court inter alia held that the EU Market Abuse 
Directive’s insider trading prohibition applies to anyone who merely deals in securities or financial 
instruments while in possession of inside information even if such information did not influence his 
trading decision.   In other words, as earlier stated, the court held that there was no need to prove the 
intention of the offenders in question for them to incur market abuse liability; see articles 1(1); 2; 3 & 4 of 
the EU Market Abuse Directive; Gide Loyrette Novel “Market Abuse Directive II: New Regulations and 
Criminal Sanctions for Market Abuse” 2011 The Brief Financial Regulation 1 3-4 & Clifford Chance 
Markets Abuse 2011 2. 
211      Article 5 read with article 6 of the Criminal Sanctions Market Abuse Directive Proposal. 
212      Articles 7 & 8 of the Criminal Sanctions Market Abuse Directive Proposal. 
213      Article 10 of the Criminal Sanctions Market Abuse Directive Proposal. 
214      Article 9 of the Criminal Sanctions Market Abuse Directive Proposal.  
215      Articles 3 & 4 of the Criminal Sanctions Market Abuse Directive Proposal. 
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 The Market Abuse Regulation Proposal stipulates that the precise data to be included in 
insider lists should be defined in delegated acts and implementing technical standards adopted 
by the European Commission.216   However, issuers whose financial instruments are admitted 
to trading on a small and medium-sized growth market and issuers who have not requested or 
approved admission of their financial instruments to trading on a regulated market, 
multilateral trading facilities and/or organised trading facilities are exempted from drawing up 
insider lists.217  This is, inter alia, aimed at removing national heterogeneous differences 
which were causing excessive administrative burdens on issuers and improving the 
investigation of market abuse activities by the competent authorities.  Nonetheless, it 
suggested that the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal should be reviewed to provide adequate 
measures or provisions on the content of insider lists and/or conditions under which issuers 
will have an obligation to draw up such lists.   In other words, the fact that the duty to provide 
adequate measures on the content of insider lists and conditions under which issuers are 
required to draw up such insider lists is solely and merely vested with the European 
Commission could, if not carefully enforced, lead to a duplication of the existing problems 
associated with excessive administrative burdens being imposed particularly on multinational 
companies and/or the heterogeneous application of the provisions on insider’s lists across the 
European Union member states.  In spite of these concerns, it is submitted that the drawing of 
insider lists by issuers and other relevant persons could, if assiduously adopted, enhance the 
prevention and combating of market abuse practices in South Africa. 
 
Any transaction made by a person executing managerial responsibilities on behalf of the 
issuer or whereby the manager lends or pledges financial instruments is now required to be 
disclosed to the regulators and the public.218  It is submitted that a similar provision should be 
introduced in South Africa to deter managers, directors and other relevant persons from 
committing market abuse offences.  The Market Abuse Regulation Proposal has also 
stipulated that managers’ transactions less than €20,000 per calendar year may not be 
216   Article 13(4) & (6) of the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal; also see the Market Abuse Regulation 
Proposal’s Explanatory Memorandum 10.   
217   Article 13(2) & (3) of the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal; also see the Market Abuse Regulation 
Proposal’s Explanatory Memorandum 10.  
218  Article 14 of the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal; also see the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal’s 
Explanatory Memorandum 10.   
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reported.219  This clarifies the scope of reporting obligations in relation to managers’ 
transactions and increases the deterring effect on such managers from wilfully engaging in 
market abuse activities. 
 
Inside information relating to issuers of a financial instrument whose financial instruments are 
admitted to trading on a small and medium-sized growth market may be posted by the trading 
venue220 on its website and/or in accordance with a standardised content and format defined 
in the implementing technical standards adopted by the European Commission.221  Such 
issuers also benefit from the new threshold for the reporting of managers’ transactions stated 
above.  This is done to ensure that the disclosure requirements for issuers whose financial 
instruments are admitted to trading on small and medium-sized growth markets are 
proportionate in order to remove excessive administrative burdens for such issuers.  
Moreover, such issuers, like any other issuers, will be required to seek permission from the 
competent authorities if they want to delay the prompt disclosure of inside information.222 
However, it remains to be seen whether this provision for the delayed disclosure of inside 
information will be homogeneously implemented in the European Union member states to 
prevent market abuse without being exploited by other devious issuers who might deliberately 
delay the disclosure of inside information to perpetrate market abuse activities and then 
circumvent their liability.   Despite this concern, it is suggested that a similar mandatory 
prompt disclosure obligation should be adopted in South Africa to enhance the combating of 
market abuse in regulated markets, over the counter markets and/or other small and medium-
sized growth markets. 
 
As highlighted above, it is clear that the practical implementation and enforcement of the 
provisions of the EU Market Abuse Directive rests with the member states.   This has, in 
some instances, resulted in the different interpretation of the requirements of the EU Market 
Abuse Directive, especially with regard to the definition of “inside information”, “insider” 
219   Article 14(3) of the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal; also see the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal’s 
Explanatory Memorandum 10.   
220   This refers to a system or facility for trading as defined in article 5(5) of the Market Abuse Regulation 
Proposal.  
221   Article 12(7) read with subsection (1) of the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal; also see the Market 
Abuse Regulation Proposal’s Explanatory Memorandum 9-10; also see Linklaters EU ‘Gets Tough’ on 
Market Abuse 20 October 2011 1 1-8 & Gide Loyrette Novel 2011 The Brief Financial Regulation 3. 
222   Article 12(4) & (5) read with subsection (9) of the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal; also see the 
Market Abuse Regulation Proposal’s Explanatory Memorandum 9-10.   
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and the “disclosure of inside information”.223 The fact that the United Kingdom enacted a 
specific definition of inside information in relation to professional intermediaries to inter alia 
curb front running while other European Union member states224 do not have such definitions 
is a case in point.  Moreover, it remains to be seen whether the new EU Market Abuse 
Proposals will promote the homogeneous implementation of the market abuse prohibition by 
all the European Union member states. 
6 5  Concluding Remarks 
 
As previously stated,225 the EU Market Abuse Directive was probably one of the most 
ambitious regulatory frameworks ever to be adopted regarding the prohibition of market 
abuse activities in the European Union.   In this respect, it is important to note that broader 
definitions of “accepted market practices”, “regulated market”, “financial instruments”, 
“inside information” and “market manipulation” were introduced by the EU Market Abuse 
Directive.226  Furthermore, the EU Market Abuse Directive brought stringent measures, for 
example:  
 
(a) a mandatory duty is imposed upon the issuers to promptly disclose inside 
information to the public;227  
 
(b) issuers or their agents are required to compile lists of their insiders (employees);228  
 
(c) persons in managerial positions are further required to report suspicious transactions 
which relate to their shares, derivatives or other financial instruments linked to 
them;229 and  
 
(d) any professional person who objectively suspects that certain transactions might give 
rise to insider trading or market manipulation is required to report (whistle-blowing) 
223   See generally Luchtman “EU Influence on Law Enforcement and International Cooperation in the Field 
of Insider Dealing” 2006 Utrecht Law Review 136 136-141.          
224   For instance, Spain and the Netherlands do not have specific definitions of inside information in relation 
to professional intermediaries.    
225    See paragraphs 6 4 3; 6 4 4 & 6 4 5 above. 
226   Articles 1(1) to (5); article 2 read with articles 3; 4 & 5 of the EU Market Abuse Directive; also see 
related discussions in paragraphs 6 3 1; 6 3 2; 6 3 3 & 6 3 4 above.   
227    Article 6(1) read with subsections (2) & (3) of the EU Market Abuse Directive.   
228    Article 6(3) of the EU Market Abuse Directive.   
229    Article 6(4) of the EU Market Abuse Directive.   
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them immediately to the competent regulatory authorities in the European Union 
member states.230  
 
These measures are clearly targeted at improving the detection and prevention of market 
abuse activities in the European Union financial markets. 
 
However, the EU Market Abuse Directive’s regulatory framework has a considerable number 
of flaws.  As earlier pointed out,231 such flaws include, inter alia, the failure on the part of the 
EU Market Abuse Directive to provide the specific types (whether civil, criminal or 
administrative sanctions) of market abuse penalties that are commonly applicable across the 
European Union member states and/or the various disparities that are found in relation to the 
interpretation and implementation of some of the provisions of the EU Market Abuse 
Directive in such member states.232  In relation to this, the researcher chose to analyse and 
demonstrate the implementation of the EU Market Abuse Directive in the United Kingdom.233 
The United Kingdom was considered because it is generally regarded as one of the major 
economies in the European Union.234  Accordingly, it was demonstrated that although the 
United Kingdom has implemented most of the provisions of the EU Market Abuse Directive, 
it has sometimes inconsistently applied heterogeneous enforcement approaches to combat 
market abuse in its financial markets.235   
 
In addition, some key proposals that were brought by the Criminal Sanctions Market Abuse 
Directive Proposal and the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal in a bid to address the flaws 
contained in the EU Market Abuse Directive were discussed.    For instance, it was indicated 
that the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal seeks to extend the scope of the EU Market Abuse 
Directive to cover a wide range of: 
 
(a) financial instruments admitted to trading on a regulated market or for which a request 
for admission to trading on a regulated market has been made;  
230    Article 6(9) read with subsection (5) of the EU Market Abuse Directive.   
231    See paragraph 6 4 5 above. 
232    See paragraph 6 4 5 above. 
233    See paragraph 6 4 5 above. 
234   Welch, Pannier, Barrachino, Bernd & Ledeboer 2005 British Institute of International and Comparative 
Law City Research Series 6-83; also see paragraph 6 4 5 above. 
235    See paragraph 6 4 5 above. 
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 (b) financial instruments traded on a multilateral trading facility or other new types of 
organised trading facilities in at least one member state; and    
 
(c) other behaviour or transactions involving financial instruments whose value relate to 
or depend on the financial instruments traded on a regulated market, multilateral 
trading facility or organised trading facilities, irrespective of whether the behaviour 
or transactions actually take place on a regulated market, multilateral trading facility 
or organised trading facility.236 
 
It was also indicated that this extended scope is intended for curbing the gaps in the regulation 
of new markets, trading venues or platforms (including multilateral trading facilities and 
organised trading facilities) and over the counter instruments.237  Despite this, it is suggested 
that the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal should be further reviewed so that it provides 
adequate practical measures or guidelines regarding the uniform application of its extended 
scope in the European Union member states to avoid balkanisation and other potential 
overregulation problems.238  It is further suggested that the aforementioned extended scope 
should be carefully revised to reduce as much as possible the risk of creating new transaction 
reporting administrative burdens and/or cross-border enforcement-related problems for 
regulators and other relevant stakeholders in the European Union member states.239  
 
The Market Abuse Regulation Proposal’s new definition of inside information for commodity 
derivatives which seeks to enable the regulators to have the powers to request relevant 
information on spot commodity markets in order to combat market abuse practices involving 
spot commodity derivatives or related spot commodity contracts was discussed.240  Although 
this research does not totally disregard this new definition for commodity derivatives, it is 
submitted that the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal should be reviewed to ensure that it 
provides specific guidelines on how regulators in the European Union member states can 
oversee the regulation of spot commodity markets and derivative markets without 
discouraging legitimate derivative and spot commodity contracts transactions and/or imposing 
236      See paragraph 6 4 5 above. 
237      See paragraph 6 4 5 above.  
238      See paragraph 6 4 5 above.  
239      See paragraph 6 4 5 above. 
240      See paragraph 6 4 5 above. 
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undue pressure on the issuers or other relevant market participants.241 It is further submitted 
that the Wholesale Energy Market Integrity and Transparency Regulation should be amended 
so that it may provide a clear roadmap on its application in the European Union member 
states and how it will dovetail with the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal and the Markets in 
Financial Instruments Directive Proposal to prevent potential negative effects of 
overregulation and/or double jeopardy on the part of the market abuse offenders.   
The Market Abuse Regulation Proposal’s new definition of inside information for emission 
allowances aimed at extending the market abuse prohibition to financial instruments covered 
under the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive Proposal and to address concerns that 
the scope of the EU Market Abuse Directive is mainly restricted to financial instruments 
traded on regulated markets was also examined.242 Accordingly, it was noted that emissions 
allowance markets participants, except small participants (emitters) whose transactions may 
not significantly affect the market price of emission allowances in question, will be mandated 
to create insider lists, report managers’ transactions and publicly disclose inside 
information.243 While giving due regard to the relevant provisions of the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive Proposal and the EU Emissions Trading System Directive, it is has 
been submitted that the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal should be reviewed to provide an 
optimal threshold for emissions or thermal input or a combination thereof to curb market 
abuse in spot carbon markets and to prevent the potential risk of smaller emission allowances 
participants circumventing their market abuse liability unduly.244   
 
Moreover, the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal’s new definition of market manipulation 
which covers both actual and attempted manipulative conduct involving strategies such as 
algorithmic trading, high frequency trading and related activities like quote stuffing, layering 
and spoofing of spot commodity derivatives or contracts and other financial instruments was 
discussed.245  It was further argued that the rationale for this new definition is, inter alia, 
targeted at empowering regulators to adopt a common approach to enforce the market 
manipulation ban across the European Union member states and/or addressing concerns that 
the EU Market Abuse Directive lacked clarity on certain key elements pertaining to the 
241      See paragraph 6 4 5 above. 
242      See paragraph 6 4 5 above. 
243      See paragraph 6 4 5 above. 
244      See paragraph 6 4 5 above. 
245      See paragraph 6 4 5 above. 
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attempted insider trading and attempted market manipulation offences giving rise to legal 
uncertainty.246   
 
The regulatory bodies’ powers to enter private premises, search and seize documents after 
having obtained permission from the relevant courts in the European Union member states 
were analysed.247 Likewise, the regulatory bodies’ powers to request existing telephone and 
data traffic records held by telecommunication operators if a reasonable suspicion exists that 
such records are required in an ongoing market abuse investigation were discussed.248  It was 
also acknowledged that the regulatory bodies’ supervisory and sanctioning powers were 
revamped, for example, such bodies are now able to impose upon the market abuse offenders, 
civil or administrative pecuniary sanctions of not less than the profit made or loss avoided 
from the market abuse transactions in question and/or a maximum fine of not less than twice 
the value of any such profit gained or loss avoided.249   Put differently, it was noted that the 
regulatory bodies may impose a maximum fine of not less than five million euros on natural 
persons and civil or administrative pecuniary sanctions of up to 10% of the total annual 
turnover in the preceding business year, on legal persons.250  It was also noted that the 
European Union member states are required to put adequate mechanisms in place to 
encourage whistle-blowers to report suspected market abuse activities to the regulatory bodies 
and/or other relevant authorities without the fear of being victimised.251  It is nonetheless 
submitted that the new regulators’ investigatory powers and whistle-blower immunity 
provisions should be carefully and uniformly utilised in the European Union member states to 
minimise the risk of discouraging potential investors, which is generally associated with 
overregulation.252  
 
The Criminal Sanctions Market Abuse Directive Proposal’s new criminal sanctions for 
market abuse were analysed.253  It was noted that the European Union member states are 
obliged to impose “effective, proportionate and dissuasive” criminal sanctions upon any 
246      See paragraph 6 4 5 above.  
247      See paragraph 6 4 5 above.  
248      See paragraph 6 4 5 above.   
249      See paragraph 6 4 5 above.   
250      See paragraph 6 4 5 above.  
251      See paragraph 6 4 5 above.   
252      See paragraph 6 4 5 above.   
253      See paragraph 6 4 5 above.   
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person who intentionally engages or attempts to engage in insider trading or market 
manipulation activities.254  It was further stated that criminal sanctions can be imposed upon 
any person who incites, aids and abets or attempts to incite, aid and/or abet another person to 
commit insider trading and market manipulation offences.255 Nevertheless, it was submitted 
that the Criminal Sanctions Market Abuse Directive Proposal should be amended to remove 
the requirement of intention on the part of the offenders because it is very difficult to prove 
and this may, if not properly enforced, give rise to the ineffective enforcement of its criminal 
sanctions.  It was further submitted that the Criminal Sanctions Market Abuse Directive 
Proposal should be reviewed to ensure that it clearly provides separate and different criminal 
sanctions for natural and juristic persons that will be homogeneously enforced across the 
European Union member states. 
 
It was noted that the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal provides that the precise data to be 
included in insider lists should be defined in delegated acts and implementing technical 
standards adopted by the European Commission.256 It was also noted that issuers whose 
financial instruments are admitted to trading on a small and medium-sized growth market and 
issuers who have not requested or approved admission of their financial instruments to trading 
on a regulated market, multilateral trading facilities and/or organised trading facilities are 
exempted from drawing up insider lists.257 Moreover, it was acknowledged that any 
transaction made by a person executing managerial responsibilities on behalf of the issuer or 
whereby the manager lends or pledges financial instruments shall be required to be disclosed 
to the regulators and the public, unless it is less than €20,000 per calendar year.258  
Nonetheless, it was submitted that the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal should be reviewed 
to provide adequate measures or provisions on the content of insider lists and/or conditions 
under which issuers shall have an obligation to draw up such lists to reduce administrative 
burdens, particularly on multinational companies.   
 
New measures were considered; for instance, inside information relating to issuers of a 
financial instrument whose financial instruments are admitted to trading on a small and 
254      See paragraph 6 4 5 above.  
255      See paragraph 6 4 5 above.   
256      See paragraph 6 4 5 above.    
257      See paragraph 6 4 5 above.    
258      See paragraph 6 4 5 above.     
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medium-sized growth market may now be posted by the trading venue on its website and/or 
in accordance with a standardised content and format defined in implementing technical 
standards adopted by the European Commission.259  Nevertheless, it was argued that such 
issuers, like any other issuers, will be required to seek permission from the competent 
authorities if they want to delay the disclosure of inside information.260  It is submitted that 
the aforementioned delayed disclosure of inside information might be very difficult to 
implement homogeneously in the European Union member states to prevent market abuse 
without being exploited by other unscrupulous issuers.  
 
Notwithstanding the aforementioned shortcomings, the EU Market Abuse Directive’s 
regulatory framework and the subsequent provisions of the Market Abuse Regulation 
Proposal and the Criminal Sanctions Market Abuse Directive Proposal could become more 
valuable to South Africa in several respects.  In a nutshell, although a detailed analysis of the 
recommendations is earmarked for the last chapter, it is concluded and submitted that the 
proposed provisions stipulated and summarised below could improve the enforcement of the 
market abuse ban in South Africa:  
 
Firstly, it is submitted that the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be amended to enact provisions which broadly extend the 
scope of the market abuse ban to cover securities or financial instruments traded on regulated 
markets, over the counter markets, organised trading facilities or multilateral trading facilities 
in South Africa or elsewhere, to enable the Financial Services Board and other relevant 
regulatory authorities to curb the market abuse challenges posed by high frequency trading 
and other related illicit activities associated with the new trading platforms;  
 
Secondly, it is submitted that the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or 
the Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be reviewed in line with the Market Abuse Regulation 
Proposal and the Wholesale Energy Market Integrity and Transparency Regulation to enact a 
specific definition of inside information for commodity derivatives, spot commodity 
derivatives and related spot commodity contracts to curb insider trading and cross-market 
manipulation in the South African physical (non-financial markets) commodities markets; 
and/or enacting separate, adequate and specific commodity derivatives regulations or 
259      See paragraph 6 4 5 above.     
260      See paragraph 6 4 5 above.       
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legislation that targets market abuse activities involving commodity derivatives, spot 
commodity derivatives and related spot commodity contracts in the South African 
commodities markets;  
 
Thirdly, it is suggested that the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be reviewed to enact adequate provisions on emission 
allowances in order to discourage cross-border market abuse activities in the spot secondary 
markets or related emission allowances markets in South Africa and elsewhere; 
Fourthly, the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets 
Bill 2012 should be amended to enact adequate, separate and specific provisions that 
distinguish and prohibit both actual and attempted insider trading and market manipulation 
offences to enhance market integrity and improve the combating of market abuse in South 
Africa; 
 
Fifthly, it is suggested that the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be amended in accordance with the Market Abuse 
Regulation Proposal to provide specific market abuse whistle-blower immunity provisions for 
the purposes of encouraging all the persons to report market abuse activities to the Financial 
Services Board and/or other relevant enforcement authorities in South Africa; 
 
Sixthly, it is submitted that the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be amended to enact specific provisions for separate and 
different criminal sanctions that can be levied against any person (including juristic persons) 
who incites, aids and abets or attempts to incite, aid and/or abet another person to commit 
market abuse offences in South Africa; 
 
Seventhly, the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012 should be amended to enact provisions that oblige issuers and other 
relevant persons to draw and update insider lists to enhance the detection and prevention of 
market abuse practices in South Africa; 
 
Eighthly, the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets 
Bill 2012 should be amended to enact provisions that mandate managers, directors and other 
relevant persons to disclose to the Financial Services Board and the public any transaction 
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(including their lending or pledging of securities or financial instruments) executed on behalf 
of the issuers, in order to deter such persons from indulging in market abuse activities; 
 
Lastly, the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets 
Bill 2012 should be amended to introduce a mandatory prompt disclosure obligation on the 
part of the issuers, for them to disclose inside information relating to securities or financial 
instruments traded on regulated markets, over the counter markets and/or other small and 
medium-sized growth markets so as to combat possible market abuse activity in both the 
regulated and unregulated markets and/or other trading platforms in South Africa.  
 
The next chapter will, from a comparative perspective, focus on the enforcement of the 
market abuse prohibition in the United Kingdom in order to recommend, where possible, 
measures and/or principles that could also be incorporated in the South African market abuse 
laws to enhance the curbing of market abuse practices in the relevant financial markets. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE ENFORCEMENT OF MARKET ABUSE PROVISIONS IN UNITED 
KINGDOM: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
7 1  Introduction   
 
Like several other countries, the United Kingdom has a regulatory and enforcement 
framework in place to combat insider trading, as well as other forms of market manipulation 
practices.   In this regard, it is important to note that the United Kingdom’s market abuse 
regime has a separate and specific statute that deals with insider trading1 and another statute 
which broadly deals with market manipulation and other related market abuse activities.2  The 
market abuse legislation in the United Kingdom has further been carefully formulated to 
incorporate some of the provisions of the 2003 European Directive on market abuse.3  
Consequently, this broad and extensive regulatory approach has led countries in other 
jurisdictions, including South Africa, to follow some of the enforcement approaches of the 
United Kingdom’s market abuse regime, especially with regard to the prohibition on insider 
trading.4  
 
It is against this background that this chapter will undertake a comparative analysis of the 
regulation and enforcement of market abuse legislation in the United Kingdom and South 
Africa to explore their similarities and differences.  Therefore, a general historical overview 
of the insider trading legislation will be discussed first, followed by a similar discussion on 
the prohibition of market manipulation practices.  This is not done only to explore the 
historical development of the anti-market abuse enforcement framework in the United 
Kingdom, but also to explore the strengths and weaknesses of the enforcement approaches 
adopted by such framework.   In relation to this, the detection, prosecution, and preventative 
1       The Criminal Justice Act 1993 (c 36), hereinafter referred to as the Criminal Justice Act.     
2     See the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (c 8), hereinafter referred to as the Financial Services 
and Markets Act.   Also see Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse: A Legal and 
Economic Analysis (2005) 307. 
3        Barnes Stock Market Efficiency, Insider Dealing and Market Abuse (2009) 125.  
4     Other countries that were also influenced by the United Kingdom’s insider trading legislation include 
Germany, Italy, Canada, Mexico and France. See further Steinberg “Insider Trading Regulation–A 
Comparative Perspective” 2003 The International Lawyer 153 154-171.  
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measures employed in the United Kingdom will be investigated and, where necessary, 
contrasted with similar enforcement approaches in South Africa.  Accordingly, only relevant 
United Kingdom market abuse provisions and cases will be discussed and contrasted with 
similar provisions and cases in South Africa for the purposes of identifying enforcement 
methods that could possibly be integrated in the South African anti-market abuse enforcement 
framework. 
 
7 2  Historical Overview of Insider Trading Prohibition 
 
A brief overview of the provisions of the insider trading legislation in the United Kingdom 
will be discussed here, with the principal focus on those that deal with the enforcement.   
Thereafter a comparative analysis with similar developments in South Africa will be carried 
out. 
 
The United Kingdom’s insider trading regime has a relatively short history.5   Until 1980, 
insider trading was not statutorily prohibited in the United Kingdom.6  Prior to this, two 
legislative attempts to outlaw insider trading in the early 1970s were unsuccessfully made.7  
This was further worsened by the fact that the common law failed to provide clear 
opportunities for the prejudiced persons to seek their redress in the civil courts.8 
 
Consequently, the legislature enacted the Companies Act 1980.9  However, this Act made 
insider trading a criminal offence only in certain specified circumstances.10  Moreover, the 
Companies Act 1980 provided some requirements for directors, members of their families and 
5       Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 308. 
6       Barnes Stock Market Efficiency, Insider Dealing 125. 
7     For instance in 1973, the Conservative government published a Companies Bill that would have 
prohibited insider trading, but it collapsed when the said government was defeated in the February 1974 
general election.  A similar Bill was proposed by the Labour government in 1978 and it suffered the same 
fate when the Labour government lost the May 1979 general election. 
8       In other words, the use of inside information without some affirmative obligation to disclose it did not 
give rise to civil liability for insider trading.  See further Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley Market 
Abuse and Insider Dealing (2009) 44.    
9       (c 22), hereinafter referred to as the Companies Act 1980. 
10     Also see s 68 to s 73 of the Companies Act 1980.   Also see generally Blair & Walker Financial Services 
Law (2006) 267.   
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substantial shareholders to report any dealings in shares of their companies to discourage the 
misuse of non-public inside information.11 
 
In an attempt to improve the prohibition of insider trading in the United Kingdom, the 
provisions of the Companies Act 1980 were revised and consolidated into the Companies Act 
1985.12  These provisions banning insider trading were further revised and re-branded as the 
Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985.13 The Insider Dealing Act prohibited 
individuals (insiders)14 who had access to material non-public inside information by virtue of 
their position within a company from dealing in the securities of the company while having 
such information. Furthermore, these insiders were prohibited from making a selective 
disclosure of non-public inside information to others (tipping) and it also prohibited the 
tippees from dealing in securities on the basis of such information.15   In addition, individuals 
with non-public information about a suggested takeover of a company were prohibited from 
dealing in that company’s stock. However, the provisions of the Insider Dealing Act applied 
only to individuals who knowingly dealt in the affected securities while in possession of 
material non-public inside information.16 Furthermore, the provisions of the Insider Dealing 
Act provided only criminal sanctions for insider trading violations.   As a result, the scope and 
impact of this Act was somewhat restricted and narrow.17 
 
Owing to a considerable uncertainty on the effectiveness of the provisions of the Insider 
Dealing Act, the legislature introduced the Financial Services Act 1986.18  The provisions of 
the Financial Services Act were inter alia aimed at supplementing and strengthening the 
enforcement of the insider trading ban in the United Kingdom.19  However, the provisions of 
11     Notwithstanding the fact that these disclosure and reporting duties were probably useful and justified in 
many respects, it is debatable whether such duties had the practical effect of prohibiting insider trading 
and other related illicit trading practices.  See further Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley Market Abuse 
and Insider Dealing 44.   
12     (c 6), hereinafter referred to as the Companies Act 1985. 
13    (c 8), hereinafter referred to as the Insider Dealing Act; also see Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley 
Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 44.   
14     Such insiders included directors, officers, employees and various kinds of agents of the company. 
15         See further Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 45. 
16       Thus, possible insider trading violations by juristic persons were not covered. Generally see s 10(b).   
17     In spite of the fact that the insider trading prohibition was effective since 1980, there were no convictions 
under the Insider Dealing Act until the late 1980s.   See further Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley 
Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 45.   
18      (c 60), hereinafter referred to as the Financial Services Act.  
19     S 173 to s 178 of the Financial Services Act.  Also see further Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley 
Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 44.    
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this Act were still applicable only to individuals and offered no civil remedy for such 
individuals who were prejudiced by insider trading. 
 
The provisions of the Insider Dealing Act (as amended by the Financial Services Act) were 
therefore, superseded by the Criminal Justice Act.20   Thus, the provisions of the Criminal 
Justice Act were, among other things, targeted at removing the loopholes that were contained 
in its predecessors by incorporating some recommendations from the European Council 
Directive on insider trading21 and extending the application of the prohibition on insider 
trading to a wider class of securities22 and individuals.23  Specifically, three classes of 
individuals (insiders) that are statutorily prohibited from committing insider trading include 
firstly, a person who has direct knowledge of non-public inside information (primary insider) 
by virtue of being a director, employee or shareholder of an issuer of securities or by virtue of 
their employment or office.24 Secondly, the Criminal Justice Act prohibits an individual 
(secondary insider) who obtains non-public inside information either directly or indirectly 
from a primary insider from committing insider trading offences.25  Lastly, the Criminal 
Justice Act further discourages any secondary insider’s tippees from indulging in insider 
trading.26   
 
Furthermore, the Criminal Justice Act prohibits individuals from engaging in approximately 
three forms of conduct that would amount to insider trading.   Firstly, individuals are 
prohibited from dealing in price-affected securities on the basis of non-public material inside 
information.27  Secondly, individuals are prohibited from encouraging (tipping) other persons 
to deal in price-affected securities on the basis of non-public material inside information.28  
20    The Criminal Justice Act came into force on 1 March 1994 together with two ancillary statutory 
instruments namely, the Insider Dealing (Securities and Regulated Markets) Order 1994 & the Traded 
Securities (Disclosure) Regulation 1994.  See further Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley Market Abuse 
and Insider Dealing 45.    
21   See Council Directive (89/552)/EEC, Article 1(2).   This enabled the United Kingdom enforcement 
authorities to investigate all individuals who engage in insider trading activity in the United Kingdom and 
elsewhere in the European Union.    See further Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley Market Abuse and 
Insider Dealing 48.    
22      See the definition of price-affected securities in Schedule 2 of the Criminal Justice Act. 
23      S 57 read with s 52; s 55(3)(b) & s 56(2) of the Criminal Justice Act. 
24      S 57(1)(a) & (2)(a). 
25      S 57(1)(b) & (2)(b). 
26      S 57.   Also see generally Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 47.    
27      S 52(1). 
28      S 52(2)(a). 
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Lastly, the Criminal Justice Act prohibits individuals from knowingly and improperly 
disclosing non-public material inside information to other persons.29  No individual (insider) 
may be convicted of insider trading unless he knew that he was in possession of non-public 
inside information and dealt in the affected securities on the basis of such information. 
 
Although the Criminal Justice Act introduced a number of significant changes such as a wider 
definition of securities,30 its provisions are still flawed in some respects.  For instance, its 
prohibition may only give rise to criminal sanctions against individuals who practise insider 
trading.   Put differently, the definition of “individual” only covers unincorporated 
partnerships or corporations comprising a collection of individuals.31 This is arguably one of 
the main weaknesses of the insider trading ban contained in the Criminal Justice Act.32 
Moreover, individuals will only be liable for insider trading when they deal in affected 
securities on a regulated market or where such dealing is conducted on the over the counter 
markets through a professional intermediary.33  
 
Apart from the Criminal Justice Act, the insider trading practice is also indirectly prohibited 
in the Companies Act 2006.34 For instance, the directors of a company are prohibited from 
accepting benefits from third parties35 and dealing in such company’s securities if they have a 
direct or indirect interest that contradicts the interests of the company, especially with regard 
to their use of privileged inside information to avoid possible conflicts of interests and/or 
insider trading.36  Moreover, circumstances in which a company can deal in its own securities 
29    S 52(2)(b).  It is of interest to note that individuals could be liable for insider trading in terms of s 52 if 
the prosecuting authorities prove that such accused individuals are insiders as stipulated in s 57 and that 
they were in possession of non-public inside information as proscribed in s 56 of the Criminal Justice Act.   
See Part V of the Criminal Justice Act.   See further Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley Market Abuse 
and Insider Dealing 46-51.   
30     This definition of securities included shares, debentures and derivatives in companies as well as gilts and 
local authority stock in both local and foreign public bodies and their derivatives.   See Schedule 2 of the 
Criminal Justice Act.    
31     This could suggest that other corporations and entities like public companies are exempted from insider 
trading liability.   Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 46.   
32      See further Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 46.   
33     Face to face over the counter (OTC) transactions between non-professional intermediaries are excluded 
from insider trading liability under the Criminal Justice Act.  Also see Avgouleas The Mechanics and 
Regulation of Market Abuse 320 & Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley Market Abuse and Insider 
Dealing 46.     
34      (c 46), hereinafter referred to as the Companies Act 2006. 
35      S 176 of the Companies Act 2006. 
36      See s 175 of the Companies Act 2006 & s 177; s 182; s 187 read with s 178(2) of the same Act which 
imposes a duty on the directors to disclose their interests in proposed or ongoing transactions. See further 
Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 20.   
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or capital to repurchase, cancel stock, or redeem preference shares are carefully regulated to 
prevent the abuse of non-public price-sensitive information through insider trading.37  
 
7 3  Historical Overview of Market Manipulation Prohibition 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that market abuse also constitutes insider trading activity,38 this sub-
heading will mainly discuss market manipulation and other forms of market abuse that do not 
necessarily amount to insider trading.  
 
Market manipulation and other related market abuse activities have been statutorily prohibited 
in the United Kingdom, probably since the early 1860s.39  The initial attempt to prohibit 
market manipulation in the United Kingdom was made by the Larceny Act 1861.   This Act 
criminalised fraudulent misrepresentations intended to create a false market.40  The second 
attempt to regulate market manipulation in the United Kingdom was possibly introduced 
under the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1939.41  However, this Act was repealed by 
the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1958.42   The Prevention of Fraud (Investments) 
Act 1958 prohibited dishonest concealment of material non-public inside information relating 
to any securities for personal gain or the benefit of others.43  However, its purported market 
abuse ban was extremely difficult to enforce, especially where the wrongful conduct was 
committed outside the United Kingdom. 
 
37      Also see generally Part 18 of the Companies Act 2006 & s 170(4) of the same Act which states that the 
general duties of directors shall be interpreted and applied in the same way as common law rules or 
equitable principles.  This is probably aimed at affording equitable damages or redress to any persons 
prejudiced by insider trading.  Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 
12-13 &17-18.   
38      In light of this, it is essential to note that about seven types of market abuse practices are statutorily 
prohibited in the United Kingdom.  Barnes Stock Market Efficiency, Insider Dealing 132; Russen 
Financial Services Authorisation, Supervision and Enforcement: A Litigator’s Guide (2006) 206-208. 
39     S 84 of the Larceny Act 1861 (24 and 25 Vict c 96).   Also see Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation 
of Market Abuse 314.  
40    S 84 of the Larceny Act 1861; also see R v Kylsant [1932] 1 KB 442, where the court employed s 84 of 
the Larceny Act 1861and convicted Lord Kylsant for misrepresentations made in his company’s 
prospectus & see further related remarks in Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 
314.  
41      (c 16); see s 12(1). 
42     (c 45); also see Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 314; Rider, Alexander, 
Linklater & Bazley Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 44.   
43    This was mainly aimed at discouraging market manipulation and other related market abuse practices.   
See further s 13 of the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act 1958.  
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As a result the legislature enacted a new market manipulation prohibition under the Financial 
Services Act.44  A two-fold market manipulation prohibition was formulated under the 
Financial Services Act.  Firstly, it prohibited the making of misleading statements or 
concealment of material non-public inside information relating to any securities.45 Secondly, 
the Financial Services Act prohibited the perpetration of market manipulation through 
misleading conduct or practices.46  
 
The market manipulation prohibition under the Financial Services Act was, however, flawed 
in some areas.  For instance, it failed to obtain more convictions against the market 
manipulation offenders.   This could have been triggered by its heavy reliance on the criminal 
sanctions alone to combat market manipulation or similar market abuse activities.47 
 
In order to improve and align the United Kingdom’s market abuse legislation with the 
international best standards, the legislature enacted the Financial Services and Markets Act.48 
The Financial Services and Markets Act came into effect on 1 December 2001.   This Act 
defined and treated market manipulation and other market abuse practices both as criminal 
and civil offences.  The initial civil provisions of the Financial Services and Markets Act 
discouraged three conducts, namely the misuse of information, the making or publishing of 
false or misleading impressions and market distortion or manipulation.49 These provisions 
were extensively revised on 1 July 2005 after the adoption of the Treasury’s Market Abuse50 
and Investment Recommendation (Media) Regulations51 to implement the European Union 
Market Abuse Directive52 and its so-called Level 2 Implementing Measures.53 
44     Also see generally Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 314; Rider, Alexander, 
Linklater & Bazley Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 44.  
45      S 47(1). 
46     S 47(2).   Also see Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 314; Black & Nobles 
“Personal Pensions Misselling: The Causes and Lessons of Regulatory Failure” 1998 MLR 789; Rider 
“Policing the City-Combating Fraud and Other Abuses in the Corporate Securities Industry” 1988 
Current Legal Problems 47 & Swan Market Abuse Regulation (2006) 5. 
47      Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 308. 
48      Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 307.  
49      See the original s 118(2)(a) to (c).   Also see Russen Financial Services Authorisation, Supervision 185. 
50     See the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Market Abuse) Regulations 2005 SI 2005/381.   Also 
see the Financial Services Authority’s Market Abuse Directive Instrument 2005, 17 March 2005 & the 
Financial Services Authority’s Market Abuse Directive Disclosure Rules Instrument 2005, 17 March 
2005.   
51      2005 SI 2005/382. 
52      See Directive 2003/6/EC of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse) 
[2003] OJ L96/16 (hereinafter referred to as the EU Market Abuse Directive); also see Avgouleas The 
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The new civil provisions under the Financial Services and Markets Act provided a broader 
and comprehensive definition of various conducts that could amount to market manipulation 
and other related market abuse practices.54  These provisions also retained civil offences for 
engaging in conduct that will give rise to the misuse of material inside information55 and 
creation of a false or misleading impression or distortion of the financial markets.56  The new 
civil offence under the Financial Services and Markets Act is now applicable to both natural 
and juristic persons.57 Moreover, this civil offence need only be proved on the balance of 
probabilities.  It is not necessary to prove intention on the part of the alleged offenders; 
negligent action or inaction may be sufficient for such offenders to incur liability.58 
 
In addition, as earlier indicated, there are seven types of market abuse practices in the United 
Kingdom and these practices will each now be briefly discussed.  Firstly, insider dealing59 is 
expressly outlawed in the Financial Services and Markets Act. Consequently, any person or 
insider who deals or attempts to deal in qualifying and related investments on the basis of 
non-public price-sensitive inside information relating to the investments in question will incur 
Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 307 & Russen Financial Services Authorisation, Supervision 
206. 
53     Also see Commission Directive 2003/124/EC of 22 December 2003 implementing Directive 2003/6/EC 
of 28 January 2003 on the definition and public disclosure of inside information and the definition of 
market manipulation [2003] OJ L339/70; Commission Directive 2003/125/EC of 22 December 2003 on 
the fair presentation of investment recommendations and the disclosure of conflicts of interest [2003] OJ 
L339/073.  Also see Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 259-260 & 307 for 
further related analysis.   
54      S 118(1) to (8); also see the initial Part VIII of the Financial Services and Markets Act. 
55      S 118(2) to (4) of the Financial Services and Markets Act. 
56     See s 118(5) to (8) of the Financial Services and Markets Act.   These civil offences are enforced parallel 
to the criminal offences contained in the Criminal Justice Act.   
57     See s 150 read with s 90; s 380; 382; s 118(1); s 118B & s 118C of the Financial Services and Markets 
Act. Additionally see Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 391-446 for related 
analysis.    
58      It is only primarily important to establish whether the alleged market abuse conduct occurred in relation 
to any qualifying investments on a prescribed market before imposing any liability on the alleged 
offenders.   Prescribed markets include but are not limited to markets listed under the rules of the United 
Kingdom recognised investment exchange such as the London Stock Exchange, the International 
Petroleum Exchange, the London Metal Exchange, EDX London, Euronext-LIFFE and Virt-x.  
Qualifying investments include financial instruments like options, bonds and other forms of securities 
debt, derivatives on commodities, company shares (and securities equivalent to company shares), money 
market instruments, financial futures contracts, forward interest rate agreements, interest rate, equity 
swaps and other securities giving right to acquire shares or bonds.  See s 118(1)(a) & (b) of the Financial 
Services and Markets Act; also see Russen Financial Services Authorisation, Supervision 206-208; 
Barnes Stock Market Efficiency, Insider Dealing 129-132 & Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley Market 
Abuse and Insider Dealing 74-75. 
59      This conduct is also criminally prohibited under the Criminal Justice Act.   See paragraph 7 2 above. 
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civil liability under the Financial Services and Markets Act.60  Secondly, improper disclosure 
is also prohibited in the Financial Services and Markets Act.   Accordingly, the disclosure of 
non-public price-sensitive information by an insider or any individual to another person in 
instances other than for the proper performance of his employment, profession or duties will 
give rise to a civil offence on the part of that individual under the Financial Services and 
Markets Act.61  Thirdly, any misuse of information is discouraged under the Financial 
Services and Markets Act.  Therefore, conduct based on information that is not generally 
available but that would affect the decision of the investors to deal or not to deal in certain 
qualifying investments could amount to market manipulation or other market abuse 
offences.62  Such conduct must also be based on information which a “regular user”63 of the 
market or the person in the position of the alleged offender would consider relevant in 
determining the terms on which to deal before civil liability can be imputed against any 
accused persons.64   
 
Fourthly, manipulating transactions are further prohibited in the Financial Services and 
Markets Act.  As a result, any behaviour or dealing that gives a false or misleading impression 
of the supply of or demand for one or more investments to raise the price of the investments 
in question to abnormal or artificial levels amounts to a civil offence of market 
manipulation.65 Such behaviour also includes the making of false or misleading transactions 
so as to give a false impression of the volume of trade in the affected securities.66   
Manipulating transactions further includes price positioning.  This usually occurs when a 
60    S 118(2).  Also see further Barnes Stock Market Efficiency, Insider Dealing 132-133 & Rider, Alexander, 
Linklater & Bazley Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 72-73 & 78. 
61      S 118(3).    In other words, the disclosure of inside information by a director of a company to another 
person in mere social context or selective briefing of market participants like financial analysts by 
directors or other persons with managerial positions will suffice for such persons to incur liability for 
improper disclosure of inside information.  
62      S 118(4). 
63      S 130A read with s 118A & s 118C of the Financial Services and Markets Act. 
64      Factors that are considered when determining whether the information in question is relevant to a “regular 
user” includes the extent to which the information is reliable (including how close the person or offender 
involved is to the tipper or the person who is the original source); whether such information is not already 
generally available to market participants and whether the information is fresh and different from 
information which is generally available or that would lead to a disclosure to be made in the future.    
Also see Barnes Stock Market Efficiency, Insider Dealing 134 & Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley 
Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 78-80 & Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 
344-345.  
65      S 118(5). 
66      For example, wash trades; buying qualifying investments at the close of the market to mislead investors 
who act at closing prices; buying and selling a specific security by persons among themselves to create an 
illusion (painting the tape) of high volumes of trading.  
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person enters small orders into an electronic trading system at prices which are higher than the 
previous bid or lower than the previous offer, in order to move the price of the qualifying 
investments in question.67   Fifthly, manipulating devices are also prohibited under the 
Financial Services and Markets Act.   Accordingly, any persons who trade or place orders to 
trade through employing fictitious devices or any other form of deception or contrivance will 
incur civil liability for market manipulation.68  Examples of conduct that involve the use of 
manipulative devices include “flipping” or disclosing conflicting statements about certain 
qualifying investments through the Internet and engaging in transactions that are aimed at 
concealing the ownership of a qualifying investment to avoid compliance with the disclosure 
requirements.   
 
Sixthly, illicit dissemination of information is prohibited in the Financial Services and 
Markets Act.   Put differently, an insider or any person who knowingly gives information that 
conveys or is likely to convey a false or misleading impression about an investment or the 
issuer of an investment will be liable for market manipulation.69   Lastly, distortion and 
misleading behaviour is also outlawed in the Financial Services and Markets Act.   In other 
words, any conduct that gives a false or misleading impression of either the demand for or the 
supply of investments and behaviour that distorts or is likely to distort the market in such 
investments leads to civil liability on the part of the offenders.70 
 
A separate civil prohibition against persons who encourage or require others to engage in 
market manipulation or other market abuse activities is also proscribed in the Financial 
Services and Markets Act.71 The requirement or encouragement offence is committed where, 
by taking or refraining from taking any action,72 a person in question has required or 
encouraged others to indulge in market manipulation or other related market abuse activities.   
67    Other examples of price positioning involve the so-called abusive squeezes, where a person has a position 
(directly or indirectly) in an investment under which quantities of qualifying investment or related 
investment are deliverable.   
68      S 118(6).  
69   S 118(7); also see further Barnes Stock Market Efficiency, Insider Dealing 138 & Rider, Alexander, 
Linklater & Bazley Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 78.    
70   S 118(8); also see Russen Financial Services Authorisation, Supervision 206-207 & Avgouleas The 
Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 332-358 for further related analysis.    
71      S 123; also see Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 78. 
72   Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 78; the Financial Services 
Authority (hereinafter referred to as the FSA), see the FSA’s Code of Market Conduct 1.8.2.  
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This may indicate that the Financial Services and Markets Act has a broader market abuse 
civil prohibition than its predecessors.  
 
Market manipulation is also treated as a criminal offence under the Financial Services and 
Markets Act.73 Precisely, any person who makes misleading statements or who dishonestly 
conceals material facts relating to qualifying investments for the purpose of inducing or who 
is reckless as to whether they may induce other persons to enter or exercise or refrain from 
exercising any rights conferred by the relevant investments will be criminally liable for 
market manipulation.74 
 
Furthermore, engaging in misleading practices and conduct which creates a false or 
misleading impression in respect of the market or the value of any qualifying investments for 
the purposes of creating that impression and inducing other persons to acquire, dispose of, 
subscribe for, or underwrite such investments or to refrain from doing so is criminalised under 
the Financial Services and Markets Act.75  This presupposes that misleading statements or 
omissions and other forms of market manipulation such as artificial transactions and trade-
based manipulations are further prohibited and criminalised under the Financial Services and 
Markets Act.76 
 
Market manipulation has further been indirectly made a criminal offence under the Fraud 
Act.77  This Act introduced a new general offence fraud which discourages false 
representations, failure to disclose non-public material inside information and fraud by abuse 
of position.78  Thus, although it is most likely that violations for market manipulation or other 
related activities may be prosecuted under the Financial Services and Markets Act or the 
Criminal Justice Act, such violations may also fall under the general offence of fraud as 
stipulated in the Fraud Act.79 
73      S 397.    This section replicates s 47(1) of the Financial Services Act. 
74      S 397(1) & (2).   Also see Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 314-316. 
75     See s 397(3).  While the prohibition under s 397(1) & (2) requires proof of dishonest or recklessness, 
liability in terms of s 397(3) may suffice even where mere misleading acts were executed by the accused 
persons.   Also see Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 314-318.   
76      S 397(3).   Also see Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 318-320. 
77      2006 (c 35), hereinafter referred to as the Fraud Act. 
78     A person may be regarded as having abused their position to commit market abuse even when their 
conduct consisted of an omission rather than an actual act.    See s 4 read with s 3.   
79      Barnes Stock Market Efficiency, Insider Dealing 128-129. 
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7 4  Available Penalties 
 
Civil, criminal and administrative penalties are employed in the United Kingdom to combat 
and discourage market abuse practices.   However, it is important to note that the discussion 
under this sub-heading will mainly focus on penalties as proscribed in the Criminal Justice 
Act and the Financial Services and Markets Act. 
 
Criminal penalties may be imposed on all persons who knowingly engage in market abuse 
practices in the United Kingdom.  Thus, the contravention of the insider trading provisions 
contained in the Criminal Justice Act80 and other market abuse provisions contained in the 
Financial Services and Markets Act will give rise to criminal penalties in the United 
Kingdom.81 Criminal penalties for insider trading under the Criminal Justice Act may only be 
imposed on individuals.82  However, the criminal penalties for insider trading under the 
Financial Services and Markets Act are now applicable to both natural and juristic persons.83  
Criminal penalties that may be imposed on individuals for insider trading or market 
manipulation include a fine or imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or both on 
summary conviction; or upon conviction on indictment, a fine or imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding seven years, or both.84 
 
The perpetrators of market abuse in the United Kingdom may also be liable for civil penalties.  
Although these penalties apply to both juristic and natural persons under the Financial 
Services and Markets Act,85 there are no civil penalties for insider trading under the Criminal 
Justice Act.86  Civil penalties that may be imposed on the perpetrators (offenders) of market 
abuse under the Financial Services and Markets Act comprise unlimited monetary fines,87 
disgorgement of profits and/or the payment of compensation to the prejudiced persons.88  A 
80      See Part V read with s 52 & s 61 of the Criminal Justice Act. 
81      S 402 read with s 397 of the Financial Services and Markets Act; also see Part V of the Criminal Justice 
Act.    
82      See paragraphs 7 2 & 7 3 above. 
83      S 402; also related remarks in paragraph 7 3 above. 
84     S 402 of the Financial Services and Markets Act; also see Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of 
Market Abuse 323-324 & Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 93-94.  
85     S 402; also see similar analysis in paragraph 7 3 above. 
86      See Part V; also see related analysis in paragraph 7 2 above. 
87      S 123(1). 
88    Also see further Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 375; Rider, Alexander, 
Linklater & Bazley Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 94.  
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number of factors have to be considered when determining the appropriate amount of the fine 
to be imposed on the offenders.  Such factors are provided for in the Financial Services and 
Markets Act as well as in the enforcement section of the Financial Services Authority’s 
Enforcement (Manual) Handbook.89  The factors include the following: (a) the adverse effect 
of the behaviour on the market in question; (b) whether the person on whom the penalty is to 
be imposed is an individual or a juristic person; (c) the amount of profits accrued or loss 
avoided; (d) the degree to which the conduct in question was deliberate or reckless and (e) the 
conduct following the behaviour of the alleged offender in question.90 
 
With regard to the last factor, the Financial Services Authority may further consider the 
degree of co-operation that the accused person gave during the investigations of the wrongful 
conduct and whether any remedial steps were taken by that person from the time that 
behaviour was initially identified.91 
 
The courts may, at the request of the Financial Services Authority, further impose monetary 
fines on a person who violates any market abuse provisions.92  This usually follows after an 
application to the court by the Financial Services Authority for an injunctive or restitution 
relief.93  
 
In addition, a number of administrative penalties are used to curb market abuse in the United 
Kingdom.94 For example, disciplinary sanctions such as variation of (withdrawal of 
authorisation) Part IV permission;95 injunctions (including cease or desist orders) to take 
remedial steps, secure or freeze assets and to discourage a certain conduct.96 These court 
injunctions can be imposed on any person who commits market abuse practices, regardless of 
89      Release 064 April 2007, which is hereinafter referred to simply as the “ENF”. 
90    See further s 205; s 206 & s 210 of the Financial Services and Markets Act.  See further ENF 14.7.4G & 
Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 374-377.     
91      See ENF 14.7.4.G(5).   Also see Swan Market Abuse Regulation 113-123. 
92      S 129 of the Financial Services and Markets Act. 
93     S 384 read with s 381 & s 383 of the Financial Services and Markets Act; also see Russen Financial 
Services Authorisation, Supervision 147-151.   
94      Swan Market Abuse Regulation 112. 
95      S 53 & s 54 read with s 63 of the Financial Services and Markets Act; also see ENF 3, 4 & 5. 
96    See s 380 & s 381 of the Financial Services and Markets Act.   Also see ENF 6.1.1.G; ENF 6.2.1.G; ENF 
6.6.1.G; ENF 6.3.2.G & ENF 6.3.7.G.   
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whether such person is regulated by the Financial Services Authority.97 Other administrative 
penalties that can be levied against market abuse offenders are public censure,98 withdrawal 
of approval on former approved persons who are not fit to perform their initial authorised 
functions,99 prohibition of individuals who engage in illicit trading activities from dealing or 
carrying out functions related to regulated activities100 and imposing restitution and redress 
orders on any persons who commit market manipulation and/or other market abuse 
offences.101  It should be borne in mind that these administrative penalties are applicable to all 
persons (natural and juristic persons) especially under the Financial Services and Markets 
Act.102 
 
The Financial Services and Markets Act further confers a private right of action to the 
Financial Services Authority to apply to the courts for a restraining order or restitution order 
against any person who knowingly contravenes its relevant market abuse provisions.103  In 
addition, the Financial Services Authority may also seek a court order against any alleged 
offenders to disgorge the profits gained or directly pay compensation to the persons affected 
by their market abuse activities.104  Although a civil private right of action is available as 
indicated above to the persons who suffer losses due to other forms of market abuse, there is 
no such express private right of action for persons affected by market manipulation as 
contained in the Financial Services and Markets Act105 and insider trading as contained in the 
Criminal Justice Act.106 
 
97     ENF 6.1.1.G.   A person who disobeys or fails to comply with an injunction may be held in contempt of 
court and could be liable to imprisonment, monetary fine or seizure of the assets.   S 206 of the Financial 
Services and Markets Act; also see ENF 6.2.5.G & see further Swan Market Abuse Regulation 125.  
98        S 205 of the Financial Services and Markets Act; also see ENF 12. 
99        S 59 read with s 66 & s 210 of the Financial Services and Markets Act.   Also see ENF 7.5.1.G. 
100       S 56(2) of the Financial Services and Markets Act.    See generally ENF 8.1.2.G. 
101      S 382; s 383 & s 384 of the Financial Services and Markets Act.   Also see ENF 9.1.2.G; ENF 9.4.2.G & 
ENF 9.5.1.G.   See further Russen Financial Services Authorisation, Supervision 136-166.    
102      In this regard, it should be noted that administrative penalties under the Criminal Justice Act are possibly 
still limited to individuals (natural persons) alone.  
103      S 150; s 380 & s 382.     The court orders for a private right of action do not however, apply to market 
abuse violations regarding s 397 of the Financial Services and Markets Act.   
104       Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 94. 
105      S 397 of the Financial Services and Markets Act; also see Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley Market 
Abuse and Insider Dealing 94.   
106       Part V of the Criminal Justice Act.  
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7 5  Detection, Prosecution and the Enforcement of the Market Abuse Prohibition 
7 5 1  The Role of the Financial Services Authority 
 
The Financial Services Authority was established as the main single body which administers 
an integrated regulatory system for all the financial services and markets in the United 
Kingdom.107 This further suggests that the Financial Services Authority has the main 
responsibility of administering and enforcing the prohibition on market abuse in the United 
Kingdom.108   
 
Although there are a number of other regulatory bodies, the Financial Services Authority has 
the sole responsibility and powers to police the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition 
in the United Kingdom.  These powers include to investigate or refer a matter to its 
Regulatory Decisions Committee; impose unlimited monetary penalties; make a public 
statement that a person has engaged in market abuse, and to apply to the courts for an 
injunction to claim restitution or restrain continued market abuse.109  The Financial Services 
Authority may further make market abuse rules and determine the general policy and 
principles to govern the performance of particular functions in the relevant financial 
markets.110 
 
In order to enhance its enforcement, the Financial Services Authority is divided into several 
divisions such as the Supervision, Markets and Enforcement Divisions.111 The Supervision 
Division’s sub-divisions within the Financial Services Authority that can make referrals to the 
Enforcement Division consist of major retail groups, retail firms, contact revenue and 
information management groups and the financial markets.112  The Financial Services 
Authority is further equipped with extensive interrogatory and investigatory powers which it 
107     The FSA was introduced on 27 October 1997 as the main regulatory body which replaced all earlier and 
similar regulatory agencies in the United Kingdom.   See Blair & Walker Financial Services Law 3.   
108     This is the so-called single regulator model which in this context entails that only one regulatory body 
(the FSA) has the main authority to supervise the regulation and enforcement of the market abuse ban in 
the United Kingdom.   It is, however, not the purpose of this sub-heading to discuss all the merits and 
demerits of this so-called single regulator model. 
109    S 2(4) of the Financial Services and Markets Act which stipulates the general functions of the FSA.   Also 
see Barnes Stock Market Efficiency, Insider Dealing 138-139.     
110     S 138 to s 158.    For further analysis, check Blair & Walker Financial Services Law 14-17.   
111     Swan Market Abuse Regulation 88. 
112   Therefore, supervisors are responsible for isolating market abuse cases in order to submit them to the 
Enforcement Division or the Crown Prosecution Services (CPS) or the Director of Public Prosecutions 
(DPP) for further investigation and prosecution.  
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may objectively exercise against any persons who violate the market abuse provisions.113   It 
may, for example, by written notice require an authorised person to provide specific 
information and other specified documents relevant to an ongoing investigation.114  Moreover, 
the Financial Services Authority may appoint additional persons as investigators of certain 
market abuse cases.115 
 
The Financial Services Authority can also act as a quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative 
regulatory body.  Consequently, the Financial Services Authority may seek judicial and quasi-
judicial remedies from the High Courts, namely issuer freezing orders or restitution orders 
against market abuse offenders, in order to stop a particular market abuse conduct.   
Moreover, the Financial Services Authority’s legislative role comprises, inter alia, powers to 
promulgate relevant rules regarding market abuse to guide all market participants in the 
United Kingdom.116   In light of this, as earlier indicated,117 the Financial Services Authority 
issued a Code of Market Conduct which provides guidance regarding conduct that amounts to 
market abuse in the United Kingdom.118  
 
In addition, the Code of Market Conduct outlines in more detail the standards required of all 
participants in the United Kingdom’s financial markets.   It broadly defines three categories of 
conduct that amount to market abuse, namely misuse of information, dissemination of false or 
misleading information and market distortion.  Misuse of information is defined to involve 
behaviour (action or inaction) that is based on information which is not generally available 
but which would be relevant to an investor’s dealings in a particular investment and which is 
ordinarily disclosed to the market.   Dissemination of false or misleading information is 
defined to involve behaviour that gives rise to or that is likely to give rise to false or 
misleading impression as to the supply or demand, price or value of an investment.119  
Distortion of the market is defined in the Code of Market Conduct to include conduct that 
113      S 165 to s 169 & s 284 of the Financial Services and Markets Act. 
114     S 165(1); (2) & (3) of the Financial Services and Markets Act; also see further Avgouleas The Mechanics 
and Regulation of Market Abuse 368-370. 
115    S 97; s 167; s 168; s 173 & s 175 of the Financial Services and Markets Act.   In addition, see Rider, 
Alexander, Linklater & Bazley Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 189-190.   
116      S 119 read with s 122 of the Financial Services and Markets Act. 
117      See discussion in paragraphs 7 3 & 7 5 1 above. 
118     See the FSA Handbook (Code of Market Conduct) released on 19 July 2001. 
119    The FSA has to date utilised the Internet bulletin boards to disclose relevant information relating to a 
number of qualifying investments.   This is aimed at preventing market manipulation activities like the so-
called pump and dump schemes which often prejudice innocent investors.   
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interferes with the normal process of supply and demand and which manipulates the market 
price of an investment.120 
 
Information gathering and relying on competent companies or skilled persons is another tool 
that is used by the Financial Services Authority.  This enables the Financial Services 
Authority to gather information from both authorised persons and in certain instances, from 
non-regulated persons to prevent possible market abuse activity from occurring.   Specifically, 
this is done by the use of skilled person’s reports to identify or track market abuse practices in 
the United Kingdom’s financial markets.121 
 
The Financial Services Authority may impose disciplinary sanctions on persons who commit 
market abuse offences.   As earlier stated,122 such disciplinary sanctions comprise injunctions 
to disgorge the profits gained or stop certain market abuse activity, issuing warning notices, 
cancelling or withdrawing of Part IV permission, and prohibiting certain individuals from 
carrying out their functions that relate to regulated activities.123 
 
With regard to detection, the Financial Services Authority in conjunction with the London 
Stock Exchange relies on the Stock Exchange Automated Quotation market marking system 
to detect all possible market abuse activities in the relevant financial markets.124  Moreover, 
all listed United Kingdom equities and other investments listed on a subsidiary market known 
as the Alternative Investment Market could further rely on the Stock Exchange Alternative 
Trading System or Stock Exchange Automated Quotation or another trading system known as 
the Stock Exchange Alternative Trading System Plus to detect and curb market abuse 
practices.  
 
In order to combat cross-border market abuse practices, the Financial Services Authority has 
brokered some co-operation with similar bodies in other jurisdictions.   It has, for instance, 
120   For example, when a person purchases large amounts of a particular share at or near the end of the day to 
mislead other investors.  
121     The FSA is manned by about 2500 to 3000 competent persons (staff).   This could further imply that that 
the Enforcement Division and other Divisions of the FSA have competent and skilled persons.   See 
generally Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 190-195 & Blair & 
Walker Financial Services Law 34-35. 
122    See paragraph 7 4 above. 
123     Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 203 & 225-229.   
124     Barnes Stock Market Efficiency, Insider Dealing 19.     
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signed various Memoranda of Understanding with other regulatory bodies like the United 
States Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
and the International Organisation of Securities Commissions.125 
 
As indicated above, it is evident that the Financial Services Authority plays a key role in the 
enforcement of the securities and market abuse provisions in the United Kingdom.   For 
instance, notwithstanding the fact that the Financial Services Authority is primarily 
responsible for the enforcement of the civil remedy for market abuse, it further oversees the 
enforcement of other securities laws in the United Kingdom.    
 
Moreover, although a few criminal cases of market manipulation and insider trading have 
been successfully prosecuted since the inception of the United Kingdom’s market abuse 
regime in 1986, relatively more prosecutions of such cases have been obtained, especially 
after 2001 when the Financial Services Authority took over from the Department of Trade and 
Industry.126  For instance, about five criminal cases of market abuse have so far been 
successfully prosecuted by the Financial Services Authority.127  Additionally, in the Rigby 
and Bailey scandal, Carl Rigby and Gareth Bailey were convicted for making a reckless 
statement, promise or forecast which was deceptive and misleading and sentenced to eighteen 
125   In 2008, the FSA co-chaired the International Organisation of Securities Commissions task force on other 
unregulated entities and hedge funds in order to examine alternative regulatory approaches that mitigate 
the risk associated with their illicit market abuse practices.  Generally see the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission & the FSA’s Memorandum of Understanding on Consultation, Cooperation and the 
Exchange of Information Related to Market Oversight (2006) <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/mou/cftc.pd> 
(accessed 27-01-2012) & see further the Financial Services Authority “FSA Signs Regulatory 
Cooperation Agreement with the CFTC” (20-11-2006) 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/PR/2006/118.shtml> (accessed 27-01-2012).  Also 
see the Commodity Futures Trading Commission & the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission “A Joint Report of the SEC and the CFTC on Harmonization of Regulation” Report 16 
October 2009 81; see further related Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) which can be accessed at 
<http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/documents/financial_services/regulating_financial_services/fin_rfs_ 
mou.cfm> (accessed 26-01-2012) & generally see the International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) Technical Committee Working Party 4 on Principles for Memorandum of 
Understanding, XVI Annual Conference 5 September 1991, which provides the model adopted by the 
FSA on several financial information sharing agreements (MOUs) that it has entered into with other 
regulatory bodies since 1992.   Blair & Walker Financial Services Law 35-38. 
126     The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) was previously responsible for enforcing the insider trading 
prohibition in the United Kingdom.   It was generally believed that the DTI failed to obtain more 
convictions in criminal cases involving insider trading in the United Kingdom.  Precisely, about 15 cases 
involving 19 individuals were prosecuted for insider trading during the period between 1984 & 1996 in 
the United Kingdom.  However, no convictions were obtained in all these 15 cases.   Barnes Stock Market 
Efficiency, Insider Dealing 161.    
127   See generally Barnes Stock Market Efficiency, Insider Dealing 161.    
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months imprisonment each.128  They were further convicted of contravening the disclosure 
provisions of the Financial Services and Markets Act129 and sentenced to a two year jail term 
each.   In the Hipwel and Bhoyrul scandal, Hipwell was jailed for six months; Shepherd was 
also jailed for three months while Bhoyrul was sentenced to 180 hours of community service 
for market abuse and conspiracy to commit market abuse on 17 December 2005.130 
 
In contrast to the few successful prosecutions achieved in the criminal cases of market 
abuse,131 the Financial Services Authority has to date obtained relatively more settlements in 
civil cases involving market abuse, especially after enactment of the enactment of the 
Financial Services and Markets Act.132   About twelve cases of market abuse offences which 
were committed during the period between April 2004 and March 2007 have so far been 
settled with the Financial Services Authority.133  Moreover, about five cases which 
constituted a breach of the Financial Services Authority’s Listing Rules were settled with the 
Financial Services Authority during the same period.134 
 
The Financial Services Authority has, in the wake of the early 1980s market abuse scandals 
such as the Guinness-Distillers135 and the Blue Arrow cases,136 subsequently introduced 
stricter measures to curb and prevent the recurrence of similar scandals in all the prescribed 
markets in the United Kingdom.137   For example, after a bogus take-over scheme for the 
shares of Distillers company, the chairman and chief executive officer of Guinness company, 
Ernest Saunders, financiers and the share support group members namely, Gerald Ronson, Sir 
128   Barnes Stock Market Efficiency, Insider Dealing 161.    
129     S 397(1); also see Barnes Stock Market Efficiency, Insider Dealing 161.    
130     Hipwell, Bhoyrul & Shepherd allegedly conspired between August 1999 & February 2000 to buy shares 
in 44 companies that they later tipped in their column over the Internet.   As a result, Hipwell made £41 
000, Anil Bhoyrul £15 000 & Terry Shepherd gained about £17 000.   Barnes Stock Market Efficiency, 
Insider Dealing 162-164.     
131    Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 94.   
132   See related remarks in paragraphs 7 4 & 7 7 of this Chapter; also see Barnes Stock Market Efficiency, 
Insider Dealing 174 & Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 95.   
133  Eight of these cases involved insider trading; one case constituted improper disclosure of non-public 
material information; two involved the unlawful dissemination and one constituted distortion and 
misleading behaviour.  Barnes Stock Market Efficiency, Insider Dealing 174.     
134    Barnes Stock Market Efficiency, Insider Dealing 174.     
135   See the related discussions in paragraphs 7 5 2 & 7 7 of this Chapter; also see Rider, Alexander, Linklater 
& Bazley Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 93-94.   
136   Directors and some members of the County NatWest and National Westminster Bank’s merchant banking 
subsidiary were convicted of misleading the market by disguising the failure of their Blue Arrow rights 
issue in February 1992.    However, their convictions were set aside on appeal in August in 1992.    
137     Generally see Barnes Stock Market Efficiency, Insider Dealing 148-152.     
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Jack Lyons and stock broker Antony Parnes were all convicted of conspiracy, theft and 
issuing false, misleading or deceptive accounting statements.138  Sir Jack Lyons was stripped 
of his knighthood, Saunders was sentenced to ten years in jail (he, however, served five 
months of this sentence but it was later halved on appeal due to his pre-senile dementia 
medical condition) and Gerald Ronson was fined for five million pounds plus a one year jail 
term.   Antony Parnes was sentenced to two and half years imprisonment, but this sentence, 
however, was later reduced to 21 months on appeal in 1991.139  Consequently, the Financial 
Services Authority has so far imposed penalties and other appropriate administrative actions 
against any individuals or companies involved in market abuse activity.   For example, in 
ABN Amro Equities UK case, on 23 April 2003 this company was fined £900 000 for market 
manipulation.   In the same case, Michael Ackers was also fined £70 000 for violation of 
Principle 3 of the Financial Services Authority’s Listing Requirements which requires 
companies and the individuals concerned to maintain good corporate standards so as to 
combat market abuse conduct.140  In Shell Transport and Trading and Royal Dutch/Shell 
Group of companies,141 a £17 000 000 fine was imposed on the directors as well as other 
persons who issued false or misleading information to the financial markets contrary to the 
Listing Rules and the relevant provisions of the Financial Services and Markets Act. 
 
Disciplinary action for a public censure was invoked by the Financial Services Authority in 
Marconi plc case.142  In this case, the Financial Services Authority issued a public statement 
to the effect that Marconi plc had failed to speedily release price-sensitive information 
regarding a change in its performance expectation to the relevant financial market.143  In 
another case, the Financial Services Authority found Roberto Casoni (a former equities 
138     Barnes Stock Market Efficiency, Insider Dealing 148-152.     
139    Barnes Stock Market Efficiency, Insider Dealing 148-152.     
140    Barnes Stock Market Efficiency, Insider Dealing 164-166.     
141  See the FSA Final Notice 2004-08-24; also see Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley Market Abuse and 
Insider Dealing 215.   
142   Generally see Barnes Stock Market Efficiency, Insider Dealing 164-165; also see other similar cases such 
as the Financial Services Authority v (1) Sean Fradley (t/a Top Bet Placement Services) (2) Gary 
Woodward [2004] EWHC 3008 (Ch), where the FSA successfully obtained injunctions against the market 
abuse offenders & Philip Jabre v Financial Services Authority (2006) 36 fin 06/2006, where the FSA 
successfully charged the accused persons for engaging in conduct that give rise to market abuse.   Also 
see Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 76-77; 206.   
143   In so doing it was stated that Marconi plc company had contravened Rule 9.2(c) of the FSA’s Listing 
Rules. 
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analyst) guilty for failing to observe the required proper standards of market conduct contrary 
to its general principles for approved persons.144 
 
7 5 2  The Role of the Courts 
 
The relevant courts and the Department of Trade and Industry have played an important role 
in the enforcement of securities and market abuse laws in the United Kingdom.145   Put 
differently, the Department of Trade and Industry146 and the courts initially had the main 
prerogative to prosecute all criminal cases involving market abuse in the United Kingdom.   
Thus, in spite of the fact that the Financial Services Authority may now itself prosecute 
market abuse cases, it used to refer such criminal cases to the Department of Trade and 
Industry and the courts for further investigations and/or prosecution.147  In most instances the 
Department of Trade and Industry could prosecute and enforce securities violations that relate 
to general corporate matters, for example, the disqualification of directors.  On the other hand, 
the courts may hear and prosecute any market abuse cases referred to them by the Financial 
Services Authority. 
 
In addition, it should be noted that the Crown Prosecution Services is the public prosecuting 
body in England and Wales.   The Director of Public Prosecutions and the Crown Office are 
the bodies responsible for prosecuting market abuse cases in Northern Ireland and Scotland 
respectively.  The courts have the power to investigate, prosecute and impose appropriate 
penalties on market abuse offenders.   For example, the courts may impose civil, criminal and 
administrative sanctions on any person who indulges in market abuse activities.148  The courts 
may, on application of the Financial Services Authority or any prejudiced person, further 
grant orders for judicial and quasi-judicial remedies such as injunction for restitution, freezing 
144    Additionally see the General Principle 3 of the FSA’s Listing Requirements.  Also see other civil cases 
that were successfully settled with the FSA’s in table seven of Barnes Stock Market Efficiency, Insider 
Dealing 164-165 & Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 206-209.    
145     Blair & Walker Financial Services Law 299-300. 
146     It is reported that the Department of Trade and Industry’s market abuse prosecutorial powers are now 
vested in the Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform.   Herbert Smith “UK Market 
Abuse Update” 2009 Financial Regulation Briefing 1 2-3; see the Department of Business Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform’s market abuse prosecutions on 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/PR/2009/002.shtml> (accessed 28-01-2012).    
147     S 402(1)(a) of the Financial Services and Markets Act. 
148   S 381 of the Financial Services and Markets Act; also see s 148 of the Powers of Criminal Courts 
(Sentencing) Act 2000 (c 6),  which empowers courts to impose restitution orders against all the 
convicted persons.    
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assets, declaratory relief, prohibitory and mandatory injunction relief as well as desist or seize 
orders against market abuse offenders.149 Undoubtedly, this has, in a way, further enhanced 
the Financial Services Authority’s imposition of administrative sanctions against the market 
abuse offenders in the United Kingdom.150 Additionally, the courts (including the Equity and 
Chancery Courts) may further award financial orders and damages to compensate all the 
persons affected by market abuse.151   
 
Despite the fact that some weaknesses and irregularities still exist in the criminal enforcement 
of the market abuse prohibition, the courts have to date successfully prosecuted a considerable 
number of cases involving market abuse in the United Kingdom.  For example, cases like the 
Chase Manhattan Equities v Goodman152 have been adequately prosecuted.   In this case 
Knox J held that any transaction or dealing based on the misuse of inside information was 
against public policy, unenforceable and consequently resulted in criminal liability on the part 
of the offenders.153  Moreover, in the Scott v Brown154 case, the Court of Appeal held that an 
agreement to stabilise the price of shares while a number of certain shares were brought into 
the financial market was illegal and unenforceable. This decision was inter alia probably 
intended at preventing market abuse practices like insider trading and market manipulation.  
In the Financial Services Authority v Fitt155 the High Court used its discretion to impose a 
freezing order against the persons accused of market abuse.156  
 
149     For further clarity check s 129; s 380; s 381; s 382 & s 383 read with s 348 of the Financial Services and 
Markets Act.   Also see Russen Financial Services Authorisation, Supervision 146-166.    
150     Significantly high penalties have further been, in many cases, successfully levied against individuals or 
companies that commit market abuse offences.   See Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley Market Abuse 
and Insider Dealing 226-230.  
151      This clearly suggest that the courts have a discretion to award equitable remedies like specific 
performance or rescission of Part IV permission against any person who violates market abuse provisions.   
S 50 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 (c 54).   Also see Seager v Copydex (No 2) [1969] 1 WLR 809, 
where damages for misuse of price-sensitive (confidential) information were granted against the 
perpetrators of securities and market abuse violations; see further Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley 
Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 38-39.   
152    [1991] BCLC 897.  
153   Also see related cases such as R v Rigby, Bailey & Rowley (2005) FSA/PN/106/2005 2005-10-07; R v 
Ghosh [1982] QB 1053 & SIB v Pantell SA (No 2) [1993] BCLC 146 (CA).   Generally see s 62(2) of the 
Criminal Justice Act; see further Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 
38-39.   
154     [1892] QB 724. 
155    [2004] EWHC 1669 ch. 
156     This injunction or freezing order was generally awarded in accordance with s 381(3) & (4) of the 
Financial Services and Markets Act.   
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In a nutshell, the successful prosecution of the Guinness-Distillers, Blue Arrow, Geoffrey 
Collier and the Smith, Spearman and Payne scandals is clear evidence of the competence of 
the relevant courts to enforce the market abuse prohibition in the United Kingdom.  For 
instance, in the Smith, Spearman and Payne case the defendants were found guilty of 
conspiracy to commit insider trading in January 2004 after Payne, who was a proof reader at a 
company of commercial printers, passed non-public information that he had seen at that 
company to the other defendants, involving drafts of the prospectus and offer documents prior 
to the announcement on the London Stock Exchange.   Eventually, about 27 takeover and 
merger transactions were made and all the defendants made almost £336 000 profit.  The 
Court of Appeal sentenced Smith and Catherine Spearman to 18 months imprisonment terms 
each.   Payne was sentenced to 21 months in jail while Richard Spearman was imprisoned for 
30 months. 
 
Likewise, in the Financial Services Authority v Martin and Anor,157 Alton J gave an 
injunctive relief against the defendants to cancel all the transactions that contravened some 
market abuse provisions.  In some instances, the defendants were also ordered to compensate 
the affected investors directly for their incurred losses. 
 
As indicated above, one can conclude that the effectiveness of the United Kingdom’s market 
abuse regime is attributed to the competence of the relevant courts in enforcing and 
prosecuting market abuse cases.  Accordingly, in spite of the inconsistent and relatively few 
successful criminal prosecutions recorded in market abuse cases by the courts during the 
Department of Trade and Industry era, a notable increase in the number of successful 
prosecutions of such cases has been achieved since the Financial Services Authority 
succeeded the Department of Trade and Industry in 2001.158 In other words, although the 
Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform and the Financial Services 
Authority are empowered to prosecute market abuse cases, the relevant courts have to date 
157   [2005] 1 BCLC 495; also see R v Caldwell [1982] AC 341, where the court charged the accused for 
disseminating false and misleading information & Bell v Lever Brothers Ltd [1932] AC 161 where the 
defendant was sued for engaging in market manipulation practices that influenced the price of the affected 
securities.      
158    See El Ajovu v Dollar Holdings [1993] 1 BCLC 760; Chaston v SWP Group Ltd [2003] 4 Current Law 78 
& the R v Rigby, Bailey & Rowley FSA/PN/106/2005 2005-10-07 scandal which was criminally 
prosecuted on 18 August 2005; also see Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley Market Abuse and Insider 
Dealing 94.    
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consistently utilised their main prerogative to hear and prosecute all criminal cases involving 
market abuse violations in the United Kingdom.  
 
7 5 3  The Role of Other Self-Regulatory Organisations 
 
In spite of the fact that the Financial Services Authority was established as the main agency 
solely responsible for the enforcement of market abuse in the United Kingdom,159 several 
self-regulatory organisations have also made a significant contribution to the supervision and 
regulation of the securities and financial services industry in the United Kingdom to date.160  
 
During the 1970s and the early 1980s, self-regulatory organisations such as the Bank of 
England, the Personal Investment Authority, the Investment Management Regulatory 
Organisation, the Securities and Investments Board and the Securities and Futures Authority 
played a leading role in the prevention, investigation and prosecution of securities and market 
abuse cases in the United Kingdom.161  Nevertheless, serious systemic flaws were still evident 
in the regulation of the financial services industry in the United Kingdom.   Therefore, in an 
attempt to rectify these flaws and to make the enforcement of the securities and market abuse 
laws more effective, most of the responsibilities of the Bank of England, the Securities and 
Investments Board and the Securities and Futures Authority were transferred to the Financial 
Services Authority in 1997. 
 
A number of regulatory organisations like the London Stock Exchange, the London 
International Financial Futures and Options Exchange Administration and Management, the 
Serious Fraud Office, the Financial Services and Markets Tribunal, the Financial Ombudsman 
Service, the Financial Services Compensation Scheme, the Department for Business 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, the Regulatory Decisions Committee, and the Treasury are 
currently involved in the regulation and enforcement of market abuse in the United Kingdom. 
 
The London Stock Exchange is the main securities exchange in the United Kingdom which 
oversees the public trading of listed qualifying investments in the relevant financial markets to 
minimise and curb market abuse activities.  This is done by adopting relevant rules and 
159     See paragraph 7 5 1 above. 
160     Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 308-310. 
161   Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 309. 
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guidelines that restrict and discourage market abuse practices.  The London Stock Exchange 
further employs sophisticated and computerised surveillance systems to detect all possible 
market abuse activity.  Where such activity is detected, a publication is made to the relevant 
financial markets and the Financial Services Authority through the so-called Suspicious 
Transaction Reports to inform all the investors and possible investors.162 
 
One of the Recognised Investment Exchange which plays a pivotal role in the regulation of 
market abuse is the London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange 
Administration and Management.  The London International Financial Futures and Options 
Exchange Administration and Management has a mandate to investigate, operate and employ 
necessary measures that detect and discourage market abuse activities.  For instance, it has 
powers to take disciplinary action like issuing private warnings to any person accused of 
serious misconduct or contravening market abuse provisions.163 
 
The Serious Fraud Office was established under the Criminal Justice Act 1987164and was 
granted wide investigatory and prosecutorial powers in respect of serious and complex 
corporate frauds.  Consequently, since its introduction the Serious Fraud Office has 
investigated and prosecuted several cases involving insider trading and market 
manipulation.165  The Serious Fraud Office is further allowed to extract any information or 
documents necessary for an ongoing investigation from any accused persons.    In addition, 
the Serious Fraud Office has the power to indict persons accused of fraud and/or market abuse 
offences and refer such matters to the Crown Prosecution Services or the Director of Public 
Prosecutions for prosecution.166 
 
For the purposes of obtaining more settlements in cases involving securities violations, the 
Financial Ombudsman Service was introduced under the auspices of the Financial Services 
and Markets Act.167  The Financial Ombudsman Service was formally launched in December 
2001 with the main aim of providing an independent alternative method of redress to all the 
162      Barnes Stock Market Efficiency, Insider Dealing 199.     
163     Swan Market Abuse Regulation 89. 
164     (c 38); see s 1 of the Criminal Justice Act 1987.  
165     Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 383-387.   
166   S 401(2) of the Financial Services and Markets Act; also see Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of 
Market Abuse 384; Kiernan “The Regulatory Bodies Fraud: Its Enforcement in the Twenty-First Century” 
2003 The Company Lawyer 293 293.  
167    S 225; also see Blair & Walker Financial Services Law 166-183. 
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affected persons or investors.   In other words, the Financial Ombudsman Service is not a 
regulatory body per se; its main role is to resolve individual disputes between consumers 
(investors) and other market participants like financial services organisations.168  The 
Financial Ombudsman Service deals with all kinds of financial disputes involving securities 
violations.   This could imply that the Financial Ombudsman Service may also deal with 
disputes involving market abuse violations.  Moreover, the Financial Ombudsman Service 
administers the Financial Services Compensation Scheme in instances where it has either 
compulsory or voluntary jurisdiction.169 The Financial Services Compensation Scheme 
provides compensation to all eligible and successful complainants who were prejudiced by 
any securities violations.170 
 
The Financial Services and Markets Tribunal is an independent regulatory body established to 
provide a platform for any person aggrieved by the decisions of the Financial Services 
Authority to appeal.171 Consequently, the Financial Services and Markets Tribunal may hear 
any references or appeal against the Financial Services Authority regarding its disciplinary 
decisions, cancellation of Part IV permission, imposed penalties, prohibition orders and its 
verdicts or final decisions on matters relating to market abuse.172  This is probably targeted at 
maintaining the stability and integrity in the United Kingdom’s financial markets.   However, 
it should be noted that the appeal against any Financial Services Authority’s decision must be 
made within 28 days of the date on which the decision notice or supervisory notice was 
issued.173  The Financial Services and Markets Tribunal may, if satisfied, conduct a de novo 
review of matters referred to it by authorised persons or by any other aggrieved persons.  For 
purposes of providing appropriate redress to the affected persons, the Financial Services and 
Markets Tribunal is obliged to derive its rules or course of action in accordance with the 
provisions of the Financial Services and Markets Act.174  The Financial Services and Markets 
168   In contrast to the regulatory powers of the FSA which are usually invoked to seek redress on a more 
broad scale, the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) is responsible for resolving disputes on an 
individual basis.  
169   S 226 & s 227 of the Financial Services and Markets Act; also see Blair & Walker Financial Services 
Law 169-170.   
170    Russen Financial Services Authorisation, Supervision 340-346. 
171   See s 132 read with s 133 of the Financial Services and Markets Act.   The Financial Services and 
Markets Tribunal (FSMT) is administered by the Tribunal Service, an executive organ of the Ministry of 
Justice in the United Kingdom.    Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 382-383. 
172   S 127(4) read with s 133 of the Financial Services and Markets Act. 
173   S 133(1) of the Financial Services and Markets Act. 
174    S 133; s 127 & s 388 of the Financial Services and Markets Act. 
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Tribunal may, for example, take decisions like re-hearing a matter, reviewing, dismissing an 
appeal or setting aside its own decision.175 Additionally, the Financial Services and Markets 
Tribunal may determine and give directions regarding the appropriate action to be followed 
by the Financial Services Authority.176  The Financial Services and Markets Tribunal may 
further give recommendations to the Financial Services Authority regarding its rules and 
regulating procedures.177 
 
The Treasury has also played a crucial role in the general regulation of the securities and 
financial services industry in the United Kingdom.   It is responsible for the overall 
institutional structure of the securities and financial services regulation and/or relevant 
legislation.  As a result, the Treasury may take action in instances where serious securities law 
violations are reported to it.   The Treasury can further appoint or remove members of the 
executive governing body and the non-executive committee of the Financial Services 
Authority.  Moreover, the Treasury can appoint an independent person to conduct a review 
and/or a separate independent inquiry into the efficiency or effectiveness of certain functions 
of the Financial Services Authority178 and the specific circumstances regarding securities, 
market abuse or any other violations where such action is considered to be in the public 
interest.179 
 
Another regulatory body which deserves some consideration is the Regulatory Decisions 
Committee.  The Regulatory Decisions Committee was established as a committee of the 
Financial Services Authority which exercises certain regulatory powers on behalf of the 
Financial Services Authority.180  In spite of the fact that the chairman of the Regulatory 
Decisions Committee is appointed by the Financial Services Authority and that it is 
accountable for its decisions to the Financial Services Authority, the Regulatory Decisions 
Committee may conduct its own independent investigations and make its own decisions 
175   A person aggrieved by a decision of the FSMT is free to apply to a Court of Appeal for permission to 
appeal within fourteen days. See Rules 23 & 24(5) of the FSMT.   
176     S 133(4); (5) & (7) of the Financial Services and Markets Act. 
177  See s 133(8) of the Financial Services and Markets Act; see further Rules 20 & 21 of the FSMT.    Also 
see generally Russen Financial Services Authorisation, Supervision 312-315.     
178   S 12 & s 13 of the Financial Services and Markets Act. 
179    Blair & Walker Financial Services Law 25-27.   
180    See Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 209-210 & Russen 
Financial Services Authorisation, Supervision 296-298.    Also see s 395(2) of the Financial Services and 
Markets Act.  
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regarding market abuse violations.181  According to the Decision Making Manual of the 
Financial Services Authority, the Regulatory Decisions Committee is a separate regulatory 
body outside the Financial Services Authority’s management structure.182 In short, the 
Regulatory Decisions Committee is also responsible for the enforcement, authorisation and 
supervision of the securities and market abuse laws in the United Kingdom.183 
 
As indicated above, it is quite clear that self-regulatory organisations like the London Stock 
Exchange, the London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange Administration 
and Management, the Serious Fraud Office, the Financial Services and Markets Tribunal, the 
Financial Ombudsman Service and the Regulatory Decisions Committee currently play an 
equally important role in preventing and curbing market abuse practices in the United 
Kingdom.184  These self-regulatory organisations may also take their own appropriate action 
regarding any market abuse violations.   For example, the London Stock Exchange has in 
most instances offered some relevant information to the Financial Services Authority 
regarding its market abuse prosecutions.185 This culminated in the speedy settlement and 
prosecution of market abuse cases by the Financial Services Authority.186  In addition, the 
Financial Services Authority co-operates quite well with other international regulatory bodies 
like the International Organisation of Securities Commissions in order to combat cross-border 
market abuse practices in the prescribed financial markets in the United Kingdom.187 
 
7 6  Co-operation between Enforcement Authorities  
7 6 1  Co-operation between the Financial Services Authority, Treasury, Department 
of Trade and Industry and the Courts  
 
A number of notable achievements obtained by the market abuse regime in the United 
Kingdom have been largely influenced by a good co-operative relationship that existed 
between the Financial Services Authority and other enforcement authorities like the Treasury, 
courts and the Department of Trade and Industry.   Accordingly, this sub-heading will 
181     Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 210.   
182    See Chapter 4.2 of the Decision Making Manual which was inserted by the Enforcement (Settlement and 
Other Procedures) Instrument in October 2005.  
183     See further Blair & Walker Financial Services Law 146-148; Swan Market Abuse Regulation 106-107.   
184     See further paragraph 7 6 2 of this Chapter. 
185     See paragraph 7 6 2 of this Chapter. 
186     See further paragraph 7 6 2 of this Chapter. 
187     See paragraph 7 5 3 above. 
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investigate whether such co-operative effort is still being employed by the Financial Services 
Authority to curb market abuse activities in the United Kingdom. 
 
Firstly, the Treasury entered into an agreement with the Financial Services Authority in 
October 1997 which outlines, among other aspects, the terms of their relationship and guiding 
principles on accountability, transparency and regular information exchange.188 This 
agreement was introduced to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the securities and 
financial services industry regulation in the United Kingdom.  In addition, the same 
agreement improved the Financial Services Authority’s monitoring and supervision of the 
clearing and settlements systems, relevant financial markets, and companies in order to detect 
and discourage market abuse violations.  The aforementioned agreement has further enabled 
the Financial Services Authority to formulate adequate policy and principles regarding its 
general regulatory functions. 
 
Secondly, the Financial Services Authority and the Department of Trade and Industry had 
concurrent jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute certain matters involving serious 
corporate frauds and market abuse offences.189   For example, it is reported that the 
Department of Trade and Industry could appoint its own investigators and inspectors to deal 
with any specific or suspected securities violations.190  The Department of Trade and Industry 
could further disclose certain information to the Financial Services Authority and other 
relevant enforcement authorities for them to take any appropriate action.191  This could imply, 
notwithstanding the fact that some of the Department of Trade and Industry’s market abuse 
prosecutorial powers are now vested in the Department for Business Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform,192 that there was a better co-operation relationship between the 
Department of Trade and Industry and the Financial Services Authority in relation to the 
enforcement of securities and market abuse laws in the United Kingdom.  It is hoped that such 
co-operation relationship will also be carried out between the Department for Business 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform and the Financial Services Authority. 
 
188     Blair & Walker Financial Services Law 35. 
189     Blair & Walker Financial Services Law 299-300. 
190     Blair & Walker Financial Services Law 299-300. 
191     Blair & Walker Financial Services Law 299. 
192     See earlier similar remarks in paragraph 7 5 2 above. 
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Lastly, the relevant courts193 are mostly responsible for the criminal enforcement of the 
market abuse prohibition in the United Kingdom.   In practice, the courts may, nevertheless, 
prosecute any market abuse cases referred to them by the Financial Services Authority.   As a 
result, the courts and the Financial Services Authority have to date achieved some substantial 
progress in their quest to eradicate market abuse practices in the relevant financial markets in 
the United Kingdom.  Furthermore, the courts have on many occasions relied on the help of 
the Crown Prosecution Services and the Financial Services Authority to obtain a number of 
settlements and convictions in market abuse cases.194  For example, as discussed earlier,195 in 
Chase Manhattan Equities v Goodman196 Knox J held that the accused persons were guilty of 
misusing material non-public inside information.  The court further held that the illicit trading 
of these accused persons was tantamount to an offence against public policy.   Moreover, in 
Seager v Copydex (No 2),197 damages were awarded against the person who misused 
confidential non-public inside information (insider trading) for personal gain.  
 
The effectiveness of the co-operation between the Financial Services Authority and the courts 
was further revealed in Financial Services Authority v Rourke,198 where Neuberger J imposed 
a declaratory injunctive relief against the accused persons who violated the Financial Services 
and Markets Act’s provisions on the disclosure of confidential information.199   The Courts of 
Appeal have to date been able to assist the Financial Services Authority to make appropriate 
decisions in relation to any appeal raised by the aggrieved persons.  Significant efforts have 
also been successfully made by both the courts and the Financial Services Authority to curb 
cross-border market abuse activities.  For example, the Financial Services Authority may 
appoint specific competent persons and assign them to assist the courts to investigate and/or 
prosecute market abuse violations perpetrated in the United Kingdom by persons domiciled 
elsewhere.200 
 
193     These include the High Courts, Supreme Courts and the Courts of Appeal. 
194     Blair & Walker Financial Services Law 300. 
195     See paragraph 7 5 2 above. 
196     897. 
197     809. 
198     (HC, 2001-10-19). 
199     S 348.    Also see Russen Financial Services Authorisation, Supervision 148-149. 
200      Also see further Blair & Walker Financial Services Law 34-38 & 302-303 & Rider, Alexander, Linklater 
& Bazley Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 190-195.   
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7 6 2  Co-operation between the Financial Services Authority and the Local Self-
Regulatory Organisations  
 
As indicated earlier,201 the Financial Services Authority does not work in isolation.   It 
involves self-regulatory organisations such as the London Stock Exchange, the London 
International Financial Futures and Options Exchange Administration and Management, the 
Serious Fraud Office, the Financial Services and Markets Tribunal, the Financial Ombudsman 
Service and the Regulatory Decisions Committee in order to enhance its anti-market abuse 
enforcement efforts.   Consequently, this sub-heading will scrutinise whether this co-operative 
enforcement approach has managed to reduce market abuse practices in the United Kingdom.   
A brief analysis of the functions of the Financial Services Authority and selected self-
regulatory organisations in relation to this co-operative approach will be therefore carried out 
under this sub-heading. 
 
The Financial Services Authority has entered into several operating arrangements (co-
operation agreements) with certain self-regulatory organisations which are directly or 
indirectly involved in the enforcement of market abuse laws in the United Kingdom.  As 
pointed out before,202 the Financial Services Authority and the London Stock Exchange have 
stipulated relevant guidelines which help them to determine the appropriate action that will be 
taken by either the London Stock Exchange or the Financial Services Authority with regard to 
suspected market abuse cases in order to avoid unnecessary duplication of their functions.  
Moreover, both the Financial Services Authority and the London Stock Exchange employ the 
same computerised surveillance systems to detect and prevent market abuse practices in the 
United Kingdom’s financial markets.203 This has enabled the Financial Services Authority to 
investigate and prosecute market abuse violations that are committed over the Internet in 
respect of any prescribed financial markets in many instances.204 Similarly, the Financial 
Services Authority has forged some good co-operation agreements with the London 
International Financial Futures and Options Exchange Administration and Management to 
detect, investigate and prosecute all market abuse cases relating to any qualifying investments 
that are dealt with on the London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange 
201    See paragraph 7 5 3 above.  
202     See paragraph 7 5 3 above. 
203     See paragraph 7 5 3 above. 
204    See Blair & Walker Financial Services Law 301-303, for generally related remarks; also see paragraphs 7 
5 1 & 7 5 3 above.   
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Administration and Management or other prescribed financial markets.205 Thus, the Financial 
Services Authority, with the help of the London International Financial Futures and Options 
Exchange Administration and Management, may detect and track any suspected market abuse 
activity in the prescribed financial markets situated in the United Kingdom or which are 
accessible electronically in the United Kingdom or in any member state of the European 
Union.206 
 
Furthermore, the Serious Fraud Office and the Financial Services Authority are both 
responsible for investigating and curbing serious fraud and other illicit trading practices that 
amount to market abuse in the United Kingdom.207  This has nonetheless resulted in the 
duplication of some of the regulatory functions by either the Financial Services Authority or 
the Serious Fraud Office, especially with regard to market abuse violations.208  One can 
therefore assume that this overlap of functions that usually occurs between the Serious Fraud 
Office and the Financial Services Authority could be indication of an inconsistent co-
operative enforcement relationship between these two regulatory bodies.   Be that as it may, 
as highlighted earlier,209 the Financial Services Authority is mainly responsible for policing 
the market abuse prohibition in the United Kingdom.  In view of this, the Serious Fraud 
Office may only prosecute certain market abuse cases if it reasonably believes that such cases 
also constitute serious fraud.210  Where such market abuse violations are detected and 
investigated by the Serious Fraud Office, they may be referred to the Crown Prosecution 
Services or the Financial Services Authority for further prosecution.211 
 
The Financial Ombudsman Service and the Financial Services Authority have been co-
operatively involved to curb market abuse activities in the United Kingdom.   For instance, 
the Financial Ombudsman Service hears individual disputes involving cases of market abuse 
205   S 118(5) of the Financial Services and Markets Act.   Also see Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley 
Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 73-74.   
206   This has enabled the FSA to discourage and combat cross-border market abuse practices.  Also see Rider, 
Alexander, Linklater & Bazley Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 74.   
207    See further analysis in paragraph 7 5 3 above. 
208    Blair & Walker Financial Services Law 300. 
209     See paragraph 7 5 1 above. 
210    Blair & Walker Financial Services Law 300. 
211   The FSA signed co-operation agreements with the Association of Chief Police Officers of England and 
Wales to enhance its investigation and prosecution of market abuse practices in the United Kingdom.   
See further Russen Financial Services Authorisation, Supervision 96; also see paragraph 7 5 3 above. 
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that do not necessarily fall under the ambit of the Financial Services Authority.212  In so 
doing, the Financial Ombudsman Service enables the Financial Services Authority to resolve 
any outstanding matters involving market abuse cases in order to promote the efficiency and 
integrity of the United Kingdom’s financial markets.   Put differently, the Financial Services 
Authority has put in place some guidelines that govern and allow the Financial Ombudsman 
Service to take independent and appropriate action regarding complaints against any decision 
of the Financial Services Authority or other relevant enforcement authorities.213  The 
Financial Services Authority has permitted the Financial Ombudsman Service to administer 
independent claims under the Financial Services Compensation Scheme in order to afford all 
the aggrieved persons an opportunity to obtain adequate redress.214 
 
As discussed before,215 the Financial Services and Markets Tribunal offers a platform for 
prejudiced persons to appeal against the decisions of the Financial Services Authority.    In 
other words, the Financial Services and Markets Tribunal and the Financial Services 
Authority have some co-operation guidelines in place to enable them to perform their 
functions more effectively. These guidelines further allow the Financial Services and Markets 
Tribunal to advise the Financial Services Authority regarding its disputed decisions or any 
other relevant matter.216  The Financial Services Authority has further exploited its mutual co-
operation with the Regulatory Decisions Committee to investigate and prosecute market abuse 
violations in the United Kingdom.217  The Regulatory Decisions Committee is responsible and 
accountable to the Financial Services Authority for its decisions in relation to market abuse 
212    See further analysis in paragraph 7 5 3 above. 
213   See generally s 226 & s 227 read with s 155 & s 225 of the Financial Services and Markets Act; also see 
Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 409-411.  
214   See R (on the application of Davies and others) v Financial Services Authority [2003] 4 All ER 1196 
where the applicants sought a judicial review to challenge the decision of the FSA to issue a warning 
notice pursuant to s 56 of the Financial Services and Markets Act without initially referring the matter to 
the FSMT.  
215   See paragraph 7 5 3 above. 
216   For example, in Legal and General Assurance Society Limited v Financial Services Authority (2005) 
FSMT 016 the FSMT upheld a decision made by the FSA to award a public censure and a financial 
penalty against the applicants and warned the FSA to be flexible in order to give appropriate penalties in 
such matters in the future; also see Piggott v FSA (2003) FSMT 004 the FSMT reduced the financial 
penalty imposed by the FSA from £40 000 to £10 000 citing that the applicants were having some 
difficulties in paying the initial penalty and see further Mohammed v FSA (2005) 013 the FSMT held that 
the applicant’s other share dealings were not in themselves unlawful and were therefore not in 
contravention of s 118 of the Financial Services and Markets Act.  Also see generally Russen Financial 
Services Authorisation, Supervision 194-195; Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse 
382-383 & the discussion in paragraph 7 5 3 above.    
217    See the related remarks in paragraph 7 5 3 above.    
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cases.218  This could prima facie imply that there is a good co-operation relationship between 
the Financial Services Authority and the Regulatory Decisions Committee, especially with 
regard to the enforcement of market abuse laws in the United Kingdom.219 
 
7 6 3  Co-operation between the Financial Services Authority and Similar 
International Regulatory Bodies  
 
The Financial Services Authority entered into some co-operation agreements (Memoranda of 
Understanding) with several regulatory bodies in other jurisdictions.   For example, the 
Financial Services Authority signed a separate Memorandum of Understanding with the 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission in October 1997.220  The main objective of this Memorandum of Understanding 
is inter alia to improve the ability of the bodies concerned to exchange relevant information in 
respect of the activities, internal controls and management systems of the United Kingdom 
and the United States of America’s companies that operate internationally.221   In addition, 
this Memorandum of Understanding developed procedures to increase co-operation, 
especially in connection with important market events occurring in the United Kingdom and 
the United States of America’s banking companies, securities and financial markets.222 
 
Furthermore, the Financial Services Authority forged bilateral and multilateral Memoranda of 
Understanding with leading international regulatory bodies such as the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, the Financial Action Task Force, the Joint Forum on Financial 
Conglomerates,223 the International Organisation of Securities Commissions,224 the Financial 
Stability Forum, and the Committee on the Global Financial System.225  The Financial 
Services Authority also entered into other short term co-operation arrangements known as the 
Financial Information Sharing Agreements with self-regulatory organisations and regulators 
218     See the related remarks in paragraph 7 5 3 above.    
219     Swan Market Abuse Regulation 106-107. 
220     See paragraph 7 5 1 above; also see Blair & Walker Financial Services Law 37. 
221     Generally see Blair & Walker Financial Services Law 37. 
222    Additionally, this Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) has generally improved the relations between 
the FSA, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) & the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) as well as the effectiveness of the financial supervision in discouraging 
cross-border market abuse activities in both the United Kingdom and the United States of America’s 
financial markets.   
223    This body is now known as the Joint Forum. 
224    See related analysis in paragraph 7 5 1 above. 
225     Blair & Walker Financial Services Law 34-38. 
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in other jurisdictions in order to share information that will be relevant to any ongoing 
investigations of securities and/or market abuse violations.226  The Financial Services 
Authority is a member of the International Organisation of Securities Commissions.227 This 
membership enables the Financial Services Authority to exchange relevant information with 
other regulatory bodies that are also members of the International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions.228  It further empowers the Financial Services Authority to co-operate with 
similar regulatory bodies elsewhere in order to establish good corporate standards and better 
surveillance systems to combat cross-border market abuse practices.229  In addition, the 
Financial Services Authority specifically signed the International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions Multilateral Memorandum Concerning Consultation, Cooperation and the 
Exchange of Information.230   This Memorandum of Understanding allows the Financial 
Services Authority to obtain mutual assistance from other international regulatory bodies and 
to adopt better corporate standards that will enhance the enforcement and prosecution of 
cross-border market abuse offences.231 The United Kingdom co-chaired the International 
Organisation of Securities Commissions taskforce on unregulated financial entities with Italy.   
This enabled the Financial Services Authority to focus closely on unregulated entities and 
hedge funds in order to devise alternative regulatory approaches that curb the negative effects 
associated with their trading and global opacity.232 
 
The Financial Services Authority co-operates with similar regulatory bodies in the European 
Union member countries.  As envisaged in the European Union Market Abuse Directive, the 
Financial Services Authority may track and prosecute market abuse activities conducted in the 
United Kingdom in relation to qualifying investments listed on a regulated financial market in 
any other European Union member state.233 
 
226     See generally Blair & Walker Financial Services Law 37. 
227     See similar analysis in paragraph 7 5 1 above. 
228     See generally Blair & Walker Financial Services Law 37-38. 
229     See generally Blair & Walker Financial Services Law 37-38. 
230     Blair & Walker Financial Services Law 37-38 & 826-830; also see similar analysis in paragraph 7 5 1 
above. 
231    See further Blair & Walker Financial Services Law 826-830; Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley 
Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 271-275.   
232     See similar discussion in paragraph 7 5 1 above. 
233    Also see Article 16(1) of the EU Market Abuse Directive which provides some guiding principles which 
allow regulatory bodies in the EU member countries to co-operate whenever necessary for the purpose of 
effectively executing their duties, especially with regard to market abuse enforcement.   Also see Blair & 
Walker Financial Services Law 302-303 & related remarks in paragraphs 7 3 & 7 5 1 above. 
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Likewise, the Financial Services Authority has reportedly received assistance from other 
affiliate bodies such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the Joint Forum, the 
Financial Action Task Force and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development to develop principles and/or identify practices that will reduce illicit trading 
activities like market abuse as much as possible.234  This has also enabled the Financial 
Services Authority to improve its supervisory methods and market abuse enforcement 
approaches.235 
 
7 7  The Adoption of Adequate Preventative Measures  
 
The United Kingdom, like many other countries, has developed and adopted several methods 
to prevent market abuse practices in all its prescribed financial markets.  These methods 
include providing a definition of, and enumerating the conduct that amounts to market abuse, 
reliance on criminal, civil and administrative penalties, public censure and the use of 
surveillance systems. 
 
As has already been pointed out,236 a wide but comprehensive definition of practices that 
constitute market manipulation and other related market abuse offences is statutorily provided 
for in the United Kingdom.  Specifically, about seven types of conduct that amount to or that 
could give rise to market abuse are clearly stipulated in the Financial Services and Markets 
Act.237  The United Kingdom’s market abuse regime further discourages and prohibits 
Internet-based market manipulation practices.238  This has led to a substantial increase in 
compliance and enforcement of the market abuse laws in the United Kingdom to date. 
 
The United Kingdom’s market abuse regime also employs appropriate penalties to discourage 
all persons from committing market abuse offences.   For example, criminal penalties may be 
levied against the offenders under both the Financial Services and Markets Act and the 
234     See generally Blair & Walker Financial Services Law 34-35 & 830-836. 
235     See generally Blair & Walker Financial Services Law 34-35 & 830-836. 
236     See paragraph 7 3 above. 
237     See s 118(1) to (8). 
238     The making or publishing of false, deceptive or misleading statements to manipulate the financial markets 
over the Internet is prohibited in the United Kingdom.   See generally Cassim “An Analysis of Market 
Manipulation under the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004 (part 2)” 2008 SA Merc LJ 177 182-183. 
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Criminal Justice Act.239   As indicated before,240 criminal penalties under the Criminal Justice 
Act are only limited to individuals who commit insider trading and very few convictions have 
been obtained in such cases so far.   The Financial Services and Markets Act has, however, 
now extended this criminal liability to both individuals and companies.241 Moreover, 
offenders may incur civil and administrative penalties for market abuse under the Financial 
Services and Markets Act.  Therefore, the Financial Services Authority may impose unlimited 
financial penalties on companies or individuals who indulge in market abuse practices.242  
The United Kingdom’s market abuse regime also provides separate and different penalties for 
individuals and companies.   This has arguably increased deterrence on the part of the 
offenders and improved the overall enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in the United 
Kingdom.243 
 
Apart from relying on penalties, the Financial Services Authority may further issue public 
statements to the effect that the accused person was involved in market abuse in some 
instances where it reasonably believes that issuing such statements is the more appropriate 
sanction.244  These public statements are also employed in instances where the accused 
persons have taken responsibility of their market abuse conduct as well as reasonable steps to 
co-operate with the Financial Services Authority and where such persons are unable to pay 
the imposed financial penalty.245 This name and shame approach is usually employed to deter 
and prevent unscrupulous persons from wilfully indulging in market abuse activities in the 
United Kingdom’s prescribed financial markets.246 
 
The Financial Services Authority also relies on the London Stock Exchange’s surveillance 
systems to detect possible market abuse activities in the United Kingdom’s prescribed 
financial markets.247 Specifically, the London Stock Exchange reports any cases of suspected 
market abuse through the Suspicious Transaction Reports to the Financial Services Authority 
239     See paragraph 7 4 above. 
240     See paragraph 7 4 above. 
241     See paragraph 7 4 above. 
242     S 123(1) of the Financial Services and Markets Act. 
243     See generally Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 191-195; also see paragraph 7 4 above. 
244     S 123(3) of the Financial Services and Markets Act; also see generally ENF 14.4.1G. 
245     See ENF 14.6.2G(6). 
246     Generally see Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 195-196. 
247     See related comments in paragraph 7 6 2 above. 
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for further adjudication.248  Thus the Financial Services Authority is responsible for the 
investigation and prosecution of market abuse practices which occur on the London Stock 
Exchange and any other prescribed financial markets in the United Kingdom.249 
 
Investigation and information gathering is another tool used by the Financial Services 
Authority’s Enforcement Division to combat market activities in the United Kingdom’s 
prescribed financial markets.250  The Financial Services Authority has powers to appoint 
specific skilled persons to investigate and submit reports pertaining to ongoing market abuse 
cases.251   In addition, the Financial Services Authority may summon and interrogate any 
persons suspected to have contravened the relevant market abuse provisions in the United 
Kingdom.252   The Financial Services Authority also has the power to impose Anton pillar 
orders and to search and seize any documents or material from any person or premises if it 
reasonably believes that such material or documents will be essential to its market abuse 
investigations.   In most instances, the Financial Services Authority searches any person or 
premises after having obtained permission from the competent courts in the United Kingdom.  
Consequently, a number of market abuse cases have so far been successfully investigated by 
both the Regulatory Decisions Committee253 and the Financial Services Authority.254 
 
The Financial Services Authority further employs whistle-blowing immunity provisions to 
promote prompt disclosure (tip-offs) by all persons who are aware of any market abuse 
activities without fear of reprisals.  Whistle-blowers in the United Kingdom are therefore 
protected against the risk of being victimised, losing their jobs or sidelined in their careers.  
This has since improved the timeous disclosure of relevant information to the prescribed 
financial markets through the Internet or the Suspicious Transaction Reports by all the market 
participants in the United Kingdom.   The Financial Services Authority also imposes a duty 
on directors, employees and other relevant persons to report or speedily publish non-public 
248     See earlier discussion in paragraph 7 5 3 above. 
249    This could further imply that the FSA is empowered to combat market abuse practices in relation to both 
listed and unlisted qualifying investments.   A central computerised system known as the Stock Exchange 
Electronic Trading Service (SEETS) is usually used to detect the occurrence of such practices in the 
relevant financial markets in the United Kingdom.  
250     See related comments in paragraph 7 5 1 above. 
251     See related analysis in paragraph 7 5 1 above. 
252     See related analysis in paragraph 7 5 1 above. 
253     See related comments in paragraphs 7 5 3 & 7 6 2 above. 
254    Wood Regulation of International Finance (The Law and Practice of International Finance Series 
Volume 7) (2007) 591; also see paragraph 7 5 1 above. 
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price-sensitive information relating to qualifying investments or their dealing in any 
qualifying investments in order to discourage illicit trading practices like insider trading.255 
 
Additionally, the Financial Services Authority uses awareness programmes to combat and 
discourage market abuse practices in the prescribed United Kingdom’s financial markets.  As 
pointed out earlier,256 the Financial Services Authority has provided the Code of Market 
Conduct to guide and educate all relevant persons regarding market abuse.  The Financial 
Services Authority has, in some instances, relied on public lectures and publishing important 
information through the Internet to inform all the relevant stakeholders regarding any illicit 
trading activities. This has assisted the Financial Services Authority to develop and establish a 
good anti-market abuse corporate ethics culture among all the market participants and issuers 
of qualifying investments.  The Financial Services Authority has formulated extensive Listing 
Principles which must be followed by all issuers of qualifying investments.257  These Listing 
Principles allow all the listed companies to take reasonable steps to train their directors about 
their duties, maintain adequate procedures, systems and controls which enable them to 
execute their functions well, and to promote market integrity.258 
 
The United Kingdom’s market abuse regime has established the Financial Services Authority 
as the main competent regulatory body to police the enforcement of the market abuse 
prohibition.259  This is the so-called single regulator model and it is used in the United 
Kingdom as a measure to discourage and combat market abuse practices in its financial 
markets.  Thus, although the Financial Services Authority co-operates with and delegates 
some of its functions to other local self-regulatory organisations like the Regulatory Decisions 
Committee;260 it remains mainly responsible for the enforcement of the market abuse 
prohibition in the United Kingdom.   
255    See the FSA’s Disclosure and Transparency Rules 2.6.1; 2.6.2; 2.2.8; 2.2.9; 2.8.1; 2.8.1; 2.8.3 to 2.8.10.   
Also see Wood Regulation of International Finance 591; Barnes Stock Market Efficiency, Insider Dealing 
119-121.  
256     See paragraph 7 5 1 & related analysis in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
257    Also see further the FSA’s Disclosure and Transparency Rules 2.6.1; 2.6.2; 2.2.8; 2.2.9; 2.8.1; 2.8.1; 
2.8.3 to 2.8.10.  Also see Wood Regulation of International Finance 591; Barnes Stock Market Efficiency, 
Insider Dealing 119-121.  
258    Generally see further the FSA’s Disclosure and Transparency Rules 2.6.1; 2.6.2; 2.2.8; 2.2.9; 2.8.1; 2.8.1; 
2.8.3 to 2.8.10.   Also see Wood Regulation of International Finance 591; Barnes Stock Market 
Efficiency, Insider Dealing 119-121.  
259     See the discussion in paragraph 7 5 1 above. 
260     See the discussions in paragraphs 7 5 3 & 7 6 2 above. 
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Moreover, the Financial Services Authority uses transaction recording, telephonic tapping, 
exit interviews, staff vetting checks, review of unusual trades and regular internal audit review 
of polices, systems and controls of issuers to prevent market abuse activities.261  For purposes 
of preventing cross-border market abuse activity, the Financial Services Authority usually 
invokes its fellow regulators in other jurisdictions to prosecute market abuse offences 
committed in the United Kingdom by persons in other countries.262 
 
A private right of action in relation to certain market abuse offences is further used to 
discourage market abuse activities in the United Kingdom.263  Therefore, all the prejudiced 
persons are given an opportunity to claim their damages or compensation directly from the 
market abuse offenders.264   This has, in a way, afforded the affected persons an alternative 
arbitration method to obtain their damages speedily from the market abuse offenders.  On the 
other hand, this private right of action method has increased deterrence on the part of the 
market abuse offenders to disengage from their illegal trading activities.265  Over and above, it 
is generally accepted that some of the persons have so far successfully relied on this private 
right of action to claim their damages from either the companies or the individuals who 
involved themselves in market abuse practices.266 
 
7 8  Concluding Remarks   
 
As already pointed out,267 the United Kingdom employs an extensive regulatory approach 
which statutorily authorises only one regulator (the Financial Services Authority) to oversee 
the enforcement of its securities and market abuse laws. Therefore, other self-regulatory 
organisations may only exercise certain functions on behalf of the Financial Services 
261     Barnes Stock Market Efficiency, Insider Dealing 122-123. 
262     See the discussion in paragraph 7 6 3 above. 
263     See similar remarks in paragraph 7 4 above. 
264     See similar remarks in paragraph 7 4 above. 
265    Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 94.   Also see paragraphs 7 4 & 
7 7 above. 
266    See Barnes Stock Market Efficiency, Insider Dealing 164-175; also see In Re A-G’s Reference (No 1 of 
1998) [1998] BCLC 193, where Lord Lane CJ ruled in favour of a plaintiff who was prejudiced by any 
insider (offender) who had dealt dishonestly in respect of the affected securities concerned & In Re A-G’s 
Reference (No 1 of 1988) [1989] AC 971 973-977 & 986, the court held that the defendant was guilty for 
misusing non-public price-sensitive information.  See further Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley 
Market Abuse and Insider Dealing 60.   
267     See paragraph 7 5 1 above; also see related remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis.. 
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Authority in order to complement its enforcement efforts.268  Nonetheless, it was 
acknowledged, in contrast to the position in South Africa,269 that there is a separate and 
specific statute, namely the Criminal Justice Act, that deals with insider trading270 and another 
one, namely the Financial Services and Markets Act, that widely deals with the prohibition of 
insider trading, market manipulation and other types of market abuse in the United 
Kingdom.271 Consequently, the Financial Services Authority is empowered as a single main 
regulatory body that exercises its regulatory functions under each of these statutes.272  The 
rationale for this single regulator model was inter alia to establish a more coherent and 
proportionate approach in relation to the regulation and enforcement of financial services, 
securities and market abuse laws as well as a level playing field for all investors and other 
relevant market participants in the United Kingdom.273  Thus, as pointed out earlier,274 the 
Financial Services Authority has fairly managed to formulate high level objectives and 
measures, especially in relation to the enforcement of market abuse laws in order to obtain 
more settlements and prosecutions in market abuse cases.275  
 
It was also noted that South Africa has so far not been able to enforce its market abuse 
prohibition successfully and consistently in order to increase the combating of market abuse 
practices in South Africa.276  The reason for this disparity could be that, unlike South Africa, 
the United Kingdom has devoted significantly more resources towards the enforcement of its 
securities and market abuse laws.277  It was further submitted that the reason for the aforesaid 
disparity might also have been influenced by the fact that the United Kingdom’s market abuse 
regime has a number of measures in place such as market abuse awareness programmes; 
appointing additional skilled investigators; technological surveillance mechanisms and about 
2500 to 3000 competent persons who work for the Financial Services Authority in order to 
enhance the enforcement of the market abuse provisions in the United Kingdom.278  In 
268     See paragraphs 7 5 3 & 7 6 2 above. 
269     See paragraphs 7 2 & 7 3 above; also see related remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
270     See paragraphs 7 2 & 7 1 above. 
271     See paragraphs 7 3 & 7 1 above. 
272     See paragraph 7 5 1 & generally see Blair & Walker Financial Services Law 53-55. 
273     See generally Blair & Walker Financial Services Law 53-55. 
274     See paragraphs 7 5 1; 7 6 2 & 7 6 3 above. 
275     See paragraph 7 5 1 above. 
276    See related analysis in Chapter Nine of this thesis; also see further related discussions in paragraphs 3 2 1 
& 4 2 in Chapters Three & Four of this thesis.   
277     See paragraph 7 5 1 above. 
278     See paragraphs 7 5 1 & 7 7 above. 
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relation to this, it is suggested that the Securities Services Act,279 the Financial Markets Bill280 
and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012281 should be reviewed to enact provisions that 
specifically empower the Financial Services Board to appoint other additional skilled persons, 
apart from its own employees, to provide it with reports or relevant information relating to 
any suspected market abuse violations in South Africa.   It was also suggested that South 
Africa should not have blindly adopted some of the enforcement methods that are employed 
in the United Kingdom without proper measures in place to ensure that such methods will be 
practically compatible and consistently enforced to combat market abuse activities in South 
Africa.282  Moreover, it was suggested that South Africa should consider practically 
implementing only the relevant principles of the United Kingdom’s single regulator model 
because it is economical and less complex.283   
 
The researcher also acknowledged that, in contrast to the position in the United Kingdom,284 
not many self-regulatory organisations have been actively involved in the enforcement of the 
market abuse prohibition to supplement the efforts of the Financial Services Board in South 
Africa to date.285  In relation to this, it is submitted that the Securities Services Act, the 
Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be amended to enact 
provisions that expressly empower other self-regulatory organisations in South Africa, apart 
from the Financial Services Board, to impose their own penalties or take any other appropriate 
action against any persons who indulge in market abuse activities in South Africa. 
 
It is submitted that a significant number of flaws and challenges such as the adoption of few 
market abuse preventative measures and the failure to provide separate and distinct penalties 
for companies and individuals could also have marred the successful enforcement of the 
market abuse ban in South Africa to date.286  It is further submitted that the Financial Services 
Board should be expressly and statutorily authorised to impose separate and different 
penalties on individuals and juristic persons or companies that engage in market abuse 
279     36 of 2004, hereinafter referred to as the Securities Services Act. 
280     [B-2011], hereinafter referred to as the Financial Markets Bill. 
281     [B12-2012], hereinafter referred to as the Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
282     See related analysis in Chapter Nine of this thesis 
283     See related analysis in Chapter Nine of this thesis 
284     See related analysis in paragraphs 7 5 3 & 7 6 2 above. 
285     See related analysis in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
286     See related remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
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activities in South Africa.  Over and above, it is suggested that the Financial Services Board, 
like the Financial Services Authority,287 should be statutorily empowered to publicise the 
names of the culprits who commit market abuse offences (public censure or name and shame 
approach) in South Africa.  In line with this, as previously stated,288 it is was submitted that 
the provisions of the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 which 
seek to empower the Financial Services Board to publish by notice on its official website or 
by means of other appropriate public media, any outcome, status or details of market abuse 
investigations (public censure or name and shame approach) if such publication is in the 
public interest, should speedily come into force.  In addition, it was noted that, unlike the 
position in the United Kingdom,289 there is no provision for a private right of action that is 
afforded to market abuse victims to enable them to recover their damages directly from the 
offenders in South Africa.290  It is accordingly submitted that the Securities Services Act, the 
Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be reviewed to enact 
provisions that give private rights of action to the affected persons for them to claim their 
damages directly from the market abuse offenders.  Furthermore, it was stated that, unlike the 
position in the United Kingdom,291 the market abuse whistle-blowing immunity method is not 
statutorily employed in South Africa.292   Therefore, it is recommended that the Securities 
Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be 
reviewed to introduce whistle-blower immunity provisions for the purposes of encouraging all 
the persons to voluntarily disclose any information regarding market abuse activities to the 
Financial Services Board or other enforcement authorities in South Africa.  It was also 
acknowledged that in most instances the Financial Services Board depend on the JSE’s 
surveillance systems to detect any purported market abuse activity in the regulated financial 
markets in South Africa.293   In view of this, it is suggested that the Financial Services Board 
should seriously consider establishing its own surveillance systems to improve and increase 
the timeous detection of market abuse activity in both the regulated and unregulated financial 
markets in South Africa. 
 
287     Generally see paragraphs 7 5 1 & 7 7 above. 
288     See related remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
289     See related remarks in paragraphs 7 4 & 7 7 above. 
290     See related remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
291     See related remarks in paragraph 7 7 above. 
292     See related remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
293     See similar comments in Chapter Nine of this thesis.   
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It has been noted that the United Kingdom’s market abuse regime has empowered the 
Financial Services Authority to enter into some co-operation agreements with local self-
regulatory organisations as well as other international regulatory bodies like the United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission and the International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions to combat market abuse practices in the United Kingdom and elsewhere.294  It 
was argued that this has enabled the Financial Services Authority and the relevant courts to 
speedily detect, investigate and prosecute any persons who commit market abuse offences in 
the United Kingdom, even when such persons are domiciled in other countries.295  On the 
other hand, it was noted that neither the Financial Services Board nor the courts have 
achieved any momentous progress in relation to the prosecution and settlement of cross-
border market abuse cases in South Africa.296  As a result, it is suggested that more 
specialised market abuse courts manned by sufficient persons with the relevant expertise to 
adjudicate in matters involving market abuse should be established in all the provinces of 
South Africa to increase awareness and/or the combating of market abuse practices in the 
South African financial markets.  It is further submitted that the Financial Services Board 
should be statutorily required to support the Director of Public Prosecutions and the relevant 
courts with the necessary information regarding ongoing market abuse cases in South Africa 
by assigning certain persons with the relevant expertise to assist the Director of Public 
Prosecutions and/or relevant courts in their prosecution of such cases in South Africa.   
 
It was further noted and discussed that although the Financial Services Board has reportedly 
forged co-operation agreements with some international self-regulatory organisations like the 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions, there is very little or no effort that has 
been specifically made to enforce and exploit such co-operation agreements to combat cross-
border market abuse practices in South Africa.297  Accordingly, it was submitted that the 
relevant provisions of the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 
which now empower the Financial Services Board to assist foreign regulators with 
investigations pertaining to any cross-border market abuse cases should speedily come into 
force to enhance the combating of such cases in South Africa and elsewhere.  It was further 
submitted that the Financial Services Board should also enter into more co-operation 
294     See paragraphs 7 5 1; 7 6 2 & 7 6 3 above. 
295    See paragraphs 7 5 2; 7 6 1 & 7 6 3 above. 
296    See related comments in Chapter Nine of this thesis; also see further related discussions in paragraphs 3 2 
1 & 3 2 6 in Chapter Three of this thesis & paragraphs 4 2 & 4 4 3 in Chapter Four of this thesis.       
297     See similar comments in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
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arrangements with international regulatory bodies that enforce commodities-based market 
abuse laws such as the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the London International 
Financial Futures and Options Exchange Administration and Management and the Trade 
Point Stock Exchange in order to increase the combating of commodities-based market abuse 
practices in South Africa.   Moreover, the fact that a relatively few market abuse cases 
reported to the Financial Services Board by either the JSE or other enforcement authorities 
have been successfully settled and prosecuted in South Africa under the Securities Services 
Act was acknowledged.298   In this regard, it is suggested that the Securities Services Act, the 
Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be reviewed to enact 
provisions that expressly impose a mandatory co-operation obligation on both the Financial 
Services Board and the JSE to improve the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in 
South Africa.   
 
The fact that the Criminal Justice Act only extends the insider trading liability to individuals 
who deal in affected securities on a regulated market or where such dealing is conducted on 
the over the counter markets through a professional intermediary,299 while there is no similar 
provision in the corresponding legislation in South Africa,300 was noted and discussed.  
Accordingly, it is suggested that the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or 
the Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be amended to enact provisions that expressly 
discourage any market abuse activity or illicit dealing in securities on unregulated over the 
counter markets through agents or professional intermediaries and face-to-face transactions 
between non-professional intermediaries in South Africa. 
 
The absence of adequate definition for insider trading in the United Kingdom and South 
Africa was discussed.301  In this regard, it is submitted that the Securities Services Act, the 
Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be amended to enact 
provisions that expressly and adequately define the concept of insider trading in South Africa.   
Moreover, it was noted that the concept of, and conduct amounting to market manipulation or 
other market abuse practices is statutorily defined in the United Kingdom,302 while such 
298      See similar remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
299      See paragraph 7 2 above.   
300      See related remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis; also see paragraph 7 2 above. 
301      See related remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis; also see paragraph 7 2 above. 
302      See related remarks in paragraph 7 3 above. 
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concept and/or conduct is not statutorily defined in South Africa.303  In view of this, it is 
submitted that the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012 should be amended to enact provisions that expressly and adequately 
define the concept of market manipulation in South Africa. 
 
Moreover, it has been noted that, unlike the Securities Services Act,304 the Financial Services 
and Markets Act treats insider trading, market manipulation and other forms of market abuse 
practices on a more equal footing in United Kingdom.305  It was argued that this approach is 
desirable306 and consequently, it was suggested that the Securities Services Act should be 
amended in line with the Financial Services and Markets Act to enable the Financial Services 
Board and/or other enforcement authorities to enforce the market abuse prohibition 
consistently in South Africa.   While giving due regard to this view,307 it was also submitted 
that another option will be to ensure that the provisions of the Financial Markets Bill which 
now extends the civil liability compensation orders to cases involving both insider trading and 
market manipulation will speedily come into effect to enhance the enforcement of the market 
abuse ban in South Africa.  
 
It was noted that the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012 do not expressly provide how the extra-territorial application of their 
market abuse ban will be utilised to protect the South African financial markets from non-
resident persons who manipulate securities listed on a foreign market where such conduct has 
no effect on the related securities listed on the regulated financial markets in South Africa.308  
In this regard, it is suggested that the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill 
and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be reviewed to enact provisions that clearly 
enumerate sufficient guidelines or conditions under which such extra-territorial application 
will be employed to prevent cross-border market abuse activities consistently in South Africa 
and elsewhere. 
 
303     See related remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis; also see paragraph 7 3 above. 
304    See s 75 & s 76 read with s 73 & s 77 of the Securities Services Act; also see related remarks in Chapter 
Nine of this thesis.          
305   See further related remarks in paragraph 7 3 above.  
306    See further related remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis; also see paragraph 7 3 above. 
307    See further related remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
308    See further related remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
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It was acknowledged that the Financial Services Authority has issued the Code of Market 
Conduct to guide all the relevant persons on conduct that amounts to market manipulation and 
related practices (including factors to be considered when determining whether such conduct 
amounts to market abuse) in the United Kingdom.309 Consequently, it is submitted that the 
Financial Services Board should be statutorily obligated to provide its own Code of Market 
Abuse Conduct containing sufficient and adequate guidelines on factors that should be 
considered from time to time, in determining whether a trading practice and/or behaviour will 
give rise to or amounts to market abuse practices in order to improve the combating of such 
practices in South Africa.  It is further submitted that both the Financial Services Board and 
the JSE should consider embarking more on awareness and educative programmes such as 
developing an adequate anti-market abuse curriculum to be taught to students from high 
school level up to tertiary level; publishing adequate quarterly informative market abuse 
booklets on their respective websites; and conducting anti-market abuse workshops and 
public lectures in order to prevent market abuse practices and increase the general awareness 
among the market participants and/or other relevant stakeholders in the South African 
financial markets.  
 
In conclusion, notwithstanding the fact that a detailed analysis of the recommendations is 
reserved for the last chapter, it is submitted that the suggestions and/or proposed provisions 
summarised below could play a key role in the enforcement of the market abuse ban in South 
Africa:  
 
Firstly, it is submitted that the Financial Services Board should be statutorily required to 
provide its own Code of Market Abuse Conduct containing sufficient and adequate guidelines 
on factors that should be considered from time to time, in determining whether a trading 
practice and/or behaviour will give rise to or amounts to market abuse practices in order to 
increase the combating of such practices in South Africa;   
 
Secondly, it is submitted that the Financial Services Board and the JSE should consider 
embarking more on awareness and educative programmes such as developing an adequate 
anti-market abuse curriculum to be taught to students from high school level up to tertiary 
level; publishing some quarterly informative market abuse booklets on their respective 
309      See paragraph 7 5 1 above; also see further related remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
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websites; conducting market abuse workshops and public lectures to prevent market abuse 
practices and increase the general awareness among the market participants and/or other 
relevant stakeholders in the South African financial markets;  
 
Thirdly, the Financial Services Board should be expressly and statutorily authorised to impose 
separate, different and unlimited monetary and other appropriate penalties on individuals and 
juristic persons or companies that engage in market abuse activities in South Africa;  
 
Fourthly, it is submitted that the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be amended to enact provisions that expressly and 
adequately define the concepts of “insider trading” and “market manipulation” in South 
Africa;   
 
Fifthly, it is submitted that the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be amended to enact provisions that expressly discourage 
any market abuse activity or illicit dealing in securities on unregulated over the counter 
markets through agents or professional intermediaries and face-to-face transactions between 
non-professional intermediaries in South Africa;   
 
Sixthly, the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets 
Bill 2012 should be reviewed to enact provisions that expressly impose a mandatory co-
operation obligation on both the Financial Services Board and the JSE to improve the 
enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in South Africa;  
 
Seventhly, the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012 should be reviewed to enact provisions that clearly enumerate sufficient 
guidelines or conditions under which the extra-territorial application of the market abuse ban 
will be employed to prevent cross-border market abuse activities consistently in South Africa 
and elsewhere;  
 
Eighthly, the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets 
Bill 2012 should be amended to enact provisions that specifically empower the Financial 
Services Board to appoint or assign other additional skilled persons, apart from its own 
352 
employees, to provide it with reports or relevant information relating to any suspected market 
abuse violations in South Africa; and 
 
Lastly, the Financial Services Board should enter into more co-operation arrangements with 
international regulatory bodies that enforce commodities-based market abuse laws such as the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the London International Financial Futures and 
Options Exchange Administration and Management and the Trade Point Stock Exchange to 
increase the combating of commodities-based market abuse practices in South Africa. 
 
Given the analysis employed in this chapter, the next chapter will comparatively focus on the 
enforcement of the market abuse ban in South Africa and Australia in order to isolate, where 
possible, appropriate enforcement measures that can be incorporated into the South African 
anti-market abuse enforcement framework.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE ENFORCEMENT OF MARKET ABUSE PROVISIONS IN 
AUSTRALIA: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
8 1  Introduction   
 
Although Australia has been criticised by some commentators as having arguably one of the 
broadest market abuse prohibitions,1 it is widely acknowledged that Australia currently has 
the most progressive and developed market abuse legislation in the world.2  Its regulatory 
framework prohibits insider trading activity indirectly through common law and directly 
through statutory insider trading provisions.3  In addition, illicit trading practices like market 
manipulation and/or other market misconduct practices are expressly prohibited under the 
Corporations Act4 as amended by the Financial Services Reform Act.5  Furthermore, in 
1    Steinberg “Insider Trading, Selective Disclosure and Prompt Disclosure: A Comparative Analysis” 2001 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 635 668; Gevurtz “The Globalization 
of Insider Trading Prohibitions” 2002 Transnational Lawyer 63 67-78; Gething “Insider Trading 
Enforcement: Where are We Now and Where do We Go from Here?” 1998 Company and Securities Law 
Journal 607 607-618; Goldwasser “The Enforcement Dilemma in Australian Securities Regulation” 1999 
Australian B.L.R 482 482; Tomasic & Pentony “The Prosecution of Insider Trading: Obstacles to 
Enforcement” 1989 Australian N.Z.J.C 65 65 & Loke “From the Fiduciary Theory to Information Abuse: 
The Changing Fabric of Insider Trading Law in the UK, Australia and Singapore” 2006 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 123 123.  
2    Huang “The Regulation of Insider Trading in China: A Critical Review and Proposals for Reform” 2005 
Australian Journal of Corporate Law 281 281-322, who argues that China and other countries that follow 
the United States of America’s insider trading principles should consider adopting the Australian model 
or principles to enhance their enforcement efforts, by combating insider trading and/or other market abuse 
practices practically and more consistently; Huang “The Insider Trading ‘Possession versus Use’ Debate: 
An International Analysis” 2005 Securities Regulation Law Journal 130 131-146 & Overland “The 
Future of Insider Trading in Australia: What did Rene Rivkin Teach Us?” 2005 Deakin Law Review 708 
713-730.  
3     Ziegelaar “Insider Trading Law in Australia” in Walker & Fisse (eds) Securities Regulation in Australia 
and New Zealand (1994) 677-678.  
4      50 of 2001(Cth) as amended, hereinafter referred to as the Corporations Act. 
5     122 of 2001(Cth) as amended, hereinafter referred to as the Financial Services Reform Act.    Generally 
see the Corporations Act, s 1041A for market manipulation; s 1041B for false trading and market rigging 
including the creation of false or misleading appearance of active trading; s 1041C for false trading and 
market rigging including artificially maintaining a trading price; s 1041D for dissemination of 
information about illegal transactions; s 1041E for false or misleading statements; s 1041F for inducing 
other persons to deal; s 1041G for dishonest conduct & s 1041H for misleading or deceptive conduct 
(civil liability only).   For a detailed analysis of these provisions, see the discussion that will ensue later in 
paragraph 8 2 8 3 of this Chapter & also see Part 7.10 of the Corporations Act.   See further Huang 
“Redefining Market Manipulation in Australia: The Role of An Implied Intent Element” 2009 Company 
and Securities Law Journal 8 9-22 (this article is also available at 
<http://www.clta.edu.au/professional/papers/conferences2009/HuangCLTA09.pdf> (accessed 13-04-
2010).   
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Australia, the market abuse prohibition is generally well accepted by the investing and non-
investing public as well as by the government.  This co-operative and co-ordinated approach 
on the part of all the relevant stakeholders has to date given rise to an increased awareness and 
commendable combating of market abuse activities in the Australian corporations, companies 
and securities markets.6 
 
It is against this background that the Australian market abuse regime accordingly demands a 
special and more careful comparative analysis.   For the purposes of this chapter, the 
significant enforcement methods which may be learnt from the Australian experience will be 
isolated where necessary for consideration in the South African market abuse regulatory 
framework.  Nonetheless, this chapter will mainly concentrate on the relevant provisions of 
the Corporations Act and other selected international market abuse cases. 
 
8 2  Historical Overview of Market Abuse Prohibition 
8 2 1  Prohibition on “Insider Trading” Prior to 1970 
 
The securities laws which were enacted to regulate the Australian financial markets in the 
early 1960s were very different to the current insider trading framework.7  For example, each 
state operated its own stock exchange and enacted its own securities laws with varying 
enforcement approaches.8  Thus, despite the fact that the federal government enacted a 
Uniform Companies Act9 which was adopted by each state, very little was achieved regarding 
the uniformity of the Australian securities laws for the purposes of combating insider trading 
in Australia. 
 
 
 
 
6       Huang 2009 Company and Securities Law Journal 9-22. 
7     Also see generally Chapter Three in Lyon An Examination of Australia’s Insider Trading Laws SJD 
Thesis, Deakin University (2003) 57.  
8     This disparate was evidenced in part, by a number of notable corporate scandals and securities abuses 
which were reported particularly after the mining boom of the late 1960s in Australia.    See further 
Chapter Three in Lyon An Examination of Australia’s Insider Trading Laws 56-57.   
9     1961, hereinafter referred to as the Uniform Companies Act.   Put differently, from 1961 to 1962 all the 
states enacted similar Companies Acts in order to comply with the Uniform Companies Act; see further s 
124 & s 124A of the Uniform Companies Act.   
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8 2 2  Prohibition on “Insider Trading” Prior to 1980 
 
Various recommendations were made in the Company Law Advisory Committee Report of 
1970.10 Consequently, a prohibition was introduced in the Uniform Companies Act to 
specifically deal with insider trading in Australia.   However, this prohibition was restricted 
only to directors, officers or other employees of a company who dealt in securities of that 
company while in possession of certain information relating to the affected securities and 
which was not generally available.11  This restriction was accordingly criticised by other 
commentators.12  As a result, the New South Wales state parliament recommended the 
adoption of a new provision to deal with insider trading under the Securities Industry Act.13  
This Act imposed criminal and civil liability on any person who traded with another person 
associated to or in association with a corporation or company for purposes of obtaining a 
financial advantage, gain or profit, if that person possessed specific price-sensitive inside 
information relating to the corporation or company which was not generally available 
(known) to the public.14  This provision was further amended in 1971.15  Nonetheless, the 
Senate Select Committee on Securities and Exchange16 exposed rampant insider trading 
activity which was committed by certain classes of brokers, directors and investors17 by 
trading in the securities of a mining company called Poseidon NL.18  Eventually, the 
Securities Industry Act19 was introduced in an attempt to strengthen the insider trading 
prohibition.20    
 
10     The Company Law Advisory Committee is hereinafter referred to as the Eggleston Committee and its 
Report as the Eggleston Report.    
11    See the Eggleston Committee, Parliament of Australia, Fourth Interim Report to the Standing Committee 
of Attorney-General: Misuse of Confidential Information Dealings in Options Disclosures by Directors 
and Summary of Recommendations (1970) 2013/70 10-11.      
12     See Chapter Three in Lyon An Examination of Australia’s Insider Trading Laws 58.     
13     53 of 1970 (NSW), hereinafter referred to as the Securities Industry Act 1970. 
14     See s 75A of the Securities Industry Act 1970. 
15   This amendment was introduced by the Securities Industry (Amendment) Act 11 of 1971(NSW), 
hereinafter referred to as the Securities Industry Amendment Act.   
16    See the Senate Select Committee on Securities and Exchange, Parliament of Australia, Australian 
Securities Markets and their Regulation (1974) 2.110.  This Committee is hereinafter referred to as the 
Rae Committee and its report as the Rae Report.    
17     See the Rae Report 129. 
18     See Rae Committee 16.2. 
19     3 of 1975 (NSW), hereinafter referred to as the Securities Industry Act 1975. 
20    See s 112 of the Securities Industry Act 1975; also see Tomasic “Insider Trading Law Reform” 1991 
Australian Studies in Law, Crime and Justice Series 127 129-141; Baxt, Black & Hanrahan Securities 
and Financial Services Law (2003) 503-504.  
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8 2 3  Prohibition on “Insider Trading” Prior to 1990 
 
Subsequent review of the insider trading legislation led to the enactment of the Securities 
Industry Act.21  Its provisions included more elaborate civil remedies for all persons who 
were prejudiced by insider trading and related activities, such as tipping.22  However, the 
Securities Industry Act 1980 restricted the insider trading prohibition only to natural persons 
connected to the company or body corporate involved, by virtue of being an officer23 of that 
body corporate or by having a substantial holding in the relevant body corporate or of a 
related body corporate or by virtue of their professional relationship with the body corporate 
or company concerned.24 Moreover, the insider trading prohibition was mainly based on the 
fiduciary relationship between the offenders and the body corporate or company concerned.25 
Nonetheless, no successful prosecutions of insider trading cases were achieved under the 
Securities Industry Act 1980.  This, inter alia, prompted other states to introduce further 
amendments to their insider trading prohibition in a bid to improve the enforcement of such 
prohibition.26  The National Companies and Securities Commission appointed Professor 
Anisman to investigate and report on the effectiveness of the Securities Industry Act 1980’s 
insider trading provisions.27  The Anisman Report revealed that the adoption of the 
requirement of the proof of connection to the company, on the part of the offenders, was 
impeding the enforcement of the insider trading prohibition in Australia.  It also exposed the 
problem of non-disclosure and proposed the adoption of a mandatory disclosure requirement 
on the part of all the listed companies in Australia.28   Nevertheless, the Anisman Report was 
criticised by the government, academics and other relevant stakeholders for, among other 
things, its failure to provide empirical evidence for its proposals and to critically review the 
policy issues regarding former insider trading legislation in Australia.29  Furthermore, the 
21     66 of 1980 (Cth), hereinafter referred to as the Securities Industry Act 1980. 
22    S 128 of the Securities Industry Act 1980.    Also see Baxt, Black & Hanrahan Securities and Financial 
Services Law 503-504.      
23     S 128(11) of the Securities Industry Act 1980. 
24     S 128(8) of the Securities Industry Act 1980. 
25      S 128(8) of the Securities Industry Act 1980. 
26     For instance, see the Securities Industry (Application of Laws) Act 61 of 1981 (NSW), hereinafter 
referred to as the Securities Industry Application of Laws Act.    
27    Also see Anisman Insider Trading Legislation for Australia: An Outline of the Issues and Alternatives 
Report (1986), hereinafter referred to as the Anisman Report, for further analysis.         
28     Generally see the Anisman Report 2; 8; 44; 63-65 & 96-100.      
29     Hogan “Insider Trading” 1988 Companies and Securities Law Journal 39 46; Black “Policies in the 
Regulation of Insider Trading and the Scope of Section 128 of the Securities Industries Code” 1988 
Melbourne University Law Review 633; House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and 
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Tomasic and Pentony Report30 indicated that insider trading was still rife in Australia 
according to the anecdotal evidence which was obtained and that insider trading activity was 
generally tolerated in the Australian securities markets and very difficult to prove owing to 
investigatory and evidentiary problems.31  In 1989, the Griffiths Report further proposed the 
adoption of an administrative framework which supervises the financial markets and the 
enforcement of insider trading provisions in Australia.32  Consequently, the Corporations 
Law33 was enacted at a federal level and it prohibited insider trading indirectly through 
common law by punishing officers, advisers or employees of any corporation or company 
who negligently or fraudulently breached their fiduciary duties by practising insider trading.34  
Moreover, its statutory (direct) prohibition on insider trading was contained in Division 2A of 
Part 7.11.35   
 
8 2 4  Prohibition on “Insider Trading” Prior to 2001 
 
In 1990 yet another legislative review was undertaken and the Corporations Legislation 
Amendment Act36 came into force.   However, its provisions were amended and repealed by 
the Corporations Legislation Amendment Act.37 This followed the adoption of several 
recommendations made in the Griffiths Report in October 1989.38  A further amendment was 
Constitutional Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Fair Shares for All: Insider Trading in Australia (1989) 9, 
this Committee is hereinafter referred to as the Griffiths Committee & its report as the Griffiths Report.    
Also see generally the RACV “Insider Trading Policy Document” (2008) 3-10 
<http://www.nus.edu.sg/lawlex.htm> (accessed 23-02-2009).          
30     See Tomasic & Pentony Report on Insider Trading and Business Ethics in Australia as referred to in 
Tomasic & Pentony “Crime and Opportunity in the Securities Markets: The Case of Insider Trading in 
Australia” 1989 Companies and Securities Law Journal 186 & Tomasic & Pentony “Coming Down on 
the Insiders: Why We Have to Curb the Casino Operators” 1989 Journal of Australian Society of 
Securities Analysts 24.    
31     See Chapter Three in Lyon An Examination of Australia’s Insider Trading Laws 65.         
32     See Chapter Three in Lyon An Examination of Australia’s Insider Trading Laws 66.         
33    109 of 1989 (Cth), also known as the Corporations Act 1989, hereinafter referred to as the Corporations 
Law 1989.  
34     See s 232(2); (4); (5) & (6) of the Corporations Law 1989; Ziegelaar Securities Regulation in Australia 
and New Zealand 678 & also see Tomasic & Bottomley Corporations Law in Australia (1995) 690-698. 
35    S 1002G of the Corporations Law 1989.   Also see generally Cox “An Outsider’s Perspective of Insider 
Trading Regulation in Australia” 1990 Sydney Law Review 455 463-470; Explanatory Memorandum of 
the Corporations Legislation Amendment Bill 1991(Cth) 326-327, hereinafter referred to as the 
Corporations Legislation Bill Explanatory Memorandum.  
36   110 of 1990 (Cth) as amended, hereinafter referred to as the Corporations Law 1990.  See s 1002 of the 
Corporations Law 1990.   
37     110 of 1991 (Cth), hereinafter referred to as the Corporations Law 1991. 
38    Baxt, Black & Hanrahan Securities and Financial Services Law 503-504; also see further Anisman 
Report 63-65.  
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introduced by the Corporations Legislation Amendment (No 2) Act.39   Moreover, the 
Corporate Law Reform Act40 was passed and it introduced new policy objectives regarding 
the regulation of insider trading in Australia, namely market fairness, equal access and market 
efficiency.41  Other key changes to the enforcement of the insider trading ban were introduced 
by the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act.42 
 
8 2 5  Prohibition on “Insider Trading” under the Corporations Act 2001 
 
Currently, the insider trading practice is proscribed in the Corporations Act.   Its provisions 
are aimed at ensuring free and fair operation of securities markets in order to avoid harm to 
any person caused by insider trading and similar activities.  Thus, the Australian legislature 
seeks to encourage the development of a free and informed market which promotes and 
enhances public investor confidence.43  Unlike some of its predecessors, the Corporations Act 
does not employ or rely on the fiduciary and misappropriation theories of insider trading.   
The Corporations Act’s insider trading provisions focus mainly on the possession and use by 
insiders or any other person of non-public price-sensitive inside information that relates to a 
company or to any listed securities, the so-called information connection only approach.   
 
Notably, the concept of insider trading is not statutorily defined in the Australian statutes, 
including the Corporations Act.  There seems to be less than full agreement with regard to the 
literal, purposive and legislative interpretation of this concept in Australia.   Therefore, the 
term “insider trading” is not prominently used in the Australian insider trading legislation.44  
The Corporations Act has, however, defined a few terms which constitute or involve insider 
trading. For example, it defines terms such as “generally available”,45 “inside information”,46 
39     201 of 1991 (Cth), hereinafter referred to as the Corporations Legislation Amendment (No 2) Act. 
40    210 of 1992 (Cth), hereinafter referred to as the Corporate Law Reform Act 1992; also see the Corporate 
Law Reform Act 31 of 1994 (Cth), hereinafter referred to as the Corporate Law Reform Act 1994.  
41   See the Corporations Legislation Bill Explanatory Memorandum 326-327; also see the Attorney-
General’s Department, Commonwealth Government’s draft legislation and explanatory paper entitled  
Insider Trading–Proposed Amendments to the Corporations Law (1990) 6.     
42    103 of 2004 (Cth), hereinafter referred to as the CLERP Act.   This Act upheld the civil penalty rules 
reforms that were introduced by a similar Act in 1999, in a bid to inter alia enhance the enforcement of 
the insider trading ban.  
43    See Division 3 of Part 7.10 of the Corporations Act.   Also see further Lyon & Du Plessis The Law of 
Insider Trading in Australia (2005) 12-13. 
44    This is the so-called fuzzy law technique, which characterises most of the Australian insider trading 
criminal sanctions.   See Lyon & Du Plessis The Law of Insider Trading in Australia 66. 
45     S 1042C read with 1042A of the Corporations Act. 
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“material effect”,47 and “procuring”.48  Nonetheless, other terms such as “insider”, “tipping”, 
“tippee” and “tipper” are not expressly defined in the current insider trading provisions.   Be 
that as it may, it is generally accepted that insider trading involves the abuse of or exploitation 
of non-public price-sensitive inside information that relates to a body corporate or its 
securities for personal gain by any person.49  Therefore, the current insider trading prohibition 
applies to all Division 3 financial products.   Division 3 financial products include: (a) 
securities, or (b) derivatives, or (c) interests in a managed investment scheme, or (d) 
debentures, stocks or bonds issued or proposed to be issued by a government, or (e) 
superannuation products other than those prescribed by the regulations made for the purposes 
of the insider trading prohibition, or (f) any other financial products that are able to be traded 
on a financial market.50  
 
As a result, insiders or any other persons who possess price-sensitive inside information that 
relates to the securities or financial products of a body corporate and who know or ought 
reasonably to have known that such information was not generally available to the public are 
prohibited from subscribing for, applying for or disposing of, purchasing, procuring or selling 
such securities or financial products.51  Notably, the current Australian insider trading 
prohibition applies to any person as defined under the Corporations Act or who qualifies to be 
an insider as stipulated under the same Act.52  The term “person” is defined to include a body 
corporate or partnership (juristic persons) as well as a natural person (an individual).53  This 
clearly shows that the Australian insider trading prohibition now has a much broader 
46     S 1042A of the Corporations Act. 
47     S 1042D read with s 1042A of the Corporations Act. 
48     S 1042F read with s 1042A of the Corporations Act. 
49    See further Ziegelaar “Insider Trading Law in Australia” in Walker, Ramsay & Fisse (eds) Securities 
Regulation in Australia and New Zealand (1998) 556-561; Bostock “Australia’s New Insider Trading 
Laws” 1992 Company and Securities Law Journal 165 181; Tomasic Casino Capitalism?: Insider 
Trading in Australia (1991) 115-117 & Chapters Two & Three in Lyon An Examination of Australia’s 
Insider Trading Laws 9-100.   
50    See further s 1042A compare it with s 764A of the Corporations Act.   Also see further Lyon & Du 
Plessis The Law of Insider Trading in Australia 54-57.    
51    S 1043A read with s 1042A & s 1042C of the Corporations Act.    Also see further Lyon & Du Plessis 
The Law of Insider Trading in Australia 14-65; O’Brien “Insider Trading Case to Test Chinese Walls” 
Irish Times (2006-05-01), on the prospect of the Citigroup Global Capital Market company facing heavy 
penalties for allegedly practising insider trading amounting to a profit of about Aus $4, 6 billion of (its 
client) Toll Holdings shares.  
52     S 1043A of the Corporations Act. 
53   Generally see s 1042G; s 1042H & s 1043A read with s 761F & s 761FA of the Corporations Act, which 
describes the term “person” to include both individuals and body corporate or juristic persons who 
possess inside information.   
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application than the similar prohibition found in other jurisdictions.  It explicitly covers both 
juristic and natural persons as well as a wide range of financial products.  Moreover, it 
discourages a number of related insider trading activities, like tipping.  Accordingly, an 
insider or any other person is specifically prohibited from deliberate, intentional and unlawful 
communicating (disclosure) of price-sensitive inside information to another person before it 
becomes generally available to the public (published).54   In addition, the Corporations Act’s 
insider trading provisions apply to acts or omissions (unlawful trading) within Australia 
relating to securities or financial products of any person or foreign body corporate as well as 
extra-territorially to acts or omissions outside Australia in relation to the securities or financial 
products of a person or body corporate that is established or carrying on business in 
Australia.55  Therefore, all territorial limitations and problems which previously impeded the 
enforcement of insider trading provisions outside Australia appear now to be solved.56 
 
8 2 6  Available Penalties and Remedies 
 
For the purposes of achieving the best results in Australia, the remedies and penalties for 
violating insider trading provisions fall in three categories, namely criminal penalties, civil 
remedies and civil penalties.57  
 
54   S 1043A(2)(c) read with (a); (b); (d) & (e) of the Corporations Act; also see Chapter Four in Lyon An 
Examination of Australia’s Insider Trading Laws 104; see further Latimer “Whistleblowing in the 
Financial Services Sector” 2002 University of Tasmania Law Review 39 46; Zipparo “Encouraging Public 
Employees to Report Workplace Corruption” 1999 Australian Journal of Public Administration 83 88; 
Liverani “Cool Reception for Whistleblowing in the Professions” 2002 Law Society Journal 26; Gobert & 
Punch “Whistleblowers, the Public Interest, and the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998” 2000 Modern 
Law Review 25 46 & generally see comparatively Brand “Sanctioned ‘Dobbing’: Whistle Blowing under 
the Corporations Act, 2001 (C’th)” <http://www.parsons.law.usyd.edu.au/CLTA/BrandPaper.pdf> 
(accessed 28-02-2007). 
55    S 1042B(a) & (b) of the Corporations Act.   Also see generally Ford, Austin & Ramsay Ford’s Principles 
of Corporations Law Looseleaf service update number 43, 9/2004 9338 [9.605] & Looseleaf service 
update number 42, 6/2004 9357 [9.650].  
56    See generally Berkahn & Su “The Definition of ‘Insider’ in Section 3 of the Securities Markets Act 1998: 
A Review and Comparison with Other Jurisdictions” 2003 Discussion Paper Series 218 9-10 
<http://www.accountancy.massey.ac.nz/Publications.htm> (accessed 02-02-2010).    Also see Danae 
Investment Trust plc v Macintosh Nominees Pty Ltd (1993) 11 ACLC 273 1242, where the Supreme 
Court of South Australia previously held that s 128 of the Securities Industry Act 1980 did not apply to 
the purchase or sale of shares in a company incorporated in Australia if such transactions took place 
elsewhere.   In this case it was further held that s 128 did not apply to transactions which took place in the 
United Kingdom. 
57      Lyon & Du Plessis The Law of Insider Trading in Australia 107. 
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8 2 6 1  Civil Penalties 
 
Although the civil penalty actions were only introduced in respect of insider trading on 11 
March 2002, when the amendments which were brought by the Financial Services Reform 
Act were formally adopted, they have to date considerably enabled the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission to seek and recover some penalties from several insider trading 
offenders in Australia.58  Therefore, the introduction of the civil penalty actions was 
positively welcomed in Australia as a potentially effective way of overcoming the high and 
difficult evidentiary challenge associated with the criminal standard of proof required for 
insider trading purposes.59  Accordingly, the Corporations Act imposes civil penalties on 
those who engage in insider trading activity by aiding, abetting, inciting, conspiring in or who 
knowingly contravene its insider trading provisions.60 Put simply, the civil penalty actions for 
insider trading are generally two-fold in nature.   Firstly, any person who violates the insider 
trading provisions will be primarily liable to compensate any other person who fall victim to 
insider trading or tipping for his losses.61  Secondly, a civil penalty action for compensation is 
further provided against a principal, person procured62 and/or any other person who 
contravenes the insider trading civil compensation provisions.63  Moreover, the actions for 
compensation and imposing a penalty must be instituted within six years of the arising of the 
cause of action.64 
 
Even though it seems that procuring or tipping another person as contemplated in the 
Corporations Act65 does not lead to an action for compensation,66 various circumstances are 
specifically provided for in the said Act under which such an action may be brought against 
58    See further s 79 of the Corporations Act.   Also see R v Hannes (2002) 43 ACSR 508 529; Companies 
and Securities Advisory Committee (CASAC) Insider Trading Discussion Paper (2001) 87-88 & see 
further 
<http://www.camac.gov.au/camac.nsf/byHeadline/PDFDiscussion+Papers/$file/Inisder_Trading_DP_Jun
e_2001.pdf> (accessed 21-05-2010).       
59     See Chapter Six in Lyon An Examination of Australia’s Insider Trading Laws 216; also see Tomasic 
“Insider Trading Regulation and Law Enforcement” 1991 Australian Studies in Law, Crime and Justice 
Series 99 110-113.     
60     S 79 of the Corporations Act.    
61     S 1043L read with s 1317HA of the Corporations Act.   
62   The term “procure” is defined as including inciting, inducing or encouraging an act or omission by 
another person.    S 1042F read with s 1043L of the Corporations Act.     
63     S 1043L read with s 1043A(1) & s 1317HA of the Corporations Act. 
64     S 1317K of the Corporations Act. 
65     S 1043A(2)(c) read with (a); (b); (d) & (e) of the Corporations Act. 
66     S 1043L of the Corporations Act. 
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an insider or any other person whose conduct amounts to tipping.67  Additionally, this enables 
any uninformed purchaser, the issuer of securities and the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission to invoke the civil proceedings in a number of ways.  Firstly, the 
issuer of the securities or financial products is entitled to recover any damages suffered by 
him from the insider or from any person who applies or procures another to apply for 
financial products as contemplated in the Corporations Act.68  The civil penalties or damages 
will then comprise the difference between the application price and the price that could have 
been asked if the information had been available to the public at the time of application.    In 
addition, the issuer of financial productions has additional rights as enshrined in the 
Corporations Act.69   For example, if such products were the subject matter of an affected 
transaction, the issuer or any affected person in question may also recover the loss incurred.70   
This may indicate that an insider or any person who contravenes the insider trading provisions 
may incur civil liability where the securities in question have been purchased or sold.71   
Secondly, an uninformed purchaser or any person who disposes of a financial product may 
recover his damages suffered from the insider trading offenders.72   Lastly, the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission may, where it considers it being in the public interest, 
bring an action in the name of and for the benefit of any affected issuer or body corporate to 
recover civil damages.73 
 
8 2 6 2  Criminal Penalties 
 
Any person who contravenes the insider trading provisions will further be liable for criminal 
penalties.74  Nonetheless, the Corporations Act does not expressly provide for ancillary 
67     S 1043L(2) to (5) of the Corporations Act. 
68     S 1043L(2) of the Corporations Act. 
69     S 1043L(5) of the Corporations Act. 
70     See further s 1043L(5) read with subsections (3) & (4) of the Corporations Act.      
71   See further Ford, Austin & Ramsay Looseleaf service update number 43, 9/2004 9406 [9.690].  Also see 
Keygrowth Ltd v Mitchell (1990) 3 ACSR 476 487. 
72     See for details s 1043L(3) & (4) read with s 1317HA of the Corporations Act.    
73    S 1043L(6) read with subsections (2) or (5) of the Corporations Act; ASC v Forem Free-way Enterprises 
Pty Ltd (1999) 30 ACSR 339 351; Welsh “The Corporations Law Civil Penalty Provisions and the 
Lessons that can be Learned from the Trade Practices Act 1974” 2000 Australian Journal of Corporate 
Law 298. 
74     S 1311(1) of the Corporations Act; also see Lyon & Du Plessis The Law of Insider Trading in Australia 
111-112.  
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criminal liability for accessories (aiders and abettors).75 Despite this, such accessories (aiders 
and abettors) who deliberately engage themselves in insider trading may still incur accessorial 
criminal liability in terms of the Criminal Code Act76 which applies to all contraventions of 
Commonwealth Acts.77  The Criminal Code Act stipulates that a person who aids, abets, 
counsels or procures the commission of an offence is regarded to have actually committed 
that offence and is sentenced accordingly even where the principal offender has not been 
prosecuted or convicted.78   In relation to this, the discretion to institute criminal proceedings 
on indictment for insider trading is vested in the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission and the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions.79  The prosecution of 
an offence against the Corporations Act may be instituted within five years after the 
commission of the offence in question or at any time agreed by the Minister of Justice.80   It is 
submitted that this five year time frame should be flexible in its application and must not be 
treated as a time restriction with regard to the institution of criminal actions for insider 
trading.   This will enable the prosecution for summary offences81 to be executed outside the 
period contemplated under other relevant statutes in Australia.82  It is also hoped that the 
insider trading offence will be successfully prosecuted anytime even after five years of its 
commission because it is treated as an indictable offence in Australia.83  
 
75     However, s 1043A(1) & 1043L(1)(c) of the Corporations Act provides that an insider, whether as a 
principal or an agent, may not deal or procure another person to deal in any financial products.   Be that as 
it may, the term “agency” does not always give rise to accessorial liability because it sometimes requires 
the element of mens rea or fault to be fulfilled before such liability can be imputed against the offenders.   
76     12 of 1995 (Cth) as amended, hereinafter referred to as the Criminal Code Act. 
77     See Part 2.4 Division 11; s 11.22 & s 11.2(5) of the Criminal Code Act.   
78   This is the so-called ancillary or accessorial liability.   See Part 2.4 Division 11; s 11.22 & s 11.2(5) of the 
Criminal Code Act; also see s 1370 & s 1384 of the Corporations Act & see further Lyon & Du Plessis 
The Law of Insider Trading in Australia 108-109. 
79    This is done in accordance with a memorandum of understanding between the Commonwealth Director 
of Public Prosecutions (Commonwealth DPP) and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
(ASIC) which was signed on 22 September 1992.   See generally s 1316 of the Corporations Act; also see 
related articles like ASIC Digest Vol 4 [3603] 3330; ASIC Digest Vol 1 [1047] 58.48 & the 
Commonwealth DPP The Decision to Prosecute: The Policy of the Commonwealth (2003) 2.28 
<http://wwww.cdpp.gov.au/Prosecutions/Policy>  (accessed 31-05-2010).  Also see related cases like 
Kovess v Director of Public Prosecutions (1998) 74 FCR 297 & Attorney-General (C’th) v Qates (1999) 
198 CLR 162. 
80      See generally s 1316 of the Corporations Act; see further Attorney-General (C’th) v Qates 162.   
81      S 4H of the Crimes Act 12 of 1914 (Cth) as amended, hereinafter referred to as the Crimes Act. 
82    For example, summary prosecutions for offences in the Victoria state are required to be instituted within 
one year of the commission of the offence in question.    See s 26(4) of the Magistrate Court Act 51 of 
1989 (Vic) as amended.   
83   See further Attorney-General (C’th) v Qates 162; Kovess v Director of Public Prosecutions 297; also see 
generally related analysis in the Insider Trading Position and Consultation Paper (2007) 17-21 
<http://www.treasury.gov.au/insidertradingpaper.htm> (accessed 23-04-2010). 
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The penalties for contravening the insider trading provisions are stipulated in Schedule 3 of 
the Corporations Act.84  Such penalties range from Aus $200, 000 and $220, 000.   For 
example, where an individual (natural person) is convicted of insider trading, he would be 
liable for a fine up to 2000 penalty units (Aus $220,000), or a maximum sentence of five 
years imprisonment, or both.85  A body corporate may, if it is convicted, be fined up to 10,000 
penalty units (Aus $1million) and in addition, to a maximum fine of up to five times the 
pecuniary penalty.86   These penalties were recently increased by the Corporations 
Amendment (No 1) Act,87 to a maximum pecuniary fine of Aus $495, 000, or three times the 
profit gained or loss avoided, whichever is the greater,88 or ten years imprisonment89 or both, 
for individuals.   Likewise, the maximum criminal penalties for bodies corporate were 
increased to a fine of Aus $4, 950, 000 or three times the profit made or loss avoided, or 10% 
of the bodies corporate’s annual turnover during the relevant period in which the offence was 
committed, whichever is greater.90 In addition, where the convicted person is a manager of a 
company or corporation, that person is automatically disqualified from performing his duties 
for a period of five years from the date of conviction or release from prison, whichever is 
later.91  Furthermore, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission may increase 
this period by applying to a court for a longer disqualification order where it is justified by 
exceptional circumstances.92  Where a person has been convicted of insider trading, the 
prosecutor on behalf of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions may apply for the 
forfeiture of any benefit derived from the criminal activity.  The proceeds will be the amount 
of the illicit profit made and such profit may be forfeited through the intervention of the 
84      See Schedule 3 items 311B & 311C of the Corporations Act. 
85      R v Hannes 529. 
86     S 1312 of the Corporations Act; also see Kovess v Director of Public Prosecutions 297; Watson & Young 
“A Preliminary Examination of Insider Trading Around Takeover Announcements in Australia” (1999) 
<http://www.parsons.law.usyd.edu.au/CLTA/BrandPaper/Watson_Young.pdf> (accessed 21-05-2008); 
the Corporations Legislation Bill Explanatory Memorandum 112.  
87     131 of 2010 (Cth), hereinafter referred to as the Corporations Amendment (No 1) Act. 
88     See the Explanatory Memorandum of the Corporations Amendment (No 1) Bill 2010 (Cth), hereinafter 
referred to as the Corporations Amendment (No 1) Bill Explanatory Memorandum; see generally the 
Corporations Amendment (No 1) Bill Explanatory Memorandum 3.11. 
89   Generally see the Corporations Amendment (No 1) Bill Explanatory Memorandum 3.11; also see further 
<http://www.treasurer.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=transcripts/2010/007.htm&pageI> (accessed 28-04-
2010), for further details regarding these penalties. 
90     Bowen “Greater Powers to the Corporate Regulator to Pursue Market Misconduct” Press Release 28 
January 2010; also see further the Corporations Amendment (No 1) Bill Explanatory Memorandum 3.11.  
91      S 206B of the Corporations Act. 
92     ASIC v Rich [2003] NSWSC 186, where a longer banning period was imposed upon the offenders. 
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Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions and the courts.93  The proceeds of an 
indictable offence also include property that is derived or realised, directly or indirectly, by 
the offenders from the commission of the offence in question.94  The courts may grant exparte 
orders preventing access to, or the sale or disposal of the assets by the alleged offenders until 
after a judicial outcome is obtained.95  Practically, the Commonwealth Director of Public 
Prosecutions and the courts have to date successfully managed to impose orders to freeze real 
property, bank accounts, share trading accounts, cars and other relevant personal property 
from some insider trading offenders in Australia.96  Moreover, the use of the seizure and 
forfeiture method to confiscate the assets or proceeds of criminal activities and any ill-gotten 
gains has to date served both as a vital deterrent and a key way of curbing insider trading 
activity in Australia.97 
 
8 2 6 3  Civil Remedies 
 
A wide range of civil remedies for insider trading are provided for under the Corporations Act 
and are mainly administered by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission.98  In 
relation to this, actions for civil remedies like compensation orders against the offenders stem 
from both the insider trading civil compensation provisions99 and the civil penalty 
compensation provisions.100 Furthermore, as earlier adverted to,101 the civil compensation 
provisions enumerate some specific circumstances under which an order for civil 
compensatory remedies may be made.102 Therefore, any competent court may issue 
93     See s 4; 19(1); s 26 & s 43 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 87 of 1987 (C’th) as amended, hereinafter 
referred to as the Proceeds of Crime Act.   Also see R v Hannes 519. 
94     See s 4 of the Proceeds of Crime Act.   
95     See s 43 of the Proceeds of Crime Act.   
96     R v Hannes 519; R v Rivkin [2003] NSWC 447. 
97    For example, in the Hannes case, it is stated that the ASIC seized and recovered about Aus $2 million 
profit made by the offenders as a result of insider trading within two days of the commission of the 
offence.    See R v Hannes 519; 529.   Also see generally Tomasic “The Prosecution of Insider Trading: 
Obstacles to Enforcement” 1991 Australian Studies in Law, Crime and Justice Series 115 116-126; 
Tomasic “Insider Trading in the USA and the United Kingdom” 1991 Australian Studies in Law, Crime 
and Justice Series 31 33-39.   
98      S 1043L & s 1317HA of the Corporations Act. 
99      S 1043L of the Corporations Act. 
100    S 1317HA of the Corporations Act. 
101    See paragraph 8 2 6 1 above. 
102   See further s 1043L(2) to (6) read with s 1043A & s 1317HA of the Corporations Act.   See further 
related analysis in paragraph 8 2 6 1 above.   Notably, the said order for compensation is usually made in 
terms of s 1317HA which consists of and is part of the civil penalty compensation provisions.   As earlier 
highlighted, such compensatory orders should be instituted within six years of the cause of action.   Also 
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compensation orders against the insider trading offenders, where the damage results directly 
from the contravention of a financial services penalty provision which prohibits trading, 
procuring and tipping.103  Notably, the civil compensatory remedies for insider trading are 
usually utilised in recovering damages from trading and procuring related violations.104  As 
result, other commentators like Gregory Lyon105 have lamented that this may lead to an 
irregular scenario where a person who contravenes the insider trading provisions through 
actual trading106 may be sued for civil compensatory damages while the person who 
communicates (tipping) that information to others will be exempted.107    
 
Although the circumstances under which the compensatory remedies may be obtained are 
somehow limited, such remedies are extended against a broad class of persons which extends 
beyond the stipulated circumstances.108   In addition, an action for compensation is available 
to the prejudiced persons regardless of whether the principal or accessory has been convicted 
of insider trading.109 
 
The Corporations Act further provides the so-called issuer’s remedy by granting the first right 
of action to the issuer of the security or other financial products.110  Accordingly, issuers may 
recover the loss suffered (the difference between the application price and the higher price 
had the information been generally available at the time of the application) from any person 
who applies for or procures another to apply for the financial products111 relating to the issuer 
see s 1317K of the Corporations Act; also see Lyon & Du Plessis The Law of Insider Trading in Australia 
117-135.                  
103   S 1317E(1) read with s 1317HA of the Corporations Act.   Insider trading civil penalty provisions for 
procuring and tipping includes s 1317E(1)(jf) & (jg) respectively.     
104   S 1043L(1) read with s 1043A(1) of the Corporations Act; see further Chapter Six in Lyon An 
Examination of Australia’s Insider Trading Laws 232.    
105    See further Chapter Six in Lyon An Examination of Australia’s Insider Trading Laws 232.    
106    S 1043A(1) of the Corporations Act. 
107    S 1043A(2) of the Corporations Act. 
108    S 79 & s 1043L of the Corporations Act.    
109   S 1043L of the Corporations Act; also see s 1005 & s 1013 of the Corporations Act, which were earlier 
insider trading civil compensation provisions respectively.   S 1043A(1) requires proof of mens rea, so 
that the person concerned knows or ought reasonably to know that he is in possession of non-public price-
sensitive information. On the one hand s 1043L(1) requires proof that the insider knew or was reckless of 
such information.  This implies that the test required for civil compensatory action for remedies is 
subjective and hence very difficult for the ASIC to recover more civil compensatory remedies against the 
alleged offenders.   See further Qu “The Efficacy of Insider Trading Civil Liability Regime in the 
Corporations Act” 2002 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 161 178. 
110    S 1043L(2) of the Corporations Act.    
111    As defined in s 1042A of the Corporations Act.    
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or the insider concerned.112  The issuer of the affected financial products may, in addition to 
actions which may be brought by other prejudiced persons against the insider trading 
offenders, further recover compensation from the offenders concerned.113 Therefore, to avoid 
being liable twice where securities were purchased or sold, the insider should not have 
benefited from an on-market transaction even if privity is not proved by another opposite 
trader.114 Additionally, civil compensatory remedies are also available to other parties 
affected by the insider or any other offender’s illicit transactions.115  This means that any 
person who disposes of a financial product can recover the losses suffered (the difference 
between the lower price for which the financial product was disposed of and the higher price 
likely to have been gained had the information been generally available) from an insider who 
dealt in such financial product.116  Furthermore, a person who acquires a financial product can 
recover the loss suffered (the difference between the higher price for which the financial 
product was acquired and the lower price for which they were most likely to have been 
obtained if the information was general available) from an insider who disposed of the 
financial product in question.117 
 
Moreover, as earlier stated,118 the Australian Securities and Investments Commission may, 
where it considers being in the public interest, institutes an action in the name of and for the 
benefit of the issuer or body corporate to recover its civil damages.119 This is usually 
employed in situations where the issuer’s board of directors was unable or unwilling to act, 
especially when the insider involved holds some influence over the board.120  
112    See similar remarks in paragraph 8 2 6 1 above. 
113   S 1043L(5) read with subsections (3) & (4) of the Corporations Act; also see related remarks in paragraph 
8 2 6 1 above.   
114    S 1043L(5) of the Corporations Act; also see Lyon & Du Plessis The Law of Insider Trading in Australia 
122. 
115    S 1043L(3) read with subsection (4) of the Corporations Act; see similar remarks in paragraph 8 2 6 1 
above. 
116    S 1043L(3) of the Corporations Act; also see similar remarks in paragraph 8 2 6 1 above. 
117   S 1043L(4) of the Corporations Act; also see related remarks in paragraph 8 2 6 1 above.   See further 
Chapter Six in Lyon An Examination of Australia’s Insider Trading Laws 237; also see generally Huang 
2005 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 281-322, this article is also available at 
<http://www.clta.edu.au/professional/papers/conference2005/HuangCLTA05.pdf> (accessed 23-04-
2010).  
118    See further related analysis in paragraph 8 2 6 1 above.   
119    S 1043L(6) of the Corporations Act. 
120   The ASIC may therefore institute the action for civil remedies without the affected issuer’s consent.   See 
s 1325 of the Corporations Act; also see also see Lyon & Du Plessis The Law of Insider Trading in 
Australia 125-130; ASC v Sackley (1991) 9 ACLC 874 & Permanent Trustee Australia Limited v 
Perpetual Trustee Company Limited (1994) 15 ACSR 722. 
368 
                                               
A private right of action is another remedy available to the issuers or affected persons to claim 
their civil damages directly from the insider trading offenders.121 Such damages include a 
determination of the profits made by any person resulting from the contravention122 or the 
value of the diminution in value of the property of a registered scheme.123  Accordingly, the 
extent of damages resulting from these determinations could conceivably go beyond the 
interpretation of loss as provided in the Corporations Act.124 
 
8 2 7  Prohibition on “Market Manipulation” 
8 2 7 1  Prohibition on “Market Manipulation” under the Common Law 
 
Australia, like many other jurisdictions,125 does not statutorily define the concept of “market 
abuse” and/or other related practices like market manipulation.  However, it is generally 
accepted that market manipulation activities were outlawed under common law as early as 
1899 in Australia.126  Therefore, like the United Kingdom,127 Australia primarily prohibited 
market manipulation through the common law principles.  Moreover, market manipulation is 
usually treated and interpreted to include activities that interfere with the natural forces of 
supply and demand of a particular security or financial product in Australia.128 
 
 
 
 
121    S 1317J read with s 1043L(2) to (5); s 1043L(9) & (10) & s 1317HA of the Corporations Act.   
122    S 1317HA(2) of the Corporations Act.   
123    S 1317HA(3) of the Corporations Act.   
124    S 1043L of the Corporations Act; also see Ampolex v Perpetual Trustee Company [No 2] (1996) 14 
ACLC 1514 1524, where it was inter alia considered whether the civil compensation provisions could be 
invoked independently from each other by the affected persons to claim their additional and/or various 
insider trading damages.     
125    See similar discussions in Chapters Two & Five of this thesis. 
126   See the codification of common law as undertaken in the Australian states of Queensland in 1899, 
Western Australia in 1902 and Tasmania in 1924.    Accordingly, in Victoria and South Australia states, 
the common law crime principles discouraging inter alia market abuse practices are expressly retained 
under s 321F(2) of the Crimes Act 6231 of 1958 (Vic) & s 133(2) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 
2252 of 1935 (SA).   See Loke “Common Origins, Different Destinies: Investors’ Rights against Market 
Manipulation in the United Kingdom, Australia and Singapore” (2007) 4-7 
<http://www.nus.edu.sg/lawlex.marketabuse/paper.htm> (accessed 24-02-2009).         
127    See R v De Berenger (1814) 3 M&S 67, 105 ER 536. 
128    See article by Loke 1-2 < http://www.nus.edu.sg/lawlex.marketabuse/paper.htm> (accessed 24-02-2009). 
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8 2 7 2  Prohibition on “Market Manipulation” Prior to 2001129   
 
Market manipulation was initially prohibited by the Securities Industry Act 1970.130   This 
Act inter alia outlawed the creation of false or misleading appearance of active trading with 
respect to the listed securities or the market for and/or the price of any securities.131  A similar 
prohibition was also retained by the legislations which were later enacted.132  Moreover, the 
Corporations Law 1990 further prohibited market manipulation practices such as the making 
or publication of false or misleading statements,133 futures contracts market manipulation and 
the artificial maintaining of securities trading prices in the relevant markets134 in Australia.135  
The Corporations Law 1990 also prohibited any misleading or deceptive conduct on the part 
of all the relevant persons, especially the officers or employees of companies.136  It is stated 
that the Corporations Law 1990 mainly prohibited stock (including securities) market 
manipulation and market rigging137 and its prohibition required proof of mens rea on the part 
129   The discussion will be focused mainly on the Corporations Law 1990 and therefore the study of all 
related Australian securities statutes is beyond the scope of this sub-heading.    Consequently, related 
legislation like the Trade Practices Act 51 of 1974 (Cth) (hereinafter referred to as the Trade Practices 
Act) as amended by the Trade Practices Legislation Amendment Bill 2005 (Cth) which was passed on 19 
October 2006, will be referred to only where necessary.      
130    See s 70 read with s 72(2). 
131    See s 70 read with s 72(2). 
132   See further the relevant provisions of the Securities Industry Amendment Act; s 109 of the Securities 
Industry Act 1975; s 124 of the Securities Industry Act 1980 & the Securities Industry Application of 
Laws Act; also see Constable “Ferocious Beast or Toothless Tiger? The Regulation of Stock Market 
Manipulation in Australia” 2011 MqJBL 54 58; see further Armson “False Trading and Market Rigging in 
Australia” (2009) paper presented at the Corporate Law Teachers Association Conference (2009-02-01 to 
03) 4-7 <http://www.clta.edu.au/professional papers/conference2009/ArmsonCLTA09.pdf> (accessed 06-
05-2012); Goldwasser “Regulating Manipulation in Securities Markets: Historical Perspectives and 
Policy Rationales” 1999 Australian Journal of Legal History 149 166-172 & 198 & Hart “The Regulation 
of Stock Market Manipulation” 1979 Australian Business Law Review 139.   
133    S 999 & s 1261 of the Corporations Law 1990.   
134   S 998(3) read with subsections (5) & (7) & s 1260(2) & (3) of the Corporations Law 1990; also see 
further s 13.6 Criminal Code Act.       
135   S 997; s 998; s 1259 & s 1260 read with s 998 of the Corporations Law 1990; also see Huang 2009 
Company and Securities Law Journal 9-10; Baxt, Black & Hanrahan Securities and Financial Services 
Law 471-472.  
136   Generally see s 995 of the Corporations Law; also see Black “Regulating Market Manipulation: Sections 
1997-999 of the Corporations Law” 1996 ALJ 987 997; Trichardt “Australian Green Shoes, Price 
Stabilization and IPOs-Part 2” 2003 C&SLJ 75 83.       
137  S 998 of the Corporations Law 1990; also see generally Goldwasser “The Regulation of Stock Market 
Manipulation-A Blueprint for Reform” 1998 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 109 109; Meyer 
“Fraud and Manipulation in Securities Markets: A Critical Analysis of Sections 123 to 127 of the 
Securities Industries Codes” 1986 C&SLJ 92 95; Armson (2009)  Corporate Law Teachers Association 
Conference Paper (2009-02-01 to 03) 6-7 <http://www.clta.edu.au/professional 
papers/conference2009/ArmsonCLTA09.pdf> (accessed 06-05-2012) & Goldwasser “Market Rigging 
after Nomura” 1999 C&SLJ 44 47. 
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of the prosecution.  Consequently, the enforcement authorities struggled to obtain settlements 
and convictions in market manipulation cases.138 
 
8 2 7 3  Prohibition on “Market Manipulation” under the Corporations Act 2001 
 
Market manipulation and other related market misconduct activities are currently prohibited 
in the Corporations Act.139 This essentially implies that the scope of application of the market 
manipulation prohibition is now broadly extended not only to market manipulation but also to 
other related activities.140 More importantly, among the major amendments brought by the 
Financial Services Reform Act is the removal, on the part of the prosecution, of the explicit 
requirement of proving the existence of intent from the wording of the market manipulation 
and other related provisions before imputing any liability on the accused offenders.141   
Consequently, market manipulation is prohibited by discouraging all persons from carrying 
out transactions which have, or are likely to have the effect of creating an artificial price for 
trading in the financial products or maintaining at an artificial level, a price for trading in the 
financial products on a financial market in Australia.142  As stated above, the current market 
manipulation provisions dispense with the requirement of proving the intention to induce 
138   See s 5.6(1) read with subsection (2) of the Criminal Code Act; also see further Huang 2009 Company 
and Securities Law Journal 9-10.   
139    See Part 7.10. 
140   These changes were introduced by the Financial Services Reform Act, which amended the Corporations 
Act’s market abuse provisions.    See further the Revised Explanatory Memorandum to the Financial 
Services Reform Bill 2001, hereinafter referred to as the Revised Explanatory Memorandum.  This Bill is 
also available at <http://www.comlaw.gov.au/comlaw/legislation/Bills1.nsf/framelodgementattachments/ 
14357E65D5775674CA2570C70002A7AF>  (accessed 22-04-2010); also see generally related remarks 
by Longo “Market Misconduct Provisions of the Financial Services Reform Act: Challenges for Market 
Regulation” (2001) paper presented at the Center for Corporate Law and Securities Regulation Seminar 
(25-07-2001) 1-9 <http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2001/01/07/1123353208631.htm> (accessed 04-06-
2008), which is also available at <http://www.cclsr.law.unimelb.edu.au/researchpapers/longo.htm> 
(accessed 04-05-2010); see further Huang 2009 Company and Securities Law Journal  9.     
141   See s 1041A read with s 1041B(1); s 1041C; s 1041D; s 1041E; s 1041F; s 1041G & s 1041H.   Notably, 
the required faults element for violating s 1041B(1) has now been established, intention is the fault 
element for the physical element for doing or omitting to do an act as stated in that subsection and 
recklessness is the fault element for having or likely to have the effect of creating or causing the creation 
of a false or misleading appearance as stated in that subsection.   See s 1041B(1)(1A) of the Corporations 
Act; also see generally the Corporations Amendment (No 1) Bill Explanatory Memorandum 3.7 & 3.14.   
It is hoped that this will, in the long run, improve the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in 
Australia.  See Constable 2011 MqJBL 107; also see generally Huang 2009 Company and Securities Law 
Journal 8-10 &16-17; Goldwasser “CLERP6-Implications and Ramifications for the Regulation of 
Australian Financial Markets” 1999 C&SLJ 210 & also see further Armson (2009) Corporate Law 
Teachers Association Conference Paper (2009-02-01 to 03) 2-4; 7-12 & 16-17 
<http://www.clta.edu.au/professional papers/conference2009/ArmsonCLTA09.pdf> (accessed 06-05-
2012).   
142    S 1041A of the Corporations Act. 
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others to sell, buy or subscribe for the affected securities or financial products, on the part of 
the prosecuting authorities.143 Put simply, the key requirement now is whether the price of 
certain financial products is artificial or misleading. Thus, the focus is now on the effect of the 
market manipulative conduct in relation to the affected financial product rather than on the 
intention144 of the trader or the person involved.  
 
Additionally, false trading and market rigging and/or the creation of a false or misleading 
appearance of active trading in a financial product or with respect to the market for, or the 
price for trading in a financial product is expressly prohibited under the Corporations Act.145 
In addition, what may constitute a false or misleading appearance of active trading is outlined 
in the so-called deeming provisions concerning wash sales146 and matched orders.147 
Likewise, the carrying out of fictitious transactions which have the effect of maintaining, 
fluctuating, inflating or depressing the price for trading in the financial products on the 
relevant financial markets in Australia is prohibited.148  
 
The dissemination of information about illegal transactions is also prohibited in the 
Corporations Act.149 Put differently, all persons are prohibited from disseminating any 
statement or information to the effect that the price for trading in financial products on the 
relevant markets will, or is likely to rise, fall or be maintained.150  Similarly, the reckless or 
143    S 1041A of the Corporations Act; compare with s 997 & s 1259 of the Corporations Law 1990. 
144    S 5.4(4); s 5.2 & s 5.6(2) read with s 5.6(1) of the Criminal Code Act. 
145    S 1041B(1) of the Corporations Act; also see s 1041B(1)(1A) of the same Act which outlines the fault 
elements. 
146    A wash sale occurs where a person or an associate is both the buyer and seller in the same transaction 
(selling and repurchasing of the same or substantially the same financial product for the purpose of 
generating activity and increasing its price).  S 1041B(2)(a) read with s 1041B(1) of the Corporations Act; 
s 1041B(3) of the Corporations Act sets out circumstances in which an acquisition or disposal of financial 
products does not involve a change in beneficial ownership & s 1041B(4) of the Corporations Act 
enumerates what a transaction of acquisition or disposal of financial products includes. 
147   A matched order occurs where a person and his associate places an order to buy or sell at the same time, 
for substantially the same number of securities or financial products at substantially the same price.   S 
1041B(2)(b) read with s 1041B(1) of the Corporations Act; also see s 5.2(2) & 5.6(2) of the Criminal 
Code Act, where other physical elements which are taken into account by the courts or the prosecuting 
authorities in determining whether the market manipulation offences were committed by the accused 
persons in question are outlined.   See paragraphs 3.115 & 15.15 of the Supplementary Explanatory 
Memorandum to the Financial Services Reform Bill 2001 (hereinafter referred to as the Supplementary 
Explanatory Memorandum) & the Revised Explanatory Memorandum respectively.  See further Huang 
2009 Company and Securities Law Journal 10.     
148    S 1041C of the Corporations Act. 
149    S 1041D of the Corporations Act. 
150   See s 1041D of the Corporations Act; also see generally Hieronymus “Manipulation in Commodity 
Futures Trading: Towards a Definition” 1977 Hofstra Law Review 41 45; Loke “The Investors’ Protected 
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intentional151 making or dissemination of a statement or information that is false or 
misleading materially, and which is likely to induce other persons to deal in financial products 
or to affect the price of such financial products is outlawed in Australia.152 
 
The Corporations Act further prohibits any person from inducing others to deal in financial 
products.153  Notably, this prohibition contains a definition of the term “dishonest”.154  This 
prohibition on ‘inducing others’ is now extended to conduct such as applying to become a 
standard employer sponsor of a superannuation entity and permitting a person to become a 
standard employer sponsor of a superannuation entity.155  The Corporations Act prohibits any 
person, in the course of carrying on a financial services business in Australia, from engaging 
in dishonest conduct in relation to a financial product or financial service.156  Dishonest 
conduct was defined to mean dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people, 
including conduct known by any person to be dishonest according to the standards of ordinary 
people.157  This definition seem to contain both subjective and objective elements which must 
be proved by the prosecution in determining whether the conduct in question will be dishonest 
as contemplated above.158 
 
Moreover, conduct in relation to a financial product or a financial service that is misleading or 
deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive other persons with respect to certain financial 
Interest against Market Manipulation in the United Kingdom, Australia and Singapore” 2007 Australian 
Journal of Corporate Law 22 22-50; McCabe “Puppet Masters or Marionettes: Is Program Trading 
Manipulative as Defined by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934?” 1993 Fordham Law Review 207 223, 
which comments on the circumstances that are considered necessary when determining whether the 
activity in question should be deemed unlawful and manipulative.     
151    S 1041E(1)(c) of the Corporations Act. 
152   S 1041E of the Corporations Act, which repealed s 999 & s 1261 of the Corporations Law 1990; also see 
generally the Ministry of Economic Development’s Regulatory Competition and Policy article “Part IV: 
The Content of A Market Manipulation Regime” 2005 Reform of Securities Trading Law 1-5 
<http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/MultipageDocumentPage_6865.aspx> (accessed 13-04-2010).   
153    S 1041F of the Corporations Act.   
154    S 1041F(2) of the Corporations Act. 
155   S 1041F(3) of the Corporations Act.  Accordingly, the contravention s 1041F will lead to civil liability 
despite the fact that it is not necessarily a ‘civil penalty provision’; see further the Supplementary 
Explanatory Memorandum paragraph 3.116. 
156  S 1041G(1) of the Corporations Act, which is treated as a ‘civil penalty provision’ but nonetheless its 
contravention may further results in criminal liability on the part of the offenders.  Also see the Revised 
Explanatory Memorandum paragraph 15.19.     
157    S 1041G(2) of the Corporations Act. 
158    This criterion was employed in Ghosh [1982] Q.B 341; also see S 1041G(2) of the Corporations Act. 
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products is broadly prohibited.159  However, this prohibition does not apply to misleading or 
deceptive takeover, compulsory acquisition and fund raising documents or disclosure 
documents or statements as defined in the Financial Services Reform Act.160  However, the 
prohibition on misleading or deceptive conduct may apply to: (a) applying to become a 
standard employer sponsor of a superannuation entity, (b) permitting a person to become a 
standard employer sponsor of a superannuation entity, (c) a trustee of a superannuation entity 
dealing with the beneficiary of that entity as such beneficiary, and (d) a trustee of a 
superannuation entity dealing with a standard employer sponsor.161 
 
Other activities that are related to market manipulation such as short selling162 and market 
stabilisation are also outlawed in the Corporations Act.  Notwithstanding this general 
prohibition, short selling and market stabilisation may only be permitted under certain 
requirements as stipulated in the Corporations Act.163 
 
8 2 7 4  Available Penalties and Remedies 
 
As is the case with the insider trading prohibition,164 the Corporations Act extends civil 
penalties, civil remedies165 and criminal penalties to any person who violates its provisions on 
market manipulation.166  
 
8 2 7 4 1  Criminal Penalties 
 
Any person who engages in market manipulation activities will be liable for a criminal 
offence and penalty.167 The discretion to institute criminal proceedings rests primarily with 
159   S 1041H(1) & (2) of the Corporations Act; also see the Revised Explanatory Memorandum paragraphs 
15.8 to 15.10, which stipulates that s 1041H repealed and replaced the former provisions of s 995 of the 
Corporations Law.     
160   See Parts 7.7 & 7.9 of the Financial Services Reform Act; also s 1041H(3) of the Corporations Act; the 
Revised Explanatory Memorandum paragraph 15.10.    
161    See further the Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum paragraphs 3.117 & 3.118.   
162    S 1020B of the Corporations Act. 
163   For example, short selling and market-stabilisation may be allowed where it is the subject of a declaration 
by a market operator (for example a stock exchange) as approved for such short selling or market 
stabilisation purposes.     
164    See paragraphs 8 2 6 & 8 2 6 4 above. 
165    S 1041I provides civil liability against any person who violates s 1041E to s1041H of the Corporations 
Act. 
166   Comino “Civil or Criminal Penalties for Corporate Misconduct–Which Way Ahead?” 2006 Australian 
Business Law Review 428 430-446; Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 192.     
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the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions.  Nonetheless, the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission may, after consultation with the Commonwealth Director of 
Public Prosecutions, further bring criminal proceedings against any person accused of 
contravening the relevant market abuse provisions in Australia.168 Accordingly, the 
prosecution of market manipulation and other market misconduct offences may be instituted 
within five years after the commission of the offence in question or at any time as stipulated 
by the Minister of Justice.169 Any person who engages in manipulation and/or other market 
misconduct offences170 will be liable for a maximum criminal penalty fine of Aus $22, 000 
for individuals or (Aus $110, 000 for a body corporate), or imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding five years, or both such fine and imprisonment.171  These penalties were recently 
increased by the Corporations Amendment (No 1) Act, to a maximum pecuniary fine of Aus 
$495, 000 or three times the profit gained or loss avoided, whichever is the greater172 or ten 
years imprisonment173 or both, for individuals.   The maximum criminal penalties for a body 
corporate were increased to a fine of Aus $4, 950, 000, or three times the profit made or loss 
avoided, or 10% of the body corporate’s annual turnover during the relevant period in which 
the offence was committed, whichever is greater.174  This clearly suggests that market 
manipulation and other related market misconduct offences are all treated as criminal offences 
which carry the same penalty.175  In relation to this, the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission may further bring such criminal proceedings even after the civil penalty 
167     S 1308A of the Corporations Act; also see Comino 2006 Australian Business Law Review 430-446. 
168     Comino 2006 Australian Business Law Review 429-446. 
169     S 1316 of the Corporations Act. 
170     S 1041A to s 1041G read with s 1311of the Corporations Act.   
171     S 1311; s 1312 & Schedule 3 item 309C of the Corporations Act; also see 4AA of the Crimes Act. 
172     See the Corporations Amendment (No 1) Bill Explanatory Memorandum 3.11. 
173  Generally see the Corporations Amendment (No 1) Bill Explanatory Memorandum 3.11; also see 
<http://www.treasurer.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=transcripts/2010/007.htm&pageI> (accessed 28-04-
2010) & Constable 2011 MqJBL 107, for further details regarding these penalties. 
174  See Bowen Press Release 28 January 2010; also see further the Corporations Amendment (No 1) Bill 
Explanatory Memorandum 3.11 & see further analysis on these new sanctions by Ewart & Tobias 
“Australia: Government Announces Increased Penalties for Market Misconduct and Greater ASIC 
Powers” (14-02-2010) <http://www.mondaq.com/australia/article.asp?articleid=93974> (accessed 28-04-
2010); Bowen “Strengthening of ASIC’s Investigative Powers, Increased Penalties for Market 
Misconduct Offences” (2010) 
<http://www.treasurer.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=transcripts/2010/0007.htm&pageI> (accessed 28-
01-2010).    
175  Austin “A Rapid Response to Questionable Trading–Moving Towards Better Enforcement of Australia’s 
Securities Laws” (2009) 1-3 
<http://www.clta.edu.au/professional/papers/conference2009/AustinCLTA09.pdf>  (accessed 28-04-
2010); also see a generally related article by Austin “Is My Client’s Conduct Dishonest or Merely 
Excusable Sharp Practice” 2008 Third International Legal Ethics Conference, Gold Coast (14-07-2008) 
<http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1288970> (accessed 29-04-2010).   
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proceedings for the same conduct have been instituted.176  However, where a person has been 
convicted of a criminal offence of the same conduct, no civil penalty action will be 
additionally instituted against such person.177 
 
8 2 7 4 2  Civil Penalties 
 
Civil penalties may also be instituted against any person who violates market manipulation178 
and/or other market misconduct provisions.179 Currently, such penalties may only be 
instituted under the civil penalty provisions.180 Put differently, the civil penalty provisions are 
now similarly applicable to both the market misconduct and continuous disclosure 
provisions.181  Consequently, civil penalties may be brought against the offenders, either as 
financial services civil penalties or as corporation or scheme civil penalties.182  
 
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission is statutorily empowered to take a 
relevant civil action against the offenders.183 For example, the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission may impose civil pecuniary penalties of up to Aus $200, 000 fine 
for individuals and Aus $1 million fine for a body corporate against the offenders and the 
recovered money will be utilised to compensate all the prejudiced persons.184  It is stated that 
these pecuniary penalties were recently increased to enhance the combating of market 
manipulation and similar practices in Australia.185  In addition, the Australian Securities and 
176   Austin (2009) 3 <http://www.clta.edu.au/professional/papers/conference2009/AustinCLTA09.pdf> 
(accessed 28-04-2010). 
177    S 1317N to s 1317P read with s 1041I; s 1317E to s 1317HA & s 206C of the Corporations Act.   
178    S 1041A to s 1041E of the Corporations Act.   
179   S 1041F to s 1041H of the Corporations Act.  The civil penalty provisions were first introduced in 1993 
and are now contained in Part 9.4B of the Corporations Act.     
180   S 1317E to s 1317HA read with s 206C of the Corporations Act.   
181   S 674 to s 675 of the Corporations Act, which relates to continuous disclosure requirements in Australia; 
also see Longo (25-07-2001)3- 4 <http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2001/01/07/1123353208631.htm> 
(accessed 04-06-2008); <http://www.cclsr.law.unimelb.edu.au/researchpapers/longo.htm> (accessed 04-
05-2010).     
182   The financial services civil penalties applies to any person who violate the market misconduct provisions 
while the corporation or scheme civil penalties applies to any contravention in relation to the continuous 
disclosure provisions.   S 1317E(1)(ja); s 1317J(3A) & s 1041I of the Corporations Act.   
183     S 1317E to s 1317HA read with s 206C; s 1317J(1) & (2) of the Corporations Act.   
184   S 1317E to s 1317HA & s 206C of the Corporations Act; also see related analysis by Austin (2009) 3 
<http://www.clta.edu.au/professional/papers/conference2009/AustinCLTA09.pdf> (accessed 28-04-2010) 
& further comments on the recently introduced new market abuse penalties by Bowen (2010) 
<http://www.treasurer.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=transcripts/2010/0007.htm&pageI> (accessed 28-
01-2010). 
185    Constable 2011 MqJBL 107 & generally see paragraphs 8 2 6 2 & 8 2 7 4 1 above. 
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Investments Commission may order the disqualification of the perpetrators of market 
manipulation and other market misconduct offences from being involved in the management 
of any company or corporation for a certain period.186  The Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission and/or the courts may declare (publicise) the existence of a 
violation, when satisfied that a particular person was involved in market manipulation and/or 
other related market misconduct offences.187  This is inter alia employed to discourage 
unscrupulous persons from engaging in market manipulation.188  The Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission may further impose orders for civil penalties for punitive 
purposes against the market manipulation offenders.189  Notably, the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission has a discretion regarding the actual amount to be imposed as civil 
punitive or pecuniary penalties against such offenders.190  In addition, further civil action 
against the offenders can be brought by the actual prejudiced person (a private right of 
action)191 and the relevant courts.   For example, a court may, after it is satisfied that the 
contravention in question will materially prejudice the issuers of the financial products to 
which it relates,192 bring a civil compensatory action against the offenders to recover any 
damages incurred by the affected persons.193   
 
186  See s 1317E to s 1317HA & s 206C of the Corporations Act; also see Austin (2009) 3 
<http://www.clta.edu.au/professional/papers/conference2009/AustinCLTA09.pdf> (accessed 28-04-
2010).  
187    S 1317E(1) of the Corporations Act; also see further Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 192.    
188   See Welsh “Eleven Years On–An Examination of ASIC’s Use of An Expanding Civil Penalty Regime” 
2004 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 175 187; Mann “Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground 
between Criminal and Civil Law” 1992 The Yale Law Journal 1795 1845.    
189   ASIC v Plymin & others [2003] VSC 123; ASIC v Plymin and Others (2003) 46 ACSR 126 & ASIC v 
Plymin and Others (2003) 21 ACLC 700, where the ASIC obtained banning orders, pecuniary penalties 
and compensation orders against Bernard Plymin, John Elliot & William Harrison in relation to their 
contravention of the market misconduct provisions, as directors of Water Wheel and its subsidiary Water 
Wheel Mills Pty Limited.  Also see Comino “High Court Relegates Strategic Regulation and Pyramidal 
Enforcement to Insignificance” 2005 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 48; this article is also 
available at <http://www.parsons.law.usyd.edu.au/CLTA/CominoPaper.pdf> (accessed 27-04-2010).    
190  However, where any financial services civil provision was violated, the courts or the ASIC may impose 
pecuniary penalties up to Aus $200 000 on the perpetrators of such offences.  S 1317EA of the 
Corporations Act read with s 1317FA of the same Act.     
191    S 1317J(3A) of the Corporations Act. 
192    S 1317E(1) of the Corporations Act. 
193   S 1041I of the Corporations Act read with s 1317S of the same Act.   The Commonwealth DPP usually 
consults with the ASIC to determine whether to bring civil penalty actions or criminal proceedings in 
relation to any market abuse violations.       
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The financial services civil penalties have to date significantly improved the enforcement of 
the market manipulation and other market misconduct provisions in Australia.194  In other 
words, the lower standard of proof required in civil cases has not been quite exploited by both 
the Australian Securities and Investments Commission and the courts to obtain more 
successful settlements in market manipulation cases in Australia.195 
 
8 2 7 4 3  Civil Remedies 
 
Civil remedies are also available to all the persons prejudiced by market manipulation196 
and/or other related market misconduct offences.197 Accordingly, the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission may institute civil penalty compensation orders against any 
person who contravenes the market manipulation and/or other market misconduct 
provisions.198  The Australian Securities and Investments Commission has further discretion 
and authority to determine the actual appropriate civil compensatory remedies that will be 
given to any persons affected by the market manipulation and/or other related offences.199 
 
In addition, a private right of action is expressly provided for any persons who incurred some 
losses as a result of market manipulation and/or other market misconduct violations to apply 
for a compensation order.200  This enables the affected persons to claim their civil 
compensatory damages timeously and directly from the perpetrators of market manipulation 
194  Middleton “The Difficulties of Applying Civil Evidence and Procedure Rules in ASIC’s Civil Penalty 
Proceedings under the Corporations Act” 2003 C&SLJ 507.     
195   Constable 2011 MqJBL 92-96; Longo “Civil Penalty Regime to Extend to Market Misconduct” 2001 
Keeping Good Companies 635 635; Andrews “If the Dog Catches the Mice: The Civil Settlement of 
Criminal Conduct under the Corporations Act and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
Act” 2003 AJCL 137 146; Huang 2009 Company and Securities Law Journal 12-15; Gilligan, Bird & 
Ramsay “Civil Penalties and the Enforcement of Directors’ Duties” 1999 UNSWLJ 417 424; Goldwasser 
1998 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 111.   See further Donald v ASIC (2001) 38 ACSR 10; 
Donald v ASIC [2001] AATA 366, the accused was found guilty of market manipulating the price relating 
to the affected shares (financial products); for further discussion on the theory, history and application of 
civil penalties in Australia, see Gething “Do We Really Need Criminal and Civil Penalties for 
Contraventions of Directors’ Duties?” 1996 ABLR 375; Bird “The Problematic Nature of Civil Penalties 
in Corporations Law” 1996 C&SLJ 405.     
196    S 1041A to s 1041E of the Corporations Act. 
197    S 1041F to s 1041H of the Corporations Act. 
198    S 1317E to s 1317HA & s 206C read with s 1325 of the Corporations Act. 
199    S 1317J(1) & (2) of the Corporations Act read with s 1317E(1)(ja) of the same Act.  Also see Austin 
(2009) 3 <http://www.clta.edu.au/professional/papers/conference2009/AustinCLTA09.pdf> (accessed 28-
04-2010).       
200   S 1317J(3A) of the Corporations Act read with s 1324A; s 1324B & s 1325(2) of the same Act, which 
deals with injunctive relief during prosecutions, orders for the disclosure of relevant information and 
compensatory orders.      
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and/or other related offences.201  As stated earlier,202 the relevant courts and/or the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission may make a declaration that certain conduct had 
constituted a market manipulation violation.203  Importantly, the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission or any other applicant in a civil action for remedies may rely on 
such declaration without being required to further prove the actual occurrence of market 
manipulation or other related contravention in question.204  A declaration of contravention of 
market manipulation and/or other market misconduct provisions is therefore a useful tool to 
expedite the actions for civil remedies by both the courts and the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission.205 
 
Furthermore, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission may seek civil or 
administrative freezing orders or injunctions from the courts against the perpetrators of 
market manipulation and other market misconduct offences.206  This remedy is, among other 
things, aimed at directly preventing or stopping the offenders from continuing with a 
particular illicit conduct or their market manipulation and/or market misconduct violations.207  
Additionally, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission or the Australian Stock 
Exchange may take disciplinary action against a market participant or any person who 
committed market manipulation and/or other related offences.   In essence, this directly 
implies that such matters will be brought to the Australian Stock Exchange Disciplinary 
Tribunal which will then decide on the appropriate civil remedy to be imposed against such 
offenders.208    
201   S 1041I & s 1317HA of the Corporations Act.  This is usually referred to as a private right of action of 
piggy–back civil rights against the offenders who are then required to compensate the claimants or the 
affected investors.      
202   See paragraph 8 2 8 4 2 above. 
203    S 1317E(1) read with s 1041I of the Corporations Act; also Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 192.   
204    Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 192; see further related comments and analysis by Morrell “Changes to the 
Takeovers Code and Takeovers Act and an Update on the Operations of the Panel” 2006 Securities Law 
Update 11-12 <http://www.takeovers.govnt.nz/speeches/km_290506.pdf>  (accessed 29-04-2010).   
205    Morrell 2006 Securities Law Update 12 <http://www.takeovers.govnt.nz/speeches/km_290506.pdf> 
(accessed 29-04-2010).      
206    S 1323 & s 1324 of the Corporations Act.   
207  See generally s 1325 read with s 1323 & s 1324 of the Corporations Act; also see Austin (2009) 3 
<http://www.clta.edu.au/professional/papers/conference2009/AustinCLTA09.pdf> (accessed 28-04-
2010).        
208   For more details regarding the role of the ASX Disciplinary Tribunal, see the ASX Disciplinary Process 
and Appeals Rule Book available at <http://www.asx.com.au/supervision/rules_guidance/ 
disciplinary_rules.htm>  (accessed 01-05-2010); Furthermore, see generally the ASX Market Rules 28.3.1 
available at <http://www.asx.com.au.supervision/rules_guidance/market_rules.htm> (accessed 01-05-
2010), for related analysis regarding the ASX Rules relating to the functions of the ASX Disciplinary 
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Any prejudiced person or the Australian Securities and Investments Commission209 may seek 
banning orders and/or disqualification orders from the courts against those who violate market 
manipulation or other market misconduct provisions.210  Notably, the banning or 
disqualification orders may be implemented against the offenders permanently or for a 
specified period.211  Therefore, the courts and the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission have discretionary powers to determine the exact period under which the 
accused persons will be banned or disqualified from executing their managerial duties in the 
affected corporations.212 Moreover, any person who can show or prove that he suffered a loss 
as a result of the contravention of continuous disclosure provisions will recover his damages 
from the offenders concerned.213 
 
Although it may be argued that the civil remedies are at the bottom of the Australian 
securities law enforcement pyramid, which has civil penalties in the middle and criminal 
penalties on the top, such remedies have to date significantly contributed to the general 
combating of market manipulation and other related offences in Australia.214   
 
8 3  Detection, Prosecution and the Enforcement of the Market Abuse Prohibition 
8 3 1  The Role of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
 
The regulation of securities markets in Australia has come a long way.   It was introduced at a 
federal level on 1 January 1991 and was administered by a single federal regulatory body, the 
Tribunal & also see Austin (2009) 5 & 7 <http://www.clta.edu.au/professional/papers/conference2009/ 
AustinCLTA09.pdf> (accessed 28-04-2010).  
209    S 920B of the Corporations Act. 
210    S 1041A to s 1041H of the Corporations Act; Constable 2011 MqJBL 96-99.   
211    S 920B(2) of the Corporations Act. 
212   S 920A(1) of the Corporations Act; ASIC v Adler [2003] NSWCA 131; ASIC v Adler (2003) 46 ACSR 
504; ASIC v Adler (2003)21ACLC 1810, where Adler was disqualified for 20 years and ordered to pay 
approximately Aus $7 million compensation jointly with Adler Corporation Pty Limited and Williams.    
In addition, Adler was further ordered to pay Aus $450 000 pecuniary penalties.  See further related 
articles by Main “One.Tel: From Rich Dream to Costly Nightmare” AFR (2006-05-29)  6; Johnston 
“Disgraced Director Vizard ‘Motivated by Greed’” AFR (2005-07-22) 1, where the ASIC successfully 
requested and imposed on Vizard, a five year ban on managing companies and about Aus $390 000 
compensatory and pecuniary penalties.   
213   S 1317J(3A) read with s 1317J(1) & (2) of the Corporations Act; Goldwasser 1999 C&SLJ 210 & Longo 
(25-07-2001) 41 <http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2001/01/07/1123353208631.htm> (accessed 04-06-
2008).    
214    Longo (25-07-2001) 21 & 23 <http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2001/01/07/1123353208631.htm> 
(accessed 04-06-2008) & Goldwasser 1999 C&SLJ 210. 
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Australian Securities Commission.215  This followed the failure of its predecessor, the 
National Companies and Securities Commission in the early 1980s to enforce the securities 
and market abuse laws consistently in Australia.216  The Australian Securities Commission 
was renamed the Australian Securities and Investments Commission on 1 July 1998.217 As a 
result, apart from its main responsibility to oversee the regulation of companies and the 
futures markets, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission assumed further 
responsibilities.218  For instance, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission may 
investigate any criminal matters involving insider trading and market manipulation and 
prosecute such matters in terms of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
Act219 and the Corporations Act.220  The Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
may further refer any serious criminal matters to the Commonwealth Director of Public 
Prosecutions for prosecution in accordance with a Memorandum of Understanding between 
itself and the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions.221  Therefore, the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission may, after investigations and liaising with the 
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, institute criminal proceedings against any 
person accused of violating any market misconduct provisions, especially where it reasonably 
suspects that such violation actually occurred.222  Eventually, if such person is convicted, the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission and/or the courts may impose a maximum 
criminal fine of Aus $495, 000, or three times the profit gained or loss avoided, whichever is 
the greater, or ten years imprisonment or both, for individuals.  The maximum criminal 
215   Adams & Freeman “The Securities Market in Australia” in Walker & Fisse (eds) Securities Regulation in 
Australia and New Zealand (1994) 141-145; also see the  relevant provisions of the Corporations Law 
1991. 
216    Adams & Freeman Securities Regulation in Australia and New Zealand 141-145; Comino “National 
Regulation of Corporate Crime” 1997 Current Commercial Law 84 & also see generally Tomasic 
“Corporations Law Enforcement Strategies in Australia: The Influence of Professional, Corporate and 
Bureaucratic Cultures” 1993 Australian Journal of Corp Law 192 197.  
217    Comino 2005 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 48. 
218   S 49 of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 51 of 2001(Cth) as amended, 
hereinafter referred to as the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act.   
219    S 49 of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act. 
220    S 1314 of the Corporations Act. 
221    See further related comments and analysis by Tomasic “Sanctioning Corporate Crime and Misconduct: 
Beyond Draconian and Decriminalisation Solutions” 1992 Australian Journal of Corp Law 82 102-105; It 
is noteworthy that the ASIC signed a new Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the 
Commonwealth DPP on 01 March 2006 which replaced the former MOU of the ASIC and the 
Commonwealth DPP that was dated 22 April 1996, see the ASIC & Commonwealth DPP’s 2006 MOU 
(01-03-2006) <http://www.asic.gov.au>  (accessed 30-04- 2010); also see Constable 2011 MqJBL 93.   
222   S 13 Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act.  Also see Boys v ASIC (1998) 26 ACSR 
464, where it was stated that the ASIC’s investigative powers are applicable if it has a ‘reason to suspect’ 
or reason to believe that the alleged contravention actually occurred.     
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penalties for a body corporate were increased to a fine of Aus $4, 950, 000, or three times the 
profit made or loss avoided, or ten per cent of the body corporate’s annual turnover during the 
relevant period in which the offence was committed, whichever is greater.223   However, 
relatively few successful prosecutions were obtained in criminal cases for market 
manipulation in Australia during the period from 1990 to 2011.224  
 
Furthermore, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission may commence civil 
proceedings against any person who engages in market abuse activities.225 Accordingly, the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission may in the public interest bring an action 
in the name of and for the benefit of the body corporate to recover its losses, pecuniary 
damages, property or other entitlements as contemplated in the Corporations Act.226 
Therefore, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission may institute a civil action 
for insider trading and/or other related offences without the consent of the affected persons or 
the issuer of the affected securities or financial products.227   Moreover, the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission may bring civil penalty proceedings and impose civil 
penalties of up to Aus $200 000 for individuals and Aus $1 million for corporations that 
contravene its Rules and/or indulge in illicit market abuse practices.228  The Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission is further empowered to apply for a compensation 
order on behalf of any person who was affected by market abuse practices.229 Additionally, 
the Australian Securities and Investments Commission may seek court orders such as 
restraint, investment, mandatory direction and cancellation orders to ensure timely 
compensation for the victims of insider trading230 and/or other related market abuse activities 
223   See related remarks in paragraphs 8 2 6 2 & 8 2 7 4 1 above & s 1311 of the Corporations Act; also see 
Austin “Government to the Rescue: ASIC Takes the Reins of the Stock Markets” 2010 C&SLJ 444 444-
446 & 451-456 & Constable 2011 MqJBL 86-92.  
224   For instance, it is stated that only about five successful criminal prosecutions for market manipulation 
were obtained during the period from 1990 to 2000, while ten successful criminal prosecutions for market 
manipulation were obtained during the period from 2001 to 2011 by the ASIC.   See Constable 2011 
MqJBL 88-89 & Goldwasser 1999 Australian B.L.R 484-485; 505-511. 
225    S 50 Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act.   
226   S 1043L(6) read with s 1043L(2) or (5) of the Corporations Act; s 50 Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission Act; also see related remarks in paragraphs 8 2 6 1& 8 2 6 3 above.     
227   Lyon & Du Plessis The Law of Insider Trading in Australia 125; also see “ASIC Commences Civil 
Proceedings Against former One.Tel Officers and Chairman” ASIC Media Release 01/441 12 December 
2001 & “Landmark Decision on Chairman’s Duties” ASIC Media Release 03/068 24 February 2003.    
228  See similar remarks in paragraph 8 2 7 4 2 above; also see further analysis by Austin (2009) 3 
<http://www.clta.edu.au/professional/papers/conference2009/AustinCLTA09.pdf> (accessed 28-04-
2010).   
229    S 1317J & s 1325 read with s 1043L(6); s 1043L(3) & (4) of the Corporations Act.      
230    S 1043O of the Corporations Act; also see ASIC v Petsas [2005] FCA 88.   
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and is further empowered to apply for a civil penalty by way of a pecuniary penalty.  A 
pecuniary penalty is a penalty imposed only after a declaration of contravention of a financial 
services penalty provision has been proved in a court of law.231   In relation to this, the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission may seek a court order for a declaration of 
contravention of market abuse provisions in Australia.232 It is nonetheless submitted that the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission has grappled to obtain more successful 
settlements in civil proceedings involving market manipulation.233 
 
Moreover, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission has powers to disqualify 
any person convicted of committing market abuse offences from his managerial position in 
any corporation.234 Regarding this, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
may impose an order against the offenders restricting, stopping or banning them from 
providing any financial services or exercising any voting or other rights attached to financial 
products,235 or issuing,236 acquiring or disposing of such financial products.237  In relation 
this, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission has so far managed to impose 
relatively more banning orders against the market abuse offenders.238 The Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission may also suspend or cancel the offenders’ Australian 
Financial Service Licences and/or impose varying conditions on such Licences.  As earlier 
stated,239 the Australian Securities and Investments Commission may further seek court 
231    ASIC v Adler (2002) 42 ACSR 80 115 & Rich v ASIC (2004) 209 ALR 271.  Also see Lyon & Du Plessis 
The Law of Insider Trading in Australia 143.   
232   S 1317E(1) read with s 1317HA; s 1317J(1) & (2) & s 1317J(3A) of the Corporations Act; also see 
related remarks in paragraphs 8 2 7 4 2 & 8 2 7 4 3 above.     
233   Also see the ASIC “ASIC Obtains Pecuniary Penalty and Disqualification Order against former Select 
Vaccines Director” ASIC Media Release 10-88 27 April 2010; also see ASIC v Soust [2010] FCA 68; 
ASIC v Nomura International plc (1998) 89 FCR 301; 29 ACSR 473, where the ASIC successfully 
imposed a civil penalty against Nomura International plc for manipulating share price index through its 
illicit Aus $600 million securities scheme & Constable 2011 MqJBL 92-96. 
234   R v Rivkin (2003) 198 ALR 400 406 where one Rivkin was disqualified from managing any corporation 
or company for five years and fined Aus $30 000.  Also see further s 1317E to s 1317HA & s 206C of the 
Corporations Act & see further related remarks in paragraphs 8 2 6 2; 8 2 7 4 2 & 8 2 7 4 3 above.      
235    S 1043O(a) of the Corporations Act.  
236    S 1043O(b) of the Corporations Act. 
237   S 1043O(c) of the Corporations Act.    It is stated that the length of the banning orders ranges from one 
year to ten years and any person aggrieved with such orders may lodge their complaints with the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal.   See Constable 2011 MqJBL 98. 
238    ASIC v Kippe (1996) 137 ALR 423 431; also see Constable 2011 MqJBL 97-99, where it is stated that the 
ASIC successfully obtained banned orders against several persons, including Clive Henry, Rocco 
Musumeci, Richard Wade and Newton Chan.   
239    See paragraph 8 2 7 4 3 above; also see Constable 2011 MqJBL 96-99. 
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orders for the freezing of assets or injunctions against the offenders.240  The Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission may also take disciplinary action which inter alia 
includes the cancellation of an agreement for the acquisition or disposal of financial products 
or imposing an order directing a person to do or refrain from doing a specified conduct.241   
  
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission has additional powers to search and 
seize any proceeds in relation to any benefits that may result from market abuse activities in 
Australia.242  Therefore, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission may issue 
notices to the accused persons in order to inspect their premises and, after obtaining a search 
warrant, to compel such persons to appear before it for the purposes of answering questions 
and/or providing it with any other relevant information.243 Additionally, the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission has powers to investigate any market abuse 
violations. Like other enforcement agencies such as the Federal Police, the State and territory, 
the Australian Securities and Investments Commission may collect statements and evidence 
from the available witnesses.   The Australian Securities and Investments Commission can 
further request any relevant person to give it reasonable assistance in relation to an ongoing 
investigation and/or any subsequent prosecution.244 Most recently, the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission’s investigatory powers were significantly increased.245 
Accordingly, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission will no longer be 
required to issue a notice before applying to a magistrate for a search warrant.246   This will 
reduce the risk of the accused persons destroying market abuse evidential material before the 
search warrant is obtained.247  Furthermore, market manipulation and insider trading offences 
240    S 1323; s 1324 read with s 1325 of the Corporations Act. 
241    S 1043O(f); (g) & (h); s 1323; s 1324 & s 920B(3) of the Corporations Act; also see Constable 2011 
MqJBL 96. 
242    R v Hannes 519 & 529. 
243    S 19 & s 29 to s 34 read with s 49 of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act.     
244   S 19(2)(a) & s 49 Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act & see further Longo “The 
Powers of Investigations of the Australian Securities Commission: Balancing the Interests of Persons and 
Companies under Investigation with the Interests of the State” 1992 C&SLJ 237.  
245   These new powers were introduced by the Corporations Amendment (No 1) Act which amended 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act and the Telecommunications (Interception and 
Access) Act 114 of 1979 (Cth) as amended, hereinafter referred to as the Telecommunications Act.    
246    Constable 2011 MqJBL 106. 
247    Constable 2011 MqJBL 106; also see s 19 & s 30 to s 33 the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission Act.     
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are now listed as serious offences under the Telecommunications Act,248 thereby empowering 
the Australian Federal Police and/or other interception agencies249 to apply for a telephone 
interception warrant in matters involving market abuse investigations. This is aimed at 
granting the Australian Securities and Investments Commission an opportunity to work with 
the Australian Federal Police to obtain intercepted telephone material which could be used in 
the prosecution of market abuse offences.250 
 
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission is now responsible for the real-time 
surveillance of the Australian securities and futures markets to detect and prevent market 
abuse activities.251  This suggests that the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission’s Market Surveillance Team now uses the same surveillance system which was 
initially used by the Australian Stock Exchange’s Surveillance Department.252  Moreover, the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission’s Market Surveillance Team is also made 
up of a number of former employees of the Australian Stock Exchange’s Surveillance 
Department with extensive market experience.253  Consequently, the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission may further detect market abuse activities from the surveillance it 
undertakes, complaints from the public, media and the assistance it receives from other 
enforcement agencies like the Australian Stock Exchange.254   It is hoped that the delays 
which used to inhibit the Australian Securities and Investments Commission’s investigations 
248   S 5D of the Telecommunications Act; also see Constable 2011 MqJBL 106 & see further Bowen (2010) 
<http://www.treasurer.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=transcripts/2010/0007.htm&pageI> (accessed 28-
01-2010).  
249    S 5(1) of the Telecommunications Act, which defines the term “interception agency”. 
250    The telecommunications intercepted must, however, be obtained under a court issued warrant or court 
order. 
251   The ASIC took over the supervision and surveillance of securities markets and market participants 
responsibility from the Australian Stock Exchange (the ASX) on 01 August 2010.  This change was 
introduced by the amendments which were brought to the Corporations Act by the Corporations 
Amendment (Financial Market Supervision) Act 26 of 2010 (Cth), hereinafter referred to as the 
Corporations Amendment Act, in order to enable new market operators to come to Australia and compete 
with the Australian Stock Exchange.   See Austin 2010 C&SLJ 444-446 & 451-459 & Constable 2011 
MqJBL 101; 107-110.   
252    Constable 2011 MqJBL 108. 
253    Constable 2011 MqJBL 108. 
254   For more details on the ASIC’s investigatory roles, see “ASIC: A Guide to How We Work” (2007-2009) 
10 <http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/asic_guide_how_we_work.pdf/$file/ 
asic_guidehow_we_work.pdf> (accessed 09-01-2010); also see the ASIC “ASIC Supervision of Markets 
and Participants: July to December 2011” Report 277, February 2012 2-19; the ASIC “ASIC Supervision 
of Markets and Participants: August to December 2010” Report 227, January 2011 8 & Constable 2011 
MqJBL 107-108. 
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and preliminary enquiries into the Australian Stock Exchange’s market abuse referrals will 
now be removed.255 
 
In addition, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission is also responsible for 
maintaining confidence of investors in securities markets and futures markets by obtaining 
orders that direct the disposal of financial products or vests such products under its control to 
ensure adequate protection of such investors,256 for the purpose of enhancing commercial 
stability, efficiency, the development of the economy and generally reducing business costs. 
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission may further employ enforceable 
undertakings against the market abuse offenders.257  These undertakings have enabled the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission to obtain timely and cost-effective 
administrative settlements flexibly in market abuse cases.258 The Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission may also administer and ensure compliance with its new Market 
Integrity Rules.259  Put differently, the market participants in licensed markets are obliged to 
comply with the Market Integrity Rules.260  Market participants are therefore prohibited from 
engaging in insider trading, market manipulation261 and/or any unprofessional conduct.262  
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission may impose a civil penalty of up to 
255    Constable 2011 MqJBL 107-108; also see R v Chan [2010] VSC 312. 
256   S 1043O(d) & (e) of the Corporations Act.  Also see generally Shaw & Von Nessen “The Legal Role of 
the Australian Securities Commission and The Australian Stock Exchange” in Walker, Ramsay & Fisse 
(eds) Securities Regulation in Australia and New Zealand (1998) 163-164; De Marzo, Fishman & 
Kathleen “The Optimal Enforcement of Insider Regulations” 1998 The Journal of Political Economy 602 
606; Middleton “ASIC’s Investigation and Enforcement Powers–Current Issues and Suggested Reforms” 
2004 C&SLJ 503.  See further related comments on ASIC’s investigatory roles in ASIC v Vines [2002] 
NSWSC 1222; ASIC v Loiterton [2004] NSWSC 172.  
257   These enforceable undertakings were introduced by the Financial Sector Reform (Amendments and 
Transitional Provisions) Act 54 of 1998 (Cth), hereinafter referred to as the Financial Sector Reform Act, 
which amended the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 90 of 1989 (Cth) as amended, 
hereinafter referred to as the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 1989; see Schedule 
1, paragraph 11 of the Financial Sector Reform Act.   
258   S 93AA of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 1989; also see the ASIC 
Regulatory Guide 100: Enforceable Undertakings, March 2007, 2; 4-5 & 17; the Australian Law Reform 
Commission Securing Compliance: Civil and Administrative Penalties in Australian Federal Regulation 
(2002) Discussion Paper 65 7.171; the ASIC “ASIC Accepts Enforceable Undertaking from former 
Victorian Stockbroker” ASIC Media Release 09-01 7 January 2009 & Constable 2011 MqJBL 99-101.   
259    See the ASIC Market Integrity Rules (ASX Market) 2010, hereinafter referred to as the Market Integrity 
Rules  which were introduced by the Corporations Amendment Act.  These Rules are modeled after the 
former ASX Market Rules which were administered by the Australian Stock Exchange (the ASX).   See 
Constable 2011 MqJBL 101-104.   
260    S 798H of the Corporations Act; also see Constable 2011 MqJBL 101.   
261    Rules 2.1.5 & 5.7.1 of the Market Integrity Rules. 
262    Rule 1.4.3 of the Market Integrity Rules; also see Constable 2011 MqJBL 101.   
386 
                                               
Aus $1 million on any person who violates its Market Integrity Rules.263  Moreover, where a 
person failed to comply with the Market Integrity Rules, the court may order such person to 
compensate the affected persons (including corporations) for any damages they incurred.264 
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission may also issue an infringement notice 
which mandates any offender to pay a penalty of not more than Aus $600, 000 or undertake 
remedial measures such as education programmes.265  Notably, the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission delegates the power to issue infringement notices and/or accept 
enforceable undertakings to an independent peer review tribunal called the Markets 
Disciplinary Panel.266   It is anticipated that many market abuse offenders will elect to comply 
with the Australian Securities and Investments Commission’s infringement notices and/or 
enforceable undertakings rather than the costly civil penalty proceedings.267 It is also expected 
that the Australian Securities and Investments Commission will develop adequate 
technological mechanisms for cross-market surveillance to detect and combat market abuse 
practices across different markets in Australia.268 
 
Although the role of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission as a corporate 
watchdog against market abuse practices has been criticised by some commentators for being 
ineffective,269 the market abuse cases which have been successfully settled and prosecuted to 
date could serve as proof of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission’s 
efficiency.  For example, at least a considerable number of persons have to date been 
investigated and prosecuted for various market abuse offences as a result of the functioning of 
the Australian Securities and Investments Commission and the relevant courts in Australia.270   
263    S 798G(2) of the Corporations Act; also see Constable 2011 MqJBL 102 & Austin 2010 C&SLJ 452. 
264    S 1317HB of the Corporations Act; Constable 2011 MqJBL 102. 
265    S 798K of the Corporations Act; also see Constable 2011 MqJBL 102. 
266   The ASIC Regulatory Guide 216: Markets Disciplinary Panel, July 2010 4; the ASIC Regulatory Guide 
225: Markets Disciplinary Panel Practices and Procedures, May 2011 & also see Constable 2011 
MqJBL 102.  
267    Constable 2011 MqJBL 102 & Austin 2010 C&SLJ 453. 
268    Austin 2010 C&SLJ 454-455. 
269    Comino 1997 Current Commercial Law 84; Ferguson “The Watchdog No one Fears” 2000 BRW 58. 
270    See “Steve Vizard Banned for 10 Years and Fined Aus $390 000” ASIC Media Release 05-215 28 July 
2005; “Citigroup’s Chinese Walls Withstand ASIC Onslaught” (2007) 1.5 Law and Financial Markets 
Review <http://www.galegroup.com/o-find.galegroup.com_citgroup.2007.pdf.htm> (accessed 22-04-
2010); “Antony Quates Pleads Guilty to Criminal Charges” ASIC Media Release 05-201 18 July 2005; 
“HIH Insurance Investigation” ASIC Media Release 01-152 16 May 2001; “Former HIH Managing 
Director Jailed” ASIC Media Release 05-108 29 April 2005; “Brad Keeling Settles in ASIC One. Tel 
Proceeds” ASIC Media Release 03/099 21 March 2003; Lyon & Du Plessis Law of Insider Trading in 
Australia 199 for the Appendix 1 Table of Australian Insider Trading Cases.  Also see ASIC v Adler 97-
99; ASIC v Rich [2003] NSWSC 186; ASIC v Loiterton 897; ASIC v Petsas 88; ASIC v Vizard [2005] 
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In other words, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission has played and 
continues to play a significant role in the entire enforcement of securities laws and the market 
abuse prohibition in Australia.271 It is evident that, in spite of the relatively few market abuse 
settlements and convictions obtained by the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission in the late 1990s,272 the Australian Securities and Investments Commission has 
in recent years successfully increased its settlements and prosecutions of market abuse cases 
in Australia.  This has been attributed to several factors which include, inter alia, the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission’s ability to devote more resources 
specifically to deal with the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in Australia.273  This 
may further indicate that the Australian Securities and Investments Commission takes the 
enforcement of market abuse as one of its top priorities.274  For example, the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission operates a system for the Electronic Document 
Lodgment.   This system enables lodgment agents such as accountants, lawyers and brokers to 
transfer relevant documents promptly to the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission electronically and free of charge in order to effect disclosure of inside 
information.   Therefore, although anecdotal evidence could suggest that the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission is still facing some challenges in relation to the 
enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in the bull markets and hedge funds,275 one can 
FCA 1037; Fame Decorator Agencies Pty Ltd v Jeffries Industries Ltd (1998) 28 ACSR 58 59-63; ASIC v 
Soust 68; ASIC v Nomura International plc 301; Endresz v Whitehouse (1997) 24 ACSR 208; Manasseh v 
R (2002) 40 ACSR 593; R v Lloyd (1996) 19 ACSR 528; R v Chan 312; Braysich v R [2011]  HCA 14 & 
see further Constable 2011 MqJBL 66-110. 
271   Austin (2009) 1-3 & 6-18 <http://www.clta.edu.au/professional/papers/conference2009/ 
AustinCLTA09.pdf> (accessed 28-04-2010); also see ASIC v Vizard 1037, where about Aus $390 000 
and a five year banning order was obtained by the ASIC against the offenders; ASIC v Vines 1222; ASIC v 
Loiterton 897; ASIC v Adler (2002) 20 ACLC 576, where about Aus $7 million was recovered by the 
ASIC from the offenders and ASIC v Plymin & others 123, where the ASIC obtained banning orders, 
pecuniary and civil compensation orders against all the market abuse offenders (defendants).     
272  See Austin (2009) 7-10 <http://www.clta.edu.au/professional/papers/conference2009/ 
AustinCLTA09.pdf> (accessed 28-04-2010).    
273   See generally D’Aloisio “Securities Markets, Participants and ASIC” (2008), this paper was presented at 
the Securities and Derivatives Industry Association Conference, Melbourne (2008-05-22) 3; 5 & 19 
<http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/Securities20%markets,%20particpantsand%
20ASIC.pdf/$file/Securities%20markets,%20participants%and%20ASIC.pdf> (accessed 13-05-2010), for 
a related analysis and discussion of the role and functions of the ASIC; Austin (2009) 7 
<http://www.clta.edu.au/professional/papers/conference2009/AustinCLTA09.pdf> (accessed 28-04-
2010); also see Constable 2011 MqJBL 107-110. 
274   See generally the survey conducted by the Allen Consulting Group “ASIC Stakeholder Survey” April 
(2008) 8 <http://www.asic.gov/asic/pdflib.nsfLookupByfileName/stakeholder_survey_2008.pdf/ 
$file/stakeholder_survey_2008.pdf> (accessed 13-05-2010).    
275   Generally see Comino 1997 Current Commercial Law 84; Ferguson 2000 BRW 58 & Constable 2011 
MqJBL 81-110. 
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conclude that the Australian Securities and Investments Commission enforcement has to date 
significantly reduced market abuse activity in the Australian financial markets. 
 
8 3 2  The Role of the Australian Stock Exchange 
 
The establishment and statutory recognition of the Australian Stock Exchange commenced in 
the early 1970s.276  This follows the adoption of the recommendations that were enshrined in 
the report of the Senate Select Committee on Securities and Exchange which was chaired by 
Senator Rae in 1974.277 In April 1987, the Australian Stock Exchange was created to replace 
the Australian Associated Stock Exchange to consolidate six former state Exchanges and to 
formulate a national exchange which has since been the only operating stock exchange in 
Australia.278  In 1998 the Australian Stock Exchange was demutualised and became a public 
company incorporated under the Corporations Act.  Its shares were eventually listed on the 
exchange that it operates.279  In other words, the Australian Stock Exchange is fully licensed 
to operate the Australian Stock Exchange.280  This license stipulates, among other things, that 
the Australian Stock Exchange must ensure that the market is fair, orderly and transparent. 
Moreover, the Australian Stock Exchange is further required to have adequate arrangements 
for supervising the market, including the necessary arrangements to oversee and monitor the 
conduct of all the market participants and to enforce compliance with the market’s operating 
rules.281  In terms of this licence, the Australian Stock Exchange is additionally obliged to 
give any appropriate and reasonable assistance to the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission, like furnishing it with a written notice as soon as possible, if it has an objective 
reason to suspect that a person has committed, is committing or is about to commit a material 
contravention of the market misconduct provisions, stipulating the accused person’s name, the 
276    Shaw & Von Nessen Securities Regulation in Australia and New Zealand 161. 
277    See the Rae Report 129.  
278    See Part IIA of the Australian Stock Exchange and National Guarantee Fund Act 6 of 1987.    Also see 
Shaw & Von Nessen Securities Regulation in Australia and New Zealand 174-175; Anonymous “History 
of the Market” <http://www.asx.com.au/about/asx/history/index.htm> (accessed 17-05-2012) & Mitchell 
Insider Dealing and Directors’ Duties (1989) 232-260, for further comparative reading.   
279  Baxt & Hanrahan Securities and Financial Services Law (2008) 382; also see Austin (2009) 4 
<http://www.clta.edu.au/professional/papers/conference2009/AustinCLTA09.pdf> (accessed 28-04-
2010).    
280    S 795B read with s 792A of the Corporations Act; also see related comments in “ASX’s Regulatory 
Licences” <http://www.asx.com.au/supervision/supervisory_role/regulatory_licences.htm> (accessed 04-
05-2010).     
281     S 792A of the Corporations Act. 
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type of contravention and its reasons for suspecting that there has or will be a market abuse 
violation.282 
 
Furthermore, under its market licence, the Australian Stock Exchange is mandated to develop 
and maintain operating rules dealing with any matter as prescribed in its regulations.283 Such 
rules have a contractual effect upon the Australian Stock Exchange and market participants 
and between a market participant and another market participant.284 For example, one of the 
obligations for market participants enshrined in the former Australian Stock Exchange Market 
Rules is that they must not engage in market manipulation or any “unprofessional 
conduct”.285 Where a market participant or an executive of a market participant violates any 
of the Australian Stock Exchange’s Market Rules or engages in unprofessional conduct, the 
Australian Stock Exchange has the authority to take appropriate disciplinary action and/or 
refer that matter to the Australian Stock Exchange Disciplinary Tribunal.286 Consequently, the 
Australian Stock Exchange Disciplinary Tribunal has wider discretionary powers to make a 
public censure, impose a disciplinary fine of up to Aus $1 million and suspend the market 
participant in question and/or to terminate such participant’s admission to the Australian 
Stock Exchange.287 The Australian Stock Exchange has further powers to require the 
production of documents and to inspect the premises of any market participant who is 
suspected to have violated its Market Rules and/or the market misconduct provisions.288  
282  S 792B read with s 792C & s 792D of the Corporations Act; also see Austin (2009) 4 
<http://www.clta.edu.au/professional/papers/conference2009/AustinCLTA09.pdf> (accessed 28-04-
2010).          
283   S 793A of the Corporations Act.   For example, in one of its operating rules, the ASX has prescribed 
Market Rules which contain rules relating to how a participant can gain access to trade or execute orders 
on the Australian Stock Exchange and other relevant information regarding the obligations of such 
participants.   For more information see the ASX’s Market Rules “A Guide to Becoming an ASX Market 
Participant”   
<http://www.asxonline.com/intradoccgilgroups/participant_services/documents/information/asx.pdf> 
(accessed 04-05-2010).   
284    S 793C of the Corporations Act. 
285    See the ASX Market Rule 2.10; see further ASX Market Rules 13.4; 13.5 & 28.3.1 which are also 
available at <http://www.asx.com.au./supervision/rules_guidance/market_rules.htm> (accessed 05-05-
2010).    
286   For more details regarding the role and functions of the ASX Disciplinary Tribunal see the ASX 
Disciplinary Processes and Appeals Rulebook <http://www.asx.com.au/supervision/rules_guidance/ 
disciplinary_rules.htm> (accessed 30-04-2010); also see generally related comments and analysis by 
Austin (2009) 5 <http://www.clta.edu.au/professional/papers/conference2009/AustinCLTA09.pdf> 
(accessed 28-04-2010).           
287   Austin (2009) 5 <http://www.clta.edu.au/professional/papers/conference2009/AustinCLTA09.pdf> 
(accessed 28-04-2010).                    
288   ASX Market Rule 28.1.1, available at <http://www.asx.com.au/supervision/rules_guidance/ 
market_rules.htm> (accessed 26-04-2010).     
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Additionally, the Australian Stock Exchange has the authority to summon market participants 
and their employees to attend its interviews and to furnish it with any other relevant 
information pertaining to an ongoing investigation.289  However, it is stated that some of these 
functions are now vested in the Australian Securities and Investments Commission.290 
 
Moreover, the Australian Stock Exchange offers a number of services to the markets such as 
fair trading systems, control of market integrity, guarantees of trade completion and supplying 
relevant information pertaining to securities trading, settlement and transfer systems.291  More 
specifically, such services include the Company Announcements Platform. The Company 
Announcements Platform was introduced by the Australian Stock Exchange in August 1995 
to assist companies to lodge announcements by facsimile to the Australian Stock Exchange 
from any place in Australia at a reasonably cheap cost.  This service was introduced to 
encourage companies to comply with prompt disclosure requirements of any inside 
information that relates to securities or financial products in Australia.  Another service 
offered by the Australian Stock Exchange is the Stock Exchange Automated Training System 
which was established in 1987 and became fully operative in 1990.292 Its main role is to 
enable the Australian Stock Exchange member organisations with recognised orders to buy 
and sell securities or financial products that are traded on a market conducted by the 
Australian Stock Exchange.  It also provides its member organisations with adequate 
information pertaining to securities or financial markets trading such as any changes in the 
market.  This avoids the abuse of non-public price-sensitive information relating to the 
financial products by any person who might have access to such information.293 Furthermore, 
in order to complement and supplement the Stock Exchange Automated Training System, the 
Clearing House Electronic Sub-register System was put in place in September 1994 by the 
Australian Stock Exchange Settlement and Transfer Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary 
of the Australian Stock Exchange, for expedient electronic settlement in Australia of share 
transfers of both domestic and foreign issuers.294 
 
289  ASX Market Rule 28.1.3, available at <http://www.asx.com.au/supervision/rules_guidance/ 
market_rules.htm> (accessed 26-04-2010).     
290   Constable 2011 MqJBL 101-102 & Austin 2010 C&SLJ 452-453; also see paragraph 8 3 1 above. 
291   See the ASX Annual Report 1996 2-3; 8-9; 15-16; 20 & 31. 
292   See the ASX Annual Report 1996 8. 
293  See generally Simpson “Securities Regulation for the Information Age” in Walker, Ramsay & Fisse (eds) 
Securities Regulation in Australia and New Zealand (1998) 37.   
294    Simpson Securities Regulation in Australia and New Zealand 39-40. 
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Probably, one of the major services offered by the Australian Stock Exchange is its assistance 
in electronic market surveillance, which is inter alia employed to investigate and detect 
market abuse practices.  This electronic surveillance has been utilised by the Australian Stock 
Exchange as early as the 1990s to detect any incidences of market abuse practices in the 
Australian financial markets.295 Notably, the Australian Stock Exchange’s detection and 
investigation functions were vested in the Australian Stock Exchange Market Supervision 
Private Limited.296  The surveillance is usually done by way of monitoring market activity 
and trading patterns through a computerised and sophisticated system called the Surveillance 
of Market Activity.   Moreover, the Surveillance of Market Activity system is programmed to 
detect abnormal trading sequences by looking at the electronic signal of the Stock Exchange 
Automated Training System which contains the details of trading and some programmed 
parameters in order to alert persons such as financial analysts for consideration.  For example, 
specific transactions conducted in relation to a nominated security can be isolated and 
analysed by the Stock Exchange Automated Training System as regards to the time, offer, 
bids, sales and purchases.  The Surveillance of Market Activity system will then compare the 
electronic signal containing all the details of trading against a series of parameters.  These 
parameters are programmed to ignore normal trading activity but to record and report any 
abnormal or irregular trading activity immediately when such parameters are violated.297 
Thereafter, such transactions will be discussed with the broker or representative concerned 
and coded for historical sequencing.298 This enables the Australian Stock Exchange to assess 
and monitor price movements and share trading volumes, through matching the 
representative’s coded transaction number with the transaction contracts held by brokers, to 
295   See further Ali v Hartley Poynton [2002] VSC 113, where the expert evidence was given in relation to the 
ASX’s surveillance techniques, namely the Surveillance of Market Activity (SOMA) and the Stock 
Exchange Automated Trading System (SEATS).   
296   The ASX’s Market Supervision Private Limited (ASXMS) is a separate company to the ASX in spite of 
the fact it is a wholly owned subsidiary of the ASX, which is also funded by the ASX.  Also see the 
article “Australian Stock Exchange” (2008) 109 <http://www.asx.com.au/about/pdf/a 
nnual_report_2008.pdf> (accessed 16-04-2010); the ASXMS is also manned by a board comprising five 
directors, three of whom are also ASX directors and two of whom are independent directors, see Mayne 
“ASX Markets Supervision–Looking Forward” (2007) 2 SDIA Conference, Sydney 
<http://www.asx.com.au/supervision/pdf/sdia_conference_speech_mayne-June01.pdf>  (accessed 16-04-
2010).     
297   See Australian Stock Exchange ASX Surveillance: Helping to Protect the Australian Share Market for all 
Participants (undated pamphlet) & see further Simpson Securities Regulation in Australia and New 
Zealand 41-42 & Hannigan Insider Dealing (1994) 20-46, for a comparative analysis on the detection and 
surveillance of market abuse activities.   
298   Consequently, such information will be continuously viewed or frozen, by a single screen or split screen 
which isolates certain facets of the transactions and their sequence for further analysis.   See Ali v Hartley 
Poynton (2001) VSC 7439-7441.     
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identify the affected clients.299  In some instances, these trading alerts were admissible as 
evidence against the perpetrators of market abuse offences.300  In the recent years, the 
Securities Market Automated Research Trading and Surveillance system has been 
successfully employed to monitor all real-time trading information and highlights unusual 
trading patterns and volume movements in order to detect market abuse activity in 
Australia.301    
 
Moreover, the Australian Stock Exchange has the power, especially where a suspected trading 
has been detected, to refer such matters to the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission in accordance with their Memorandum of Understanding.302  Specifically, any 
such referrals are directly transferred to the Market Watch Division of the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission for more investigation and preliminary analysis.  If 
the Market Watch Division is satisfied that some market abuse offences were committed, then 
the matter will be passed on to the Enforcement Division of the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission, which will eventually commence with the legal proceedings against 
the offenders concerned.303 Notably, these surveillance systems are now operated by the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission to execute its duties in relation to the real-
time surveillance of the Australian securities and financial markets.304  Put differently, 
Australia used to impose the responsibility to enforce the market abuse ban squarely on the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission as a government national regulator and the 
Australian Stock Exchange as an independent self-regulatory organisation.305 Consequently, 
the Australian Stock Exchange played a key role in the real-time monitoring of market 
participants and the surveillance of market abuse activities in the Australian securities and 
299   This detection method is commonly employed by a number of broking firms that tape and digitally record 
all the telephonic orders from the client to the representatives.    
300     As was held in R v Evans [1998] VSC 488. 
301   Austin (2009) 6 <http://www.clta.edu.au/professional/papers/conference2009/AustinCLTA09.pdf> 
(accessed 28-04-2010).      
302   See the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the ASX and the ASIC which was concluded on 
30 June 2004, (30-06-2004) <http://www.asx.com.au/about/pdf/ASICMOU.pdf> (accessed 03-03-2010).  
303   Austin (2009) 6 <http://www.clta.edu.au/professional/papers/conference2009/AustinCLTA09.pdf> 
(accessed 28-04-2010).                         
304   Constable 2011 MqJBL 101-102; 108 & Austin 2010 C&SLJ 444-446 & 452-453; also see paragraph 8 3 
1 above.     
305   The similar enforcement approach is also employed in countries such as the United States of America, 
France, Canada, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Japan, Germany and the United Kingdom (UK).   See 
Gadinis & Jackson “Markets as Regulators: A Survey” (2007) <http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=960168> 
(accessed 29-04-2010).    
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financial markets.306 Nonetheless, these powers have now been transferred to the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission.307 
 
8 3 3  The Role of Other Self-Regulatory Organisations  
 
For the purposes of this sub-heading, the self-regulatory organisations include the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission, the Corporations and Market Advisory Committee, 
the International Banks and Securities Association of Australia, the Securities and Derivatives 
Industry Association, the Australian Financial Markets Association and the Australian 
Institute of Company Directors.  Each of these self-regulatory organisations will therefore be 
briefly discussed below. 
 
8 3 3 1  The Role of the Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee   
 
The Corporations and Market Advisory Committee has also contributed significantly to the 
general regulation and enforcement of the securities laws in Australia.308 Specifically, the 
Corporations and Market Advisory Committee was established in terms of Part 9 of the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 1989 as an advisory body to the 
government, which is responsible for monitoring the occurrence of illicit trading activities and 
the enforcement of market abuse provisions in Australia.  Some commentators agree that the 
Corporations and Market Advisory Committee has to date made a number of useful proposals 
for the reform of the Australian market abuse regulatory framework.309  This could be the 
reason why a considerable number of successful prosecutions of matters involving market 
abuse have been achieved in Australia to date.310 Moreover, the Corporations and Market 
306   Koeck “Just What is Insider Trading? Beware of Overkill in the New Trading Laws” 1990 Journal of the 
Australian Society of Security Analysts 2 3.      
307    See paragraph 8 3 1 above. 
308    Lyon & Du Plessis Law of Insider Trading in Australia 10.    Prior to 11 March 2002 the CAMAC was 
known as the Companies and Securities Advisory Committee (CASAC), for more information see 
<http://www.camac.gov.au> (accessed 08-03-2007). 
309    See generally Baxt, Black & Hanrahan Securities and Financial Services Law 546-547; also see Mann 
1992 The Yale Law Journal 1845; “ASIC Restrains Rich Assets” ASIC Media Release 01/199 8 June 
2001; “Jodee and Maxine Rich Asset Transfer Agreement” ASIC Media Release 03/362 13 November 
2003.  
310    See the Australian government’s Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee Insider Trading Report 
(2003) 27-48 <http://www.camac.gov.au/camac.nsf/PDFDiscussion+Papers/$file/ 
Insider_Trading_DP_11_2003.pdf> (accessed 22-02-2010).   Hereinafter referred to as the CAMAC 
Report.   
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Advisory Committee has to date managed to participate in the reviewing of market abuse 
laws, especially with regard to insider trading, and has on a number of occasions formulated 
proposals for reforms aimed at promoting investor confidence and the integrity of the 
Australian securities and futures markets.311   
 
In addition, the Corporations and Market Advisory Committee has, to a fair extent, managed 
to isolate potentially serious flaws that are sometimes embedded in the securities legislation 
and recommended possible solutions to combat market abuse practices in Australia to date.312  
Put differently, the Corporations and Market Advisory Committee may make 
recommendations on any matter relating to the operation or administration of the corporations 
or securities legislation, or companies or a segment of the financial products and financial 
services industry, or law reform with regard to the corporations or securities legislation and/or 
proposals for improving the efficiency of the financial markets in Australia.313 
 
8 3 3 2  The Role of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission   
 
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission is equally involved in the regulation 
of the securities legislation and the enforcement of the anti-market abuse prohibition in 
Australia.314 For example, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission is 
empowered under the Trade Practices Act to intercept all electronic communications based on 
a suspicious trading which could be as a result of market manipulation or insider trading.  
Additionally, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission prohibits the 
formulation of cartels by discouraging contracts, arrangements or understandings which have 
the effect or are likely to have the effect of substantially lessening competition or containing 
an exclusionary provision.315 As a result, the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission may impose civil pecuniary penalties of up to Aus $10 million per contravention 
on corporations and Aus $500 000 per contravention on individuals (or company executives) 
311    See Griffiths Report paragraph 3.3.6; CAMAC Report 27-48. 
312    See generally Baxt, Black & Hanrahan Securities and Financial Services Law 546-547.       
313   See CAMAC Report vi; 27-48 & also see related remarks by CAMAC Insider Trading Discussion Paper 
(2001) 87, at <http://www.camac.gov.au/camac.nsf/PDFDiscussion+Papers/$file/ 
Insider_Trading_DP_06_2001.pdf>    (accessed 22-05-2010). 
314  See further Austin (2009) 11 <http://www.clta.edu.au/professional/papers/conference2009/ 
AustinCLTA09.pdf> (accessed 28-04-2010).     
315    S 45(2) of the Trade Practices Act. 
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who indulge in cartels.316  In 2006, a new regime of criminal sanctions was introduced to 
enable the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission to curb serious cartel conduct 
and market abuse activities.317  In addition, the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission has further concluded a Memorandum of Understanding with the 
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions to seek criminal prosecutions and jail terms 
for individuals who systematically engage in the violation of market misconduct provisions or 
who misled it in relation to its market abuse investigations.318 
 
8 3 3 3  The Role of the International Banks and Securities Association of Australia      
 
Additionally, the International Banks and Securities Association of Australia has to date 
formulated some business rules and guidelines that do not only represent the interests of 
merchant and investment banks in Australia, but that have also played a crucial role in dispute 
resolution.319 The International Banks and Securities Association of Australia has further 
managed to promote and protect the interest of its members in Australia and other foreign-
owned institutions.  Moreover, the International Banks and Securities Association of 
Australia’s rules and guidelines require all its member organisations to ensure that their 
employees acknowledge in writing that they are aware of such rules or guidelines and that 
they are not going to violate the market misconduct provisions and/or engage in transactions 
involving conflicts of interests.   The International Banks and Securities Association of 
Australia’s guidelines also require the member organisations to summarise the relevant 
316     S 76(1A) & (1B) of the Trade Practices Act.   
317   Under the new regime, a fine for corporations that is the greater of Aus $10 million or three times the gain 
from the contravention or 10% of the annual turnover of the body corporate and all its subsidiary bodies, 
will now be levied against those individuals or corporations that engage in cartel conduct or other market 
misconduct offences. In relation to this, see generally related remarks and analysis by Austin (2009) 11-
13 <http://www.clta.edu.au/professional/papers/conference2009/AustinCLTA09.pdf> (accessed 28-04-
2010).                         
318  See “Proceedings Instituted Against Visy Group, Senior Executives for Alleged Cartel in the Corrugated 
Fibrebroad Container Market” ACCC Media Release 327/05 21 December 2005, where Visy Industries 
Holdings Pty Ltd, its subsidiary bodies corporate and respondents incurred about Aus $427 million fines 
for engaging in price-fixing and other unconscionable market conduct; also see further details and 
analysis by Anonymous “Memorandum of Understanding between the Commonwealth Director of Public 
Prosecutions and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission regarding Serious Cartel 
Conduct” <http://www.cdpp.gov.au/Media/Releases/20081201-ACCC-and-CDPP-Cartel-Conduct-
Immunity-MOU.pdf> (accessed 19-05-2012). 
319   See the International Banks and Securities Association of Australia (IBSA) “Avoiding Conflicts of 
Interest: A Guide for the Financial Services Industry” (1989) 
<http://www.securities.edu.au/cms/data/live/files/891.pdf> (accessed 22-02-2009), for further analysis.   
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statutory provisions and examples of situations which highlight an alert of any contravention 
of the market misconduct provisions (especially insider trading).320 
 
The International Banks and Securities Association of Australia’s guidelines stipulate that 
price-sensitive information which is in the possession of an employee should only be given to 
the other employees in the normal course of executing their professional duties.  In addition, 
the International Banks and Securities Association of Australia’s guidelines recommend the 
physical separation of the underwriting and corporate advisory developments as well as the 
employees from other member organisations.321  This could have aimed at discouraging 
insider trading and market manipulation. Moreover, the International Banks and Securities 
Association of Australia’s guidelines require its member companies to develop and maintain 
lists of embargoed or restricted securities in which employees or any persons related to them 
cannot deal in or encourage other clients to deal in, until the stipulated embargo is lifted.322 
 
8 3 3 4  The Role of the Securities and Derivatives Industry Association     
 
The Securities and Derivatives Industry Association has further contributed significantly to 
the securities regulation in Australia, especially with regard to conflict resolution.323  For 
example, the Securities and Derivatives Industry Association has developed its best practice 
guidelines regarding research integrity, which among other things, encourage both the 
securities industry and the financial services industry to promote a culture of self-compliance 
in order to reduce as much as possible the occurrence of conflicts of interests.  Although the 
Securities and Derivatives Industry Association guidelines are neither a comprehensive 
prescription nor a mandatory method for combating conflicts of interests, they provide useful 
ways of enforcing Chinese walls and the general combating of market abuse activities in 
Australia.   For instance, the Securities and Derivatives Industry Association guidelines 
320   The IBSA mandate its member organisation to list or summarise the examples of price-sensitive 
information such as profit forecasts, mergers or reconstructions, impending takeovers, financial liquidity 
problems, proposed share issues and significant changes in operations. See the IBSA article (1989) 2 
<http://www.securities.edu.au/cms/data/live/files/891.pdf> (accessed 22-02-2009).  
321    See the IBSA Rule 3.5. 
322   See general R v Hannes (2000) 36 ACSR 72 115, where similar embargo lists were employed by the 
financial institutions, for example Macquirie Corporate Financial advised TNT Limited regarding a 
proposed takeover. However, Macquirie Corporate Finance placed TNT Limited on its embargo list to 
prevent the employees of Macquirie Corporate Finance from dealing in TNT Limited shares.      
323   For a more detailed analysis, see Securities and Derivatives Industry Association (SIASDIA) “Best 
Practice Guidelines for Research Integrity” (2001) <http://www.securities.edu.au/cms/data/live/ 
files/891.pdf> (accessed 22-02-2009).   
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include measures for encouraging its member organisations to put the interests of the 
investors first by engaging in independent and objective research and/or financial advice and 
establishing specific and separate reporting structures to ensure that analysts report only to the 
head of research and not to the corporate or trading units for approval.324 Such guidelines also 
encourage member organisations to have Chinese walls to prevent the improper dissemination 
of price-sensitive information.   Additionally, the Securities and Derivatives Industry 
Association guidelines encourage member organisations to discourage market abuse by 
implementing a written statement of a corporation’s policies and procedures for managing 
conflicts of interests, restricting trading by analysts in the subject of research during the 
research or for a reasonable period after its completion or from trading in a manner 
inconsistent with the research in question and/or by monitoring the public’s compliance with 
a corporation’s policies and procedures.325 
 
8 3 3 5  The Role of the Australian Financial Markets Association and the Australian 
Institute of Company Directors 
 
The Australian Financial Markets Association and the Australian Institute of Company 
Directors have additionally played a key role in the regulation and enforcement of securities 
legislation in Australia.   They have specifically formulated various guidelines for the persons 
involved in the securities business such as brokers and other market participants like financial 
analysts.  Particularly, the Australian Institute of Company Directors has devised certain rules 
and guidelines to promote market integrity and investor confidence by discouraging 
corporation directors from abusing their office or price-sensitive information to engage inter 
alia in market abuse activities.  Likewise, the Australian Financial Markets Association has 
some rules and regulations that prohibit any person from engaging in market manipulation, 
especially with regard to the transactions that are conducted privately or bilaterally on the 
over the counter financial markets and on the Australian offshore licenced markets.326 In other 
words, the Australian Financial Markets Association regulates the over the counter financial 
markets and ensures that the parties to the over the counter transactions include terms in their 
contracts which prohibit the misuse of material non-public price-sensitive information.  In 
324    See further Chapter Five in Lyon An Examination of Australia’s Insider Trading Laws 195.   
325    See further Chapter Five in Lyon An Examination of Australia’s Insider Trading Laws 195.   
326    See the Australian Financial Markets Association (the AFMA) article “AFMA Response to the CAMAC 
Insider Trading Proposal Paper” 01 November 2002 2-10.  
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addition, the Australian Financial Markets Association has further positively contributed to 
the review and reform of various securities and financial laws in Australia.327 
 
8 3 4  The Role of the Courts 
 
The Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions and the courts have a crucial role in the 
enforcement of the securities and market abuse legislation in Australia.328  Therefore, all the 
competent courts329 have inherent powers to impose sanctions on any person who contravenes 
insider trading and/or other market misconduct provisions in Australia.330  These powers 
include the making of: (a) orders restraining any accused persons from exercising rights 
attached to Division 3 financial products, (b) orders to restrain the acquisition, issue or 
disposal of such products, (c) orders for the vesting of such products in the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission and/or to direct the disposal of such products, or (d) 
orders for the cancellation of the Australian financial services licences.331 The competent 
courts in Australia further have powers to make orders that direct any person to do or refrain 
from doing specified acts, for the purposes of ensuring compliance with any other order they 
may make in this regard.332  Additionally, the competent courts in Australia have the 
discretion to make a declaration of contravention of the market manipulation and/or other 
market misconduct provisions, particularly when they are certain that such contravention 
actually occurred.333  In relation to this, the Australian courts advocates that market abuse 
practices should be regulated and outlawed at all costs in order to maintain open and 
transparent financial markets which promote investor confidence and market integrity.334  
327     See the AFMA article 01 November 2002 2-10.  
328    For a general comparative discussion on the role of the courts in Australia, see Coffey “The Reasonable 
Investor Test across Two Continents” 2008 Journal of the Australasian Law Teachers Association 45 45-
48, also available at <http://www.austlii.com/au/journals/JIALawTA/2008/6.pdf> (accessed 07-05-2010).     
329   Such competent courts include district courts, courts of appeal, federal courts, High Courts and Supreme 
Courts of Australia.   
330    S 1043O of the Corporations Act. 
331   S 1043O of the Corporations Act; also see generally related comments by Baxt, Black & Hanrahan 
Securities and Financial Services Law 546; Mann 1992 The Yale Law Journal 1845.  Also see “ASIC 
Obtains Court Undertakings Freezing Assets of Former One. Tel Managers” ASIC Media Release 01/343 
24 September 2001.     
332    S 1043O(h) of the Corporations Act; also see further the CAMAC Report 27-48. 
333    S 1317E(1) of the Corporations Act; also see further Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 192.  
334   See North v Marra Developments Limited (1981) 148 CLR 42; 59 (High Court Australia), where the High 
Court held that the securities markets must be free from market manipulation or other market abuse 
activities in order to promote the interests of both the investors and the community at large by ensuring 
that such markets allows the true forces of genuine supply and demand to be operative in them.    Also see 
Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 37-39; Toross “Double–Click on this: Keeping Pace with Online Market 
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Moreover, the success achieved by the Australian courts in relation to the effective 
enforcement of the market abuse provisions is clearly reflected in the number of reported 
settlements and prosecutions achieved in both civil and criminal cases to date.335  The 
Australian courts have in fact been commended for radically achieving more settlements and 
prosecutions in relation to market abuse cases, particularly with regard to insider trading.336 
They do not rely on circumstantial evidence to impute liability on the accused persons, but 
they nonetheless take cognisance of other relevant factors, such as the actual abuse of material 
non-public price-sensitive inside information by an insider or any other person for personal 
benefit or for the benefit of another.337 The Australian courts have further provided useful 
interpretation and guidelines regarding the enforcement of some key market abuse provisions.   
For example, in the Firns case,338 the Court of Appeal held that information was readily 
observable if it was disseminated to a financial market in Australia as stipulated in the 
Manipulation” 1999 Loyola of Los Angeles L. R 1399 1413, where market manipulation practices like the 
so-called auction process and/or pre-opening session were discussed and strongly recommended to be 
prohibited because they had the effect of interfering with the actual price of the securities traded in the 
financial markets.    
335   See for example Exicom v Futuris (1995) 13 ACLC 1758; ASIC v Kippe (1996) 67 FCR 449; Ampolex v 
Perpetual Trustee Company (No 2) 1524; ASIC v Donovan (1998) 28 ACSR 583 608; ASIC v Roussi 
[1999] FCA 618; R v Hannes 120; ASIC v Hutchings (2001) 38 ACSR 387; R v Firns (2001) 51 NSWLR 
548; ASIC v Adler 115; ASIC v Rich (2003) 45 ACSR 305; R v Rivkin [2004] NSWCCA 7 17; ASIC v 
Petsas 88.  Also see related comparative analysis by Tomasic “Corporate Crime and Corporations Law 
Enforcement Strategies in Australia” 1993 Center for National Corporate Law Research Discussion 
Paper 1/93 70; Cox “An Economic and American Perspective of Insider-trading Regulation in Australia 
and New Zealand” in Walker & Fisse (eds) Securities Regulation in Australia and New Zealand (1994) 
621-637.     
336    See the Australian Law Reform Commission Principled Regulation: Federal Civil and Administrative 
Penalties in Australia Report No 95 2002 113 & related evidence by Lyon & Du Plessis The Law of 
Insider Trading in Australia 110-153 & 163-167; Comino 1997 Current Commercial Law 84.   
337   Glandon Pty Ltd v Strata Consolidated Pty Ltd (1998) 11 ACLC 895, where Mahoney JA submitted that 
a fiduciary duty may exist when a director purchases a shareholder’s shares as a result of an informational 
advantage which he usually has at the expense of the shareholder(s) concerned and consequently, such 
director would have committed insider trading if he dealt in the shares in question on the basis of the 
price-sensitive information which he had; also see Brunninghausen case (1999) 46 NSWLR 538 549; 
Glavanics v Brunninghausen (1996) 14 ACLC 345  549, where the plaintiff’s reliance on the breach of a 
fiduciary duty was overturned by the Court of  Appeal and in essence acquitting the defendant of all the 
charges that were brought against him, namely fraud, engaging in misleading and deceptive conduct, 
negligence and breach of a fiduciary duty.     
338  R v Firns (2001) 51 NSWLR 548 & R v Firns [2001] NSWCCA 191, where Mr Firns was consequently 
convicted to an imprisonment term of which he appealed but was unsuccessful.  Also see R v Kruse 
[2001] NSWCA 59 & Kruise v DPP (Cth) [2001] NSWCA 59, where in the same vein of interpreting the 
readily observable principle, the District Court held that the decision of the Supreme Court of PNG was 
delivered while Mr Kruse and others were present and hence it was accordingly readily observable and 
generally available and Mr Kruse was therefore acquitted; However, in R v Hannes (2000) 36 ACSR 72 
115-116, the Court of Appeal held that the term “readily observable” meant that the matter had to be able 
to be easily perceived by the senses in some way and/or was available in the relevant markets and that 
such words were plain English which required no further explanation.     
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Corporations Act.339  Additionally, the Australian courts have also managed, in some 
instances, to provide meaningful recommendations regarding the enforcement of penalties, 
remedies and other related actions against the market abuse offenders.340 Precisely, the 
Australian courts advise the Australian Securities and Investments Commission and other 
relevant authorities regarding whether a criminal as opposed to civil action should be 
instituted against any market abuse offenders in question.341 
 
As highlighted above, the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions and the relevant 
courts have also contributed immensely to the market abuse enforcement in Australia.  For 
example, the courts may, upon the request from the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission, the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions or the affected persons, 
grant orders for compensation, injunctive relief, restitution orders, seize and desist orders, 
banning orders, freezing orders and other appropriate sanctions against the offenders in 
Australia.342 Moreover, the courts have helped the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission to interpret certain key principles regarding market abuse prohibition in 
Australia.  This has in a way helped to increase the number of market abuse prosecutions 
which are executed by both the courts and the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission in Australia.  Additionally, the Supreme Courts and the Courts of Appeal have 
quite usefully provided their support to the Australian Stock Exchange, the Australian Stock 
Exchange Disciplinary Tribunal and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to resolve market 
abuse related appeals from the aggrieved persons. 
 
339    S 1042C(1)(a) of the Corporations Act. 
340   See generally National Exchange Pty Ltd v ASIC [2004] FCAFC 90(25) were a reasonable investor test 
was employed by the court against the offenders concerned.     
341   R v Hannes 508, were Mr Hannes was convicted for insider trading and sentenced to two years and two 
months imprisonment plus a fine of Aus $100 000; also see ASIC v Petsas & Miot (2005) 23 ACLC 269, 
where the first civil penalty proceedings for insider trading were instituted in the courts and all the 
defendants pleaded guilty; ASIC v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 963, where 
the a civil penalty action against Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Ltd was, however, unsuccessful; 
Donald v ASIC 10; Donald v ASIC [2001] AATA 366 where the accused was convicted of market 
manipulation.   Also see generally Coffey 2008 Journal of the Australasian Law Teachers Association 
45-48; 52-53.    
342    For example, see Donald v ASIC 366; North v Marra Developments Limited 42; ASIC v Petsas & Miot 
269 & Glandon Pty Ltd v Strata Consolidated Pty Ltd 895.     
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8 4  Co-operation between Enforcement Authorities   
8 4 1  Co-operation between the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, 
the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions and the Courts 
 
Although the Australian Securities and Investments Commission is mainly responsible for 
policing the regulation and enforcement of the securities and market misconduct provisions in 
Australia, it does not perform its functions alone.  For example, it works closely with other 
enforcement agencies like the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, the federal 
police and the competent courts to combat market abuse activities in Australia.   
 
As stated earlier,343 the Australian Securities and Investments Commission has the authority 
to hear, investigate and prosecute all matters relating to market abuse violations in 
Australia.344  Be that as it may, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission is 
required in terms of its Memorandum of Understanding with the Commonwealth Director of 
Public Prosecutions to refer all serious market abuse cases to the Commonwealth Director of 
Public Prosecutions for further investigations and/or prosecution.345 While the existence of 
this Memorandum of Understanding could be a prima facie indication of some good co-
operation between the Australian Securities and Investments Commission and the 
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, it has been criticised by some commentators 
for restricting the Australian Securities and Investments Commission from fully utilising its 
powers to promptly settle or prosecute market abuse cases in Australia.346   In other words, 
the aforementioned Memorandum of Understanding has sometimes inadvertently resulted in 
unnecessary complexities and inexplicable delays, especially in the criminal prosecution of 
market abuse cases by both the Australian Securities and Investments Commission and the 
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions in Australia.347 
343    See paragraph 8 3 1 above. 
344    S 13 of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act. 
345   See the ASIC & Commonwealth DPP’s 2006 MOU (01-03-2006) <http://www.asic.gov.au> (accessed 
30-04-2010); also see paragraph 8 3 1 above & generally see related remarks by Austin (2009) 2-3 
<http://www.clta.edu.au/professional/papers/conference2009/AustinCLTA09.pdf> (accessed 28-04-
2010). 
346    For example, see Duplessis “Reverberations after the HIH and Other Recent Australian Corporate 
Collapses” 2003 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 225 245 & also see Chapter Seven in Lyon An 
Examination of Australia’s Insider Trading Laws 283.      
347   R v Brown, MacDougall and Weston [2002] VSCA 99, where it took about twelve months after the 
ASIC’s referral, for the Commonwealth DPP to institute criminal proceedings against the accused 
persons; R v Evans 488, where it took four years after the ASIC’s referral, for the Commonwealth DPP to 
institute legal proceedings against the alleged offenders; also see generally Leaf “Enough is Enough” 
2002 Fortune 30 36-37.   
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On the other hand, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission has to date 
managed to utilise the advice and help from the competent courts to obtain a considerable 
number of settlements and convictions in market abuse cases in Australia.348  Therefore, 
notwithstanding some existing challenges like the lack of sufficient experienced staff, 
especially in the courts, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission and the 
competent courts have achieved commendable success in relation to the enforcement of the 
market abuse prohibition in Australia to date.349  It has further been stated that the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission have in place some arrangements which allow it to 
have the relevant assistance from the federal police, especially with regard to the execution of 
a telephone interception warrant and search warrant and the conducting of market abuse 
investigations in Australia.350  Accordingly, this enables the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission to investigate and speedily summon any suspected market abuse 
offenders for interrogation and/or production of any other relevant documents. 
 
8 4 2  Co-operation between the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
and the Local Self-Regulatory Organisations 
 
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission has a number of Memorandum of 
Understanding and/or co-operation arrangements in place with several self-regulatory 
organisations for the purposes of ensuring that there are efficient channels for communication, 
increased mutual understanding, exchange of relevant information and other appropriate 
measures for the provision of assistance, particularly in relation to the detection and 
investigation of market abuse activities in Australia.351  In this regard, it must be noted that 
for the purposes of this sub-heading, more attention will be paid to the co-operation between 
the Australian Securities and Investments Commission and the self-regulatory organisations 
like the Australian Stock Exchange, the Corporations and Market Advisory Committee, the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, the Australian Financial Markets 
Association, the Australian Institute of Company Directors, the International Banks and 
Securities Association of Australia and the Securities and Derivatives Industry Association. 
 
348    See paragraphs 8 3 1 & 8 3 4 above. 
349   Austin (2009) 1-3 & 7-10 <http://www.clta.edu.au/professional/papers/conference2009/ 
AustinCLTA09.pdf> (accessed 28-04-2010) & also see paragraphs 8 3 1 & 8 3 4 above. 
350  Austin (2009) 3; 10-11 <http://www.clta.edu.au/professional/papers/conference2009/ 
AustinCLTA09.pdf> (accessed 28-04-2010); Longo 1992 CSLJ 237 & also see paragraph 8 3 1 above.  
351    See generally paragraph 8 3 1 above.   
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As earlier stated,352 the Australian Stock Exchange has concluded a Memorandum of 
Understanding with the Australian Securities and Investments Commission which allows the 
Australian Stock Exchange to assist the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
with regard to market abuse investigations and/or prosecution.353  Additionally, such 
assistance and/or referrals of the Australian Stock Exchange to the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission’s Market Watch Department will provide details of the trading data, 
broker records, a report with the analysis, chronology, other relevant data and identification of 
the persons accused of committing the market abuse offences in question.354  Although more 
may still need to be done to increase the number of successful market abuse enforcement 
actions in Australia, the co-operative enforcement effort of the Australian Stock Exchange 
and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission has to date managed to achieve a 
commendable number of successful disciplinary actions and other appropriate sanctions, 
particularly in insider trading and market manipulation cases.355 
 
Similarly, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission have some co-operation 
arrangements in place with the Corporations and Market Advisory Committee regarding the 
general regulation and enforcement of the market misconduct provisions in Australia.356  In 
relation to this, the Corporations and Market Advisory Committee may, in terms of such co-
operative arrangements, advise the Australian Securities and Investments Commission on any 
matter relating to law reform or the operation of the market misconduct provisions and the 
352    See paragraph 8 3 2 above. 
353  See the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the ASX and the ASIC (30-06-2004) 
<http://www.asx.com.au/about/pdf/ASICMOU.pdf> (accessed 03-03-2010); also see Austin (2009) 6 
<http://www.clta.edu.au/professional/papers/conference2009/AustinCLTA09.pdf> (accessed 28-04-
2010).       
354   Austin (2009) 6 <http://www.clta.edu.au/professional/papers/conference2009/AustinCLTA09.pdf> 
(accessed 28-04-2010); also see Lawrence “ASX Markets Supervision” (2008) 11 SDIA Annual 
Conference <http://www.asx.com.au/supervision/pdf/sdia_speech_melb_may08_mayne_lawrence.pdf> 
(accessed 09-06-2010).      
355   For a further analysis, see the Australian Stock Exchange Annual Report 2008 29-30, also available at 
<http://www.asx.com.au/about/pdf/annual_report_2008.pdf> (accessed 09-05-2010), which outlined that 
in 2008 alone the number of cases which were settled by the ASX Disciplinary Tribunal increased to 28 
in contrast to only 24 which were obtained in 2007 and accordingly the fines were increased by 137% to 
about Aus $1.1 million, more than Aus $175 000 fines which were obtained in 2007 for market 
manipulation.   In addition, the number of enforcement actions in relation to the ASX’s market abuse 
cases which were referred to the ASIC further increased in 2008 compared to those in 2007.    
356    See the ASIC article “ASIC’s Submission on CAMAC’s Issues Paper: Aspects of Market Integrity” 
(2009) 3-24 <http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdf.camac_paper_March09.pdf> (accessed 09-05-2010); also 
see generally paragraph 8 3 3 1 above.   
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administration or regulation of the securities and futures markets in Australia.357  
Accordingly, this has helped both the Corporations and Market Advisory Committee and the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission to come up with useful submissions and 
recommendations that discourage market abuse activities and promote market integrity in 
Australia.358 
 
In addition, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission and the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission have mutual measures which enable the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission, after referring a matter involving serious cartels or 
market abuse offences to the Australian Competition Tribunal, to further refer such matters to 
the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions or the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission.  This has been useful in providing some strategic ways of enforcing 
the market abuse prohibition in Australia, in that where a matter is not satisfactorily dealt with 
by the Australian Competition Tribunal, it will eventually be settled or prosecuted by either 
the Australian Securities and Investments Commission or the Commonwealth Director of 
Public Prosecutions.359  
 
The Australian Financial Markets Association and the Australian Institute of Company 
Directors may also advise the Australian Securities and Investments Commission on any 
matter relating to the regulation of the securities laws in Australia.360  Specifically, as earlier 
pointed out,361 the Australian Institute of Company Directors may assist the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission with any information relating to the directors who 
commit market abuse offences, while the Australian Financial Markets Association may 
provide the Australian Securities and Investments Commission with the relevant information 
regarding the market abuse violations in the Australian over the counter markets.362  
Additionally, both the Australian Financial Markets Association and the Australian Institute 
of Company Directors participate actively in the public consultation and law reform forums 
357   See the ASIC article (2009) 5-24 <http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdf.camac_paper_March09.pdf> 
(accessed 09-05-2010); also see further paragraph 8 3 3 1 above.   
358    See the ASIC article (2009) 5-24 <http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdf.camac_paper_March09.pdf> 
(accessed 09-05-2010).   
359   See ACCC Media Release 327/05 21 December 2005; Samuel (2005) paper presented at the International 
Competition Enforcement Conference (21-04-2005) <http://www.accc.gov.au/Samuel_Paper_2005.htm> 
(accessed 12- 03-2010). 
360    See further analysis in paragraph 8 3 3 5 above. 
361    See further analysis in paragraph 8 3 3 5 above. 
362    See further analysis in paragraph 8 3 3 5 above. 
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that sometimes recommend and advise the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
on matters relating to the enforcement of the market misconduct provisions in Australia.363  
 
Lastly, the International Banks and Securities Association of Australia and the Securities and 
Derivatives Industry Association have in recent years successfully managed to draw some 
useful guidelines that complement the Australian Securities and Investments Commission’s 
anti-market abuse enforcement efforts.364   For example, in terms of such guidelines, the 
International Banks and Securities Association of Australia may assist the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission by stipulating, among other things, that its member 
organisations must not abuse price-sensitive information and must have Chinese walls to 
prevent insider trading and other related market abuse practices.365  Similarly, the Securities 
and Derivatives Industry Association mandates its members to promote useful objective 
research and to have special and separate reporting requirements for the employees to combat 
the misuse of price-sensitive information by such employees through insider trading or market 
manipulation.366 
 
8 4 3  Co-operation between the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
and Similar International Regulatory Bodies 
 
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission has entered into some co-operation 
agreements with other like-minded regulatory bodies in other jurisdictions.   These co-
operation agreements are mainly aimed at addressing the various challenges facing such 
regulatory bodies, particularly in relation to the effective enforcement of the market abuse 
prohibition in their respective jurisdictions.367 For example, in 2008 the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission and the United States Securities and Exchange Commission 
concluded an Enforcement Memorandum of Understanding which, among other things, seeks 
to provide greater and enhanced co-operation between the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission and the United States Securities and Exchange Commission.368  
363   See further analysis in paragraph 8 3 3 5 above. 
364   See further analysis in paragraphs 8 3 3 3 & 8 3 3 4 above. 
365   See further analysis in paragraph 8 3 3 3 above. 
366   See paragraph 8 3 3 4 above. 
367  See Austin (2009) 17-18 <http://www.clta.edu.au/professional/papers/conference2009/ 
AustinCLTA09.pdf> (accessed 28-04-2010).        
368   For further discussion and/or analysis on this MOU, see the ASIC Press Release “SEC, Australian 
Authorities Sign Mutual Recognition Agreement” (26-08-2008) 
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This Memorandum of Understanding further empowers both the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission and the United States Securities and Exchange Commission to share 
any relevant information, assist each other in relation to their enforcement mandates and to 
promote the establishment of a more coordinated enforcement approach.  Additionally, this 
Memorandum of Understanding offers both the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission a better platform to 
address and combat cross-border market abuse activities.369 
 
Furthermore, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission concluded a 
Memorandum of Understanding with the Financial Services Authority on 24 June 2002.370   
The main purpose of this Memorandum of Understanding is to ensure that both the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission and the Financial Services Authority are fully able to 
execute their enforcement duties more effectively by providing a proper framework for co-
operation, including efficient channels for mutual communication and increased mutual 
understanding. Moreover, this Memorandum of Understanding upholds certain principles 
which include the fact that both the Australian Securities and Investments Commission and 
the Financial Services Authority are obliged to provide the fullest mutual support to each 
other in any manner consistent with their Memorandum of Understanding.  The 
aforementioned Memorandum of Understanding also maintains the principle that it does not 
abolish, modify or supersede any laws or regulatory requirements which are applicable to 
either Australia or the United Kingdom.   In other words, the Memorandum of Understanding 
in question does not cancel or affect any other Memorandum of Understanding which exists 
between the Australian Securities and Investments Commission and other regulatory bodies, 
apart from the Financial Services Authority.371   More importantly, the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission and the Financial Services Authority’s Memorandum of 
Understanding sets out the type of assistance which both the Australian Securities and 
<http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic.nsf/byheadline08-193+SEC+Australian+authorities+sign+mutual+ 
recognition+agreement?openDocument> (accessed 10-05-2010).   
369   See generally some related remarks by Thomsen (the director of enforcement at the SEC) “US Experience 
of Insider Trading Enforcement Actions” 2008 ASIC Summer School 89-96.   
370   For further analysis, see the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) & the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) MOU “Memorandum of Understanding between the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (ASIC) and the Financial Services Authority (FSA)” (24-06-2002) 3-23 
<http://www.asic.gov.au/asic.nsfMOU_June_2002.openDocument.pdf>   (accessed 10-05-2010).   This 
MOU is also available at <http://www.fsa.gov/pubs/mou/mou_australias.pdf> (accessed10-05-2010). 
371  For further details and/or related comments, see the ASIC & the FSA MOU (24-06-2002) 7 
<http://www.asic.gov.au/asic.nsfMOU_June_2002.openDocument.pdf>   (accessed 10-05-2010).  
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Investments Commission and the Financial Services Authority are expected to provide to each 
other.   For example, both the Australian Securities and Investments Commission and the 
Financial Services Authority are required to provide each other with any relevant information 
in their possession; help each other in conducting inspections or examinations of the financial 
services providers; exchange or discuss information on matters of mutual interest, such as 
alternative dispute resolution; help each other to obtain any specific information and/or 
documents from the accused persons, and to permit, after a formal request, the representatives 
of the requesting authority to participate in the conduction of enquiries made by or on behalf 
of the requested authority as contemplated in their Memorandum of Understanding.372  This 
Memorandum of Understanding further stipulates that both the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission and the Financial Services Authority may provide each other with 
information, or arrange for information to be provided on a voluntary basis, even in instances 
where no formal request has been made.   Similarly, subject to secrecy and confidentiality 
issues, a joint investigation may be undertaken by the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission and the Financial Services Authority, especially where the suspected violation 
also breaches the relevant laws of both jurisdictions and where suspected cross-border market 
abuse practices are detected.373 
 
In addition, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission is a member of the 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions.  This suggests that the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission, like other member regulators, is a signatory to the 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions Multilateral Memorandum of 
Understanding which deals inter alia with the exchange and sharing of relevant information 
relating to fraud and market abuse violations.374  Therefore, the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission is able, in terms of this Multilateral Memorandum of 
Understanding, to rely on the surveillance or investigatory support from other member 
regulators to detect and combat cross-border market abuse activities.375 
372  For further details and/or related comments, see the ASIC & the FSA MOU (24-06-2002) 7 
<http://www.asic.gov.au/asic.nsfMOU_June_2002.openDocument.pdf>   (accessed 10-05-2010).  
373  For further details and/or related comments, see the ASIC & the FSA MOU (24-06-2002) 16-17 
<http://www.asic.gov.au/asic.nsfMOU_June_2002.openDocument.pdf>   (accessed 10-05-2010).  
374   See the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) MOU “Multilateral Memorandum 
of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information” (2002) 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD126.pdf> (accessed 10-05-2010).   
375  See Austin (2009) 16-18 <http://www.clta.edu.au/professional/papers/conference2009/ 
AustinCLTA09.pdf> (accessed 28-04-2010).               
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8 5  The Adoption of Adequate Preventative Measures 
 
Like several other jurisdictions, Australia has to date successfully developed and employed a 
number of enforcement approaches (including the use of appropriate definitions) to curb 
market abuse activities in its securities and financial markets.  Although no express statutory 
definition for the concept of market abuse is provided under the Corporations Act, a number 
of practices which may give rise to market abuse offences are enumerated and outlawed under 
the said Act.376 As a result, the Corporations Act’s prohibition on market abuse has achieved 
some considerably more success in relation to the settlements and prosecution of market 
abuse offences than under its predecessors.377 However, for the purposes of this sub-heading, 
the enforcement approaches to be discussed include the use of civil penalties, civil remedies, 
criminal sanctions, private actions, administrative actions, self-regulatory organisations as 
well as investigation, surveillance and detection techniques. 
 
Appropriate penalties and sanctions are further employed in Australia to prevent and deter all 
persons from engaging in market abuse activities.  As earlier alluded to,378 separate criminal 
penalties for individuals and corporate bodies may be imposed by the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission or the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions on any 
market abuse offenders in Australia.  Apart from criminal penalties, the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission and/or the relevant courts may levy separate civil penalties 
against individuals or corporations that are found guilty of violating insider trading and other 
market misconduct provisions of the Corporations Act.379 In addition, the Australian market 
abuse regime further relies on civil remedies to combat market abuse practices.  For instance, 
actions for civil remedies like compensation orders, pecuniary monetary penalties and orders 
for any damages suffered by the prejudiced persons can be instituted by the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission against the individuals or entities that commit market 
abuse offences.380  The Australian Securities and Investments Commission and the Australian 
Stock Exchange may also take appropriate administrative action against any person who is 
376    See further paragraphs 8 2 5 & 8 2 7 3 above. 
377    See further paragraphs 8 2 4 & 8 2 7 2 above. 
378    See further paragraphs 8 2 6 2 & 8 2 7 4 1 above. 
379    See paragraphs 8 2 6 1 & 8 27 4 2 above, for further details regarding the actual amount of, and/or types 
of civil penalty actions that can be brought against the market abuse offenders under the Corporations 
Act.  
380    See paragraphs 8 2 6 3 & 8 2 7 4 3 above, for further details and analysis. 
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reasonably believed to have contravened the market abuse provisions of the Corporations 
Act.381 For example, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission may make a 
declaration of contravention once it is certain that the accused person has committed the 
market abuse contravention in question.   Additionally, the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission can seek court orders for injunction relief during prosecutions, 
disqualification or banning a certain person from performing his managerial duties in the 
corporations and orders to stop or restrict a person from continuing to indulge in certain 
market abuse conduct.  Similarly, the Australian Stock Exchange has the powers to make a 
public censure, impose disciplinary fines and suspend the market abuse offenders from 
admission to trading at the Australian Stock Exchange.382 
 
Apart from the appropriate penalties and sanctions, the Australian market abuse regime 
employs private rights of action for the issuers of securities and any other persons who are 
prejudiced by market abuse activities to seek compensation orders from the courts against the 
offenders.383 These private rights of action have to date usefully enabled the affected issuers 
and other prejudiced persons to claim their compensatory damages and civil pecuniary 
penalties promptly and directly from the perpetrators of market abuse practices in 
Australia.384   
 
Moreover, the Australian authorities also rely on the self-regulatory organisations to 
complement the Australian Securities and Investments Commission’s market abuse 
enforcement efforts. Thus, in contrast to the so-called single regulator model which is mainly 
employed in the United Kingdom,385 Australia seems to be using the multi-functional 
regulatory approach similar to the one adopted in the United States of America.   This 
approach allows the Australian Securities and Investments Commission as well as other self-
regulatory organisations to enforce the market abuse prohibition in Australia.386 As a result, 
the relevant Australian enforcement authorities have to date achieved some considerable 
381    See paragraphs 8 3 1 & 8 3 2 read with paragraphs 8 2 6 3; 8 2 7 4 3 above, for further details and 
analysis. 
382    See paragraph 8 3 2 above, for further details regarding the role of the ASX. 
383   S 1041I; s 1043L(2) to (5); s 1317HA; s 1317J(3A) read with s 1324A; s 1324B & s 1325(2) & s 1317S 
of the Corporations Act.  Also see paragraphs 8 2 6 3 & 8 2 7 4 3 above for further details regarding the 
enforcement of the private right of action for market abuse in Australia.     
384    See paragraphs 8 2 6 3 & 8 2 7 4 3 above. 
385    See Chapter Six of this thesis for more details and analysis of the United Kingdom’s single regulator 
model. 
386    See paragraph 8 4 2 above. 
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success in the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in Australia and other relevant 
jurisdictions (cross-border market abuse practices).387 
 
Investigation and information gathering is another weapon used by the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission to prevent market abuse practices in the relevant Australian 
financial markets.   For example, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission may 
apply to the relevant courts for a search warrant to search any person or premises suspected of 
having the documents, evidence or other information necessary for a current market abuse 
case trial.388  It is further reported that the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
can rely on the Administrative Appeals Tribunal members to get the required search warrant 
and all the intercepted telephonic communications in relation to its market abuse 
investigations.389  As stated previously,390 the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission and the Australian Stock Exchange have further powers to summon any person 
accused of committing market abuse offences for interrogatory interviews in order to obtain 
the relevant facts and/or information. 
 
Surveillance is another method used by the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission to detect and prevent market abuse practices in the Australian financial markets.    
For example, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission now operates some 
computer surveillance techniques like the Securities Market Automated Research Trading and 
Surveillance system  to isolate and detect all possible market abuse activities in the Australian 
financial markets.391 
 
Chinese walls are employed in Australia as another method which promotes a culture among 
all the companies, of developing their own internal principles, polices and structures that 
reduce the occurrence of market abuse practices like insider trading between the different 
387  Austin (2009) 7-10 & 17-18 <http://www.clta.edu.au/professional/papers/conference2009/ 
AustinCLTA09.pdf> (accessed 28-04-2010).               
388   S 3E of the Crimes Act & s 530C of the Corporations Act; also see Middleton “ASIC’s Investigation and 
Enforcement Powers-Current Issues and Suggested Reforms” 2004 C&SLJ 503 & generally see related 
remarks by Austin (2009) 3 & 10 <http://www.clta.edu.au/professional/papers/conference2009/ 
AustinCLTA09.pdf> (accessed 28-04-2010).       
389  See Austin (2009) 10-11 <http://www.clta.edu.au/professional/papers/conference2009/ 
AustinCLTA09.pdf> (accessed 28-04-2010).      
390    See paragraphs 8 3 1& 8 3 2 above. 
391   Austin (2009) 3-7 <http://www.clta.edu.au/professional/papers/conference2009/AustinCLTA09.pdf> 
(accessed 28-04-2010); also see paragraphs 8 3 1 & 8 3 2 above.   
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departments of such companies.   Therefore, although the Chinese walls are often used as 
defences, they are also used as preventative measures against market abuse practices in 
Australia.   Additionally, with regard to insider trading prevention, listed public entities and 
directors of such entities are required to disclose their interests in securities of those entities 
and/or to comply with both the structured (periodic) and continuous disclosure requirements 
of the Australian Stock Exchange.392  Therefore, listed entities are obliged to complete their 
regular periodic financial reports, half-yearly and annual reports and accounts.393  More 
importantly, compliance with the structured (periodic) reporting requirement does not cancel 
the listed entities’ duty of continuous disclosure.   In other words, listed entities will still be 
required, under the continuous disclosure requirements, to notify the Australian Stock 
Exchange and other market participants regarding any information which is required by other 
disclosing entities for them to further notify the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission.394  This is primarily aimed at combating insider trading and market 
manipulation.   The Australian Stock Exchange further recommends the adoption by the listed 
entities of some best practices principles that ensure that there is no private briefing which is 
done by such entities during blackout periods or which is inconsistent with the continuous 
disclosure requirements.   Moreover, both the Australian Stock Exchange and the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission may investigate any suspicious trading at, or before 
the time of significant announcements to the markets by the issuers, whether or not such 
announcements occurred during a blackout period.395   This is targeted at identifying all 
potential illegal trading activity by the employees of the listed entities during blackout 
periods. 
 
As indicated before,396 the Australian authorities, especially the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission, also rely on international co-operation arrangements to tackle and 
prevent cross-border market abuse activities.  Additionally, whistle-blower immunity is 
another preventative measure used in Australia, especially by the Australian Competition and 
392   See generally s 205G of the Corporations Act; also see Lyon & Du Plessis Law of Insider Trading in 
Australia 188-189.   
393   See generally s 205G of the Corporations Act; also see Lyon & Du Plessis Law of Insider Trading in 
Australia 188-189.   
394   See generally s 674(1) & (2); s 675; s 1311(1) & s 1317E of the Corporations Act; also see the ASX 
Listing Rule 3.1.     
395    It is submitted that this provision should also apply to the Australian Clearing House Pty Limited (ACH) 
and the ASX Settlement and Transfer Corporation Pty Limited (ASTC). See the ASIC article (2009) 19 
<http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdf.camac_paper_March09.pdf> (accessed 09-05-2010). 
396    See paragraph 8 4 3 above, for further details. 
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Consumer Commission, to encourage all persons to freely report to it any incidences of cartels 
and/or other serious market abuse offences.397 
 
8 6  Concluding Remarks 
 
As discussed above, the current Australian market abuse prohibition is aimed, among other 
things, at promoting equal access to the relevant non-public price-sensitive information, 
market efficiency, market fairness, market integrity and public investor confidence.   To attain 
this goal, the Australian legislature has, from as early as the 1960s, consistently adopted a 
number of statutes, policies, recommendations and other necessary measures to combat 
market abuse activities in the Australian financial markets.398   
 
It was noted that the concept of insider trading is not statutorily defined in the Australian 
statutes, including the Corporations Act.399  In line with this, it was stated that the concept of 
insider trading generally involves the abuse or exploitation of non-public price-sensitive 
inside information that relates to a body corporate or its securities for personal gain by any 
person.400 Moreover, it was also stated that the current Australian insider trading prohibition 
employs the information connection only approach.401  It was accordingly indicated that this 
approach defines an insider as any person who has non-public price-sensitive inside 
information that relates to a company or to any listed securities or financial products.402  It 
was further stated that such person is prohibited from unlawfully trading in any securities 
(insider trading and tipping) on the premise of such information to avoid prejudice to other 
persons who did not have access to the information in question.403  In addition, the 
Corporations Act’s insider trading provisions apply to acts or omissions (unlawful trading) 
within Australia relating to securities or financial products of any person or foreign body 
corporate as well as extra-territorially to acts or omissions outside Australia in relation to the 
securities or financial products of a person or body corporate that is established or carrying on 
397   For more information on the ACCC’s whistle-blower immunity policy, see the ACCC “ACCC Immunity 
Policy for Cartel Conduct” (26-08-2005) <http://www.accc.gov/content/index.phtml/itemId/708758> 
(accessed 11-05-2010).   
398    See the historical analysis and other relevant discussions under the sub-headings in paragraph 8 2 above. 
399    See paragraph 8 2 5 above. 
400    See paragraph 8 2 5 above. 
401    See paragraph 8 2 5 above. 
402    See further analysis in paragraph 8 2 5 above. 
403    See further analysis in paragraph 8 2 5 above. 
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business in Australia.404   Put differently, it was noted that the current Australian insider 
trading prohibition has a relatively broader application and it explicitly covers both juristic 
and natural persons as well as a wide range of financial products.405 Furthermore, the 
Australian insider trading prohibition contains both structured (quarterly and annual) and 
continuous mandatory disclosure requirements for the issuers of securities and affected 
persons to ensure that all market participants have equal access to price-sensitive inside 
information relating to such securities.406  Likewise, the scope of application of the market 
manipulation prohibition in Australia is now broadly extended, not only to market 
manipulation, but also to other related activities such as dishonest conduct, shortselling and 
market rigging.407   It was also noted that the current market manipulation provisions dispense 
with the requirement of proving the intention to induce others to sell, buy or subscribe for the 
affected securities or financial products, on the part of the prosecuting authorities.408   In other 
words, the focus is now on the effect of the market manipulative conducts in relation to the 
affected financial product rather than on the intention of the trader or the person involved.409  
 
The Corporations Act imposes civil penalties, civil remedies and criminal penalties on any 
person (including entities) who violates its provisions on market abuse provisions.410  In line 
with this, it was noted that the criminal penalties for market abuse were recently increased to a 
maximum pecuniary fine of Aus $495, 000, or three times the profit gained or loss avoided, 
whichever is the greater, or ten years imprisonment or both, for individuals.  The maximum 
criminal penalties for a body corporate were increased to a fine of Aus $4, 950, 000, or three 
times the profit made or loss avoided, or 10% of the body corporate’s annual turnover during 
the relevant period in which the offence was committed, whichever is greater.411 
 
It was indicated that the Australian Securities and Investments Commission may institute 
civil, criminal or administrative proceedings against the market abuse offenders.412  
404    See paragraph 8 2 5 above. 
405    See paragraph 8 2 5 above. 
406    See paragraph 8 5 above. 
407   See Part 7.10 of the Corporations Act; also see paragraph 8 2 7 3 for a further analysis of the prohibition 
on market manipulation and/or other market misconduct practices under the Corporations Act.    
408    See paragraph 8 2 7 3 above. 
409    See paragraph 8 2 7 3 above. 
410    See paragraphs 8 2 6 1; 8 2 6 2; 8 2 6 3; 8 2 7 4 1; 8 2 7 4 2 & 8 2 7 4 3 above. 
411      See paragraphs 8 2 6 2 & 8 2 7 4 1 above. 
412     See paragraph 8 3 1 above. 
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Accordingly, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission may refer any serious 
criminal matters to the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions.  Likewise, the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission may institute a civil action for insider 
trading and/or other market abuse offences in the name of, and for the benefit of the affected 
persons or the issuer of the affected securities or financial products to recover their losses, 
pecuniary damages, property or other entitlements as contemplated in the Corporations Act.413  
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission may also impose a civil penalty of up 
to Aus $1 million on any person who violates its Market Integrity Rules.  Moreover, where a 
person failed to comply with the Market Integrity Rules, the court may order such person to 
compensate the affected persons (including corporations) for any damages they incurred.414 
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission may further institute infringement 
notices and/or enforceable undertakings against the market abuse offenders.   In the same 
vein, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission may take administrative action to 
ban or disqualify any person convicted of committing market abuse offences from his 
managerial position in any corporation.415  Thus, the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission may impose an order against the offenders restricting, stopping or banning them 
from providing any financial services or exercising any voting or other rights attached to 
financial products; or issuing, acquiring or disposing such financial products.416 The 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission may also suspend or cancel the offenders’ 
Australian Financial Service Licences and/or impose varying conditions on such Licences.417  
Additionally, it was acknowledged that the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission’s investigatory powers were significantly increased and it will no longer be 
required to issue a notice before applying to a magistrate for a search warrant.418 Furthermore, 
it was noted that market manipulation and insider trading offences are now listed as serious 
offences under the Telecommunications Act and this empowers the Australian Federal Police 
and/or other interception agencies to apply for a telephone interception warrant in matters 
involving market abuse investigations.   As a result, the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission may now rely on the Australian Federal Police to obtain intercepted telephone 
413      See paragraph 8 3 1 above. 
414      See paragraph 8 3 1 above. 
415      See paragraph 8 3 1 above. 
416      See paragraph 8 3 1 above. 
417      See paragraph 8 3 1 above. 
418      See paragraph 8 3 1 above. 
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material which could be used in the prosecution of market abuse offences in Australia.419 The 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission has additional powers to search and seize 
any proceeds in relation to any benefits that may result from market abuse activities in 
Australia.   Moreover, it was noted that the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission is now responsible for the real-time surveillance of the Australian securities and 
futures markets to detect and prevent market abuse activities.420   Furthermore, the relevant 
courts and/or the Australian Securities and Investments Commission may also make a 
declaration that certain conduct had constituted a market manipulation violation.  It was also 
acknowledged that such declaration of contravention of market manipulation and/or other 
market misconduct provisions is a useful tool to expedite the actions for civil remedies by 
both the courts and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission.421 
 
It was also indicted that the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in Australia is not 
necessarily contingent upon the Australian Securities and Investments Commission alone.422  
It involves a co-operative effort of a number of self-regulatory organisations and other 
regulatory authorities that complement the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
in curbing market abuse practices in Australia.423 Likewise, the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission has successfully forged some co-operation agreements with several 
international self-regulatory organisations like the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission, the Financial Services Authority and other members of the International 
Organisation of Securities Commissions Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding for the 
purposes of combating cross-border market abuse activities in Australia and elsewhere.424 
 
Likewise, it was acknowledged that a number of preventative enforcement methods such as 
Chinese walls, whistle-blower immunity provisions and private rights of action are employed 
discourage market abuse activities in Australia.425  However, in relation to this, bounty 
rewards are not yet employed in Australia to allow more persons to provide the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission and/or other enforcement authorities with the 
419      See paragraph 8 3 1 above. 
420      See paragraph 8 3 1 above. 
421      See paragraphs 8 3 1 & 8 2 7 4 3 above.  
422      See paragraph 8 3 1 above. 
423      See paragraphs 8 3 2; 8 3 3 1 to 8 3 3 5; 8 3 4; 8 4 1 & 8 4 2 above. 
424     See paragraph 8 4 3 above. 
425     See paragraphs 8 2 6 3; 8 2 7 4 3 & 8 5 above. 
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relevant information that can lead to the recovery of civil remedies from the market abuse 
offenders.     
 
In conclusion, it is hoped that this chapter will help the South African legislature and other 
relevant stakeholders to recognise some of the shortcomings of the current South African 
market abuse regime and, where necessary, to learn from the Australian experience.  For 
example, as Huang purported, “the Australian ‘information connection only approach’ to the 
definition of insiders is both theoretically justifiable and practically manageable”.  The 
researcher concurs with Huang and submits that instead of rigidly following some of the 
United States of America’s market abuse principles,426 the legislature could consider 
following the Australian approach in order to make its market abuse prohibition more aligned 
to the international best practices.   Accordingly, notwithstanding the fact that a detailed 
analysis of the recommendations will be conducted in the last chapter, it is submitted that the 
following fifteen suggestions and/or proposed provisions could play a key role in the 
enforcement of the market abuse ban in South Africa: 
 
Firstly, it is suggested that the Financial Services Board should be statutorily empowered (like 
the Australian Securities and Investments Commission)427 to enable it to make a declaration 
of contravention of market abuse provisions and/or to seek a court order for such declaration 
in South Africa whenever such contravention occurs, for deterrence purposes;  
 
Secondly, it is submitted that the Financial Services Board should be statutorily empowered 
(like the Australian Securities and Investments Commission)428 to take over the real-time 
surveillance of the South African securities and financial markets from the JSE, to enable it to 
detect, investigate and prevent market abuse practices in South Africa effectively and 
timeoulsy by eradicating the delays that might be associated with the Financial Services 
Board’s investigations into the JSE’s market abuse referrals;   
 
Thirdly, it is suggested that South Africa should consider following the developments in 
Australia429 and empowering the Financial Services Board to develop its own adequate 
426     Huang 2005 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 281-322. 
427     See paragraph 8 3 1 above. 
428    See paragraph 8 3 1 above. 
429    See paragraph 8 3 1 above. 
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technological mechanisms for market abuse cross-market surveillance, in both the regulated 
and unregulated financial markets in South Africa;  
 
Fourthly, the South African Police Services and/or the Financial Services Board should be 
statutorily empowered (as is the position in Australia)430 to co-operatively work together to 
intercept telephonic data from any suspected offenders in matters involving market abuse 
investigations in South Africa;431 
 
Fifthly, the Financial Services Board and the South African Police Services should also 
consider concluding a binding Memorandum of Understanding relating to market abuse 
investigations in order to enhance the prevention of market abuse activities in South Africa 
and elsewhere (cross-border market abuse activities);    
 
Sixthly, it is suggested that the JSE and the Financial Services Board should follow the 
Australian position432 and conclude a binding Memorandum of Understanding to enhance 
their co-operation in relation to the detection and combating of market abuse practices in 
South Africa; 
 
Seventhly, the Directorate of Market Abuse and/or a new self-regulatory organisation should 
be statutorily established and authorised to independently make recommendations to the 
legislature in relation to any matter dealing with the securities law reform and the general 
regulation of market abuse in South Africa; 
 
Eighthly, the Securities Services Act,433 the Financial Markets Bill434 and/or the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012435 should be reviewed to enact a specific provision that obliges the JSE to 
give reasonable assistance to the Financial Services Board by inter alia searching the 
premises of the accused persons who are suspected of engaging in market abuse practices and 
430    See paragraph 8 3 1 above. 
431   Nevertheless, such interception should be undertaken in accordance with the Regulation of Interception of 
Communications and Provision of Communication-related Information Act 70 of 2002.  
432      See paragraph 8 4 2 above. 
433      36 of 2004, hereinafter referred to as the Securities Services Act. 
434      [B-2011], hereinafter referred to as the Financial Markets Bill. 
435      [B12-2012], hereinafter referred to as the Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
418 
                                               
by summoning any such persons to furnish it with other relevant information relating to 
ongoing market abuse investigations;   
 
In the ninth place, the JSE (like the Australian Stock Exchange)436 should consider 
establishing its own Markets Disciplinary Tribunal which specifically deals with any illicit 
violations of its Listing Requirements and/or market abuse cases in South Africa; 
 
In the tenth place, it is submitted that the Financial Services Board should (as is the position 
in Australia)437 consider concluding a binding Memorandum of Understanding with the 
Director of Public Prosecutions to enhance their co-operation and enforcement of the market 
abuse prohibition in South Africa; 
 
In the eleventh place, South Africa should consider adopting the Australian approach438 and 
introducing a mandatory statutory duty on the part of the insiders or issuers for them to 
continuously or periodically disclose their non-public price-sensitive inside information, 
coupled with civil penalties for non-compliance to enable the JSE and/or the Financial 
Services Board to oblige all the listed public entities and directors of such entities to promptly 
and consistently disclose their interests in the securities of those entities to prevent market 
abuse practices in South Africa;   
 
In the twelfth place, it is submitted that South Africa should consider adopting the Australian 
approach439 to use the seizure and forfeiture method to recover or confiscate assets and other 
illegal benefits from the market abuse offenders; 
 
In the thirteenth place, the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be amended to expressly provide some rebuttable 
presumptions in order to assist the Director of Public Prosecutions in the prosecution of 
market abuse cases in South Africa; 
 
436      See paragraph 8 3 2 above. 
437      See paragraph 8 4 1 above. 
438      See paragraph 8 5 above. 
439      See paragraph 8 2 6 2 above.  
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In the fourteenth place, it is submitted that insider trading and market manipulation should be 
statutorily treated as indictable offences in South Africa; 
 
Lastly, it is submitted that South Africa should consider adopting the Australian approach440 
and enacting adequate statutory provisions to deal with the Chinese walls in order to reduce 
and/or discourage market abuse practices in South Africa. 
 
Now that the Australian position on the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition has been 
discussed as indicated above, the next chapter will provide an overall comparative analysis on 
the enforcement of the market abuse ban in the European Union, the United Kingdom, 
Australia, the United States of America and South Africa.  
440      See paragraph 8 5 above. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
OVERALL COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ENFORCEMENT OF 
MARKET ABUSE PROVISIONS 
 
 
9 1  Introduction   
 
As indicated in the previous chapter, this chapter will comparatively explore how market 
abuse practices are detected, investigated, prosecuted and prevented in the European Union, 
the United Kingdom, the United States of America, South Africa and Australia.  Put 
differently, this chapter will provide an overall comparative analysis on the enforcement of 
the market abuse ban in the European Union, the United Kingdom, Australia, the United 
States of America and South Africa.   This will be done to inter alia examine whether the 
market abuse provisions in these respective jurisdictions are being effectively implemented to 
prevent insider trading and market manipulation in their relevant financial markets.  
 
9 2  Evaluation and Analysis of the Historical Overview of Insider Trading 
Prohibition  
 
In contrast to the early developments of the regulation and enforcement of insider trading in 
the United States of America,1 the legislature in South Africa only introduced a prohibition on 
insider trading in 1973.2   Like the position in the United States of America,3 the South 
African regulatory framework also prohibits any person (including juristic persons) from 
practising insider trading and related activities like tipping.4  Despite these similarities, the 
most important characteristics of the regulatory framework in the United States of America, 
1   See paragraph 5 3 1 in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
2      S 233 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973, hereinafter referred to as the Companies Act.    Also see the 
historical development of the regulation and enforcement of the insider trading ban in Chapter Two of 
this thesis.  
3       See paragraph 5 3 1 in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
4      See s 73 & s 77 of the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004, hereinafter referred to as the Securities 
Services Act; clauses 82 & 86 read with clause 83 of the Financial Markets Bill [B-2011], hereinafter 
referred to as the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 80 & 84 read with clause 81 of the Financial Markets 
Bill [B12-2012], hereinafter referred to as the Financial Markets Bill 2012 (I have employed the term 
“clause” to refer to the provisions of both the Financial Markets Bill & the Financial Markets Bill 2012 
because at the time of writing this chapter, the aforementioned Bills were not yet effectively passed into 
law).   Also see the historical analysis of the regulation of insider trading in South Africa in Chapter Two 
of this thesis. 
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namely the co-ordinated (joint) effort between the courts, self-regulatory organisations and 
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission and the statutory provision of private 
rights of action5 to combat insider trading is relatively minimal in South Africa due to inter 
alia the differences in relation to the financial markets sizes and enforcement approaches.6  
Furthermore, the South African market abuse regulatory framework appears to have blindly 
borrowed some of the principles regarding the civil enforcement of insider trading from the 
United States of America as will be highlighted later.7  
 
Likewise, both the South African and the United Kingdom’s insider trading regulatory 
frameworks prohibit individuals from committing insider trading offences, especially in 
relation to securities listed on regulated financial markets.8   Moreover, both South Africa9 
and the United Kingdom’s10 insider trading regulatory frameworks prohibit primary insiders, 
secondary insiders and their tippees from knowingly dealing directly or indirectly11 in 
securities on the basis of non-public price-sensitive (material) inside information for their own 
benefit or for the benefit of others.12 Unlike in the United Kingdom,13 there is no express 
provision that discourages dealing in securities on unregulated over the counter markets 
5      S 77 of the Securities Services Act; clause 86 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 84 of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.   Moreover, the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 does not expressly provide for 
any private of action for the persons affected by insider trading.  See generally s 115 & s 116 read with 
Part C of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008, hereinafter referred to as the Consumer Protection 
Act.   
6      See the discussions that will be assumed in the later paragraphs of this Chapter highlighting that there is 
little or no co-operation between the courts and the Financial Services Board (the FSB) and very few 
successful prosecutions or civil claims that have been obtained especially in the courts.    
7      For instance, in civil cases it seems as if the provision for a civil penalty of up to three times the profit 
made or the loss avoided by the offenders was blindly borrowed from the United States of America 
without statutorily empowering the affected persons to directly claim their damages from the offenders, 
apart from claiming through the Financial Services Board, see the discussions that will be assumed later 
in paragraph 9 2 1 of this Chapter; also see s 77 of the Securities Services Act; clause 86 of the Financial 
Markets Bill; clause 84 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012 & the historical development of the regulation 
and enforcement of insider trading in Chapter Two of this thesis.  
8   In other words, similar classes of individuals are discouraged from engaging in illicit insider trading 
activities in both South Africa and the United Kingdom.   
9   S 72; s 73 & s 77 of the Securities Services Act; also see the definition of insider in clause 81 read with 
clauses 82 & 86 of the Financial Markets Bill & the definition of insider in clause 79 read with clauses 80 
& 84 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
10     S 52 of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 (c 36), hereinafter referred to as the Criminal Justice Act. 
11    Individuals (insiders) are therefore prohibited from encouraging or discouraging others to deal in the 
affected securities while in possession of non-public inside information or to improperly disclose non-
public inside information relating to such securities. 
12    This could further indicate that similar conduct that may give rise to insider trading is prohibited in South 
Africa as well as in the United Kingdom.  
13     S 59 & s 52(3) of the Criminal Justice Act. 
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through agents or professional intermediaries in South Africa.14   This could be due to the fact 
that insider trading activities in the over the counter markets are probably very restricted since 
such transactions are mostly done on a face-to-face basis between persons who know each 
other quite well.   Furthermore, although the words “through an agent” are used in some 
provisions that discourage insider trading under the Securities Services Act,15 this Act does 
not expressly provide a statutory definition for the term “agent”.16  Similarly, the Financial 
Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 do not provide a clear definition of the term 
“agent” to enhance the interpretation and enforcement of the insider trading prohibition in 
South Africa.17 On the contrary, the term “professional intermediary” which is similar to the 
term “agent” is employed and fully defined in the United Kingdom.18   Notably, the South 
African insider trading ban has an unlimited extra-territorial application.  Thus, in contrast to 
the United Kingdom’s insider trading regime which only applies to any dealing that takes 
place on a regulated market which operates in the United Kingdom or if the person dealing in 
the price-affected securities is a professional intermediary or relies on a professional 
intermediary to deal in such securities on a regulated financial market in the United 
Kingdom,19 an insider who unlawfully deals in the South African securities listed on a foreign 
market can be prosecuted for insider trading in South Africa even if the territorial (nexus) link 
to South Africa does not exist.20  Furthermore, unlike the position in the Criminal Justice 
Act,21 insider trading is treated both as a civil and criminal offence in South Africa.22   
14    S 73 & s 77 of the Securities Services Act; clauses 82 & 86 of the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 80 & 
84 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.    
15     S 73(1) & s 77(1).    
16    Although it can be argued that the ordinary meaning of the term “agent” is generally known to all the 
relevant persons, the Securities Services Act did not provide an adequate and clear definition of this term 
for the purposes of improving the implementation of the insider trading prohibition in South Africa.   
17   Clauses 82 & 86 read with clause 81 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 80 read with clause 79 of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
18     S 59 of Criminal Justice Act. 
19    S 62 & s 79(2) of the Criminal Justice Act which outlines the scope of the insider trading offence.    See 
further Rider, Alexander, Linklater & Bazley Market Abuse and Insider Dealing (2009) 56-57 & 
Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse (2005) 323-324. 
20    Jooste “A Critique of the Insider Trading Provisions of the 2004 Securities Services Act” 2006 SALJ 437 
453; also see paragraph 2 4 1 3 in Chapter Two of this thesis; see the definition of regulated market in s 
72 & clause 81 of the Securities Services Act & the Financial Markets Bill respectively; also see clause 
79 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
21     See paragraph 7 2 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
22    S 73 & s 77 of the Securities Services Act; clauses 82 & 86 of the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 80 & 
84 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.    
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However, no attempt has been made to statutorily define the concept of insider trading in both 
South Africa23 and the United Kingdom.24 
 
In addition, as was the position in Australia,25 prior to 1973 the South African financial 
markets reportedly had higher levels of insider trading practices and such practices were not 
statutorily prohibited.26  This prompted the appointment of the Committees such as the Van 
Wyk de Vries Commission of Inquiry into the Companies Act of 1973 (the Van Wyk de Vries 
Commission) and the King Task Group into the Insider Trading Legislation (the King Task 
Group).27  These Committees, like in Australia,28 recommended inter alia, several reforms of 
insider trading and other related legislation in South Africa.29 Notably, like the position under 
the Corporations Act,30 the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 did not define the concept of insider trading.31  The Securities 
Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 have nonetheless 
provided definitions for some terms that relate to insider trading like “insider”, “inside 
information”, “regulated market”, “person” and “deal”.32  There are notable similarities 
between the current South African and Australian insider trading provisions that relate to the 
definitions and other general prohibitions, but it remains to be seen, due to the absence of a 
comprehensive definition of the concept of insider trading, whether the South African insider 
trading prohibition33 will also be consistently enforced like the similar prohibition in 
Australia.34 Moreover, in contrast to the so-called “information connection only approach” 
23    S 72; s 73 & s 77 of the Securities Services Act; clauses 81; 82 & 86 of the Financial Markets Bill & 
clauses 79; 80 & 84 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
24     See Part V of the Criminal Justice Act. 
25     See paragraph 8 2 2 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
26    See further paragraphs 2 1 & 2 3 1 in Chapter Two of this thesis; also see Myburgh & Davis “The Impact 
of South Africa’s Insider Trading Regime: A Report for the Financial Services Board” (25-03-2004) 8 
<http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> (accessed 09-02-2009).  
27     See further paragraphs 2 1 & 2 3 1 in Chapter Two of this thesis. 
28     See paragraphs 8 2 2; 8 2 3 & 8 2 4 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
29     See further analysis in paragraphs 2 1 & 2 3 1 in Chapter Two of this thesis.   
30     50 of 2001(Cth) as amended, hereinafter referred to as the Corporations Act; also see paragraph 8 2 5 in 
Chapter Eight of this thesis.   
31   S 7 2 of the Securities Services Act; clause 81 of the Financial Markets Bill & also see clause 79 of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
32     S 72 of the Securities Services Act; clause 81 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 79 of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.      
33     See generally Jooste 2006 SALJ 438.   
34     See further paragraphs 8 2 5; 8 2 6 1; 8 2 6 2 & 8 2 6 3 in Chapter Eight of this thesis.       
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which is adopted and employed in Australia,35 the Securities Services Act, the Financial 
Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 seem to be employing the person connection 
approach by prohibiting insiders (employees, directors or shareholders) of a company and any 
other persons who possessed unpublished price-sensitive information (or who are connected 
to a company) by virtue of their relationship with such insiders, from dealing in the affected 
securities of that company for personal gain or the gain of another person.36  Moreover, as is 
the position in Australia,37 the definition of the term “person” which is provided in the 
Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 also 
include a partnership and a trust.38 This suggests that a trust or a partnership can be held liable 
for insider trading in South Africa.  However, unlike the position in Australia,39 it is not 
expressly and statutorily provided whether the partnership itself or the members of such 
partnership will incur liability for insider trading in South Africa.40  In contrast to the situation 
in Australia,41 the South African insider trading prohibition’s extra-territorial application is 
still to be successfully enforced in South Africa or elsewhere.42  In relation to this, as is the 
position in Australia43 and as stated in the previous chapters of this thesis,44 South Africa 
should consider adopting a more feasible and practically enforceable extra-territorial 
approach.  
 
In European Union, the European Union Insider Dealing Directive45 offered the pioneering 
insider trading provisions which were applicable in the European Union member states.46 
35     See paragraph 8 2 5 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
36    S 73 & s 77 read with s 72 & s 74 of the Securities Services Act; clauses 82 & 86 read with clauses 81 & 
83 of the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 80 & 84 read with clauses 79 & 81 of the Financial Markets 
Bill 2012.    
37     See paragraph 8 2 5 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
38    S 72 of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 81 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 79 of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.     
39    S 1042G; s 1042H read with s 761F & s 761FA of the Corporations Act; also see paragraph 8 2 5 in 
Chapter Eight of this thesis.    
40    S 73 & s 77 read with s 72 of the Securities Services Act; also see clauses 82 & 86 read with clause 81 of 
the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 80 & 84 read with clause 79 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
41     Generally see paragraph 8 2 5 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
42     Jooste 2006 SALJ 453. 
43     Generally see paragraph 8 2 5 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
44     See further discussions in Chapters Two, Three & Four of this thesis. 
45    Council Directive 89/592/EEC of 13 November 1989, OJ 1989 L334/30 (hereinafter referred to as the 
Insider Dealing Directive or the IDD).  
46     Articles 1(2) & 2(1) of the IDD.   See further paragraphs 6 1 & 6 2 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
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Nonetheless, the Insider Dealing Directive was repealed and replaced47 by the EU Market 
Abuse Directive.48 The EU Market Abuse Directive introduced several changes such as the 
three definitions of inside information in a bid to combat insider trading.49  Likewise, in South 
Africa, inside information is defined in the Securities Services Act50 as specific or precise 
information which has not been made public and which is obtained or learned by an insider 
and which, if it were made public, would be likely to have a material effect on the price or 
value of any security listed on a regulated market.51  A closer look at this definition reveals a 
number of key elements that are also employed in a similar general definition of inside 
information contained in the EU Market Abuse Directive.52   Such elements include the 
requirements that:  
 
(a) information must not have been made public;   
 
(b) information must be precise or specific; and   
 
(c) if such information were to be made public, it would be likely to have a material or 
significant effect on the price or value of the affected securities or financial 
instruments.  
 
Notably, a similar definition or approach is also employed in the Financial Markets Bill and 
the Financial Markets Bill 2012.53  Put differently, the definition of inside information 
contained in the Securities Services Act,54 the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012,55 like the position under the EU Market Abuse Directive,56 also 
incorporates an element of specificity.  As a result, unconfirmed information or rumours do 
not qualify or fall under the ambit of the definition of inside information stipulated in the 
47     Consequently, the implementation of the provisions of the IDD will not be analyzed in detail. 
48    See the Directive of the European Parliament and Council of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and 
market manipulation (market abuse) 2003/6/EC [2003] OJ L96/16 (hereinafter referred to as the EU 
Market Abuse Directive).    See further paragraphs 6 1 & 6 2 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
49     See further paragraphs 6 3 1 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
50     See s 72 of the Securities Services Act.  
51     See further related discussions in paragraphs 2 3 4 1 & 2 4 1 3 in Chapter Two of this thesis. 
52     Article 1(1) of the EU Market Abuse Directive; also see paragraph 6 3 1 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
53     Clause 81 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 79 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.    
54     S 72 of the Securities Services Act.    
55     Clause 81 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 79 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
56     Article 1(1) of the EU Market Abuse Directive; also see paragraph 6 3 1 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
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Securities Services Act,57 the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012.58  
In addition, like the position under the EU Market Abuse Directive,59 the definition of inside 
information contained in the Securities Services Act,60 the Financial Markets Bill and the 
Financial Markets Bill 201261 also includes an element and/or degree of price-sensitivity, in 
that the relevant information should be likely to have a significant or material effect on the 
price of securities if it were made public.  Nonetheless, unlike the general definition of inside 
information contained in the EU Market Abuse Directive,62 the definition of inside 
information provided in the Securities Services Act,63 the Financial Markets Bill and the 
Financial Markets Bill 201264 is limited only to securities listed on a regulated market.  
Furthermore, in contrast to the position under the EU Market Abuse Directive,65 the Securities 
Services Act,66 the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 201267 do not 
provide special or complementary definitions of inside information in relation to derivatives 
on commodities and/or to the persons involved in the execution of orders relating to listed 
securities or other related derivative financial instruments.  It is submitted that this gap, if not 
expressly addressed, could easily result in the commission of front running or other market 
abuse activities pertaining to commodities derivatives by some unscrupulous financial brokers 
and/or other related market participants in South Africa.  
 
Furthermore, in South Africa, an “insider” means a person who has inside information 
through being a director, employee or shareholder of an issuer of securities listed on a 
regulated market to which the inside information relates;68 or having access to such 
57     S 72 of the Securities Services Act.    
58     Clause 81 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 79 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
59   Article 1(1) of the EU Market Abuse Directive; also see paragraph 6 3 1 in Chapter Six of this thesis & 
Avgouleas “A Critical Evaluation of the New EC Financial Market Regulation: Peaks, Troughs and the 
Road Ahead” 2004-2005 The Transnational Lawyer 179 204.     
60     S 72 of the Securities Services Act. 
61     Clause 81 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 79 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
62     Article 1(1) of the EU Market Abuse Directive; also see paragraph 6 3 1 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
63     S 72 of the Securities Services Act.    
64     Clause 81 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 79 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
65     Article 1(1) of the EU Market Abuse Directive; also see paragraph 6 3 1 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
66     S 72 of the Securities Services Act.    
67     Clause 81 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 79 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
68    S 72(a)(i) of the Securities Services Act; clause 81(a)(i) of the Financial Markets Bill & also see clause 
79(a)(i) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
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information by virtue of employment, office or profession;69 or where such person knows that 
the direct or indirect source of the information was an insider as contemplated in the 
Securities Services Act,70 the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012.71  
Thus, like the position under the EU Market Abuse Directive,72 this definition also provides 
the primary insiders category comprising directors, employees or shareholders of the issuer of 
securities listed on a regulated market and other persons who accessed inside information by 
virtue of their employment, office or profession.73 Moreover, the secondary insiders category 
is also provided under the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012, consisting of any person who knows that the direct or indirect 
source of his inside information was a primary insider.74  The definition of insider which is 
stipulated in the Securities Services Act,75 the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial 
Markets Bill 201276 is further applicable to both natural and juristic persons.   However, 
unlike the EU Market Abuse Directive,77 the Securities Services Act,78 the Financial Markets 
Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 201279 do not expressly provide whether their respective 
market abuse provisions apply to natural persons (agents or corporate insiders) who 
participate in the execution of transactions on behalf of a primary insider who is a legal or 
juristic person in order to combat market abuse practices by such agents in the South African 
financial markets.80 In relation to this, a company (legal person) which repurchases its own 
shares would be an insider to itself.   This should have been acknowledged in the definition of 
an insider which is provided in the Securities Services Act,81 the Financial Markets Bill and 
69   S 72(a)(ii) of the Securities Services Act; clause 81(a)(ii) of the Financial Markets Bill & 79(a)(ii) of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.      
70     S 72(b) of the Securities Services Act.     
71    Clause 81(b) of the Financial Markets Bill; clause 79(b) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012 & also see 
further related discussions in paragraphs 2 3 4 1 & 2 4 1 3 in Chapter Two of this thesis.      
72     Article 2(1) of the EU Market Abuse Directive; also see paragraph 6 3 2 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
73   S 72(a)(i) & (ii) of the Securities Services Act; clause 81(a)(i) & (ii) of the Financial Markets Bill & 
clause 79(a)(i) & (ii) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.    
74    S 72(b) of the Securities Services Act; clause 81(b) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 79(b) of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.     
75     S 72(a)(i); (ii) & (b) of the Securities Services Act. 
76    Clause 81(a)(i); (ii) & (b) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 79(a)(i); (ii) & (b) of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.   
77     Article 2(2) of the EU Market Abuse Directive; see paragraph 6 3 2 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
78     S 72(a)(i); (ii) & (b) of the Securities Services Act. 
79    Clause 81(a)(i); (ii) & (b) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 79(a)(i); (ii) & (b) of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.    
80    See generally Cassim “The New Statutory Provisions on Company Share Repurchases: A Critical 
Analysis” 1999 SALJ 760 777.      
81      S 72(a)(i); (ii) & (b) of the Securities Services Act. 
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the Financial Markets Bill 2012,82 to protect shareholders of a company against such 
company taking advantage of the non-public price-sensitive information to repurchase their 
shares at a lower price than what the company would have paid if the information had been 
made public.83  Moreover, the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 merely enumerates and prohibits four types of practices, namely, 
(a) dealing (directly or indirectly) in securities listed on a regulated market by an insider who 
knows that he has inside information which relates to such securities for his own personal 
benefit;84 (b) dealing (directly or indirectly) in securities listed on a regulated market by an 
insider who knows that he has inside information which relates to such securities for the 
benefit of another person;85 (c) improper disclosure of inside information to another person by 
an insider who knows that he has such information;86 and (d) the encouraging or discouraging 
of another person by an insider, to deal in securities listed on a regulated market.87  
Nonetheless, in a striking contrast to the EU Market Abuse Directive’s insider trading 
prohibition (which applies to financial instruments traded on both the regulated markets and 
the over the counter markets),88 the insider trading prohibition provided in the Securities 
Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 applies mainly 
to securities transactions executed on the regulated markets.89  Accordingly, in this regard, it 
is submitted that the EU Market Abuse Directive’s insider trading prohibition is broader than 
the similar prohibition contained in the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and 
the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
 
82     Clause 81(a)(i); (ii) & (b) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 79(a)(i); (ii) & (b) of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.   
83     Cassim “Some Aspects of Insider Trading–Has the Securities Services Act, 36 of 2004 Gone too Far?” 
2007 SA Merc LJ 44 55.     
84     S 73(1)(a) & s 77(1)(a) of the Securities Services Act; clauses 82(1)(a) & 86(1)(a) of the Financial 
Markets Bill & clause 80(1)(a) read with clause 84 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
85     S 73(2)(a) & s 77(2)(a) of the Securities Services Act; clauses 82(2)(a) & 86(2)(a) of the Financial 
Markets Bill & clause 80(2)(a) read with clause 84 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.    
86     S 73(3)(a) & s 77(3)(a) of the Securities Services Act; clauses 82(4)(a) & 86(4)(a) of the Financial 
Markets Bill & clause 80(4)(a) read with clause 84 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
87    S 73(4) & s 77(4) of the Securities Services Act; clauses 82(5) & 86(5) of the Financial Markets Bill & 
clause 80(5) read with clause 84 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.     
88      See further paragraph 6 3 3 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
89     S 73 & s 77 of the Securities Services Act; clauses 82 & 86 of the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 80 & 
84 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
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9 2 1  Evaluation and Analysis of the Available Penalties and Remedies for Insider 
Trading 
 
Like the United States of America,90 South Africa also provides for civil, criminal91 and 
administrative penalties for insider trading in terms of the Securities Services Act.92  These 
penalties are set to be retained unchanged in the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.93  On the other hand, the provision for a civil penalty of up to three times 
the profit made or the loss avoided was apparently directly borrowed from the United States 
of America.94  Moreover, as is the position in the United States of America, the enforcement 
of the civil penalty in South Africa is a responsibility of an independent board, the Financial 
Services Board.95 Nonetheless, it remains questionable whether this approach has offered the 
ideal solution to the South African situation in relation to civil penalties and remedies, 
considering the fact that the Securities Service Act, the Financial Markets Bill and the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 did not employ enforcement approaches from other jurisdictions 
like Australia.96   Like the United States of America,97 South Africa offers some remedies to 
the victims of insider trading.  For example, the Financial Services Board may, on behalf of 
the aggrieved persons, effect a civil action for compensatory and punitive damages against the 
offenders.98  As is the case with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, the 
Financial Services Board may only claim civil damages of up to three times the profit made or 
loss avoided by the offenders.99  Moreover, the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets 
Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 stipulate that the civil damages obtained by the 
Financial Services Board should also be paid into a trust account for distribution to successful 
90     See paragraph 5 3 2 in Chapter Five of this thesis.  
91     S 115(a) of the Securities Services Act.  
92     See further analysis in paragraph 4 4 5 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
93     Clause 115(a) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 111(a) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
94     S 77 of the Securities Services Act; clause 86 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 84 of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.  Also see generally Botha “Control of Insider Trading in South Africa: A Comparative 
Analysis” 1991 South African Mercantile Law Journal 1 6-11. 
95    S 82 read with s 77 of the Securities Services Act; clause 91 read with clause 86 of the Financial Markets 
Bill & clause 86 read with clause 84 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
96    S 82 read with s 77 of the Securities Services Act; clause 91 read with clause 86 of the Financial Markets 
Bill & clause 86 read with clause 84 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
97     See paragraph 5 3 3 in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
98    S 77 of the Securities Services Act; clause 86 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 84 of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.   Also see Cassim “An Analysis of Market Manipulation under the Securities Services 
Act 36 of 2004 (part 2)” 2008 SA Merc LJ 177 191-192.  
99    S 77 of the Securities Services Act; clause 86 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 84 of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.   
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claimants and for the Financial Services Board to recoup its expenses and costs incurred.100  
Furthermore, like the United States of America,101 South Africa employs administrative 
penalties to prevent and deter all persons from indulging in insider trading and other market 
abuse practices.102  Unlike the United States Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
Enforcement Division which oversees the enforcement of all market abuse penalties 
(including administrative penalties) in the United States of America,103 the Financial Services 
Board and/or the Registrar of Securities Services normally refer any administrative cases 
involving market abuse practices (including insider trading) to the Enforcement Committee in 
South Africa.104 Furthermore, in contrast to the United States of America’s insider trading 
criminal sanctions,105 the South African legislature has rigidly provided for a fixed maximum 
fine of R50 million, or imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years, or both.106 
Although prima facie these penalties seem to be quite significant, it is submitted that 
Cassim107 correctly argues that the current available insider trading penalties might not be 
high enough for deterrence purposes.   For instance, in spite of the fact that most companies 
may take any fine for market abuse offences just like another cost of doing business, no 
distinction has been made in relation to the penalties imposed on natural and juristic persons 
to increase deterrence.108  Additionally, unlike the position in the United States of America 
where there are no specific statutory limitations for criminal actions,109 the competent courts 
in South Africa do not seem to have express statutory authority or discretion to impose any 
other additional penalties (apart from those stipulated in the Securities Services Act, the 
Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012) upon the insider trading 
offenders without violating the autrefois acquit or autrefois convict doctrine.110   
100   S 77(7); (8) & (9) of the Securities Services Act; clause 86(9); (10) & (11) of the Financial Markets Bill 
& clause 84(2); (3) & (4) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
101    Paragraph 5 3 2 in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
102    S 6A to 6I of the Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act 28 of 2001 as amended, hereinafter 
referred to as the Protection of Funds Act.   
103    Paragraph 5 3 2 read with paragraph 5 4 1 in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
104   S 94(e); s 101 & s 104 of the Securities Services Act; clause 105 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 
101 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.    Also see paragraph 3 2 3 in Chapter Three of this thesis.     
105    Paragraph 5 3 2 in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
106   S 115(a) of the Securities Services Act; clause 115(a) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 111(a) of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
107    Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 191-195.   
108   S 115(a) of the Securities Services Act; clause 115(a) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 111(a) of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
109    Palmiter Securities Regulation: Examples and Explanations (2005) 451-454; 460-461. 
110   S 115(a) of the Securities Services Act; clause 115(a) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 79(a)(i); (ii) 
& (b) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
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Notwithstanding the differences in the financial markets sizes and enforcement approaches 
that are used in South Africa and the United States of America,111 the Financial Services 
Board has to date obtained very few successful settlements and damages from the insider 
trading offenders.112   This is unlikely to change even if the Financial Markets Bill or the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 is passed into law because these Bills still do not expressly 
provide for other enforcement methods like whistle-blower immunity, private rights of action 
and bounty rewards to increase the settlement or prosecution of cases involving insider 
trading and other related practices.113     
 
Furthermore, like the United Kingdom,114 South Africa uses civil, criminal115 and 
administrative penalties and/or remedies to combat market abuse practices.116  As is the 
position in the United Kingdom117 and as indicated above, criminal and administrative 
penalties are used to discourage all forms of market abuse in South Africa.118  On the other 
hand, civil penalties are employed only to curb insider trading in South Africa.119  In contrast 
to this position in South Africa, no civil penalties for insider trading are provided for under 
the Criminal Justice Act in the United Kingdom.120 However, a number of civil penalties are 
now available to discourage and curb insider trading as well as other market abuse practices 
under the Financial Services and Markets Act.121 
111    See paragraphs 5 3 2; 5 3 3 & 5 4 1 in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
112   For example, during the period between January 1999 and June 2011 only about 197 insider trading cases 
were investigated and successfully completed, generally see related analysis on the Directorate of Market 
Abuse’s past investigations by the Financial Services Board “Past Investigations of the Directorate of 
Market Abuse” Media Release (28-06-2011) <http://www.fsb.co.za/ftp://ftp.fsb.co.za/public/documents/ 
AReport2011.pdf> (accessed 22-11-2011); However, during the period between January 2010 and April 
2011 only eleven cases involving insider trading were investigated and these investigations were still 
ongoing, as confirmed by the Financial Services Board “List of Current Investigations of the Directorate 
of Market Abuse” Media Release (28-06-2011) <http://www.fsb.co.za/ftp://ftp.fsb.co.za/public/ 
documents/AReport2011.pdf> (accessed 22-11-2011) & also see paragraph 4 2 of Chapter Four of this 
thesis for further analysis.    
113   Clauses 86; 82 read with clauses 83; 84; 85; 87; 88 & 91 of the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 80; 84  
read with clauses 81; 82; 83 & 86 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
114    See paragraph 7 4 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
115   S 115(a) of the Securities Services Act; clause 115(a) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 111(a) of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.     
116    Also see paragraph 4 4 5 in Chapter Four of this thesis.   
117    See paragraph 7 4 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
118   S 73; s 75; s 76 & s 77 of the Securities Services Act; clauses 82; 86; 84; 85; 87 of the Financial Markets 
Bill & clauses 80; 82; 83 & 84 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.     
119    S 77 of the Securities Services Act.  
120    See paragraph 7 4 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
121   The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (c 8), hereinafter referred to as the Financial Services and 
Markets Act; also see paragraph 7 4 in Chapter Seven of this thesis.   
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In addition, like the position in Australia,122 South Africa extends civil penalties for insider 
trading activities to both juristic and natural persons who engage in such activities.123  
Moreover, it is hoped, as is the position in Australia,124 that the Securities Services Act, the 
Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 will be amended to provide 
separate and distinct penalties for individuals and juristic persons in South Africa.  However, 
there is no express mandatory statutory duty on the part of the insiders or issuers provided 
under the Securities Services Act,125 the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 
2012126 to continuously disclose the transactions pertaining to their securities or other 
instruments,127 or any express duty on companies or institutions to disclose their unpublished 
price-sensitive inside information to the public.   This could imply that there are no 
appropriate civil sanctions for such non-disclosure in South Africa.128  In this regard, South 
Africa should consider adopting the Australian approach129 and introduce a mandatory 
statutory duty coupled with civil penalties for non-compliance on the part of the insiders or 
issuers for them to continuously disclose their non-public price-sensitive inside information.  
In addition, like the position in Australia,130 South Africa also employs criminal penalties to 
combat insider trading activities.131 Notably, the criminal monetary penalties for insider 
trading were considerably increased from a fine of R2 million132 to a R50 million fine.133  
Nonetheless, it has already been stated that the potential enormous profits associated with 
market abuse practices like insider trading could still overshadow the deterring effect of the 
fine or imprisonment term provided in the Securities Services Act.134 These concerns are set 
122    See paragraph 8 2 6 1 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
123   S 77 of the Securities Services Act; clause 86 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 84 of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.  
124    See paragraph 8 2 6 1 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
125    S 73; s 77 read with s 74. 
126   Clauses 82 & 86 read with clause 83 of the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 80 & 84 read with clause 81 
of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.     
127    Jooste 2006 SALJ 452. 
128   Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 191–192.    
129   Lyon & Du Plessis The Law of Insider Trading in Australia (2005) 170-197; generally see paragraph 8 2 
6 1 in Chapter Eight of this thesis.   
130    See paragraph 8 2 6 2 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
131   S 115(a) of the Securities Services Act; clause 115(a) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 111(a) of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.   Also see further analysis in paragraph 2 5 4 in Chapter Two of this thesis & 
Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 193-195.        
132    See s 5 of the Insider Trading Act 135 of 1998, hereinafter referred to as the Insider Trading Act. 
133   See s 115(a) of the Securities Services Act; clause 115(a) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 111(a) of 
the Financial Markets Bill 2012.    See further analysis in paragraph 2 5 4 in Chapter Two of this thesis.     
134   See Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 194; also see Jooste 2006 SALJ 453-454; similar remarks in paragraph 2 5 
4 in Chapter Two of this thesis.       
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to remain unresolved because neither the Financial Markets Bill nor the Financial Markets 
Bill 2012 increased the criminal penalties for insider trading.135 Additionally, as in 
Australia,136 the responsibility for the criminal prosecution of insider trading in South Africa 
lies mainly with the Director of Public Prosecutions.  Nonetheless, in South Africa, the 
Director of Public Prosecutions may only institute criminal proceedings in relation to insider 
trading after a referral from the Financial Services Board.137  Moreover, in contrast to the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission,138 the Financial Services Board is not 
statutorily empowered to institute its own additional criminal penalties and/or to use the 
seizure and forfeiture method to recover or confiscate criminal assets and other illegal benefits 
from the insider trading offenders.   Additionally, it is not quite certain whether insider 
trading is also treated as an indictable offence139 against the financial markets and which can 
therefore be prosecuted any time in South Africa.  This obscurity could have worsened the 
existing challenges regarding the required evidentiary burden of proof for insider trading 
criminal sanctions in South Africa.  However, like the Corporations Act,140 the Securities 
Services Act does not expressly provide any rebuttable presumptions that could assist the 
Director of Public Prosecutions in the prosecution of insider trading cases in South Africa.141  
This flaw remains unresolved in the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 
2012.142    
 
Like in Australia,143 civil remedies are also available to all the persons who fall victim to 
insider trading practices in South Africa.144  Moreover, like the position in Australia,145 the 
Financial Services Board is mainly empowered to oversee the enforcement of such remedies 
135    Clause 115(a) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 111(a) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.     
136    See paragraph 8 2 6 2 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
137   Also see further Loubser “Insider Trading and other Market Abuses (Including the Effective Management 
of Price-sensitive Information)” in the Insider Trading Booklet final draft 2006 (02-10-2006) 26-27 
<http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-10-2008).   
138    See paragraph 8 2 6 2 in Chapter Eight of this thesis.  
139    See paragraph 8 2 6 2 in Chapter Eight of this thesis.  
140  Generally see further remarks in the Insider Trading Position and Consultation Paper (2007) 27-28 
<http://www.treasury.gov.au/insidertradingpaper.htm> (accessed 23-04-2010).  
141    See similar remarks in paragraph 3 2 6 in Chapter Three of this thesis.    
142    Clause 82 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 80 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.     
143    See paragraph 8 2 6 3 in Chapter Eight of this thesis.  
144    S 77 of the Securities Services Act; clause 86 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 84 of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.     
145    See further analysis in paragraph 8 2 6 3 in Chapter Eight of this thesis.    
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in South Africa.146  However, unlike the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission,147 it is not clear whether the Financial Services Board is statutorily limited to 
institute civil proceedings for insider trading remedies on the behalf of the affected persons 
only in instances where it considers being in the public interest.  In other words, the Financial 
Services Board appears to be statutorily empowered to institute such proceedings against the 
offenders regardless of whether a public interest exists.148  In this regard, the Financial 
Services Board’s enforcement approach for civil compensatory remedies is more desirable 
when compared to that of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission.   It is hoped 
that the absence of a restricted time frame under which the civil action for remedies may be 
instituted and the non-existence of a requirement for such action to be in the public interest149 
will be utilised by the Financial Services Board to obtain more civil remedies from the insider 
trading offenders in South Africa.  Notably, in relation to this and as is the position with the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission,150 the Financial Services Board may 
bring several actions for remedies on behalf of the affected persons such as the order for a 
penalty for punitive and compensatory purposes, in a sum or monetary amount determined by 
the courts but not exceeding three times the loss avoided or the profit gained by the 
offenders.151 Such any order may also include the payment by the offender, of any interest, 
commission and the costs of the suit as determined by the courts in South Africa.152  
Nonetheless, unlike the position in Australia,153 and as earlier highlighted above, there is no 
statutory private right of action for the issuers or other affected persons to claim their civil 
remedies directly from the insider trading offenders in South Africa.154  This has been 
criticised as one of the loopholes in the Securities Services Act’s insider trading civil 
146    S 82 read with s 77 of the Securities Services Act; clause 91 read with clause 86 of the Financial Markets 
Bill; clause 86 read with clause 84 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012 & see further paragraph 3 2 1 in 
Chapter Three of this thesis.       
147    See related remarks in paragraphs 8 2 6 1 & 8 2 6 3 in Chapter Eight of this thesis.        
148   For more detail regarding these so-called wide powers of the FSB, see a discussion in paragraph 3 2 1 in 
Chapter Three of this thesis.     
149    See further analysis in paragraph 8 2 6 3 in Chapter Eight of this thesis.     
150    See further analysis in paragraph 8 2 6 3 in Chapter Eight of this thesis.    
151   S 77(1)(c)(ii); (2)(c)(ii); (3)(b)(ii) & (4)(b)(ii) of the Securities Services Act; see clause 86(1)(c)(ii); 
(2)(c)(ii); (3)(b)(ii); (4)(b)(ii) & (5)(b) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 84 of the Financial Markets 
Bill 2012.   
152   See s 77(1)(c)(iii) & (iv); (2)(c)(iii) to (v); (3)(b)(iii) to (v) & (4)(c) to (e) of the Securities Services Act; 
clause 86(1)(c)(iii) & (iv); (2)(c)(iii) to (v); (3)(b)(iii) & (iv); (4)(b)(iii) to (v) & (5)(c) to (e) of the 
Financial Markets Bill & also see clause 84 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.        
153    See related remarks in paragraph 8 2 6 3 in Chapter Eight of this thesis.          
154    S 77 of the Securities Services Act; clause 86 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 84 of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.     
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remedies provisions.155 Conspicuously, this flaw remains unresolved in the Financial Markets 
Bill as well as the Financial Markets Bill 2012 and as result issuers or affected persons are 
merely left to claim their damages from the insider trading offenders through their own civil 
litigation.  Moreover, although it seems that the Australian civil penalties for insider trading 
are not very different from the civil remedies and that the criminal penalties are not severe 
enough for deterrence purposes,156 the considerable number of successful insider trading 
settlements and prosecutions obtained in Australia to date could imply that such penalties are 
relatively better utilised in Australia than in South Africa.157  
 
Lastly, in the European Union,158 unlike the Securities Services Act,159 the Financial Markets 
Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012,160 the EU Market Abuse Directive does not 
specifically provide the amount of remedies or penalties which may be imposed against the 
insider trading offenders.161  It is up to the European Union member states to provide the 
appropriate sanctions for insider trading and/or other related market abuse offences.162  This 
failure on the part of the EU Market Abuse Directive to provide common market abuse 
penalties that are applicable across the European Union member states could have weakened 
and contributed to the inconsistent implementation of its provisions.163 
 
9 3  Evaluation and Analysis of the Historical Overview of Market Manipulation 
Prohibition 
 
The EU Market Abuse Directive introduced a harmonised definition and prohibition on 
market manipulation in the European Union in 2003.164  Nonetheless, unlike the position 
155   See further related discussions in paragraphs 2 5 4 & 3 2 7 in Chapters Two & Three of this thesis 
respectively.  Whiting “Civil Liability for Insider Trading: A Comparison of the Insider Trading Act 1998 
with the Securities Services Act of 2004” 2005 Responsa Meridiana 99 116-117.     
156    See similar remarks in paragraphs 8 2 6 1; 8 2 6 2 & 8 2 6 3 in Chapter Eight of this thesis.              
157    See further related discussions in paragraphs 2 5 4 & 3 2 7 in Chapters Two & Three of this thesis 
respectively.   
158    See Chapter Six of this thesis. 
159    S 115(a); also paragraphs 2 5 4 & 4 4 5 in Chapters Two & Four of this thesis. 
160    Clause 115(a) of the Financial Markets Bill; clause 111(a) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012 & 
paragraphs 2 5 4 & 4 4 5 in Chapters Two & Four of this thesis.    
161   Article 14 of the EU Market Abuse Directive.  Nevertheless, regulatory bodies in the EU member states 
are allowed to determine and disclose the sanctions imposed on the market abuse offenders, see article 
14(4) of the EU Market Abuse Directive. 
162    Article 14(1); (3) & (4) of the EU Market Abuse Directive.   
163    See paragraph 6 4 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
164    See paragraphs 6 1 & 6 3 4 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
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under the EU Market Abuse Directive,165 the concept of market manipulation is not 
specifically defined in the Securities Services Act,166 the Financial Markets Bill and the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.167  However, like the EU Market Abuse Directive,168 the 
Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 also 
outlaw several practices that could result in market manipulation, for example, fictitious and 
artificial transactions-based manipulations.169 Furthermore, the Securities Services Act,170 the 
Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012171 prohibit trade-based (including 
wash sales) manipulations.  The Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 further prohibit disclosure-based manipulations that are usually 
executed through the publishing of false, misleading or deceptive statements, promises and 
forecasts.172  In this regard, the prohibition on market manipulation contained in the Securities 
Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 is relatively 
identical to the similar prohibition that is provided in the EU Market Abuse Directive.173   In 
addition, as is the situation under the EU Market Abuse Directive,174 the Securities Services 
Act, the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 provide several practices 
that could amount to being, or that are deemed to be manipulative, to include among others: 
 
(a) executing a transaction with no beneficial change of ownership of the securities; 
 
(b) entering an order to buy or sell a security on a regulated market knowing of a similar 
opposite order that has been entered or that will be entered, with the intention of 
creating a deceptive appearance of active public trading in connection with or an 
artificial market price for that security; and  
165    See paragraph 6 3 4 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
166    S 72; s 75 & s 76.  
167    Clauses 81; 84; 85 & 87 of the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 79; 82 & 83 of the Financial Markets 
Bill 2012.     
168    See paragraph 6 3 4 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
169   S 75(1)(a)(i) & (ii) of the Securities Services Act; clause 84(1)(a)(i) & (ii) read with clause 87 of the 
Financial Markets Bill & clause 82(1)(a)(i) & (ii) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012 & also see 
paragraphs 2 4 1 1 &  2 5 1 in Chapter Two of this thesis.    
170    S 75(1)(b) & (2).   
171   Clause 84(1)(b) & (2) read with clause 87 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 82(1)(b) & (2) of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.     
172   S 76 of the Securities Services Act; clause 85 read with clause 87 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 
83 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012 & also see paragraphs 2 4 1 1 & 2 5 3 in Chapter Two of this thesis.    
173    Article 1(2) of the EU Market Abuse Directive; also see paragraph 6 3 4 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
174    Article 1(2) of the EU Market Abuse Directive; also see paragraph 6 3 4 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
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(c) employing any device, scheme or artifice to defraud other persons as a result of a 
transaction effected through the facilities of a regulated market.175  
 
Nonetheless, unlike the position under the EU Market Abuse Directive,176 the prohibition on 
market manipulation stipulated in the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and 
the Financial Markets Bill 2012 does not specifically discourage Internet-based market 
manipulation practices.177 Moreover, it appears as if the market manipulation prohibition 
provided in the Securities Services Act,178 the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012179 also employs an objective (effect-based) based approach similar to that 
of the EU Market Abuse Directive.180 Nonetheless, the South African market abuse 
prohibition does not specifically distinguish between and/or prohibit both actual and 
attempted market manipulation practices.  
 
On the other hand, although market manipulation has been discouraged in the United 
Kingdom from as early as the 1860s,181 it was only statutorily prohibited in South Africa in 
the late 1980s.182  Prior to this, market manipulation was mainly prohibited by the common 
law in South Africa.183  In contrast to the position in the United Kingdom where the concept 
of, and conduct amounting to market manipulation or other market abuse practices is 
statutorily defined,184 this concept is not statutorily defined in the Securities Services Act.185  
175   See further s 75(3) of the Securities Services Act; clause 84(3) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 
82(3) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012 & also see related analysis in paragraphs 2 4 1 1 & 2 5 1 in 
Chapter Two of this thesis.   
176    Article 1(2) of the EU Market Abuse Directive; also see paragraph 6 3 4 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
177   S 75 & s 76 of the Securities Services Act & clauses 84; 85 & 87 of the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 
82 & 83 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.     
178    S 75 & s 76 of the Securities Services Act. 
179    Clauses 84; 85 & 87 of the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 82 & 83 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
180    Article 1(2) of the EU Market Abuse Directive; also see paragraph 6 3 4 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
181    See paragraph 7 3 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
182   Also see the relevant provisions of the now repealed statutes, the Stock Exchanges Control Act 1 of 1985, 
hereinafter referred to as the Stock Exchanges Control Act, see s 40 & the Financial Markets Control Act 
55 of 1989, hereinafter referred to as the Financial Markets Control Act, see s 20 to s 23.    Notably, s 1 of 
the Stock Exchanges Control Act prohibited the market manipulation of securities which included stocks, 
shares and debentures while the relevant provisions of the Financial Markets Control Act prohibited 
market manipulation of financial instruments, as defined in s 1 including futures contracts, option 
contracts and loan stock on a financial market.   Also see paragraphs 2 2 1; 2 2 2; other relevant sub-
paragraphs under paragraph 2 2 in Chapter Two of this thesis & Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 34.    
183   Under common law, market manipulation is usually referred to as a crime of “rigging the market”.   Also 
see Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 34; 40-42.     
184    S 118 of the Financial Services and Markets Act. 
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The same status quo is also replicated in the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets 
Bill 2012.186 Moreover, unlike the position in the United Kingdom where about seven types 
of market abuse are clearly enumerated and statutorily prohibited, only three forms of market 
abuse practices, namely insider trading, prohibited trading practices (trade-based market 
manipulation) and the making or publication of false, misleading or deceptive promises, 
statements or forecasts (disclosure-based market manipulation) are statutorily discouraged in 
South Africa.187 Moreover, unlike the position under the Securities Services Act,188 the 
Financial Services and Markets Act treats insider trading,189 market manipulation and other 
forms of market abuse practices on a more equal footing in the United Kingdom.190 For 
instance, as discussed earlier,191 market manipulation and other market abuse practices are all 
treated as civil or criminal offences under the Financial Services and Markets Act in the 
United Kingdom.  This approach is desirable in that it has enabled the Financial Services 
Authority and other enforcement authorities to enforce the market abuse prohibition 
consistently in order to combat market manipulation and other related practices in the United 
Kingdom.192  In view of this, it is objectively anticipated that the provisions of the Financial 
Markets Bill which now extends the civil liability compensation orders to cases involving 
market manipulation193 will come into effect to improve and increase the enforcement of the 
market abuse ban in South Africa.  Notably, behaviour would constitute market manipulation 
and/or other market abuse offences in terms of the Financial Services and Markets Act if it 
occurs in the United Kingdom or in relation to any qualifying investments which are mainly 
traded on a prescribed market in the United Kingdom194 or the relevant European Union 
member states.  Thus, in order for the Financial Services Authority to impose liability on the 
185   See s 75 & s 76 & Chapter VIII of the Securities Services Act.   Also see further Cassim “An Analysis of 
Market Manipulation under the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004 (part 1)” 2008 SA Merc LJ 33 34-35.   
186   Clauses 84; 85; 87 & related clauses under Chapter X of the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 82; 83 & 
related clauses under Chapter X of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.     
187   S 73; s 75; s 76 & s 77 of the Securities Services Act; clauses 82; 86; 84; 85; 87 of the Financial Markets 
Bill & clauses 80; 82; 83 & 84 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.     
188  This Act does not impose civil liability on persons who make or publish false, misleading or deceptive 
statements, promises and forecasts (disclosure-based market manipulation) or engage in prohibited 
trading practices (trade-based market manipulation).   See s 75 & s 76 read with s 73 & s 77 of the 
Securities Services Act; also see related analysis in paragraphs 2 5 1; 2 5 3 read with paragraphs 2 5 2 1 & 
2 5 2 2 of Chapter Two of this thesis & paragraph 4 4 4 in Chapter Four of this thesis.   
189    See further paragraph 7 2 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
190    S 118. 
191    See paragraph 7 3 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
192    See the discussions in paragraph 7 5 1 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
193    See clause 87 of the Financial Markets Bill; no similar provision is made in the Financial Markets Bill 
2012.     
194    S 118A(1)(a). 
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alleged offenders, there must be a territorial nexus with the relevant financial markets in the 
United Kingdom or elsewhere.  This could imply that the United Kingdom’s provisions on 
market manipulation and other market abuse practices have a restricted extra-territorial 
application.195 However, in South Africa, conduct may amount to market manipulation or 
insider trading if it was made in relation to securities listed on a regulated market (whether 
domestic or foreign) which is run in terms of the laws of the country in which the market 
conducts business as a market for dealing in securities listed on that market.196  This implies, 
in contrast to the position in the United Kingdom,197 that the South African market abuse 
prohibition is unlimitedly applicable to securities listed on any regulated foreign market and 
to both natural and juristic persons.198  However, it remains to be seen whether the South 
African enforcement authorities will be able to mobilise and have sufficient resources 
necessary to implement and enforce the prohibition on market manipulation extra-territorially.   
Moreover, it is not expressly and statutorily provided how this so-called extra-territorial 
application will be utilised to protect the South African financial markets from non-resident 
persons who manipulate securities listed on a foreign market where such conduct has no 
effect on the related securities listed on the regulated financial markets in South Africa.199  
This deficiency is still not addressed in the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets 
Bill 2012.200 
 
The legislature in the United Kingdom amended its market abuse legislation in order to align 
it with the EU Market Abuse Directive.201 In light of this, the Financial Services Authority 
was conferred more powers as a single administrative regulator to ensure that the prohibition 
on market manipulation and related practices is consistently complied with.  The Financial 
Services Authority has, for instance, issued the Code of Market Conduct to guide all the 
relevant persons on conduct that amounts to market manipulation and related practices 
195    See related remarks in paragraph 7 3 read with paragraph 7 2 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
196   S 72 of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 81 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 79 of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012, for the definition of regulated market.     
197    S 118A(1)(a). 
198    S 72; 73; s 75; s 76 & s 77 of the Securities Services Act; clauses 81; 82; 86; 84; 85; 87 of the Financial 
Markets Bill & clauses 79; 80; 82; 83 & 84 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   Also see generally Jooste 
2006 SALJ 453; Cassim 2007 SA Merc LJ 66-67.    
199    S 72 which defines the term “regulated market” read with s 75 & s 76 of the Securities Services Act. 
200   Clause 81 which defines the term “regulated market” read with clauses 84; 85 & 87 of the Financial 
Markets Bill & clause 79 which defines the term “regulated market” read with clauses 82 & 83 of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.     
201   See article 11 of the EU Market Abuse Directive.   Also see further Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 38; 
paragraph 7 3 in Chapter Seven of this thesis.  
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(including factors to be considered when determining whether such conduct amounts to 
market abuse) in the United Kingdom.202 This Code of Market Conduct has, for instance, 
stipulated some factors to be considered when determining whether a person dealing in any 
qualifying investment has created a false or deceptive appearance of a trading activity in 
relation to a certain security or an artificial price or value of the qualifying investment and the 
extent to which the price, rate or option volatility movements for the affected investment are 
outside their normal daily, weekly or monthly range.203  Although such market conduct is also 
prohibited by the Securities Services Act,204 it is not quite clear whether the Financial 
Services Board has a similar Code or booklet containing the guidelines regarding the 
behaviour that amounts to market manipulation or related practices in South Africa.   In 
addition, market manipulation practices such as the creation of a false or deceptive 
appearance of trading activity in connection with a security,205 dealing that will create an 
artificial practice206 and placing orders to buy or sell listed securities in order to create an 
artificial price for a security or a false or deceptive appearance in trading activity in relation to 
that security207 are merely stated and prohibited in the Securities Services Act.  Additionally, 
the same shortcomings are also retained in the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.208 Similarly, like the United Kingdom,209 South Africa prohibits certain 
conduct that is deemed manipulative, improper, false or deceptive.210  For example, the 
Securities Services Act discourages practices such as: (a) wash sales,211 (b) engaging in 
conduct that amounts to or creates matched orders,212 (c) buying orders at successively higher 
prices and selling such orders at successively lower prices in order to improperly influence the 
market prices of certain securities,213 (d) entering orders to buy securities (marking the close) 
at or near the close of the market to change or maintain the close price of a listed security,214 
202   This Code of Market Conduct was revised on 1 July 2005 in accordance with s 119 of the Financial 
Services and Markets Act.    The Code of Market Conduct is usually referred to as the “MAR”. 
203    See MAR 1.6.10E. 
204    S 75(1)(a) read with s 76 of the Securities Services Act.  
205    S 75(1)(a)(i).  
206    S 75(1)(a)(ii).  
207    S 75(1)(b).  
208   See clause 84 read with clauses 85 & 87 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 82 read with clause 83 of 
the Financial Markets Bill 2012.     
209    See paragraph 7 3 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
210    S 75(3).  
211    S 75(3)(a).  
212    S 75(3)(b). 
213    S 75(3)(c).  
214    S 75(3)(d). 
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(e) auctioning process,215 (f) effecting a market corner,216 (g) maintaining an artificial 
price,217 and (h) employing manipulating devices, schemes or artifices or manipulative act, 
practice or course of business to defraud other investors.218 Furthermore, the same practices 
are also deemed manipulative and are prohibited under the Financial Markets Bill and the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.219 Nevertheless, in contrast to the position in the United 
Kingdom, disclosure-based market manipulation and/or other related activities that are 
perpetrated through the Internet are not statutorily prohibited in South Africa.220 Moreover, 
the Securities Services Act does not expressly provide practical guiding factors on how to 
determine whether certain practices may be deemed to be amounting to market 
manipulation.221 This flaw is not resolved in the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.222 
 
Furthermore, like the situation in Australia,223 market manipulation practices are statutorily 
prohibited under the Securities Services Act,224 the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.225 However, it is hoped that the Securities Services Act, the Financial 
Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 will be amended to provide an adequate 
statutory definition of the concept of market manipulation involving all the elements of this 
offence (how it is committed) as well as the various types of market manipulation practices to 
enhance the combating of such practices in South Africa.  Like the position under the 
Corporations Act,226 and as already stated above, the Securities Services Act,227 the Financial 
215    S 75(3)(e).  
216    S 75(3)(f).  
217    S 75(3)(g).  
218   S 75(3)(h).   The wording of this subsection is almost identical to s 118(6) of the Financial Services and 
Markets Act.   
219   Clause 84(3)(a) to (i) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 82(3)(a) to (i) of the Financial Markets Bill 
2012.      
220   S 76 read with s 75 of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 85 read with clauses 84 & 87 of the 
Financial Markets Bill & clause 83 read with clause 82 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.      
221    S 75(3) read with subsection (4).  
222   Clause 84(3) read with subsection (4) of the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 82(3) of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.     
223    See paragraph 8 2 7 1 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
224    S 75 & s 76 of the Securities Services Act.   
225   Clauses 84; 85 read with clause 87 of the Financial Markets Bill & also see clauses 82 & 83 of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.     
226    See paragraph 8 2 7 3 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
227    S 75 of the Securities Services Act.   
442 
                                               
Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012228 also discourage trade-based market 
manipulation.229  Notably, the prohibition on trade-based market manipulation contained in 
the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 is 
relatively similar to that of the Corporations Act.230  Moreover, the Securities Services Act, 
the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 prohibit directly or indirectly, 
the making or publication of false, misleading or deceptive statements, promises or forecasts 
in respect of the listed securities that relate to the past or future performance of a public 
company.231  However, there is no similar provision in the Corporations Act.232  In this 
respect, the South African market abuse prohibition on disclosure-based market manipulation 
is commendably broader233 than that of the Corporations Act.  In addition, unlike the similar 
prohibition provided in the Corporations Act,234 the prohibition on the disclosure-based 
market manipulation contained in the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and 
the Financial Markets Bill 2012 does not require the inducement of other persons to buy or 
sell any affected listed securities before any liability is imposed on the offenders.235 
Additionally, the concealment or omission of a material fact which gives rise to or which may 
give rise to the making or publication of a statement, promise or forecast that is false or 
deceptive is prohibited under the Securities Services Act,236 the Financial Markets Bill and 
228    Clause 84 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 82 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.     
229   S 75(1)(a) & (b) of the Securities Services Act; clause 84(1)(a) & (b) of the Financial Markets Bill & 
clause 82(1)(a) & (b) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012; s 75(3)(b) of the Securities Services Act; clause 
84(3)(b) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 82(3)(b) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012; s 75(3)(c) of 
the Securities Services Act; clause 84(3)(c) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 82(3)(c) of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012; s 75(3)(d) of the Securities Services Act; clause 84(3)(d) of the Financial 
Markets Bill & clause 82(3)(d) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012; s 75(3)(e) of the Securities Services 
Act; clause 84(3)(e) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 82(3)(e) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012; s 
75(3)(f) of the Securities Services Act; clause 84(3)(f) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 82(3)(f) of 
the Financial Markets Bill 2012; s 75(3)(g) of the Securities Services Act; clause 84(3)(g) of the Financial 
Markets Bill & clause 82(3)(g) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012; s 75(3)(h) of the Securities Services 
Act; clause 84(3)(h) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 82(3)(h) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012; s 
75(3)(a) of the Securities Services Act; clause 84(3)(a) of the Financial Markets Bill; clause 82(3)(a) of 
the Financial Markets Bill 2012 & also see Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 42-51; 52-60 & paragraph 2 5 1 in 
Chapter Two of this thesis.   
230    See paragraph 8 2 7 3 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
231   S 76(1) & (2) of the Securities Services Act; clause 85(1) & (2) of the Financial Markets Bill; clause 83 
of the Financial Markets Bill 2012 & also see paragraph 2 5 3 in Chapter Two of this thesis.     
232    S 1041E of the Corporations Act; also see paragraph 8 2 7 3 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
233   S 76 of the Securities Services Act; clause 85 of the Financial Markets Bill; clause 83 of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012 & see Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 178.   
234   See generally s 1041E read with s 1041F of the Corporations Act & also see paragraph 8 2 7 3 in Chapter 
Eight of this thesis.    
235   S 76 of the Securities Services Act; clause 85 of the Financial Markets Bill; clause 83 of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012 & also see Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 179-180.   
236    S 76(1)(b). 
443 
                                               
the Financial Markets Bill 2012.237  The use of the term “material fact” in this prohibition 
could suggest that an objective test is employed to determine whether the concealed or 
omitted fact could reasonably give rise to disclosure-based market manipulation in South 
Africa.238 On the other hand, the Corporations Act,239 the Securities Services Act,240 the 
Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012’s disclosure-based market 
manipulation ban241 may only give rise to liability on the part of the accused person, where 
such person knew or ought reasonably to have known that the statements he made or 
published were false or misleading.   This could further suggest that a purely objective 
approach is adopted in the enforcement of the disclosure-based market manipulation ban in 
Australia and South Africa.242 Moreover, in contrast to the position in Australia,243 there is no 
specific provision in the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012 which expressly prohibits, directly or indirectly, the dissemination of 
information about illegal transactions and dishonest conduct in relation to listed securities.244  
In addition, market (price) stabilisation mechanisms are allowed in Australia when certain 
prescribed requirements are met245 while such mechanisms are generally treated as a defence 
against some market manipulation offences in South Africa.246   Nonetheless, in contrast to 
the situation in Australia,247 there are relatively few defences apart from the price-stabilisation 
237    Clause 85(1)(b) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 83(1)(b) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.     
238   S 76(1) of the Securities Services Act; clause 85(1) of the Financial Markets Bill & see further clause 
83(1) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.     
239    S 1041E(1)(c)(ii) of the Corporations Act. 
240    S 76(1)(a) read with (b) of the Securities Services Act; Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 181-182.   
241    Clause 85(1)(a) read with (b) of the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 83(1) of the Financial Markets Bill 
2012.     
242   See further See further Huang “Redefining Market Manipulation in Australia: The Role of An Implied 
Intent Element” 2009 Company and Securities Law Journal 8 10; Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 181-182.    
243    S 1041D & s 1041G of the Corporations Act; also see paragraph 8 2 7 3 in Chapter Eight of this thesis.  
244   S 75 & s 76 of the Securities Services Act; clauses 84 & 85 of the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 82 & 
83 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.     
245    Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 184-185. 
246   S 75(3)(i) of the Securities Services Act; clause 84(3)(i) of the Financial Markets Bill; clause 82(3)(i) of 
the Financial Markets Bill 2012 & also see Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 184-185; Chapter Five of the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange Limited (the JSE) Listing Requirements which outlines some obligations 
or requirements that must be complied with by the issuers of securities before engaging in price-
stabilisation in South Africa.   See further Rule 5.99 of the JSE Listing Requirements which stipulates the 
various circumstances and conditions under which the price-stabilisation measures will be permitted by 
the JSE and the Securities Services Act.  
247    S 1317S of the Corporations Act; also see Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 184-185 & 189. 
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defence that are available to any person accused of committing market manipulation offences 
in South Africa.248   
 
Lastly, in the United States of America, the prohibition on market manipulation was 
introduced by the so-called New Deal legislation that was enacted after a heavy crash 
occurred in its stock markets in 1929.249  Moreover, the Securities Services Act, like its 
United States of America counterpart, the Securities Exchange Act,250 prohibits any person 
from knowingly engaging or participating in trade-based market manipulation practices that 
interfere with the normal market mechanisms of supply and demand for securities.251  A 
similar provision is stipulated in the Financial Markets Bill.252  However, unlike the Securities 
Services Act,253 the Financial Markets Bill does not directly employ the term “knowingly” in 
its trade-based market manipulation provision and this could imply that no proof of intention 
is mandatorily required before any liability can be imposed upon the offenders.254  
Furthermore, the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012’s disclosure-based market manipulation provisions,255 unlike similar 
provisions in the United States of America,256 no longer require the motive or intention for 
making a false or misleading statement in order to impose liability on the offenders.257 
Nonetheless, the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets 
Bill 2012 do not expressly prohibit a person who inadvertently aided or abetted another 
person to make or publish a false, misleading or deceptive statement, promise or forecast that 
relate to any security.258  For instance, where a printing company inadvertently aided or 
248   S 75 & s 76 of the Securities Services Act; clauses 84 & 85 of the Financial Markets Bill; clauses 82 & 83 
of the Financial Markets Bill 2012 & also see Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 198-199.      
249    See paragraph 5 3 4 in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
250   1934; Public Law 73-291, 48 Stat 881 15 USC 78a-78ll as amended (hereinafter referred to as the 
Securities Exchange Act); also see paragraph 5 3 4 in Chapter Five of this thesis.   
251   S 75(1).    Moreover, the provisions of s 75(3) goes a bit wider than s 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act by deeming a number of trading practices to be regarded as manipulative in South Africa.    Also see 
Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 52-60. 
252  Clause 84(1) read with (3), which enumerates other practices that can be deemed as trade-based market 
manipulation in South Africa & also see clause 82(1) read with (3) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.     
253    S 75(1). 
254   Clause 84(1) of the Financial Markets Bill; the term “knowingly” was however, re-introduced in clause 
82(1) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.     
255   S 76 of the Securities Services Act; clause 85 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 83 of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.     
256    S 9(a)(4) of the Securities Exchange Act.  
257    Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 179-180.    
258    S 76 of the Securities Services Act & clause 85 of the Financial Markets Bill; clause 83 of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012 & also see Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 178.    
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abetted a market abuse offender by ignorantly printing and/or publishing his misleading or 
deceptive materials pertaining to listed securities, to the detriment of other uninformed 
investors.   In other words, it was held in Central Bank of Denver NA v First Interstate Bank 
of Denver NA259 that the words “directly or indirectly” do not apply to secondary actors who 
are not directly involved in market manipulation practices like aiders and abettors.   
Therefore, if we are to follow the approach employed in this case, the words “directly or 
indirectly” as stated in the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012’s disclosure-based market manipulation provisions could be 
interpreted to exclude aiders and abettors.260  Furthermore, it is uncertain whether the 
Financial Services Board prohibits Internet-based market manipulation activities. Unlike the 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission, the Financial Services Board does not 
have a specific unit that prohibits Internet-based market abuse activities.261  Additionally, the 
Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 do not 
have provisions that specifically prohibit commodity-based market manipulation in South 
Africa.262 Apparently, commodity-based market manipulation practices are prohibited and 
enforced by both the JSE and the Financial Services Board.  Nonetheless, in contrast with the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission,263 it remains to be seen whether the JSE and the 
Financial Services Board will consistently increase the prohibition and surveillance of 
commodity-based market manipulation practices in South Africa.264    
 
9 3 1  Evaluation and Analysis of the Available Penalties and Remedies for Market 
Manipulation 
 
As is the position in the United States of America,265 the Securities Services Act also imposes 
criminal and administrative penalties and remedies against any person who indulges in trade-
based market manipulation and disclosure-based market manipulation practices in South 
259    (1994) 511 US 164 (US SC) 170-171.  
260    S 76 of the Securities Services Act & clause 85 of the Financial Markets Bill; clause 83 of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012 & also see Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 178.     
261   On the other hand, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) introduced the 
Office of Internet Enforcement to combat Internet-based market abuse practices.    See further Cassim 
2008 SA Merc LJ 182-183.    
262   S 75 & s 76 of the Securities Services Act; clauses 84; 85 & 87 of the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 82 
& 83 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.     
263    See paragraph 5 3 4 1 in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
264   See Myburgh & Davis (25-03-2004) 13 <http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/FSBReport.pdf> 
(accessed 09-02-2009); paragraph 4 3 1 in Chapter Four of this thesis. 
265    Paragraph 5 3 5 in Chapter of this thesis. 
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Africa.266  For instance, persons who engage in such market manipulation practices will be 
liable for a fine not exceeding R50 million, or imprisonment for a period not more than ten 
years, or both such fine and imprisonment.267 The same criminal penalties are also contained 
in the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012.268  Unlike the position in 
the United States of America, relatively few investigations269 and criminal prosecutions 
involving market manipulation cases have been obtained in the relevant courts in South Africa 
to date.270  As previously indicated,271 this could be aggravated by the fact that the Securities 
Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 do not impose 
sufficient, separate and distinct criminal penalties against the natural and juristic persons that 
commit market manipulation offences to increase deterrence.272  Moreover, the Securities 
Services Act does not expressly provide civil penalties and remedies for market manipulation 
offences.273 This omission on the part of the legislature could potentially weaken South 
Africa’s market abuse regime,274 compared to similar foreign legislation in countries like the 
United States of America.   Be that as it may, this flaw could be addressed by the Financial 
Markets Bill as it now empowers the Financial Services Board to claim from the market 
manipulation offenders, legal costs and civil compensatory penalties of up to three times the 
profit gained or loss avoided plus interest.275   In contrast to the position in the United States 
266   S 75 & s 76.    Also see Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 193-195; paragraph 9 2 1 above & paragraph 4 4 5 in 
Chapter Four of this thesis.     
267   S 115(a) of the Securities Services Act; also see paragraph 4 4 5 in Chapter Four of this thesis; Cassim 
2008 SA Merc LJ 191-195.   
268   Clause 115(a) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 111(a) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.     
269    For example, during the period between January 1999 and June 2011 only about 14 market manipulation 
cases were investigated and successfully completed by the Directorate of Market Abuse, see  the 
Financial Services Board (28-06-2011) 
<http://www.fsb.co.za/ftp://ftp.fsb.co.za/public/documents/AReport2011.pdf> (accessed 22-11-2011); the 
Financial Services Board “List of Current Investigations of the Directorate of Market Abuse” Media 
Release (28-06-2011) <http://www.fsb.co.za/ftp://ftp.fsb.co.za/public/documents/AReport2011.pdf> 
(accessed 22-11-2011), indicates that during the period between March 2007 and April 2010 only four 
cases involving disclosure-based market manipulation and twelve cases of trade-based market 
manipulation were investigated and such investigations were still ongoing. 
270    Refer to paragraph 4 4 5 in Chapter Four of this thesis.   
271    Also see related remarks in paragraph 9 2 1 above.    
272   S 115(a) of the Securities Services Act; clause 115(a) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 111(a) of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.     
273   S 75 & 76; also see Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 192.   This suggests that persons who fall victim to market 
manipulation practices are left to find their own civil remedies.    Also see Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 36.   
274   Notably, there is no specific statutory civil remedy provision for market manipulation violations as 
outlawed under s 75 & s 76 of the Securities Services Act.   
275   Nonetheless, there is no statutory private right of action for the prejudiced persons to claim their damages 
straight from offenders on their own, see clause 87 of the Financial Markets Bill & no similar provision is 
made in the Financial Markets Bill 2012.         
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of America,276 little or no consideration was given to the introduction of specific civil 
remedies and/or penalties for commodities-based market manipulation practices in South 
Africa.277 Although it appears that the enforcement of commodities-based market 
manipulation cases vests with both the Financial Services Board and the JSE, not many 
settlements involving such cases have been obtained in the South African courts to date.278  It 
is not clear whether the Financial Services Board and the JSE have the statutory authority to 
impose their own civil remedies and/or penalties and appropriate rules to prevent commodity-
based market manipulation.   In other words, the Securities Services Act, the Financial 
Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 fall short when it comes to the statutory 
provision and policing of commodities-based market manipulation remedies in South 
Africa.279  On the other hand, the Enforcement Committee may impose unlimited 
administrative penalties on market manipulation offenders in South Africa.  However, the 
Securities Services Act does not empower the Enforcement Committee to provide civil 
monetary administrative penalties to compensate persons who fall victim to market 
manipulation.280  As stated before,281 this problem may be solved by the Financial Markets 
Bill as it now extends civil penalties to market manipulation offences.282  Despite this, the 
Enforcement Committee does not have more discretionary powers with regard to the 
enforcement of administrative penalties for market abuse.283  Nonetheless, neither the 
Protection of Funds Act nor the Securities Services Act have a statutory provision that 
expressly empowers the Enforcement Committee to make or enact its own rules to discourage 
276    Paragraph 5 3 5 in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
277   S 75; s 76 & s 115(a) of the Securities Services Act; see further clauses 84; 85; 87 & 115(a) of the 
Financial Markets Bill & clauses 82; 83 & 111(a) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.     
278    See generally the Financial Services Board Annual Report 2011 4 99-102.       
279   S 75 & s 76 of the Securities Services Act & clauses 84; 85 & 87 of the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 
82 & 83 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   It is submitted that the JSE and the Financial Services 
Board should be statutorily empowered to have more discretionary powers to combat and discourage 
commodities-based market manipulation activities in South Africa.   
280   Such compensatory money is only available in matters involving insider trading, see s 77 read with s 75; s 
76; s 101; s 104 & s 105.   This may indicate that the Enforcement Committee, unlike the United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, does not have 
express statutory authority to make its own appropriate additional administrative penalties for market 
manipulation.  See paragraph 4 4 5 in Chapter Four of this thesis. 
281    See paragraph 9 3 read with paragraph 9 2 1above. 
282   Clause 87 read with clause 105 of the Financial Markets Bill & no similar provision for market 
manipulation civil penalties is made in the Financial Markets Bill 2012.     
283   Unlike the position in the United States of America, the Enforcement Committee does not have 
discretionary powers to impose administrative penalties on the persons who attempt to commit market 
manipulation offences in South Africa.   See paragraph 4 4 5 in Chapter Four of this thesis; Cassim 2008 
SA Merc LJ 195.   
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market manipulation practices.284  This problem is still not addressed in the Financial Markets 
Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012.285  As a result, the Enforcement Committee is 
currently able to bring only a few administrative actions such as compensatory orders, cost 
orders, punitive damages orders and disciplinary orders against the market manipulation 
offenders.286  Furthermore, there is no express statutory provision for a private right of action 
for market manipulation victims in South Africa.287  
 
On the other hand, in the European Union,288 unlike the Securities Services Act,289 the 
Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012,290 and as similarly indicated,291 
the EU Market Abuse Directive does not specifically provide the amount of remedies or 
penalties which may be imposed against the market manipulation offenders.292 Such penalties 
and/or remedies are determined by the European Union member states.293 This shortcoming is 
retained in the Criminal Sanctions Market Abuse Directive Proposal294 while, on the other 
284   S 101; s 104; read with s 75; s 76; s 102 & s 105 of the Securities Services Act & s 6A to s 6I of the 
Protection of Funds Act.    Also see paragraph 3 2 3 in Chapter Three of this thesis.   
285   Clause 105 read with clauses 84; 85 & 87 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 101 read with clauses 82 
& 83 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.     
286  The Financial Services Board “Enforcement Committee Actions” Media Release (28-06-2011) 
<http://www.fsb.co.za/ftp://ftp.fsb.co.za/public/documents/AReport2011.pdf> (accessed 22-11-2011), 
which shows that the Enforcement Committee successfully obtained administrative penalties in only 
about sixteen cases of market manipulation during the period between December 2006 and July 2011; 
also see the Financial Services Board Annual Report 2011 101-102 & Van Deventer “Harnassing 
Administrative Law in Encouraging Compliance” 2009 FSB Bulletin 3 4.   One can argue that the 
Enforcement Committee like the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, must have express 
statutory authority to make additional administrative rules and to take any other action which it 
reasonably believe will improve the enforcement of the market abuse administrative remedies in South 
Africa. 
287   S 75 & s 76 of the Securities Services Act; clauses 84; 85 & 87 of the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 82 
& 83 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   Moreover, the Consumer Protection Act also does not 
expressly provide for any private of action for the persons affected by market manipulation.   See 
generally s 115 & s 116 read with Part C of the Consumer Protection Act.   It is accordingly submitted 
that a private right of action provision should be enacted to give equal opportunity to all the affected 
persons to claim their own damages straight from the perpetrators of market abuse practices in South 
Africa, see related remarks in paragraph 9 2 1 above. 
288    See the related discussion in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
289    S 115(a); also paragraphs 2 5 4 & 4 4 5 in Chapters Two & Four of this thesis. 
290   Clause 115(a) of the Financial Markets Bill; clause 111(a) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012 & also see 
further paragraphs 2 5 4 & 4 4 5 in Chapters Two & Four of this thesis.    
291    See related remarks in paragraph 9 2 1 above. 
292   Article 14 of the EU Market Abuse Directive.   Nevertheless, regulatory bodies in the EU member states 
are allowed to determine and disclose the sanctions imposed on the market abuse offenders, see article 
14(4) of the EU Market Abuse Directive. 
293    Article 14(1); (3) & (4) of the EU Market Abuse Directive.   
294    Articles 6 & 8; also see paragraph 6 4 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
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hand, the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal now provides specific civil or administrative 
pecuniary sanctions for market abuse.295 
Moreover, like the United Kingdom,296 South Africa uses civil, criminal297 and administrative 
penalties to combat market manipulation practices.298 With regard to criminal penalties, South 
Africa rigidly imposes a maximum fine of R50 million, or imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding ten years, or both such fine and imprisonment against the offenders.299  Moreover, 
as argued before,300 this flaw and obscurity is still embedded in both the Financial Markets 
Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012.301 In contrast to this, unlimited monetary and other 
penalties may be imposed on the offenders by the Financial Services Authority in the United 
Kingdom.302 
 
As earlier discussed,303 several factors are considered in order to determine appropriate civil 
monetary fines that will be imposed on the market abuse offenders in the United Kingdom.  
Likewise, almost similar factors are used to determine appropriate civil compensatory or 
punitive fines and administrative penalties in South Africa.304  Moreover, like the United 
Kingdom,305 and as already indicated above, South Africa imposes a variety of unlimited 
administrative penalties on persons who commit market abuse offences.306  Nevertheless, 
unlike the Financial Services Authority,307 the Financial Services Board is not statutorily 
empowered to impose certain administrative penalties like public censure or making public 
(name and shame method) statements against any persons who violated the market abuse 
295   Article 26(1)(k); (l) & (m) of the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal; also see paragraph 6 4 5 in Chapter 
Six of this thesis.     
296    See Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
297   S 115(a) of the Securities Services Act; clause 115(a) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 111(a) of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.      
298    See paragraph 4 4 5 in Chapter Four of this thesis; also see related remarks in paragraph 9 2 1 above.   
299   S 115(a) of the Securities Services Act; clause 115(a) of the Financial Markets Bill; clause 111(a) of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 & see further related remarks in paragraph 9 2 1 above.   
300    See paragraph 4 4 5 in Chapter Four of this thesis; also see related remarks in paragraph 9 2 1 above.   
301    Clause 115(a) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 111(a) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.     
302   S 123(1) of the Financial Services and Markets Act; also see Avgouleas The Mechanics and Regulation of 
Market Abuse 375.       
303    See paragraph 7 4 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
304   S 77 & s 104(9) of the Securities Services Act; clause 87 read with clauses 86 & 89 of the Financial 
Markets Bill; clause 84 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012 & see further Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 195.   
305    See paragraph 7 4 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
306   S 101 & 102 read with s 104 of the Securities Services Act; clause 105 of the Financial Markets Bill; 
clause 101 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012; s 6A to s 6I of the Protection of Funds Act & also see 
Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 195.   
307    S 123(3) & s 124 of the Financial Services and Markets Act.    Also see ENF 14.4.1.G. 
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provisions.308   This flaw could be corrected by the Financial Markets Bill and/or the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 which now allows the Financial Services Board to publish by 
notice on its official website or by means of other appropriate public media, any outcome, 
status or details of market abuse investigations (public censure) if such publication is in the 
public interest.309    
 
Furthermore, as is the position under the Corporations Act in Australia,310 and as stated 
above, the Securities Services Act also provides criminal sanctions for market manipulation 
offences.311    Nonetheless, in contrast to the position in Australia,312 and as already stated 
above, the Securities Services Act’s criminal penalties for market manipulation313 might be 
less deterrent, particularly with regard to companies which may easily afford to pay the R50 
million fine and then continue to commit other market manipulation offences in future.314  In 
this regard, it is hoped that the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 will be reviewed in line with the Australian position315 to 
introduce sufficient and more dissuasive maximum criminal penalties for individuals and 
juristic persons, with much higher maximum penalties being imposed on such juristic persons.   
Like its Australian counterpart,316 the Director of Public Prosecutions in South Africa has the 
main prerogative to institute criminal proceedings against the perpetrators of market 
manipulation offences.317  Furthermore, in South Africa, the Director of Public Prosecutions 
may institute such proceedings only after referrals from the Financial Services Board.318  
Nevertheless, unlike the situation in Australia,319 the Securities Services Act, the Financial 
308    S 82 of the Securities Services Act. 
309   Clause 91(2)(e) of the Financial Markets Bill; clause 86(2)(e) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012 & also 
related remarks in paragraph 3 2 1 in Chapter Three of this thesis.    
310    See paragraph 8 2 7 4 1in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
311   See s 115(a) read with s 75 & s 76 of the Securities Services Act, which directly outlaws any conduct 
which constitutes market manipulation offences or which may constitute such offences in South Africa.  
Also see similar comments in paragraphs 9 2 1 above; 2 5 4 in Chapter Two of this thesis & Cassim 2008 
SA Merc LJ 193-195.    
312    See paragraph 8 2 7 4 1 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
313    S 115(a) of the Securities Services Act.   
314   See paragraph 2 5 4 in Chapter Two of this thesis; also see related discussions in paragraphs 4 4 5 in 
Chapter Four of this thesis & also see paragraph 9 2 1 above & Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 194.    
315    See paragraph 8 2 7 4 1 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
316   See related remarks on the powers of the Commonwealth DPP in paragraph 8 2 7 4 1 in Chapter Eight of 
this thesis.   
317    See paragraph 3 2 6 in Chapter Three of this thesis.     
318   Generally see s 82(9) of the Securities Services Act; clause 91(9) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 
86(10) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.      
319    See similar comments in paragraph 8 2 7 4 1 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
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Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 do not specifically provide whether the 
Financial Services Board may, in addition to civil proceedings, bring its own criminal 
proceedings against the market manipulation offenders without initially referring such 
proceedings to the relevant courts in South Africa.320  Moreover, the enforcement of the 
criminal sanctions for market manipulation and/or other related offences has, to some extent, 
been impeded by the everlasting difficulties relating to the high evidentiary burden of proof 
required in the prosecution of such offences in both South Africa321 and Australia.322  In 
addition, the implementation of the criminal sanctions for market manipulation has so far 
been relatively more successful in Australia323 than in South Africa.324 This could be 
evidenced, in part, by a considerable number of cases that have so far been obtained by the 
courts in Australia.325  On the other hand, there are relatively few cases involving market 
manipulation offences that have been successfully investigated and prosecuted in South 
Africa to date.326  
 
As stated above, the Securities Services Act’s market manipulation provisions do not give rise 
to civil liability on the part of the offenders in spite of the fact that they are fairly comparable 
and commendable internationally, especially with regard to the nature and scope of their 
application.327 Consequently, it is hoped that South Africa will follow the example of 
320   Apparently, such proceedings may only be instituted by the Financial Services Board if the Director of 
Public Prosecutions rejects to prosecute the market manipulation cases in question.   S 82(9) of the 
Securities Services Act; clause 91(9) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 86(10) of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.     
321    See paragraph 2 5 4 in Chapter Two of this thesis; also see related discussions in paragraphs 4 4 5; 5 3 5 1 
& 6 4 1 in Chapters Four; Five & Six of this thesis respectively.  
322   Samuel “Cartels, Criminal Penalties and The Leniency Policy” (2005) presented at the International 
Competition Enforcement Conference, Tokyo, (21-04-2005) 
<http://www.accc.gov.au/Samuel_Paper_2005.htm> (accessed 12- 03-2010) & Constable “Ferocious 
Beast or Toothless Tiger? The Regulation of Stock Market Manipulation in Australia” 2011 MqJBL 54 
107-110.  
323    See generally paragraph 8 2 7 4 1 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
324   See related analysis in paragraph 9 2 1 above & paragraphs 2 5 4 & 4 4 5 in Chapters Two & Four of this 
thesis respectively. 
325   R v Adler [2005] NSWSC 274; R v Adler [2005] 53 ACSR 471; Adler v R (2006) 57 ACSR 675; R v 
Williams [2005] NSWSC 315; R v Williams (2005) 216 ALR 113 & also see Comino 2006 Australian 
Business Law Review 440-446.   
326   See related analysis in paragraph 9 2 1 above & paragraphs 2 5 4 & 4 4 5 in Chapters Two & Four of this 
thesis respectively. 
327   S 75 & s 76 read with s 115(a)  of the Securities Services Act; also see generally Cassim 2008 SA Merc 
LJ 33-36; paragraphs 2 5 1 & 2 5 3 in Chapter Two of this thesis.  Also see further comparative 
discussions in Chapters Five; Six & Seven of this thesis which deals with the enforcement of market 
abuse provisions in the United States of America (US), United Kingdom (UK) and European Union (EU) 
respectively.    
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Australia328 and/or other jurisdictions on derivative civil penalties for market manipulation, in 
order to promptly enact the relevant provisions of the Financial Markets Bill which provides 
for such civil penalties.329  As already stated above, it appears that the affected persons are 
denied the prospect of recovering their losses through their own private civil litigation 
proceedings for market manipulation, under the Securities Services Act,330 the Financial 
Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012.331 Therefore, it is hoped that the Securities 
Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 will be reviewed 
in line with the position in Australia332 to provide a private right of action for the persons 
affected to claim their own civil remedies directly from the offenders. Moreover, in contrast 
to the Australian position,333 the civil remedies and civil penalties for market manipulation are 
not expressly and statutorily treated differently in South Africa. Additionally, as stated above, 
the Securities Services Act also does not have specific civil remedies for market 
manipulation.334  This implies that the Securities Services Act treats and interprets market 
manipulation simply as a wrong against the financial markets rather than a direct wrong 
against all the affected persons.335   This may further suggest that its market manipulation 
prohibition is directed only at the public good and not necessarily at the individual or affected 
person’s protection.336  It is, however, argued that such affected persons are not statutorily 
precluded from seeking their own additional civil remedies, apart from private rights of 
action, directly from the market manipulation offenders.337  Additionally, unlike the 
Australian experience,338 no provision was made in the Securities Services Act for the 
competent courts and/or the Financial Services Board to make a declaration of contravention 
328    See paragraph 8 2 7 4 2 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
329   Clause 87 of the Financial Markets Bill; no similar provision is made in the Financial Markets Bill 2012; 
also see related remarks in paragraph 9 2 1above & in Chapters Five & Six of this thesis. 
330   S 75 & s 76 of the Securities Services Act; also see generally paragraphs 2 5 1 & 2 5 3 in Chapter Two of 
this thesis; Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 191-193.   The researcher submits that the Securities Services Act 
should have considered the Australian’s Corporations Act approach, of not only relying on criminal 
penalties for market manipulation.    See further Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 191-195; 198-199.  
331    Clause 87 of the Financial Markets Bill & no similar provision is made in the Financial Markets Bill 
2012.      
332    See paragraph 8 2 7 4 3 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
333    S 1041I of the Corporations Act; also see paragraph 8 2 7 4 3 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
334    S 75 & s 77read with s 115(a) of the Securities Services Act. 
335   Luiz “Market Abuse II–Prohibited Trading Practices and Enforcement” 2002 Juta’s Business Law 180 
183; Henning & Du Toit “High–Pressure Selling of Securities: From Rigging the Market to False 
Trading, Market Manipulation and Insider Dealing” 2000 The Company Lawyer 29 29-36; Cassim 2008 
SA Merc LJ 192.      
336    Henning & Du Toit 2000 The Company Lawyer 29-36. 
337    Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 192 & 195; also see paragraph 2 5 4 in Chapter Two of this thesis.    
338    See paragraph 8 2 7 4 3 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
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of the market manipulation provisions.339 As result, the preventive and deterrent effect 
attached to such a declaration of contravention by the courts in Australia is obviously absent 
in respect of the relevant courts in South Africa.  Moreover, in contrast to the position in 
Australia,340 and as already stated above, the Enforcement Committee may only seek an 
administrative compensatory monetary remedy payable to the Financial Services Board for 
later reimbursement to the affected persons, only with regard to insider trading violations.341 
No similar provision is made in the Financial Markets Bill, but it is rather indicated that the 
Financial Services Board can now recover civil damages in market manipulation cases on 
behalf of the affected persons.342 
 
9 4  Evaluation and Analysis of the Role of Regulators and Other Role Players 
 
The Financial Services Board343 has almost similar functions as those of the United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission.344   In other words, the Financial Services Board, like 
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, bears the main responsibility to 
oversee and enforce the securities and market abuse laws in South Africa.  It is not very clear 
whether the Financial Services Board is also statutorily responsible for enforcing the 
prohibition on commodities-based market manipulation in South Africa.  Moreover, there is 
no specific regulatory body like the Commodity Futures Trading Commission345 which is 
statutorily authorised to deal effectively and exclusively with the commodities-based market 
manipulation violations in South Africa.346  Strikingly, this flaw has still not been corrected 
by the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012.347 Like the United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission,348 the Financial Services Board also has quasi-
339    S 75 & s 76 of the Securities Services Act.  
340    See paragraph 8 2 7 4 3 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
341   S 105 read with s 101(2) of the Securities Services Act; also see similar remarks in paragraph 2 5 4 in 
Chapter Two of this thesis; also see Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 195.   
342   See clause 87 read with clause 105 of the Financial Markets Bill; no provision for civil penalties is made 
under the Financial Markets Bill 2012.      
343    See paragraph 3 2 1 in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
344    See paragraph 5 4 1 in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
345    See paragraphs 5 3 4 1 & 5 4 1 in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
346   See s 73; s 75; s 76 & s 77 of the Securities Services Act.    In relation to this, it is submitted that either 
the FSB or the JSE should be statutorily empowered to exclusively deal with the enforcement and 
prohibition of commodities-based market abuse practices in the relevant South African financial markets.      
347   Clauses 82; 84; 85; 86 & 87 of the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 80; 82; 83 & 84 of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.      
348    See paragraph 5 4 1 in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
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legislative (rulemaking) authority.349 The Financial Services Board may, for instance, make 
market abuse rules after consulting with the Directorate of Market Abuse.350  In addition, the 
Financial Services Board exercises administrative and supervisory authority over the 
Directorate of Market Abuse, the Enforcement Committee and other relevant securities 
market participants.  In spite of these positive developments, most of the market abuse rules 
that could be made by the Financial Services Board are only limited to the general manner in 
which its administrative powers and roles should be conducted.351  To ensure more 
compliance and to enhance the enforcement of the market abuse ban, the Financial Services 
Board delegates some of its roles to the Directorate of Market Abuse, the JSE and the 
Enforcement Committee.  The Directorate of Market Abuse deals primarily with the market 
abuse investigations, the JSE offers surveillance support for the detection of market abuse 
activity and the Enforcement Committee oversees the enforcement of the administrative 
sanctions.352  Nevertheless, the Financial Services Board does not have its own surveillance 
systems or other mechanisms like the United States Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
Electronic Data Gathering Analysis and Retrieval system353 to detect and prevent market 
abuse activity in the South African financial markets.354  In contrast with the United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission,355 the Financial Services Board is still to employ other 
additional relevant measures to discourage and curb cross-border market abuse activities.356  
Additionally, unlike the United States Securities and Exchange Commission,357 the Financial 
Services Board has not been able to investigate and/or successfully obtain timeous 
enforcement settlements consistently in market abuse cases as evidenced in figure 1 and table 
1 below.   
 
349   S 82(2)(g) of the Securities Services Act; clause 91(2)(f) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 86(2)(f) 
of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.          
350   S 82(2)(g) of the Securities Services Act; clause 91(2)(f) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 86(2)(f) 
of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.      
351   Unlike the SEC, the FSB does not have express or actual authority to make (quasi-judicial powers) 
additional binding rules that it reasonably believe are necessary for the effective enforcement of the 
market abuse prohibition in South Africa.   S 82(2)(g) of the Securities Services Act; clause 91(2)(f) of 
the Financial Markets Bill; clause 86(2)(f) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012 & see further paragraphs 3 
2 1 & 4 2 in Chapters Three & Four of this thesis respectively.         
352    See paragraphs 3 2 2; 3 2 3 & 3 2 5 in Chapter Three of this thesis.     
353    See paragraph 5 4 1 in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
354  In relation to this, the FSB should consider following the SEC approach of devoting more competent 
persons to deal specifically with the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in South Africa.        
355    See paragraph 5 4 1 in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
356    See paragraphs 3 2 1 & 4 2 in Chapters Three & Four of this thesis respectively.   
357    See paragraph 5 4 1 in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
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Figure 1: The Financial Services Board’s anti-market abuse enforcement statistics from 1999 
to 2010.  
 
 
 
Adapted from the Financial Services Board’s 2011 Annual Report.358   
 
Table 1: The Financial Services Board’s annual anti-market abuse enforcement statistics of 
new cases from 1999 to 2010. 
 
 
 
Adapted from the Financial Services Board’s 2011 Annual Report.359   
 
Furthermore, as is the situation in the European Union where the initial market abuse 
regulatory authority was vested in the Forum of European Securities Commissions,360 such 
358   See the Financial Services Board Annual Report 2011 4 99-101.   Notably, figure 1 indicates a sharp and 
inconsistent decline in new cases of market abuse that were successfully investigated each year, from 
1999 to 2010. 
359   See the Financial Services Board Annual Report 2011 99-101.   Table 1 indicates that very few cases 
were successfully investigated while many cases were either brought forward or carried forward each 
year, from 1999 to 2010.  
360    See paragraph 6 4 1 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
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regulatory functions were a joint responsibility of the Registrar of Companies, the Department 
of Justice and the Securities Regulation Panel prior to 1998 in South Africa.361 Moreover, like 
the Committee of European Securities Commissions Regulators,362 the Financial Services 
Board replaced all the previous regulatory authorities and it bears the main responsibility to 
oversee the enforcement of the market abuse provisions in South Africa.363  Additionally, as 
is the position under the European Union,364 the Financial Services Board has its own 
established committees, namely the Directorate of Market Abuse which is an investigatory 
arm of the Financial Services Board and the Enforcement Committee which polices the 
enforcement of the market abuse administrative sanctions on a referral basis.365  The Financial 
Services Board has to date fairly managed to perform its duties in relation to the enforcement 
of the market abuse provisions,366 which include, inter alia, investigating market abuse 
violations;367 making market abuse rules;368 interrogating any persons accused of violating the 
market abuse provisions;369 and instituting civil and other appropriate proceedings against any 
persons who commit market abuse offences.370 However, unlike the Committee of the Wise 
Men’s committees, namely the Committee of European Securities Commissions Regulators 
and the European Securities and Markets Authority (including the repealed European 
Securities Committee),371 the Financial Services Board (including its committees, the 
Directorate of Market Abuse and the Enforcement Committee) has no authority to oversee the 
enforcement of securities and market abuse laws by similar regulatory bodies across the 
African Union member states.372  This is influenced, in part, by the fact that there is no 
361    See paragraph 2 3 3 1 in Chapter Two of this thesis. 
362    See paragraph 6 4 2 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
363    See similar remarks in paragraph 3 2 1 in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
364    See paragraphs 6 4 1; 6 4 2; 6 4 3 & 6 4 4 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
365   S 83; s 97 to s 104 of the Securities Services Act; clauses 92 & 105 of the Financial Markets Bill; clauses 
87 & 101 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012 & also see paragraphs 3 2 2 & 3 2 3 in Chapter Three of this 
thesis.     
366    See further related analysis in paragraphs 3 2 1 & 4 2 in Chapters Three & Four of this thesis respectively. 
367   S 82(2)(a) of the Securities Services Act; clause 91(2)(a) & (b) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 
86(2)(a) & (b) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.      
368   S 82(2)(g) of the Securities Services Act; clause 91(2)(f) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 86(2)(f) 
of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.      
369   S 82(2)(e) of the Securities Services Act; clause 91(3)(b) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 86(3)(b) 
of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.      
370   S 82(2)(b) & (c) of the Securities Services Act; clause 91(2)(c) & (d) of the Financial Markets Bill & 
clause 86(2)(c) & (d) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.      
371    See paragraphs 6 4 2; 6 4 4 read with 6 4 3 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
372   S 82 of the Securities Services Act; clause 91 of the Financial Markets Bill; clause 86 of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012 & also see further related analysis in paragraphs 3 2 1 & 4 2 in Chapters Three & Four 
of this thesis respectively. 
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legislation like the EU Market Abuse Directive373 which has been specifically enacted to 
harmonise the enforcement of the securities and market abuse laws in Africa.374 Accordingly, 
the Financial Services Board’s powers are primarily limited to the implementation and 
enforcement of the market abuse provisions in South Africa.375 
 
Moreover, like the Financial Services Authority in the United Kingdom,376 and as already 
stated above, the Financial Services Board bears the sole responsibility and function to 
oversee the enforcement of the securities and market abuse provisions in South Africa.377 
Nonetheless, unlike the position in the United Kingdom, where the Bank of England’s 
regulatory mandate does not include banks because they are regulated by the Financial 
Services Authority,378 the South African Reserve Bank (not the Financial Services Board) 
oversees the regulation of banks in South Africa.   In this regard, the Financial Services 
Authority’s regulatory powers are broader than those of the Financial Services Board.379 On 
the other hand, like the Financial Services Authority,380 the Financial Services Board 
administers and enforces the civil market abuse provisions in South Africa.381  However, it is 
not very clear whether the Financial Services Board is also adjudicated by sufficient and 
competent persons to enhance its cross-border market abuse enforcement efforts in South 
Africa and elsewhere.382  Nonetheless, like the Financial Services Authority,383 and as already 
indicated above, the Financial Services Board has quasi-legislative (rule-making) powers.384 
While this is a commendable achievement and must as such be welcomed, it is not quite 
certain whether the Financial Services Board has to date been able to make any such rules or 
373   Generally see paragraphs 6 4 1; 6 4 2; 6 4 3 & 6 4 4 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
374   It is submitted that this might have generally contributed to the inconsistent enforcement and combating 
of cross-border market abuse practices especially in the African securities and financial markets.     
375   S 82 of the Securities Services Act; clause 91 of the Financial Markets Bill; clause 86 of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012 & also see further related analysis in paragraphs 3 2 1 & 4 2 in Chapters Three & Four 
of this thesis respectively.    
376    See paragraph 7 5 1 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
377    See paragraphs 3 2 1 & 4 2 in Chapters Three & Four of this thesis. 
378    See paragraph 7 5 1 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
379    See paragraphs 3 2 1 & 4 2 in Chapters Three & Four of this thesis. 
380    See paragraph 7 5 1 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
381   S 77 of the Securities Services Act; clauses 86 & 87 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 84 of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.    Also see the discussions in paragraphs 3 2 1 & 4 2 in Chapters Three & 
Four of this thesis.   
382    See paragraph 4 2 read with paragraph 3 2 1 in Chapters Four & Three of this thesis respectively.   
383    See paragraph 7 5 1 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
384   S 82(2)(g) of the Securities Services Act & clause 91(2)(f) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 86(2)(f) 
of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.      
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to issue its own adequate Code of Market Abuse Conduct to guide all the relevant market 
participants on conduct that amounts to market abuse in South Africa.   Unlike the Financial 
Services Authority’s Code of Market Conduct which supplemented and defined market abuse 
conduct in the United Kingdom,385 such conduct is merely outlined, mainly in Chapter VIII of 
the Securities Services Act, Chapter X of the Financial Markets Bill and Chapter X of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 in South Africa.386  In addition, the Financial Services Board 
may only commence its investigations when it has received some tip-offs regarding any 
suspected market abuse activity from the JSE.387  As indicated earlier,388 this is not the 
position in the United Kingdom where the Financial Services Authority is authorised to 
appoint other additional skilled persons to provide it with reports or relevant information 
relating to any suspected market abuse violations.  Nevertheless, like the Financial Services 
Authority,389 the Financial Services Board may impose disciplinary, administrative and civil 
sanctions like orders for compensatory and punitive damages as well as desist or cease orders 
on market abuse offenders.390 
 
As briefly highlighted above, in order to enhance compliance and the general enforcement of 
market abuse prohibition in South Africa, the Financial Services Board has also purportedly 
entered into co-operation agreements with other international regulatory bodies like the 
Financial Services Authority, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission and the 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions.391  However, it remains to be seen 
whether these co-operation agreements will be fully exploited by the Financial Services Board 
to combat cross-border market abuse activities in South Africa. 
 
In addition, like the Australian Securities and Investments Commission,392 the Financial 
Services Board has ostensibly broad powers in order to ensure the proper supervision, 
regulation and enforcement of the financial markets and the market abuse prohibition in South 
385    See paragraph 7 5 1 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
386   Nonetheless, the FSB has to date issued several booklets and bulletins with general information regarding 
the regulation of market abuse practices in South Africa.    
387    See related remarks in paragraphs 9 3 & 9 3 1 above. 
388    See paragraph 7 5 1 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
389    See paragraph 7 5 1 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
390   Generally see s 77 read with s 82 of the Securities Services Act; clauses 86 & 87 read with clause 91 of 
the Financial Markets Bill & clause 84 read with clause 86 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.      
391    See paragraph 4 3 3 in Chapter Four of this thesis. 
392    See paragraph 8 3 1 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
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Africa.393  For instance, the Financial Services Board may institute criminal proceedings to 
prosecute any alleged market abuse offences especially where the Director of Public 
Prosecutions394 in South Africa declines to do so as contemplated in the Securities Services 
Act,395 the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012.396  However, this 
could imply, in contrast to the Australian Securities and Investments Commission,397 that the 
Financial Services Board does not have authority to institute such criminal proceedings at any 
time, regardless of whether the Director of Public Prosecutions in South Africa has declined 
to prosecute them.   In relation to this, unlike the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission,398 the Financial Services Board is not statutorily empowered to impose its own 
criminal penalties on the market abuse offenders in South Africa.399   With regard to civil 
proceedings, like the Australian Securities and Investments Commission,400 the Financial 
Services Board is empowered to administer proof of claims on behalf of the affected persons 
and to distribute any payments or the recovered damages to such persons.401 Nonetheless, in 
contrast to the Australian Securities and Investments Commission,402 the Financial Services 
Board is not statutorily empowered to impose any fixed amount of civil penalties in relation 
to market abuse offences.403 Specifically, the Financial Services Board may impose a penalty 
for compensatory or punitive purpose upon the market abuse offenders, as regards any 
amount as determined by the relevant courts but not exceeding three times the amount of 
profit gained or loss avoided by the offenders concerned.404 Furthermore, in contrast to the 
position with the Australian Securities and Investments Commission,405 the Financial Services 
Board does not seem to be statutorily authorised to make a declaration or to seek a court order 
393   See s 82 of the Securities Services Act; clause 91 of the Financial Markets Bill; clause 86 of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012 & also see similar remarks in paragraph 3 2 1 in Chapter Three of this thesis.     
394    See related remarks in paragraphs 9 2 1 & 9 3 1 above. 
395    S 82(9) of the Securities Services Act.  
396    Clause 91(9) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 86(10) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.      
397    See paragraph 8 3 1 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
398    See paragraph 8 3 1 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
399    S 82 of the Securities Services Act; clause 91 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 86 of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.      
400    See paragraph 8 3 1 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
401   See s 82(2)(c) read with s 77 of the Securities Services Act; clause 91(2)(d) read with clauses 86 & 87 of 
the Financial Markets Bill; clause 86(2)(d) read with clause 84 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012 & also 
see similar remarks in paragraph 3 2 1 in Chapter Three of this thesis & paragraphs 9 2 1 & 9  3 1 above.     
402    See paragraph 8 3 1 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
403    S 82 of the Securities Services Act; clause 91 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 86 of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.      
404    S 77 of the Securities Services Act.   
405    See paragraph 8 3 1 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
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for a declaration of contravention of market abuse provisions in South Africa.406 Additionally, 
notwithstanding its enforcement authority, the Financial Services Board does not appear to 
have statutory powers to disqualify and/or impose banning orders on the market abuse 
offenders to restrict or stop them from assuming any managerial position in the affected 
companies for a certain period.407 Unlike the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission,408 the Financial Services Board is not statutorily and expressly empowered to 
institute administrative actions such as freezing orders, injunctions, restraint orders and other 
appropriate sanctions against the market abuse offenders in South Africa.409 Additionally, 
unlike the Australian Securities and Investments Commission,410 it appears that the Financial 
Services Board does not employ infringement notices and enforceable undertakings to 
discourage market abuse activities in South Africa.411 However, like the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission,412 and as previously stated above,413 the Financial Services 
Board has the power to investigate, summon and interrogate any person in respect of any 
market abuse violations.414  Furthermore, the Financial Services Board also has the discretion, 
subject to the conditions that it may determine, to delegate its power to any fit person to 
investigate, summon, interrogate or search the premises and/or persons accused of 
contravening the market abuse provisions.415 Nevertheless, such fit persons may search the 
accused person’s premises only in matters regarding market abuse after obtaining a search 
406   S 73; s 75; s 76 & s 77 read with s 82 of the Securities Services Act & clauses 82; 84; 85; 86 & 87 read 
with clause 91 of the Financial Markets Bill; clauses 80; 82; 83 & 84 read with clause 86 of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.   Also see similar remarks in paragraph 3 2 1 in Chapter Three of this thesis & 
paragraph 9 3 1 above.     
407   S 82 of the Securities Services Act; clause 91 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 86 of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.      
408    See paragraph 8 3 1 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
409    S 82 of the Securities Services Act; clause 91 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 86 of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.       
410    See paragraph 8 3 1 in Chapter Eight of thesis. 
411   S 82 of the Securities Services Act; clause 91 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 86 of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.   It is hoped that the FSB will also introduce infringement notices and enforceable 
undertakings to discourage market abuse activities in South Africa.    
412    See paragraph 8 3 1 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
413    See further analysis in paragraph 3 2 1 in Chapter Three of this thesis.  
414   S 82(10) read with s 82(2)(a); (d) & (e) of the Securities Services Act; clause 91(10); (2)(a) & (b); (3)(a) 
to (d) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 86(2)(a) & (b); (3)(a) to (c); (4) & (11) of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.     
415   S 82(4) of the Securities Services Act; clause 91(4) of the Financial Markets Bill; clause 86(5) of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 & see further analysis in paragraph 3 2 1 in Chapter Three of this thesis.  
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warrant from a judge or magistrate who has jurisdiction in the area where such premises are 
located.416   
 
Additionally, in contrast to the Australian Securities and Investments Commission,417 the 
Financial Services Board is not responsible for the real-time surveillance of the South African 
securities and financial markets to detect and prevent market abuse practices.   Moreover, 
unlike the Australian Securities and Investments Commission,418 it is uncertain whether the 
South African Police Services and/or the Financial Services Board is empowered to intercept 
telephonic data419 from any suspected offenders in matters involving market abuse 
investigations in South Africa.  This could have contributed, in part, to the current paucity of, 
and/or delays associated with the market abuse cases that have been prosecuted or settled with 
the Financial Services Board in South Africa to date.420  With regard to this, apart from solely 
imposing the main responsibility of enforcing the market abuse prohibition on the Financial 
Services Board, enacting a statutory private right of action for the issuers of securities or the 
affected persons should be seriously considered to improve the curbing of market abuse 
activities in South Africa.421 Moreover, it is hoped that South Africa will follow the 
Australian approach422 and empower the Financial Services Board to take over the real-time 
surveillance of the South African securities and financial markets, to intercept telephonic data 
from the suspected market abuse offenders and to develop its own technological mechanisms 
for market abuse cross-market surveillance.  In relation to this, it is important to note that the 
JSE bears the responsibility to operate the Stock Exchange in South Africa.423 Additionally, 
like the Australian Stock Exchange,424 the JSE is involved in the general regulation and 
enforcement of securities laws in South Africa in order to prevent, among other things, the 
occurrence of market abuse and/or other illicit trading activities in the relevant regulated 
416   S 82(3)(a) of the Securities Services Act; clause 91(3)(e) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 86(4)(b) 
of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.      
417    See paragraph 8 3 1 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
418    See paragraph 8 3 1 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
419    S 82 of the Securities Services Act; clause 91 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 86 of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.  However, it is submitted that such interception should be undertaken in accordance 
with the Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-related 
Information Act 70 of 2002 although this Act does not expressly provide for market abuse-related 
interceptions in South Africa.   See related comments in paragraph 8 6 in Chapter Eight of this thesis.      
420    See further paragraphs 3 2 1; 3 2 7 & 4 2 in Chapters Three & Four of this thesis 
421    Jooste 2006 SALJ 458-459. 
422    See paragraph 8 3 1 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
423    See paragraph 3 2 5 in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
424    See paragraph 8 3 2 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
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financial markets.425  Moreover, although the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets 
Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 do not expressly provide whether the JSE is 
statutorily obliged to give reasonable assistance to the Financial Services Board, the JSE has, 
however, played a very significant role in the detection, investigation and prevention of 
market abuse practices in South Africa to date.426  Therefore, like the Australian Stock 
Exchange,427 the JSE is primarily responsible for the promotion of market integrity and 
market fairness in the South African financial markets and companies.   Nevertheless, unlike 
the position in Australia,428 the JSE (not the Financial Services Board) is responsible for the 
real-time monitoring of market participants and the surveillance of market abuse activities in 
the South Africa financial Markets.429 In relation to this, the JSE’s Surveillance Division is 
reportedly equipped with sophisticated proprietary surveillance systems that are designed to 
detect abnormal movements and trading volumes which usually point to market abuse 
activity.430 These surveillance systems are controlled by the Market Practices Department of 
the JSE’s Surveillance Division and are reportedly capable of isolating the names, addresses, 
telephone numbers and other details of the parties involved in the affected transactions.431 
Consequently, unlike the current position in Australia,432 where suspicious or irregular trading 
activity is detected in South Africa, the JSE’s Surveillance Division may contact the affected 
persons or refer such matters to the Directorate of Market Abuse for further investigation.433 
Nonetheless, in contrast to the position in Australia,434 there seems to be no statutory or 
formal binding Memorandum of Understanding that has been brokered between the Financial 
Services Board and the JSE regarding the detection and referral of suspected market abuse 
425    See similar remarks in paragraphs 3 2 1 & 3 2 5 in Chapter Three of this thesis.     
426    Loubser (02-10-2006) 25 <http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-10-2008); 
also see related remarks in paragraph 3 2 5 in Chapter Three of this thesis.       
427    See paragraph 8 3 2 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
428    See paragraphs 8 3 2 & 8 3 1 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
429    See similar remarks in paragraphs 3 2 1 & 3 2 5 in Chapter Three of this thesis.     
430   Also see further Loubser (02-10-2006) 25 <http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> 
(accessed 10-10-2008); Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 196–198.    Also see related remarks in paragraph 3 2 5 
in Chapter Three of this thesis.       
431   See generally Loubser (02-10-2006) 25 <http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 
10-10-2008); also see related remarks in paragraph 3 2 5 in Chapter Three of this thesis.       
432  The Australian Securities and Investments Commission no longer rely on the Australian Stock 
Exchange’s referrals to detect market abuse activities in the Australian securities markets.    See 
paragraph 8 3 2 in Chapter Eight of this thesis.   
433  Loubser (02-10-2006) 25 <http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf> (accessed 10-10-2008); 
also paragraph 3 2 5 in Chapter Three of this thesis.   
434   See paragraph 8 3 2 in Chapter Eight of this thesis.   
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practices in South Africa.  It is hoped that South Africa will adopt the Australian approach435 
and introduce a statutory or formal binding Memorandum of Understanding between the JSE 
and the Financial Services Board in order to enhance the detection and combating of market 
abuse practices in South Africa.  As stated earlier, it is also hoped that the responsibility for 
the real-time monitoring of market participants and the surveillance of the South African 
financial markets will be moved from the JSE to the Financial Services Board to eradicate the 
delays which usually hamper the Financial Services Board’s investigations into the JSE’s 
market abuse referrals.  Like the Australian Stock Exchange,436 the JSE has also developed its 
own Listing Requirements aimed at preventing market abuse activities.  For example, the JSE 
requires all the listed companies to disclose promptly any price-sensitive information relating 
to the listed securities.437  This general obligation of disclosure on the part of the issuers of 
securities is commonly utilised through the JSE’s Securities Exchange News Service to curb 
and prevent insider trading in South Africa.438 Nevertheless, in contrast to the Australian 
Stock Exchange,439 the JSE does not seem to have its own Disciplinary Tribunal which 
specifically deals with any violations of its Listing Requirements and/or market abuse cases in 
South Africa.  As a result, apart from some disciplinary action such as suspension, 
termination of operating licences and stopping or delaying the trading of the offender’s 
securities on the JSE, the JSE does not seem to have the statutory authority to impose fixed or 
specified disciplinary monetary fines on such offenders.  In this regard, the JSE’s enforcement 
powers appear to be more restricted than those of the Australian Stock Exchange.440 
Moreover, unlike the position in Australia,441 the JSE is not statutorily empowered to search 
the premises of the accused persons who are suspected of engaging in market abuse practices 
and/or to summon any such persons to furnish it with other relevant information relating to 
ongoing market abuse cases.   
 
 
 
 
435   See paragraph 8 3 2 in Chapter Eight of this thesis.   
436   See paragraph 8 3 2 in Chapter Eight of this thesis.    
437   S 3 of the JSE Listing Requirements that relate to the disclosure of price-sensitive information. 
438   S 3.4 of the JSE Listing Requirements; also see paragraph 3 2 5 in Chapter Three of this thesis.        
439   See paragraph 8 3 2 in Chapter Eight of this thesis.   
440   See paragraph 8 3 2 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
441    See paragraph 8 3 2 in Chapter Eight of this thesis.   
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9 5  Evaluation and Analysis of the Role of the Courts and Other Role Players 
 
In contrast with the position in the United States of America,442 it has already been pointed 
out that very few cases of market abuse have, to date, been successfully prosecuted and settled 
in South Africa.443   Unlike the United States of America’s Department of Justice and 
courts,444 the Director of Public Prosecutions and the competent courts in South Africa have, 
to some extent, struggled to obtain more convictions in market abuse cases to date.445 
Notwithstanding the efforts being made by the Financial Services Board to refer the criminal 
cases of market abuse to the Director of Public Prosecutions for prosecution, only a few 
competent courts446 have jurisdiction to hear such cases.447  This has, to some extent, 
restricted or resulted in delays in the prosecution of some market abuse cases in South 
Africa.448  Moreover, as discussed earlier,449 some of the market abuse cases that were 
referred to the Director of Public Prosecutions by the Financial Services Board are still 
pending while others have either been withdrawn or abandoned, possibly because of 
insufficient evidence and the backlog of other cases in the relevant courts.450    
 
442    See paragraph 5 4 2 in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
443    Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 33-37.    
444    See paragraph 5 4 2 in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
445   Notwithstanding the fact that Bloomberg News published a story on 11 April 2007, stating that the 
Financial Services Board was investigating and/or has reported to the Director of Public Prosecutions the 
alleged market manipulation caused by an unknown American business consortium after making a 
substantial offer of $12, 5 billion for Gold Fields Limited resulting in 11% increase in its shares and 
adding about R10 billion to the market value of Gold Fields Limited shares.   See Brown “Gold Fields 
Zooms 11% on Bid Talk” Business Report (2007-04-12) 1.   This story was unfortunately somewhat false 
and misleading, for example, as at 13 April 2007, the JSE had since the enactment of the Securities 
Services Act only referred about seven cases of market manipulation to the Financial Services Board 
and/or the Director of Public Prosecutions for further investigation and possible prosecution by the courts.  
No convictions were obtained by the South African competent courts in all these cases.   This may further 
indicate that market abuse practices are still difficult to investigate and prosecute in South Africa.   See 
report by Brown “FSB may Probe Bloomberg Story on Gold Fields” Business Report (2007-04-13) 1; 
also see Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 34. 
446  S 79(1) of the Securities Services Act; this provision is likely to be repealed by clause 81 of the Financial 
Markets Bill and/or clause 86(10) & other relevant provisions of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.      
447    See paragraph 3 2 6 in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
448   This could be worsened by the fact that the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill & the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 do not have provisions that empower or establish more courts to specifically 
adjudicate or deal with market abuse cases in South Africa.   See s 79(1) of the Securities Services Act; 
also see clause 81 read with clause 89 & other relevant provisions under Chapter X of the Financial 
Markets Bill & other relevant provisions under Chapter X of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.      
449   See further related analysis in Chapters Two; Three & Four of this thesis; also see paragraphs 9 2 1 & 9 3 
1 above.     
450   The Director of Public Prosecutions is still to ensure that the competent courts are manned by sufficient 
people with the relevant expertise in order to obtain more prosecutions and settlements in market abuse 
cases referred to them by the FSB. 
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Moreover, unlike the position under the EU Market Abuse Directive,451 relatively few courts 
have the jurisdiction to hear market abuse cases in South Africa.452 In other words, the EU 
Market Abuse Directive does not expressly provide for a specific court to hear market abuse 
cases in the European Union.453 This role was apparently left to the relevant courts in the 
European Union member states.454 
  
In contrast to the position in the United Kingdom,455 as has already been highlighted above 
and in previous chapters,456 only the High Courts or Regional Courts have the jurisdiction to 
hear market abuse cases under the Securities Services Act.457 This flaw could be corrected if 
the Financial Markets Bill comes into force since it now provides that any court within whose 
jurisdiction the regulated market has its principal place of business or head office or in which 
any element of the dealing or offence occurred can hear market abuse cases, without any need 
to make an attachment to found or confirm its jurisdiction.458  Nevertheless, the high 
evidentiary burden employed in criminal cases of market abuse remains probably the main 
contributory factor of the paucity of convictions obtained in such cases in both the United 
Kingdom and South Africa.   In line with this, it remains to be seen whether the Financial 
Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012’s market abuse provisions will enhance 
the combating and prosecution of market abuse cases in South Africa.  Additionally, unlike 
the position in the United Kingdom,459 it is not quite certain whether the relevant courts in 
South Africa may also rely on any skilled persons from the Financial Services Board itself or 
on persons who are assigned to them by the Financial Services Board to adjudicate in market 
abuse cases.  Furthermore, the absence of sufficient persons with the relevant expertise to 
adjudicate in matters involving market abuse remains a significant challenge for the 
competent courts in South Africa.460  
 
451    See Chapter Six of this thesis. 
452    See related analysis above & paragraphs 3 2 6 in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
453    See Chapter Six of this thesis. 
454    See Chapter Six of this thesis. 
455    See paragraph 7 5 2 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
456    See similar analysis in Chapter Two to Chapter Four of this thesis. 
457    S 79(1) of the Securities Services Act.    
458   Clause 81 of the Financial Markets Bill; no similar provision is expressly made in clause 79 of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 & also see related comments in paragraph 3 2 6 in Chapter Three of this 
thesis.   
459    See paragraph 7 5 2 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
460    See related analysis in paragraph 3 2 6 in Chapters Three of this thesis. 
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Moreover, like the position in Australia,461 and as stated above, the competent courts in South 
Africa also have the discretion to impose appropriate sanctions and penalties against the 
market abuse offenders.462  In the same vein, the competent courts in South Africa further 
have powers to hear and give advice on any market abuse matter referred to them by the 
Financial Services Board.463 In particular, such advice usually relates to the actual amount of 
the fines to be imposed on the market abuse offenders and the nature of proceedings (that is 
civil, criminal or administrative proceedings) to be instituted against such offenders. 
However, other commentators464 have alluded to the fact that the paucity of settlements and 
prosecutions of market abuse cases in South Africa could have been ameliorated if the 
legislature had not rigidly adopted some of the American contemporaneous principles,465 
especially with regard to the insider trading prohibition.  In addition, it is submitted that the 
legislature should consider statutorily engaging additional regulatory agencies and 
empowering more specialised courts that deal with market abuse offences in South Africa.   In 
line with this, it is hoped that the Australian approach466 will be adopted in South Africa to 
empower the competent courts to have the discretion to make a declaration of contravention 
of the market abuse provisions whenever they are certain that such contravention actually 
occurred in order to increase deterrence on the part of the offenders. 
 
9 6  Evaluation and Analysis of the Role of Other Self-Regulatory Organisations     
 
Apart from the Financial Services Board and its committees, other regulatory bodies like the 
JSE are also statutorily allowed to deal with the enforcement of market abuse in South Africa.    
Accordingly, like the United States Securities and Exchange Commission,467 the Financial 
Services Board may exercise supervisory authority over all the regulatory bodies that deal 
with market abuse in South Africa.468  In the same vein, as stated before,469 the Financial 
Services Board has a prerogative to make market abuse rules that govern the enforcement of 
461    See paragraph 8 3 4 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
462   S 79 of the Securities Services Act; clause 81 of the Financial Markets Bill & no similar provision is 
expressly made in clause 79 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.  
463    See related remarks in paragraphs 3 2 1 & 3 2 6 in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
464    For example see Jooste’s summary and concluding remarks in Jooste 2006 SALJ 460.   
465    The so-called United States of America (US) approach. 
466    See paragraph 8 3 4 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
467    See paragraph 5 4 3 in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
468    See related remarks in paragraphs 3 2 1 in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
469    See related remarks in paragraphs 9 4 & 9 5 above. 
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market abuse laws in South Africa.470  Apart from the Financial Services Board and the JSE, 
there are no self-regulatory organisations that are specifically responsible for enforcing 
market abuse laws in South Africa.471  In relation to this, there is no specific provision in the 
Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 which 
empowers other self-regulatory organisations to enforce the market abuse ban in South 
Africa.472  While this approach is good in that it minimises bureaucracy, balkanisation, 
conflict of interests and confusion that may be associated with many regulatory bodies and 
self-regulatory organisations, it has not been fully utilised to obtain more settlements and 
prosecutions of market abuse cases in South Africa to date.473  
 
Furthermore, unlike the situation in the European Union,474 where the EU Market Abuse 
Directive has advocated for the adequate co-operation between the relevant stakeholders, no 
such provision is made in South Africa.475 In other words, although there are no specific self-
regulatory bodies, apart from the European Securities and Markets Authority, that are 
mandated to exclusively deal with market abuse under the EU Market Abuse Directive, the 
duty to involve such bodies was apparently ceded to the relevant European Union member 
states.476 
 
Additionally, in contrast with the position in the United Kingdom regarding the role of self-
regulatory organisations,477 it appears as if the importance of the role of such organisations 
has to some extent been overlooked in South Africa.478  This may be reflected, in part, by the 
470   S 82(2)(g) of the Securities Services Act; clause 91(2)(f) of the Financial Markets Bill & see further 
clause 86(2)(f) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   This implies that other regulatory bodies like the 
Directorate of Market Abuse do not have express statutory authority to make their own independent 
market abuse rules regarding the enforcement of market abuse laws in South Africa. 
471   The Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill & the Financial Markets Bill 2012 mainly 
empower only the Financial Services Board to police the regulation and enforcement of market abuse ban 
in South Africa. See s 82 of the Securities Services Act; clause 91of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 
86 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.      
472   See relevant sections under Chapter VIII entitled Market Abuse in the Securities Services Act, relevant 
clauses under Chapter X entitled Market Abuse in the Financial Markets Bill & relevant clauses under 
Chapter X entitled Market Abuse of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.      
473    See paragraphs 3 2 1 & 4 2 in Chapters Three & Four of this thesis respectively. 
474    See related remarks in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
475   Also see relevant sections under Chapter VIII entitled Market Abuse in the Securities Services Act; 
relevant clauses under Chapter X entitled Market Abuse in the Financial Markets Bill & relevant clauses 
under Chapter X entitled Market Abuse of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.      
476    See Chapter Six of this thesis. 
477    See paragraph 7 5 3 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
478    See similar analysis in paragraphs 4 3 1 in Chapters Four of this thesis.  
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fact that only a few self-regulatory organisations, namely the JSE, the Enforcement 
Committee, the Directorate of Market Abuse and the Securities Regulation Panel, are either 
directly or indirectly involved in the enforcement of the securities and market abuse laws in 
South Africa.479  Nevertheless, apart from the Financial Services Board, there are no other 
self-regulatory organisations that are statutorily, specifically and mainly responsible for 
enforcing market abuse laws in South Africa.480 As a result, not many self-regulatory 
organisations have been actively involved in the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition 
to supplement the efforts of the Financial Services Board in South Africa to date.481  South 
Africa seems to have blindly adopted some of the enforcement methods that are employed in 
the United Kingdom by empowering the Financial Services Board as the only main regulatory 
board that oversees the enforcement of its market abuse ban.  In relation to this, it is suggested 
that South Africa should consider practically implementing only the relevant principles of the 
United Kingdom’s single regulator model because it is economical and less complex.  This 
could increase the number of settlements and convictions in market abuse cases in South 
Africa.  Additionally, it is not certain whether other self-regulatory organisations in South 
Africa have the same or similar statutory leverage available to the Financial Services Board to 
make their own decisions, rules and appropriate regulations in relation to market abuse 
offences.482  However, it is important to note that the Directorate of Market Abuse and the 
Enforcement Committee have functions483 almost similar to those of their United Kingdom 
counterparts, the Regulatory Decisions Committee and the Financial Services and Markets 
Tribunal respectively.484   
 
Moreover, the role of the self-regulatory organisations in South Africa is not as widely 
recognised as it is in Australia.485  For instance, in contrast to the Australian Stock 
Exchange,486 the JSE does not seem to have the powers to impose monetary pecuniary 
penalties against the market abuse offenders in South Africa.   It is therefore hoped, as is the 
479   See related remarks on the role of each of these self-regulatory organisations (SROs) in Chapter Three of 
this thesis; see further paragraphs 4 2 & 4 3 1 in Chapter Four of this thesis.   
480   See Chapter VIII of the Securities Services Act, Chapter X  of the Financial Markets Bill & Chapter X of 
the Financial Markets Bill 2012.         
481    See similar analysis in paragraphs 4 3 1 in Chapters Four & Five of this thesis. 
482   See Chapter VIII of the Securities Services Act, Chapter X of the Financial Markets Bill & Chapter X of 
the Financial Markets Bill 2012.      
483    See paragraphs 3 2 2 & 3 2 3 in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
484    See paragraph 7 5 3 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
485    See paragraphs 8 3 2; 8 3 3 1; 8 3 3 2; 8 3 3 3; 8 3 3 4 & 8 3 3 5 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
486    See paragraph 8 3 2 in Chapter Three of this thesis.   
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position in Australia,487 that the Securities Regulation Panel and the JSE will continue to 
participate more in matters regarding the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in 
South Africa.488   However, like the Corporations and Market Advisory Committee,489 the 
Directorate of Market Abuse has the powers to advise and perform some investigatory 
functions on the behalf of the Financial Services Board.490  Nevertheless, unlike the 
Corporations and Market Advisory Committee,491 the Directorate of Market Abuse is not 
statutorily authorised to make recommendations to the South African legislature on matters 
regarding the securities law reform, operation of securities and financial markets and the 
general regulation of such markets.492  Moreover, in contrast to the Corporations and Market 
Advisory Committee,493 the Directorate of Market Abuse is yet to engage more in the public 
consultation and making of proposals to the legislature and/or other relevant authorities 
regarding the general regulation and enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in South 
Africa.   Moreover, unlike the Australian Stock Exchange,494 it is uncertain whether the 
Enforcement Committee has the powers to take an administrative action like suspending or 
banning the market abuse offenders from managing any company for a stipulated period in 
South Africa.495  In addition, in contrast to the Australian Stock Exchange,496 the 
Enforcement Committee does not seem to have additional powers to summon any suspected 
offenders to produce evidence or documents necessary for any particular ongoing market 
abuse case trial or to search any premises or persons who are suspected to have such 
documents.497    Furthermore, unlike the self-regulatory organisations in Australia,498 as 
already stated above, the self-regulatory organisations in South Africa seem to have restricted 
authority, especially with regard to the making of their own market abuse rules,499 decisions, 
487    See paragraphs 8 3 3 3; 8 3 3 4 & 8 3 3 5 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
488    See related analysis in paragraph 3 2 7 in Chapters Three of this thesis. 
489    See paragraph 8 3 3 1 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
490   S 83(1)(c); (d) & (e) of the Securities Services Act; clause 92(1)(c); (d) & (e) of the Financial Markets 
Bill; clause 87(1)(c) & (d) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012 & also see paragraph 3 2 2 in Chapter Three 
of this thesis.     
491    See paragraph 8 3 3 1 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
492    S 83 of the Securities Services Act; clause 92 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 87 of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.     
493    See paragraph 8 3 3 1 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
494    See paragraph 8 3 2 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
495    See further analysis in paragraph 3 2 3 in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
496    See paragraph 8 3 2 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
497    See further analysis in paragraph 3 2 3 in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
498    See paragraphs 8 3 2; 8 3 3 1; 8 3 3 2; 8 3 3 3; 8 3 3 4 & 8 3 3 5 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
499    Also see paragraph 9 4 above. 
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regulations and other appropriate disciplinary or administrative actions on matters involving 
market abuse offences.500  In relation to this, it is hoped, as is the position in Australia,501 that 
more self-regulatory organisations will be statutorily empowered and introduced in South 
Africa in the near future to complement the Financial Services Board’s efforts to combat 
market abuse activities.   
 
9 7  Evaluation and Analysis of the Co-operation between the Regulators, Courts 
and Other Role Players  
 
In South Africa, the Financial Services Board and the Director of Public Prosecutions are also 
responsible for the civil and criminal enforcement of the market abuse prohibition 
respectively.502 As is the position in the United States of America,503 the Director of Public 
Prosecutions may only prosecute criminal cases of market abuse that are referred to it by the 
Financial Services Board in South Africa.   However, in contrast to the position in the United 
States of America,504 there is apparently little or minimal co-operation between the Financial 
Services Board and the Director of Public Prosecutions in South Africa.   Put differently, the 
co-operative enforcement relationship between the Financial Services Board and the Director 
of Public Prosecutions has not been fully developed and utilised to increase and improve the 
criminal prosecution of market abuse cases in South Africa.505  
  
Moreover, as highlighted earlier,506 the EU Market Abuse Directive did not expressly provide 
for a specific court to hear market abuse cases in the European Union.507  This role was 
apparently left to the relevant courts in the European Union member states.508  Accordingly, 
like the position in South Africa,509 the EU Market Abuse Directive510 does not expressly 
500    Also see related comments in paragraph 4 3 1 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
501    See paragraphs 8 3 2; 8 3 3 1; 8 3 3 2; 8 3 3 3; 8 3 3 4 & 8 3 3 5 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
502   Paragraph 9 5 above; paragraphs 3 2 1 & 3 2 6 in Chapter Three of this thesis & paragraph 4 2 in Chapter 
Four of this thesis. 
503    Paragraphs 5 4 2 & 5 5 1 in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
504    Paragraph 5 5 1 in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
505    Paragraph 3 2 6 in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
506    See paragraph 9 5 above. 
507    See Chapter Six of this thesis. 
508    See Chapter Six of this thesis. 
509    See related analysis in paragraphs 9 4 & 9 5 above; also see paragraph 3 2 6 in Chapter Three of this 
thesis. 
510    See Chapter Six of this thesis. 
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provide for the co-operation of the relevant courts and other enforcement authorities in the 
European Union.511    
 
Furthermore, as is the position with the Financial Services Authority,512 the Financial 
Services Board has to date received considerable help, especially in respect of the criminal 
prosecution of market abuse cases, from the courts and the Director of Public Prosecutions in 
South Africa.513  As has already been discussed above,514 the Director of Public Prosecutions 
in South Africa, like the Crown Prosecution Services of the United Kingdom,515 usually 
prosecutes matters relating to market abuse after a referral from the Financial Services Board 
or other relevant authorities.  This could, in a way, suggest that the Director of Public 
Prosecutions in South Africa may only commence its own investigations or prosecution of 
market abuse offences after consultation with the Financial Services Board.516 This position 
remains unchanged in the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012.517 As 
indicated above,518 although it may be prima facie presumed that the Financial Services 
Board supports the Director of Public Prosecutions and the relevant courts with the necessary 
information regarding ongoing market abuse cases in South Africa, it is not clear whether the 
Financial Services Board is statutorily mandated to assign certain persons with the relevant 
expertise to assist the courts in their prosecution of such cases.519  Moreover, notwithstanding 
the outstanding effort that is being made by the courts and the Financial Services Board to 
prosecute market abuse cases timeously and effectively, the paucity of successful settlements 
or prosecutions that have been obtained in such cases remains a major challenge in South 
Africa to date.520 Relatively few settlements have been obtained in cases involving market 
abuse activities like market manipulation in South Africa.521  In line with this, it remains to be 
seen whether the co-operation relationship between the Financial Services Board, the courts 
511    See related analysis 9 5 above. 
512    See paragraph 7 6 1 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
513    See related analysis in paragraph 3 2 6 in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
514    See paragraph 3 2 6 in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
515    See related remarks in paragraph 7 5 3 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
516    S 82(9) of the Securities Services Act. 
517    Clause 91(9) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 86(10) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.     
518    See related remarks in paragraph 9 5 above. 
519    Generally see paragraph 3 2 6 in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
520   See similar analysis in paragraphs 3 2 1 & 3 2 6 in Chapter Three of this thesis & paragraph 4 2 in 
Chapter Four of this thesis. 
521   See Pretorius v Natal South Sea Investment Trust Limited 1965 3 SA 410 (W), where the court held that 
the accused persons were guilty for prejudicing other investors by selling overpriced securities (market 
manipulation).  
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and the Director of Public Prosecutions will give rise to more convictions and settlements in 
matters involving market abuse in South Africa.522  Additionally, as similarly stated above, it 
is uncertain whether the courts and the Financial Services Board have been successful with 
regard to the combating of cross-border market abuse practices.523  For example, no single 
case involving cross-border market abuse activities has been reported or successfully 
prosecuted in South Africa to date.524  Accordingly, this raises some doubt as to whether the 
co-operative efforts of the courts and the Financial Services Board have to date sufficiently 
and effectively dealt with the market abuse violations in South Africa and elsewhere. 
 
Lastly, like the position in Australia,525 the requirement that the Financial Services Board 
must refer all market abuse criminal cases to the Director of Public Prosecutions could have 
somewhat limited the Financial Services Board’s prospects of speedily instituting its own 
criminal proceedings against the perpetrators of market abuse in South Africa.   In addition, in 
contrast to the position in Australia,526 the Financial Services Board and the Director of Public 
Prosecutions appear not to have concluded any binding Memorandum of Understanding 
regarding the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in South Africa.   This could imply 
that both the Financial Services Board and the Director of Public Prosecutions are not 
statutorily and expressly obliged to co-operate with each other to enforce the market abuse 
prohibition in South Africa.  It is therefore hoped that the Financial Services Board and the 
Director of Public Prosecutions will conclude a binding co-operation and relevant 
information-sharing Memorandum of Understanding to enhance their co-operation and 
enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in South Africa.   Moreover, unlike the position 
in Australia,527 it is uncertain whether there are some binding and/or formal co-operation 
arrangements that were concluded by the Financial Services Board and the South African 
Police Services, particularly in relation to the criminal investigation of market abuse activities 
in South Africa.   In other words, although it is generally expected that the South African 
Police Services would arrest any persons indicted by the either the Financial Services Board 
522   Unlike in the United Kingdom, there is no person who has been convicted for insider trading in South 
Africa. See related analysis in paragraph 3 2 6 in Chapter Three of this thesis & paragraphs 4 2 in Chapter 
Four of this thesis. 
523   See related analysis in paragraph 3 2 6 in Chapter Three of this thesis & paragraphs 4 2 in Chapter Four 
of this thesis.   
524   See related analysis in paragraph 3 2 6 in Chapter Three of this thesis & paragraphs 4 2 in Chapters Four 
of this thesis.  
525    See further paragraph 8 4 1 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
526    See further paragraph 8 4 1 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
527    See further paragraph 8 4 1 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
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or the courts, there appears to be no formal Memorandum of Understanding that was 
concluded between the Financial Services Board and the South African Police Services in 
relation to the investigation and prevention of market abuse activities in South Africa and 
elsewhere (cross-border market abuse activities).    
 
9 8  Evaluation and Analysis of the Co-operation between the Regulators and Other 
Local Self-Regulatory Organisations  
  
In South Africa, as earlier stated,528 the Financial Services Board also polices the general 
enforcement of securities laws by other regulatory bodies such as the JSE and the Securities 
Regulation Panel.  This prima facie suggests that the Financial Services Board has some co-
operation relationship with other local regulatory bodies regarding the enforcement of such 
laws in South Africa.  Although the degree or extent of the effectiveness of such co-operation 
relationship is unclear, the Financial Services Board has to date managed to obtain some 
settlements and to investigate market abuse cases referred to it by other self-regulatory 
organisations like the JSE.529  However, unlike the position in the United States of 
America,530 it is uncertain whether the Financial Services Board has entered into any binding 
co-operation agreements with specific local self-regulatory organisations like the Securities 
Regulation Panel to combat market abuse practices in the South African financial markets.531  
 
Furthermore, as stated before,532 the EU Market Abuse Directive533 has advocated for the 
adequate co-operation between the relevant stakeholders in the European Union member 
states.534  On the contrary, no similar provision has been made in South Africa.535    
 
In addition, as is the position in the United Kingdom,536 and as indicated above,537 the 
Financial Services Board works hand in hand with other local self-regulatory organisations to 
528    See paragraph 9 6 above. 
529    Paragraphs 3 2 5 & 4 3 1 in Chapters Three & Four of this thesis.  
530    Paragraph 5 5 2 in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
531   There are no self-regulatory organisations such as those in the United States of America that are 
specifically and statutorily empowered to supplement the Financial Services Board’s efforts to enforce 
and combat commodities-based market abuse activities in South Africa and elsewhere. 
532    See paragraph 9 6 above. 
533    See Chapter Six of this thesis. 
534    See related remarks in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
535   See relevant sections under Chapter VIII entitled Market Abuse in the Securities Services Act; relevant 
clauses under Chapter X entitled Market Abuse in the Financial Markets Bill & relevant clauses under 
Chapter X entitled Market Abuse in the Financial Markets Bill 2012.      
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complement its market abuse enforcement efforts.538  Like the London Stock Exchange,539 the 
JSE has to date been assisting the Financial Services Board with the surveillance, detection 
and investigation of suspicious illicit activities which in most instances would be indicative of 
market abuse violations.540 As highlighted in previous chapters,541 there is some co-operation 
and relevant information sharing between the Financial Services Board and the JSE.542  
Moreover, as stated before,543 the JSE has now consolidated the functions of the Bond 
Exchange of South Africa in order to investigate and curb commodities-based market abuse 
practices in South Africa.  This suggests that the Financial Services Board now relies on the 
JSE to combat commodities-based market abuse practices in the South African financial 
markets.544 Nevertheless, the fact still remains that a relatively few market abuse cases 
reported to the Financial Services Board by either the JSE or other enforcement authorities 
have to date been successfully settled and prosecuted in South Africa under the Securities 
Services Act.545  This status quo is likely to continue because the Financial Markets Bill and 
the Financial Markets Bill 2012 still do not expressly and statutorily impose a mandatory co-
operation obligation on both the Financial Services Board and the JSE to improve the 
enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in South Africa.546 
 
As stated earlier,547 the Directorate of Market Abuse has similar roles as those of the 
Regulatory Decisions Committee and it investigates and exercises some functions on behalf 
of the Financial Services Board.548  Currently, the Financial Services Board and the 
Directorate of Market Abuse work closely and consult each other in relation to the making of 
536    See paragraph 7 6 2 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
537    Also see paragraph 9 6 above. 
538    See the related remarks in paragraph 9 6 above.    
539    See paragraph 7 6 2 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
540   See the analysis in paragraphs 3 2 5 & 4 3 1 in Chapters Three & Four of this thesis respectively; also see 
paragraph 9 6 above.   
541    See specifically Chapters Two; Three & Four of this thesis. 
542    See further analysis in paragraph 4 3 1 in Chapter Four of this thesis. 
543    See further analysis in paragraph 4 3 1 in Chapter Four of this thesis. 
544    See further analysis in paragraph 4 3 1 in Chapter Four of this thesis. 
545   See relevant provisions under Chapter VIII of the Securities Services Act; also see related analysis in 
paragraph 9 6 above & paragraphs 3 2 5 & 4 3 1 in Chapters Three & Four of this thesis respectively.  
546    See Chapter X of the Financial Markets Bill & Chapter X of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.    
547    See paragraph 9 6 above. 
548   S 83 of the Securities Services Act & clause 92 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 87 of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.   Also see similar discussions in paragraphs 3 2 2 & 4 3 1 in Chapters Three & Four of 
this thesis respectively.   
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market abuse rules, penalties and any other decisions.549 It is hoped that this co-operation 
between the Financial Services Board and the Directorate of Market Abuse will in future 
produce more settlements and convictions, especially in criminal cases of market abuse.550  
Notwithstanding the fact that the Financial Services Board and the Directorate of Market 
Abuse convene regular meetings to discuss and share any relevant confidential information, 
especially in respect of ongoing market abuse investigations, more may still need to be done 
to increase the number of market abuse cases that will be prosecuted in South Africa.  
 
Likewise, the Securities Regulation Panel offers additional support to the Financial Services 
Board in relation to the regulation and enforcement of securities laws in South Africa.551  For 
example, the Securities Regulation Panel has some requirements in place pertaining to the 
disclosure of price-sensitive information.552 This is aimed at preventing insider trading and 
market manipulation by insiders in relation to the offeror or offeree company by dealing 
unlawfully in securities of the affected companies at an early stage of the negotiations.  All 
parties to an offer relating to an affected transaction are required to take reasonable steps to 
prevent the making or publication of misleading statements, creation of false markets and 
other market abuse activities.553  However, the extent of co-operation between the Financial 
Services Board and the Securities Regulation Panel remains unclear.  It appears as if the 
Securities Regulation Panel does not involve itself much in the day-to-day enforcement of 
matters relating to market abuse as such matters usually concern the Financial Services Board.   
Consequently, the actual degree of co-operation between the Financial Services Board and the 
Securities Regulation Panel is very difficult to ascertain since the Securities Regulation Panel 
does not primarily deal with the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in South Africa 
on a more regular basis.  
 
Furthermore, like the Financial Services and Markets Tribunal of the United Kingdom,554 the 
Enforcement Committee555 provides all aggrieved persons with an opportunity to appeal 
against any decisions of the Financial Services Board, especially with regard to the penalties 
549    See similar analysis in paragraph 4 3 1 in Chapter Four of this thesis. 
550    See similar analysis in paragraphs 3 2 2 & 4 3 1 in Chapters Three & Four of this thesis respectively. 
551     See generally paragraph 9 6 above & paragraph 4 3 1 in Chapter Four of this thesis. 
552     See generally paragraph 4 3 1 in Chapter Four of this thesis. 
553     See the Securities Regulation Panel (SRP) General Principles 6 & 9.  
554     See paragraphs 7 5 3 & 7 6 2 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
555    S 101 & 102 read with s 104 of the Securities Services Act; clause 105 of the Financial Markets Bill & 
clause 101 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.      
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for market abuse.556  While this is important in that it helps the Financial Services Board to 
review its own decisions and to make appropriate decisions in relation to its market abuse 
enforcement and regulatory functions, only a minimum number of market abuse cases have 
been settled with the Enforcement Committee to date.557 Accordingly, this could be an 
indication that there is inconsistent, little or no co-operation between the Financial Services 
Board and the Enforcement Committee.  
 
Lastly, like the Australian Stock Exchange, and as earlier indicated558 the JSE requires all the 
issuers of listed securities to disclose any trading activity which might result in market abuse 
promptly through the Securities Exchange News Service.559  Notably, there is some co-
operative enforcement effort between the JSE and the Financial Services Board which has to 
date relatively given rise to the increased investigation and detection of market abuse 
practices in South Africa.560  On the other hand, like the Australian Financial Markets 
Association,561 the JSE (not the Bond Exchange of South Africa) now deals with the 
regulation of commodities and futures markets in South Africa.  Nonetheless, it remains to be 
seen whether the JSE will be actively and consistently involved in the enforcement of the 
commodities-based market abuse prohibition in South Africa.562  Furthermore, unlike the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission,563 the Securities Services Act,564 the 
Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012565 do not expressly provide 
whether the Enforcement Committee has the powers to refer market abuse cases to the 
556    See similar analysis in paragraphs 3 2 3 & 4 3 1 in Chapters Three & Four of this thesis respectively. 
557    Generally see similar remarks in paragraph 7 5 3 1 above; also see paragraph 9 6 above & paragraphs 3 2 
3 & 4 3 1 in Chapters Three & Four of this thesis respectively.   
558    See related comments in paragraphs 9 4 & 9 6 above; also see paragraph 8 4 2 in Chapter Eight of this 
thesis. 
559    S 3.4 of the JSE Listing Requirements; also see generally paragraph 4 3 1in Chapter Four of this thesis.     
560   It is reported that during the period from 2005 to 2008 alone, the JSE substantially increased the number 
of market abuse cases which were later referred to the FSB.    However, only about seven of such cases 
relating to market manipulation were later investigated and prosecuted by the FSB during the same 
period.   See generally Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 34. 
561    Generally similar remarks in paragraphs 8 3 3 5 & 8 4 2 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
562    See related analysis in paragraph 4 3 1 in Chapters Four of this thesis & paragraph 9 6 above. 
563    See related remarks in paragraph 8 4 2 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
564    S 94(e); s 97 to s 105. 
565   See clause 105 & the relevant clauses under Chapter X entitled Market Abuse in the Financial Markets 
Bill & clause 101 & the relevant clauses under Chapter X  entitled Market Abuse in the Financial Markets 
Bill 2012.      
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Director of Public Prosecutions for prosecution.566   Nevertheless, as is the position with the 
Australian Institute of Company Directors, the International Banks and Securities Association 
of Australia and the Securities and Derivatives Industry Association,567 and as earlier stated, 
the Securities Regulation Panel provides the Financial Services Board with the necessary 
support pertaining to the general regulation and enforcement of the relevant securities law 
prohibitions in South Africa.568    
 
9 9  Evaluation and Analysis of the Co-operation between the Regulators and 
Similar International Regulatory Bodies 
 
The Financial Services Board has reportedly entered into co-operation agreements with the 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission and the Financial Services Authority of 
the United States of America and the United Kingdom respectively569 for the purposes of 
curbing cross-border market abuse activities.  While this is a positive attempt to combat and 
reduce all potential cross-border market abuse practices as much as possible, relatively 
minimal success has been achieved in relation to the utilisation of such co-operation 
agreements in South Africa to date.570  In other words, it remains uncertain whether such co-
operation agreements have been fully implemented to improve the detection, investigation 
and prosecution of all possible unscrupulous trading practices in the relevant financial 
markets in South Africa and elsewhere.571 One can therefore ascribe this inconsistent 
enforcement of cross-border market abuse laws to the low level of co-operation between the 
Financial Services Board and similar bodies in other jurisdictions.572  Nonetheless, this flaw 
could be corrected by the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 
which now empowers the Financial Services Board to assist foreign regulators with 
investigations pertaining to any cross-border market abuse cases.573  
566   On the contrary, the ACCC has signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the 
Commonwealth DPP in Australia which allows it to refer serious cartels and market abuse cases to the 
Commonwealth DPP for prosecution.     
567    See paragraph 8 4 2 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
568   See the Securities Regulation Panel (SRP) General Principles 6 & 9; also see related remarks in paragraph 
9 6 above. 
569    Paragraph 4 3 3 in Chapter Four of this thesis; also see related remarks in paragraph 9 4 above.   
570    Paragraph 4 3 3 in Chapter Four of this thesis.   
571   See similar comments in paragraph 9 4 above; also see discussions in paragraph 4 3 3 of Chapter Four of 
this thesis.   
572   See related comments in paragraph 9 4 above; also see discussions in paragraphs 4 3 3 of Chapter Four of 
this thesis.   
573   Clause 91(2)(b) of the Financial Markets Bill; clauses 86(2)(b) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012 & also 
see similar remarks in paragraph 3 2 1 of Chapter Three of this thesis.   
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Additionally, unlike the situation in the European Union574 where the EU Market Abuse 
Directive encourages mutual co-operation between the regulatory authorities and other 
relevant stakeholders in all the different European Union member states,575 the Securities 
Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets 2012 do not expressly 
provide for such international co-operation in South Africa.576 
 
In contrast to the Financial Services Authority,577 it is not certain whether the Financial 
Services Board has also entered into some co-operation arrangements with international 
regulatory bodies that deal with commodities-based market abuse practices such as the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the London International Financial Futures and 
Options Exchange Administration and Management and the Trade Point Stock Exchange.578   
Likewise, it is not clear whether South Africa has also ratified any agreement with the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development579 in order to enable the Financial 
Services Board to improve its policies regarding the monitoring, investigation, information 
gathering and the adoption of other appropriate market abuse enforcement approaches.  
Nevertheless, the Financial Services Board should be commended for its great efforts to 
respond to the mounting global concern over the negative effects of market abuse activities.580 
It has, for instance, joined the International Organisation of Securities Commissions in order 
to learn from the experiences of similar regulatory bodies that are members of the 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions.581 For example, in light of this, the 
Financial Services Board can rely on its International Organisation of Securities Commissions 
membership to co-operate with other regulators such as the Securities and Exchange Board of 
India to track and investigate market abuse activities that relate to the affected securities in 
South Africa by the perpetrators who anonymously dealt in such securities while in India.582 
574    See related remarks in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
575    See Chapter Six of this thesis; also see related remarks in paragraph 9 6 above. 
576   See the relevant sections under Chapter VIII entitled Market Abuse in the Securities Services Act; also 
see the relevant clauses under Chapter X entitled Market Abuse in the Financial Markets Bill as well as in 
the Financial Markets Bill 2012.  
577    See paragraphs 7 5 1 & 7 6 3 read with paragraph 7 6 2 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
578   This might further suggest that commodities-based cross-border market abuse practices are not being 
sufficiently detected and prosecuted in South Africa.  
579    Blair & Walker Financial Services Law (2006) 832-833. 
580    See paragraph 4 3 3 in Chapter Four of this thesis 
581    Generally see related comments in paragraph 9 4 above; also see similar discussions in paragraphs 3 2 1 
& 4 3 3 of Chapters Three & Four of this thesis respectively.   
582    Also see similar comments in paragraphs 3 2 1 & 4 3 3 of Chapters Three & Four of this thesis 
respectively.   
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However, it is unclear whether the Financial Services Board has concluded any binding co-
operation Memorandum of Understanding with the Securities and Exchange Board of India in 
relation to the enforcement of the cross-border market abuse prohibitions.   
 
As is the position in Australia,583 and as stated above, the Financial Services Board is reported 
to have concluded some separate mutual co-operation agreements with the United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission584 and the Financial Securities Authority.585 Moreover, 
although more may still need to be done by the Financial Services Board to increase the 
consistent enforcement of these co-operation agreements to improve its own detection, 
investigation and prosecution of cross-border market abuse cases in South Africa, it is 
encouraging that the Financial Services Board has at least taken the initiative to co-operate 
and/or seek the relevant enforcement support from other regulators at an international level.  
In addition, like the Australian Securities and Investments Commission,586 the Financial 
Services Board is a signatory of the International Organisation of Securities Commissions 
Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding.  Thus, like the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission,587 and as stated above, the Financial Services Board may also 
utilise surveillance, investigation and detection support from other International Organisation 
of Securities Commissions Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding member regulators to 
combat cross-border market abuse practices in South Africa.588 Nevertheless, in contrast to 
the Australian Securities and Investments Commission,589 the Financial Services Board has, 
in relatively few instances, reportedly managed to rely on other International Organisation of 
Securities Commissions’ Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding member regulators for 
some market abuse prohibition enforcement support.590 It is hoped that the Financial Services 
Board will consider entering into more co-operation agreements with other renowned 
international regulators like the Ontario Securities Commission and the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission to strengthen and improve its enforcement of the market abuse 
583    See paragraph 8 4 3 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
584   Notably, the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Financial Services Board and the 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission was signed in Pretoria on 01 April 1996. 
585    See similar remarks in paragraph 4 3 3 in Chapters Four of this thesis.         
586    See paragraph 8 4 3 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
587   See paragraph 8 4 3 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
588   Generally see related comments in paragraph 9 4 above. 
589   See paragraph 8 4 3 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
590   See generally similar remarks above & paragraph 9 4 above. 
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prohibition.  This could potentially improve the Financial Services Board’s investigation and 
detection of cross-border market abuse activities in South Africa and elsewhere.591   
 
9 10  Evaluation and Analysis of the Adoption of Adequate Preventative Measures 
 
A considerable number of methods are also used to prevent market abuse practices in South 
Africa.   In other words, South Africa has made some significant efforts to promote and build 
a good anti-market abuse culture among all the relevant persons in both regulated and 
unregulated financial markets.  As in the United States of America,592  South Africa relies on 
civil, criminal, and administrative sanctions to deter and discourage unscrupulous persons 
from engaging in market abuse activities.593  Nevertheless, unlike the position in the United 
States of America,594 and as already pointed out,595 the Securities Services Act’s market abuse 
civil sanctions are only limited to cases involving insider trading.596  As stated earlier,597 this 
flaw could be addressed by the Financial Markets Bill as it now extends civil sanctions to 
market manipulation offences.598  Furthermore, apart from the workshops, seminars, 
presentations and the JSE’s Insider Trading Booklet, no other measures were employed by the 
Financial Services Board or other enforcement agencies to increase awareness and prevent 
market abuse activity in the South African financial markets.599 Moreover, the South African 
legislature did not employ other methods like incentives, bounty rewards and whistle-blower 
immunity to encourage informants to voluntarily report all suspected market abuse activities 
to the Financial Services Board or other relevant enforcement authorities.600  It is submitted in 
line with the position in the United States of America601 and the United Kingdom,602 that the 
591   Nevertheless, it is encouraging that the FSB has reportedly entered into a co-operation MOU with the 
Emirates Securities and Commodities Authority (ESCA) of the United Arab Emirates in April 2007.    
592   Paragraphs 5 3 2; 5 3 3; 5 3 5 & 5 3 6 in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
593   Paragraphs 9 2 1 & 9 3 1 above & see further paragraph 4 4 7 in Chapter Four of this thesis. 
594   Paragraphs 5 3 2; 5 3 3; 5 3 5 & 5 3 6 in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
595    See related remarks in paragraph 9 3 1 read with paragraph 9 2 1 above. 
596   This implies that other market abuse practices like trade-based market manipulation and disclosure-based 
market manipulation do not lead to civil liability on the part of the offenders in South Africa.   See s 77 of 
the Securities Services Act. 
597    See related remarks in paragraph 9 3 1 read with paragraph 9 2 1 above. 
598   See clause 87 read with clauses 84 & 85 of the Financial Markets Bill; no similar provision is made in the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012.         
599    Paragraph 4 4 6 in Chapter Four of this thesis. 
600    Paragraph 4 4 7 in Chapter Four of this thesis; also see paragraph 9 2 1 above. 
601    See paragraph 5 5 3 in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
602    See paragraph 7 7 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
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Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 
should be amended to provide specific market abuse whistle-blower immunity provisions603 
for the purposes of encouraging all persons to report market abuse activities to the Financial 
Services Board and/or other relevant enforcement authorities in South Africa. On the other 
hand, the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 
2012 do not have provisions that authorise a specific regulatory body to enforce and prohibit 
Internet-based market abuse practices.604  Moreover, in contrast to the United States of 
America’s multi-functional regulatory model,605 South Africa gives the Financial Services 
Board the main responsibility of enforcing the market abuse provisions.606 In addition, unlike 
the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission,607 other self-regulatory bodies like 
the JSE may only refer any suspected market abuse activities to the Financial Services Board 
for further investigations.608  Furthermore, there is no express statutory private right of action 
for the affected persons to claim their damages directly from the offenders in South Africa.609 
 
In addition, as stated earlier,610 in spite of some inconsistencies that sometimes occur 
regarding the interpretation of the provisions of the EU Market Abuse Directive, a number of 
the European Union member states have successfully adopted some relevant rules, 
regulations, legislation and/or other relevant measures to implement the provisions of the EU 
Market Abuse Directive in order to inter alia combat cross-border market abuse practices.   
603    Notably, although s 159 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008; the Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000; s 9 
of the South African constitution & the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination 
Act 4 of 2000 can be employed to protect shareholders, directors and other employees from occupational 
reprisals, there are no specific provisions in the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill & the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 that can be used to encourage and/or protect market abuse whistle-blowers 
from such reprisals.   
604   See s 73; s 75; s 76 & s 77 of the Securities Services Act; clauses 82; 84; 85; 86 & 87 of the Financial 
Markets Bill & clauses 80; 82; 83 & 84 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   Also see related comments 
in paragraph 9 3 above.   
605    See Chapter Five of this thesis. 
606  Although other regulatory bodies like the JSE, the Directorate of Market Abuse, the Director of Public 
Prosecutions, the Board of Appeal, the Enforcement Committee and the Securities Regulation Panel are 
also involved in the enforcement of the securities and market abuse laws, there are no regulatory bodies 
or self-regulatory organisations other than the FSB that are expressly and statutorily empowered to make 
their own rules for the purposes of enforcing or combating market abuse practices in South Africa.   See 
generally related analysis under paragraphs 3 2 1 & 4 2 in Chapters Three & Four of this thesis.  
607   See paragraph 8 5 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
608  Accordingly, the FSB may investigate such matters and/or refer criminal matters to the Director of Public 
Prosecutions for prosecution or to the Enforcement Committee for further administrative action.   
609   See further related remarks in paragraphs 9 2 1 & 9 3 1 read with paragraphs 9 2 & 9 3 above. 
610   See the discussion in paragraph 6 4 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
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However, unlike the position of the regulatory bodies in the European Union,611 the Financial 
Services Board may extra-territorially612 enforce the Securities Services Act’s market abuse 
provisions only where some co-operation arrangements with similar bodies elsewhere exist.613  
The same status quo is set to be retained under the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.614  Moreover, unlike the position under the EU Market Abuse Directive,615 
the Securities Services Act,616 the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 
2012617 do not have specific definitions of inside information as regards to commodity 
derivatives and professional intermediaries so as to curb market abuse activities, particularly 
front running, by brokers and/or other market participants in the South African financial 
markets.618   In this regard, the Securities Services Act,619 the Financial Markets Bill and the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012620 employ a slightly distinct and different approach from that 
which is followed under the EU Market Abuse Directive.621 Accordingly, it remains to be 
seen whether the approach employed in the Securities Services Act,622 the Financial Markets 
Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012,623 especially in relation to the interpretation and 
application of the market abuse prohibition, will enable the Financial Services Board and 
other relevant authorities to prevent market abuse activities in South Africa robustly and 
consistently.624  
 
Unlike the position in the United Kingdom,625 there was no attempt on the part of the South 
African legislature to define the concept of market abuse comprehensively.626  In addition, 
611   See paragraph 6 4 5 read with paragraphs 6 4 2; 6 4 3 & 6 4 4 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
612   S 72 which defines the term “regulated market” to include both domestic and foreign securities markets; 
also see related discussion in paragraph 2 4 1 3 in Chapter Two of this thesis.    
613   S 82; also see paragraphs 3 2 1 & 4 3 3 in Chapters Three & Four of this thesis.  
614   See clause 91(2)(b) of the Financial Markets Bill; clause 86(2)(b) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012 & 
also see paragraphs 3 2 1 & 4 3 3 in Chapters Three & Four of this thesis.   
615   Article 1(1); also see paragraphs 6 3 1 & 6 4 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
616   S 72. 
617   Clause 81 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 79 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.      
618   Also see related remarks in paragraph 9 2 above. 
619   S 72. 
620   Clause 81 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 79 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.      
621   Article 1(1); also see paragraphs 6 3 1 & 6 4 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
622   S 72; s 73; s 74; s 75; s 76 & s 77. 
623   See clauses 81; 82; 83; 84; 85; 86 & 87 of the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 79; 80; 81; 82; 83 & 84 of 
the Financial Markets Bill 2012.      
624    See related discussions in paragraphs 3 2 1; 3 2 2; 3 2 3 & 3 2 5 in Chapter Three of this thesis.     
625    See similar remarks in paragraph 7 3 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
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unlike the position in the United Kingdom,627 the Financial Services Board is not statutorily 
authorised to impose unlimited financial penalties on the market abuse offenders.628  As 
indicated before,629 no separate and distinct penalties for violating market abuse provisions 
are given to individuals and companies in South Africa.630 Furthermore, in contrast to the 
situation in the United Kingdom,631 the Financial Services Board is not statutorily empowered 
to issue public statements to expose the perpetrators of market abuse under the Securities 
Services Act.632  Therefore, it is not very clear whether this name and shame approach may be 
used by the Financial Services Board in conjunction with another penalty for market abuse 
deterrence purposes under the Securities Services Act.633    
 
Detection and surveillance is another method employed by the enforcement authorities in 
South Africa to prevent market abuse practices.   Thus, like the position in the United 
Kingdom where market abuse surveillance is extended to all the prescribed financial 
markets,634 such surveillance is also usually restricted to the regulated financial markets in 
South Africa.   Moreover, as is the position with the Financial Services Authority,635 the 
Financial Services Board uses the investigation and information gathering method to identify 
and prevent all possible contravention of market abuse provisions by both individuals and 
companies in South Africa.636  In line with this, as has already been said,637 in most instances 
the Directorate of Market Abuse may, on behalf of the Financial Services Board, summon, 
interrogate or search and seize documents or material from any person or premises when it 
626   See Chapter VIII of the Securities Services Act; Chapter X of the Financial Markets Bill; Chapter X of 
the Financial Markets Bill 2012 & also see paragraphs 9 2 & 9 3 above.   
627    See analysis in paragraphs 7 4 & 7 5 1 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
628   See s 115(a) of the Securities Services Act; clause 115(a) of the Financial Markets Bill; clause 111(a) of 
the Financial Markets Bill 2012 & also see analysis in paragraph 4 4 5 in Chapter Four of this thesis.   
629   See paragraph 9 2 1 & 9 3 1 above. 
630  This could probably fail to deter and prevent all persons especially companies or other entities from 
wilfully indulging in market abuse activities.  S 115(a) of the Securities Services Act; clause 115(a) of the 
Financial Markets Bill & clause 111(a) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012 & also see analysis in 
paragraph 4 4 5 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
631    See related remarks in paragraph 7 4; 7 5 1 & 7 7 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
632    S 82. 
633   S 82.   It is generally believed that potential offenders might desist from committing market abuse 
offences if they are aware that their identity and illicit trading practices, if caught, will be made public.  
634   See generally paragraphs 7 5 3 & 7 6 2 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
635   See paragraphs 7 5 1 & 7 7 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
636   S 82 of the Securities Services Act; clause 91 of the Financial Markets Bill; clause 86 of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.  Also see paragraph 4 2 read with paragraph 3 2 1 in Chapters Four & Three of this 
thesis respectively.       
637   See further paragraphs 9 4 above; also see paragraphs 4 3 1 & 3 2 1 in Chapters Three & Four of this 
thesis.   
484 
                                                                                                                                                   
objectively believes that such material or documents are relevant to the market abuse matter 
under investigation.638 However, the Securities Services Act,639 the Financial Markets Bill 
and the Financial Markets Bill 2012640 do not expressly empower the Financial Services 
Board to appoint other additional competent persons apart from the members of the 
Directorate of Market Abuse to investigate the occurrence of market abuse activities in the 
South African financial markets.641 
 
Awareness and educational programmes have further been employed by the Financial 
Services Board in an attempt to prevent market abuse practices in the South African financial 
markets.  The Financial Services Board, for example, issues some quarterly informative 
market abuse booklets on its website to increase the general awareness among the market 
participants and all the relevant stakeholders.642 However, unlike the Financial Services 
Authority which was statutorily obliged to publish a detailed Code of Market Conduct,643 the 
Financial Services Board is not expressly and statutorily empowered to provide a similar code 
of market conduct to increase market abuse awareness and promote a good anti-market abuse 
corporate ethics culture in South Africa.644   
 
Lastly, like the Australian Securities and Investments Commission,645 and as earlier stated, 
the Financial Services Board employs the investigation and information gathering method to 
prevent market abuse activity in South Africa.646  However, it is not clear whether the 
Financial Services Board has measures in place to enable it to work closely with the South 
African Police Services when conducting its market abuse investigations.  Additionally, in 
contrast to the Australian Stock Exchange and the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission’s position,647 the Financial Services Board does not have statutory authority to 
638   S 83 read with s 84 of the Securities Services Act.  
639   S 82 & s 83 read with s 84 of the Securities Services Act. 
640   Clauses 91 & 92 read with clause 93 of the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 86 & 87 read with clause 88 
of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.      
641    See related analysis in paragraph 9 4 above. 
642    See similar discussions above & in paragraph 4 4 6 in Chapters Four of this thesis. 
643    See paragraphs 7 5 1 & 7 7 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
644   See Chapter VIII of the Securities Services Act; Chapter X of the Financial Markets Bill & Chapter X of 
the Financial Markets Bill 2012, which outlines market abuse offences in South Africa.   Also see the 
analysis in paragraph 9 4 above & paragraphs 4 4 6 & 4 4 7 in Chapter Four of this thesis. 
645    See paragraph 8 5 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
646   S 82 of the Securities Services Act; clause 91 of the Financial Markets Bill; clause 86 of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012 & also see paragraph 3 2 1 in Chapter Three of this thesis.   
647    See paragraphs 8 5 & 8 3 1 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
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declare any contravention of market abuse provisions in South Africa whenever such 
contravention occurs.648  In this regard, it is hoped that South Africa will follow the position 
in Australia649 and empower the Financial Services Board to declare any contravention of 
market abuse provisions in South Africa for deterrence purposes whenever such contravention 
occurs.650   
 
Market surveillance is also used to detect and prevent market abuse activity in South Africa.  
Nonetheless, unlike the position in Australia,651 the JSE (not the Financial Services Board) 
operates some computerised surveillance systems which detect suspected market abuse 
activities in relation to listed securities in South Africa.652  Additionally, the JSE Equities 
Rules do not impose a mandatory duty on the issuers of listed securities to notify either the 
Financial Services Board or the JSE of any detected or suspected market abuse violations.653  
Moreover, in contrast to the situation in Australia,654 the Securities Services Act, the Financial 
Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 do not expressly provide for a continuous 
disclosure requirement on the part of the issuers of listed securities.   In relation to this, it is 
hoped that South Africa will consider adopting the Australian approach655 and introduce both 
the structured (periodic) and continuous disclosure requirements to enable the JSE and/or the 
Financial Services Board to oblige all the listed public entities and directors of such entities to 
disclose their interests in securities of those entities promptly and consistently to prevent 
market abuse practices in South Africa.  Moreover, the Securities Services Act, the Financial 
Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 do not specifically provide for the Chinese 
walls and their use in preventing market abuse activities between the different departments of 
the companies.656  In relation to this, it is hoped that South Africa will consider adopting the 
648    S 82 of the Securities Services Act; clause 91 of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 86 of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012.  
649    See paragraphs 8 5 & 8 3 1 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
650   In relation to this, if the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 comes into force, 
the Financial Services Board could be merely allowed to publish the status and outcome of the market 
abuse investigations when the publication is in the public interest.   See clause 91(2)(e) of the Financial 
Markets Bill & clause 86(2)(e) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.   
651    See paragraphs 8 3 2; 8 3 1 & 8 5 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
652    See paragraph 3 2 5 in Chapter Three of this thesis; paragraph 9 4 above. 
653    See the JSE Equities Rule 8.10.7; also see Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 196-198. 
654    See paragraph 8 5 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
655    See paragraph 8 5 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
656   S 73; s 75; s 76 & s 77 of the Securities Services Act; clauses 82; 84; 85; 86 & 87 of the Financial 
Markets Bill & clauses 80; 82; 83 & 84 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.  
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Australian approach657 and enact adequate statutory provisions to deal with Chinese walls and 
private right of actions for the affected persons in order to reduce and/or discourage market 
abuse practices in South Africa.  Like the current position in Australia,658 and as highlighted 
earlier,659 some self-regulatory organisations are also involved in the enforcement of the 
market abuse prohibition in South Africa.660  However, both the South African and 
Australian661 market abuse regimes do not use bounty rewards to encourage more persons to 
provide both the Financial Services Board and the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission with the relevant information that can lead to the recovery of civil remedies from 
the market abuse offenders.  It is hoped that specific provisions for bounty rewards will be 
introduced in South Africa to prevent market abuse activities.  
 
9 11  Concluding Remarks 
 
It was noted that, unlike the multi-functional regulatory approach of the United States of 
America,662 South Africa mainly empowers the Financial Services Board to supervise and 
oversee the enforcement of its market abuse prohibition.663 Moreover, despite the fact that the 
Financial Services Board has to date managed to obtain some settlements in civil cases of 
market abuse,664 it falls short when comparing its anti-market abuse enforcement record with 
that of similar foreign regulatory bodies like the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission,665 the Financial Securities Authority666 and the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission.667 For example, unlike the Financial Services Board,668 the United 
States Securities and Exchange Commission has in a number of instances not rigidly imposed 
657    See paragraph 8 5 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
658    See paragraph 8 5 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
659    See further related remarks in paragraph 9 6 above. 
660    See paragraphs 3 2 2; 3 2 3; & 3 2 5 in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
661   For a further related analysis on the Australian position, see Austin “A Rapid Response to Questionable 
Trading–Moving Towards Better Enforcement of Australia’s Securities Laws” (2009) 13-14 
<http://www.clta.edu.au/professional/papers/conference2009/AustinCLTA09.pdf>  (accessed 28-04-
2010). 
662    See paragraphs 9 4; 9 6 & 9 10 above; also see paragraphs 5 4 3 & 5 5 2 in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
663    Also see paragraphs 3 2 1 & 4 2 in Chapters Three & Four of this thesis respectively.   
664    Paragraph 9 4 above. 
665   See paragraph 9 4 above; see further paragraph 5 4 1 in Chapter Five of this thesis & paragraphs 3 2 1 & 
4 2 in Chapters Three & Four of this thesis respectively.    
666    See paragraph 7 5 1 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
667    See paragraph 8 3 1 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
668    See paragraph 3 2 1 in Chapter Three of this thesis & paragraphs 4 2 & 4 3 1 in Chapter Four of this 
thesis.   
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its own civil monetary fines; other self-regulatory organisations under its supervision have 
further awarded their own penalties to discourage market abuse practices in the United States 
of America.669  On the contrary, in South Africa, it is not certain whether other self-regulatory 
organisations like the JSE may impose their own civil or administrative market abuse 
penalties, apart from those of the Financial Services Board.670 Put differently, it was noted 
that the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 
2012 do not expressly provide whether other self-regulatory organisations in South Africa are 
empowered like the Financial Services Board to impose their own penalties or to take any 
other appropriate action against the market abuse offenders in South Africa.671 Given this 
current status quo, as indicated above, it remains to be seen whether the Financial Services 
Board will be equally comparable to the Financial Services Authority, the United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission in relation to the investigation, detection, settlement and prosecution of market 
abuse offences in South Africa.672  Moreover, it was also acknowledged that the Securities 
Services Act does not expressly provide civil penalties and remedies for market manipulation 
offences.673  It was accordingly submitted that this omission on the part of the legislature 
could potentially weaken South Africa’s market abuse regime,674 compared to similar foreign 
legislation in countries like the United States of America.    It was also stated that this flaw 
could be addressed by the Financial Markets Bill as it now empowers the Financial Services 
Board to claim legal costs and civil compensatory penalties of up to three times the profit 
gained or loss avoided plus interest from the market manipulation offenders.675  In addition, it 
was noted that the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012 fall short when it comes to the statutory provision and policing of 
commodities-based market manipulation remedies in South Africa.676    
669    See paragraph 5 4 3 read with paragraph 5 5 2 in Chapter Five of this thesis; also see paragraph 9 4 above.   
670   Apparently, other regulatory bodies like the JSE and the Securities Regulation Panel are not statutorily 
and expressly empowered to impose their own penalties upon the market abuse offenders in South Africa.  
671   See Chapter VIII of the Securities Services Act, Chapter X of the Financial Markets Bill & Chapter X of 
the Financial Markets Bill 2012.    Also see paragraphs 9 4; 9 6 & 9 8 above. 
672   Generally see paragraphs 9 4; 9 6 & 9 8 above; also see related discussions in paragraphs 4 2 in Chapters 
Four of this thesis.    
673   S 75 & s 76; also see Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 192 & related remarks in paragraphs 9 3; 9 2 1 & 9 3 1 
above.   This suggests that persons who fall victim to market manipulation practices are left to find their 
own civil remedies.    Also see Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 36.   
674    See paragraph 9 3 1 above.   
675   See clause 87 of the Financial Markets Bill; no similar provision is made in the Financial Markets Bill 
2012 & related remarks in paragraphs 9 3; 9 2 1 & 9 3 1 above.         
676    See paragraph 9 3 1 above.   
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It was further noted that, in spite of the fact that the Financial Services Board like the United 
States Securities and Exchange Commission is a member of the International Organisation of 
Securities Commissions and has signed co-operative agreements with other regulators like the 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission to discourage cross-border market abuse 
practices, not even a single case involving such practices has been reported and/or settled with 
the Financial Services Board to date.677  Nevertheless, the Financial Services Board is still to 
fully utilise the support from other International Organisation of Securities Commissions 
Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding member regulators to combat cross-border 
market abuse activities.678 Put differently, unlike the position in the European Union,679 
minimal attention has been given to combat cross-border market abuse practices in South 
Africa.680  It was additionally noted that notwithstanding the fact that the Financial Services 
Board, like the Financial Securities Authority681 and the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission,682 has also concluded some Memoranda of Understanding with the 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission and the Financial Securities Authority, 
relatively little progress has been made by the Financial Services Board to fully utilise such 
Memoranda of Understanding to combat cross-border market abuse activities in South 
Africa.683  Moreover, it remains to be seen whether the South African self-regulatory 
organisations’ enforcement efforts will be fairly comparable to those of Australia,684 the 
United Kingdom685 and the United States of America,686 particularly in relation to the 
detection and prosecution of cross-border market abuse practices.687 It was also submitted that 
677   For example, during the period between March 2008 and June 2011 the Financial Services Board 
managed to give some undisclosed assistance to other foreign regulators only in four cases involving the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission; the Belgium Banking, Finance and Insurance 
Commission; the Jersey Financial Services Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission, generally see related comments and analysis on the Directorate of Market Abuse’s past 
investigations by the Financial Services Board (28-06-2011) 
<http://www.fsb.co.za/ftp://ftp.fsb.co.za/public/documents/AReport2011.pdf> (accessed 22-11-2011); 
also see paragraphs 9 4; 9 6 & 9 9 above. 
678    See paragraphs 9 4; 9 6 & 9 9 above; also see related comments in paragraphs 4 2 & 4 3 3 Chapters Four 
of this thesis.   
679    Generally see paragraph 6 4 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
680    See further related discussions in paragraphs also see paragraphs 9 4; 9 6 & 9 9 above; also see 
paragraphs 3 2 7 & 4 3 3 in Chapters Three & Four of this thesis respectively.    
681    See paragraphs 7 5 1 & 7 6 3 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
682    See paragraphs 8 3 1 & 8 4 3 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
683   See related remarks in paragraphs 9 4 to 9 10 above; also see related comments in paragraphs 4 2 & 4 3 3 
Chapters Four of this thesis.    
684    See paragraph 8 4 2 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
685    See paragraph 7 6 2 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
686    See paragraph 5 5 2 in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
687    See paragraphs 9 6 & 9 8 above. 
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while the reasons for the lack of reported successful cases of cross-border market abuse 
prosecutions and settlements remain unclear, one can conclude that this might have been 
caused by the unavailability of sufficient resources and the adoption of inadequate 
preventative measures on the part of the Financial Services Board, as a national regulator, to 
monitor and enforce the market abuse prohibition, both at a local and international level.688   
It was further submitted that the absence of the Financial Services Board’s own market abuse 
surveillance systems could have aggravated the paucity of successful cases of cross-border 
market abuse prosecutions and settlements in South Africa.689  Moreover, it was 
acknowledged that, like the Department of Justice in the United States of America,690 the 
Director of Public Prosecutions is responsible for the criminal prosecution of market abuse 
cases in South Africa.691  It was further noted that, unlike the Department of Justice in the 
United States of America,692 the Director of Public Prosecutions has not been able to obtain 
more convictions in matters involving market abuse in South Africa to date.693   In relation to 
this, it was stated that some market abuse cases have either been abandoned or withdrawn.694  
Moreover, it was also indicated that although it may be prima facie presumed that the 
Financial Services Board supports the Director of Public Prosecutions and the relevant courts 
with the necessary information regarding ongoing market abuse cases in South Africa, it is 
not clear whether the Financial Services Board is statutorily mandated to assign certain 
persons with the relevant expertise to assist the courts in their prosecution of such cases.695    
  
Additionally, it was highlighted that the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill 
and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 do not have specific provisions which give private rights 
of action (class actions) to all the prejudiced persons to increase deterrence and to afford such 
persons the opportunity to claim their own compensatory damages straight from the market 
688    Paragraphs 4 2; 4 3 1; 4 3 3; 4 3 4; & 4 5 in Chapter Four of this thesis; also see further discussions in 
paragraph 3 2 7 in Chapter Three of this thesis.    
689    See paragraphs 9 4; 9 6; 9 8 & 9 10 above; see further discussions in paragraphs 3 2 1; 3 2 5 & 3 2 7 in 
Chapter Three of this thesis & also see related remarks in paragraph 4 2 in Chapter Four of this thesis. 
690    Paragraphs 5 4 2 & 5 5 1 in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
691    Paragraphs 9 5 & 9 7 above; paragraph 3 2 6 in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
692    Paragraphs 5 4 2 & 5 5 1 in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
693    See paragraphs 9 5 & 9 7 above; also see 3 2 6 & 4 2 in Chapters Three & Four of this thesis. 
694    See paragraphs 9 5 & 9 7 above; also see 3 2 6 & 4 2 in Chapters Three & Four of this thesis.  
695    See related remarks in paragraphs 9 5 & 9 7 above& also generally see paragraph 3 2 6 in Chapter Three 
of this thesis.     
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abuse offenders.696  This could also suggest that, unlike the position in the United 
Kingdom,697 all the persons who are prejudiced by market abuse activities are not statutorily 
given the opportunity to independently claim their compensatory damages directly from the 
perpetrators of such activities in South Africa.698  Put differently, it was noted that only the 
Financial Services Board is statutorily empowered to bring a civil action on behalf of all the 
persons affected by market abuse practices in terms of the Securities Services Act,699 the 
Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012.700 It was further stated that this 
approach has, in a way, contributed to the scanty and inconsistent enforcement of the market 
abuse prohibition in South Africa.701  Moreover, unlike the position in Australia,702 this 
approach could have been worsened by the absence of a mandatory duty of continuous 
disclosure on the part of the issuers of listed securities to prevent the market abuse offences in 
South Africa.703   
 
It was noted that, as is the case with the current European Union market abuse regime,704 a 
number of regulatory and enforcement measures have also been employed to curb market 
abuse in South Africa.705  For example, the Securities Services Act was introduced in 2005 to 
improve, among other things, the regulation of market abuse in South Africa.706  Furthermore, 
the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012707 were recently introduced in 
a bid to inter alia improve and remedy some of the flaws that are contained in the Securities 
Services Act, especially with regard to the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in 
South Africa.   In addition, it was noted that a number of regulatory authorities such as the 
696   Paragraphs 9 2 1; 9 3 1 & 9 10 above; see further s 73; s 75; s 76; s 77 read with s 78 & s 82 of the 
Securities Services Act; also see clauses 82; 84; 85; 86; 87 read with clauses 88 & 91 of the Financial 
Markets Bill & clauses 80; 82; 83 & 84 read with clause 86 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.       
697    See paragraphs 7 4 & 7 7 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
698    See related comments in paragraphs 9 2 1; 9 3 1 & 9 10 above. 
699    S 82 of the Securities Services Act. 
700   See clause 91 of the Financial Markets Bill; clause 86 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012 & also see 
related comments in paragraphs 9 2 1; 9 3 1 & 9 10 above. 
701    See related comments in paragraphs 9 2 1; 9 3 1 & 9 10 above.   
702    See paragraphs 8 3 1; 8 2 7 4 2 & 8 5 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
703    See paragraph 9 10 above. 
704    See paragraphs 6 4 1 to 6 4 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
705    See related remarks in paragraphs 9 4 to 9 10 above. 
706   The Securities Services Act was assented to on 18 January 2005 and it introduced Chapter VIII which 
deals specifically with the regulation of market abuse in South Africa.  See further details in s 72 to s 87 
of the Securities Services Act.  
707   See the relevant clauses under Chapter X entitled Market Abuse in the Financial Markets Bill & relevant 
clauses under Chapter X entitled Market Abuse in the Financial Markets Bill 2012.  
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Financial Services Board, the Directorate of Market Abuse, the Enforcement Committee, the 
Board of Appeal, the JSE, and the competent courts have to date been fairly involved in the 
enforcement of the market abuse provisions in South Africa.708  Furthermore, it was noted 
that, unlike the position in the European Union,709 the Securities Services Act, the Financial 
Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 do not expressly provide any provisions that 
require issuers or their agents to draw up and update their employee or insider’s lists and/or 
such issuers, managers or directors of juristic persons to immediately report (mandatory duty 
of disclosure) any suspicious transactions to the relevant authorities in South Africa.710  It was 
additionally noted that, in contrast to the EU Market Abuse Directive and the subsequent 
Market Abuse Regulation Proposal,711 the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill 
and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 do not seem to expressly provide whether the Financial 
Services Board or other relevant regulatory authorities have the authority to access telephone 
and existing data traffic records from companies, issuers of securities and other suspected 
market abuse offenders in order to track down and meritoriously discourage the commission 
of market abuse offences in South Africa.712  In this regard, it is acknowledged that adopting 
the approach employed in the EU Market Abuse Directive or the subsequent Market Abuse 
Regulation Proposal713 could assist the regulatory authorities in South Africa to curb the 
occurrence of market abuse activities in both the regulated and unregulated financial markets 
as much as possible.  Unlike the position in the European Union,714 it was noted that in South 
Africa it is not provided whether the issuers of securities are statutorily allowed to delay or 
defer the publication of inside information, especially where such delay could be reasonable 
and justifiable.715 In relation to this, it is acknowledged that the provisions of the Market 
Abuse Regulation Proposal that deal with the definition of inside information, market 
manipulation and the dissemination of inside information716 could become so handy in the 
708    See related remarks in paragraphs 9 4 to 9 10 above. 
709    See paragraph 6 4 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
710   See the relevant provisions under Chapter VIII of the Securities Services Act, relevant provisions under 
Chapter X of the Financial Markets Bill & relevant provisions under Chapter X of the Financial Markets 
Bill 2012 & also see paragraphs 9 2; 9 3 & 9 10 above.      
711    See paragraph 6 4 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
712   See relevant provisions under Chapter VIII of the Securities Services Act; relevant provisions under 
Chapter X  of the Financial Markets Bill; relevant provisions under Chapter X of the Financial Markets 
Bill 2012 & also see paragraphs 9 2; 9 3 & 9 10 above.      
713    See paragraph 6 4 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
714    See paragraphs 6 4 5 & 6 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis.  
715   S 72 to s 87 of the Securities Services Act; clauses 81 to 95 of the Financial Markets Bill & clauses 79 to 
90 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.    
716    See paragraph 6 4 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
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enforcement of the market abuse ban in South Africa.  Moreover, it was indicated that in 
contrast to the situation in the European Union,717 no provision is expressly made under the 
Securities Services Act for the Financial Services Board to co-operate with similar bodies in 
South Africa and/or other jurisdictions.718 It was additionally noted that although the 
Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets 2012 now stipulates that the Financial 
Services Board may assist foreign regulators with investigations pertaining to any cross-
border market abuse cases,719 it remains unclear whether the Financial Services Board is 
statutorily obligated to co-operate with other local enforcement bodies,720 for the purposes of 
enhancing and/or increasing the curbing of market abuse activities in South Africa.721  It was 
also indicated that, unlike the Securities Services Act722 the Financial Markets Bill and the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012,723 the EU Market Abuse Directive does not specifically provide 
the amount of remedies or penalties which may be imposed against the market abuse 
offenders.724  It was also acknowledged that this failure on the part of the EU Market Abuse 
Directive725 to provide common market abuse penalties that are applicable across the 
European Union member states has weakened and contributed to the inconsistent 
implementation of its provisions.726  It was further noted that this flaw is repeated in the 
Criminal Sanctions Market Abuse Directive Proposal727 while, on the other hand, the Market 
Abuse Regulation Proposal now provides specific civil or administrative pecuniary sanctions 
for market abuse.728  
 
717   Article 16 of the EU Market Abuse Directive; see further article 19 read with articles 16 to 18 & 20 of the 
Market Abuse Regulation Proposal & also see paragraph 6 4 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
718   See the relevant provisions under Chapter VIII of the Securities Services Act; also see paragraphs 9 2; 9 3 
& 9 10 above.      
719   Clause 91(2)(b) of the Financial Markets Bill; clause 86(2)(b) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012 & also 
see related remarks in paragraph 3 2 1 in Chapter Three of this thesis.   
720   See the relevant provisions in Chapter X of the Financial Markets Bill & the relevant provisions in 
Chapter X of the Financial Markets Bill 2012    
721    Also see paragraphs 9 2; 9 3; 9 6; 9 7 & 9 8 & 9 10 above. 
722    S 115(a). 
723    Clause 115(a) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 111(a) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.  
724   Article 14 of the EU Market Abuse Directive.   Nevertheless, regulatory bodies in the EU member states 
are allowed to determine and disclose the sanctions imposed on the market abuse offenders, see article 
14(4) of the EU Market Abuse Directive.   See paragraphs 9 2 1 & 9 3 1 above; also paragraphs 2 5 4 & 4 
4 5 in Chapters Two & Four of this thesis respectively.    
725    See paragraph 6 4 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
726   See paragraphs 9 2 1 & 9 3 1 above; also paragraphs 2 5 4 & 4 4 5 in Chapters Two & Four of this thesis 
respectively.      
727    Articles 6 & 8; also see paragraph 6 4 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
728   Article 26(1)(k); (l) & (m) of the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal; also see paragraph 6 4 5 in Chapter 
Six of this thesis & paragraph 9 3 1 above.     
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Moreover, it was stated that the United Kingdom’s market abuse single regulator model is not 
employed in South Africa.729  In relation to this, it was accordingly noted that although other 
self-regulatory organisations like the JSE, the Directorate of Market Abuse, the Securities 
Regulation Panel and the Enforcement Committee are also involved in the enforcement of 
securities and market abuse laws as indicated earlier,730 only the Financial Services Board 
may make market abuse rules as well as other appropriate guidelines that govern the 
investigation of market abuse activities by such self-regulatory organisations and/or other 
relevant enforcement authorities in South Africa.731 It was also indicated that, unlike the 
Financial Services Authority,732 the Financial Services Board cannot impose unlimited 
financial penalties in matters involving criminal cases relating to market abuse in South 
Africa.733 Such unlimited penalties may only be imposed by the Enforcement Committee in 
respect of administrative cases for market abuse.734  Moreover, it was noted that the Financial 
Services Board is not expressly and statutorily authorised to impose separate and/or different 
penalties on individuals and companies that engage in market abuse activities.735 It was 
additionally noted that, unlike the position in Australia,736 the United Kingdom737 and the 
United States of America,738 the Financial Services Board does not publicise the names of the 
culprits who commit market abuse offences (name and shame approach) in South Africa.    In 
line with this, it is hoped that these flaws will be corrected by the Financial Markets Bill 
and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 in order to improve the enforcement of the market 
abuse prohibition in South Africa.739  Furthermore, in contrast to the courts in the United 
Kingdom,740 Australia741 and the United States of America,742 the South African courts are 
729    See paragraphs 9 4 & 9 6 above. 
730    See paragraphs 9 4 to 9 10 above. 
731   Generally see paragraphs 9 4 to 9 10 above; also see paragraphs 3 2 1 & 4 2 in Chapters Three & Four of 
this thesis respectively.   
732    Generally see paragraphs 7 5 1; 7 4 & 7 7in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
733    Generally see paragraphs 9 2 1; 9 3 1; 9 4 & 9 10 above. 
734    Generally see paragraphs 9 2 1; 9 3 1; 9 4 & 9 10 above. 
735    Generally see related comments in paragraphs 9 2 1; 9 3 1 & 9 10 above. 
736    See paragraphs 8 3 1 & 8 5 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
737    Generally see paragraphs 7 5 1; 7 5 3; 7 6 2 & 7 8 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
738    See related comments in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
739    Generally see related comments in paragraphs 9 2 1; 9 3 1 & 9 10 above. 
740    See paragraphs 7 5 2 & 7 6 1 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
741    See paragraphs 8 3 4 & 8 4 1 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
742    See paragraphs 5 4 2 & 5 5 1 in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
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still to obtain more settlements and convictions in market abuse cases.743  For example, there 
is no single insider trading case that has been successfully prosecuted in the South African 
courts to date.744  Moreover, relatively few cases of market manipulation have either been 
settled or prosecuted by our courts to date.745  Moreover, it was noted that in contrast to the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission,746 the Financial Services Board has no 
statutory authority to make a declaration of a market abuse contravention whenever such 
contravention occurs in South Africa or elsewhere.747     
 
In view of the analysis above and notwithstanding the fact that a detailed analysis of the 
recommendations will be conducted in the last chapter, it is submitted that the following six 
recommendations could play a key role in the enforcement of the market abuse ban in South 
Africa: 
 
Firstly, it is submitted that the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be reviewed to provide adequate special or 
complementary definitions of inside information in relation to derivatives on commodities 
and/or to the persons (professional intermediaries) involved in the execution of orders relating 
to listed securities or other related derivative financial instruments. It is submitted that this 
could prevent the commission of front running or other market abuse activities pertaining to 
commodities derivatives by some unscrupulous financial brokers and/or other related market 
participants in South Africa;   
 
Secondly, it is submitted that the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or 
the Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be reviewed to enact provisions that expressly prohibit 
natural persons (agents or corporate insiders) who participate in the execution of transactions 
on behalf of a primary insider who is a legal or juristic person, from committing market abuse 
practices and other related organised crime activities in the South African financial markets; 
743    See related remarks in paragraphs 9 5 & 9 7 above & also generally see paragraph 3 2 6 in Chapter Three 
of this thesis.     
744    See related remarks in paragraphs 9 5 & 9 7 above & also generally see paragraph 3 2 6 in Chapter Three 
of this thesis.     
745    See related remarks in paragraphs 9 5 & 9 7 above & also generally see paragraph 3 2 6 in Chapter Three 
of this thesis.     
746   See paragraph 8 3 1 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
747   S 82 of the Securities Services Act; clause 91 of the Financial Markets Bill; clause 86 of the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012 & also see generally paragraphs 9 2 1; 9 3 1; 9 4; 9 6; 9 8 & 9 10 above.    
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Thirdly, the definition of an insider which is provided in the Securities Services Act, the 
Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be amended in order to 
expressly acknowledge that a company (legal person) which repurchases its own shares would 
be an insider to itself.  It is submitted that this will protect shareholders of a company against 
such company taking advantage of the non-public price-sensitive information to repurchase 
their shares at a lower price than what the company would have paid if the information had 
been made public; 
 
Fourthly, the relevant courts in South Africa should be expressly and statutorily empowered 
to impose other additional penalties (apart from those stipulated in the Securities Services 
Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012) upon the market 
offenders without the fear of violating the autrefois acquit or autrefois convict doctrine; 
 
Fifthly, the Financial Services Board should consider employing infringement notices and 
enforceable undertakings to discourage market abuse activities in South Africa; and 
 
Lastly, South Africa should consider adopting and implementing the relevant principles of the 
United Kingdom’s single regulator model because it is economical and less complex.   This 
could increase the number of settlements and convictions in market abuse cases in South 
Africa. 
 
Now that the overall comparative analysis of the enforcement of the market abuse ban in the 
European Union, the United Kingdom, Australia, South Africa and the United States of 
America has been undertaken, the next chapter will focus on the overall conclusions and 
recommendations. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
10 1  Introduction   
 
As indicated in the previous chapter, this chapter focuses on the overall conclusions and 
recommendations.  Put differently, this chapter will provide conclusions and 
recommendations on the enforcement of the market abuse ban in the European Union, the 
United Kingdom, Australia, the United States of America and South Africa.   This will be 
done by firstly, providing the general observations regarding the enforcement of the market 
abuse ban in the European Union, the United Kingdom, Australia, the United States of 
America and South Africa.   Secondly, the overall conclusions on the enforcement of the 
market abuse prohibition in each of these jurisdictions will be discussed.   Lastly, overall 
recommendations from the European Union, the United Kingdom, Australia and the United 
States of America will be discussed in a bid to inter alia provide a new policy framework 
and/or propose provisions that will enhance the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition 
in South Africa.  It is hoped that the recommendations in this chapter will help the legislature 
and other relevant stakeholders to revamp the current market abuse laws in order to develop 
an adequate and robust enforcement framework that consistently and effectively combats 
market abuse activities in the South African financial markets.    
 
10 2  General Observations     
 
The prohibition on market abuse in South Africa was introduced in the early 1970s in a bid to 
restore public investor confidence in the financial markets.1 This prohibition was later 
consolidated in the Securities Services Act.2   While this attempt on the part of the legislature 
to improve the regulation and enforcement of the market abuse prohibition by repealing and 
replacing all the previous statutes which dealt with such prohibition by the Securities Services 
Act was commendable, it was observed that previous flaws were repeated3 and new ones were 
1       See Chapters Two & Three of this thesis. 
2       36 of 2004, hereinafter referred to as the Securities Services Act. 
3      Luiz “Prohibition Against Trading on Inside Information – The Saga Continues” 1990 SA Merc LJ 328 
328; Botha “Control of Insider Trading in South Africa: A Comparative Analysis” 1991 SA Merc LJ 1 1; 
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additionally introduced, particularly in relation to the enforcement of the insider trading ban.4   
In relation to this, it was further observed that the same status quo is retained in the Financial 
Markets Bill5 and the Financial Markets Bill 2012.6  It was observed, as evidenced in the 
previous chapters,7 that the legislature’s good intentions with the adoption of the Securities 
Services Act and the drafting of the Financial Markets Bill and/or the subsequent provisions 
of the Financial Markets Bill 2012 are still to be reflected in an increase of market abuse 
prosecutions and settlements in South Africa.  Notably, unlike the equivalent provisions in the 
United States of America,8 the United Kingdom,9 the European Union10 and Australia,11 the 
Securities Services Act has very few defences that relate to market manipulation.12  It was 
further noted that the Securities Services Act omitted to provide a statutory derivative civil 
remedy for market manipulation in South Africa.13  It was also observed that although the 
Securities Services Act brought fairly higher penalties for market abuse, it failed to provide 
separate and distinct penalties for companies (entities) and individuals in order to deter all the 
relevant persons from committing market abuse offences.14  It was further observed that this 
flaw was repeated in the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012.15  
Additionally, it was observed that, unlike the position in other jurisdictions like the United 
States of America,16 the United Kingdom,17 the European Union18 and Australia,19 South 
Jooste “The Regulation of Insider Trading in South Africa – Another Attempt” 2000 SALJ 284 284-305 
& Osode “The New South African Insider Trading Act: Sound Law Reform or Legislative Overkill?” 
2000 Journal of African Law 239  248.  
4      Jooste “A Critique of the Insider Trading Provisions of the 2004 Securities Services Act” 2006 SALJ 437; 
also see related discussions in Chapters Two; Three & Four of this thesis.   
5       [B-2011], hereinafter referred to as the Financial Markets Bill.   
6      [B12-2012], hereinafter referred to as the Financial Markets Bill 2012, (I have employed the term 
“clause” to refer to the provisions of both the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 
because at the time of writing this Chapter & thesis, the aforementioned Bills were not yet effectively 
passed into law).   Also see related discussion in Chapters Two; Three & Four of this thesis.   
7      See related analysis in Chapters One, Two, Three & Four of this thesis. 
8      See related analysis in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
9      See related analysis in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
10     See related analysis in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
11     See related analysis in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
12    Cassim “An Analysis of Market Manipulation under the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004 (part 2)” 2008 
SA Merc LJ 177 191; 198-199; also see discussions in Chapters Two; Three & Four of this thesis.  
13     See discussions in Chapters Two; Three; Four & Nine of this thesis.   
14       See discussions in Chapters Two; Three & Four of this thesis.   
15       See discussions in Chapters Two; Three & Four of this thesis.   
16       See related analysis in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
17       See related analysis in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
18       See related analysis in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
19       See related analysis in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
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Africa does not seem to have an express statutory prohibition on Internet-based market abuse 
practices.20  
 
It was acknowledged that both the United States of America21 and the South African22 market 
abuse regimes have similar regulatory and enforcement goals and missions.   In spite of this, 
they adopt and implement very different approaches to achieve their enforcement goals or 
targets.23   For instance, it was observed that the United States of America, unlike South 
Africa, employs a multi-functional regulatory approach which allows more positive 
competition among the regulatory bodies in order to give rise to a much better and consistent 
enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in its financial markets.   It was also noted that 
although the South African market abuse legislation24 was relatively influenced by the 
corresponding legislation in the United States of America,25 it appears to lack a more practical 
enforcement approach to combat market manipulation activities in South Africa.26   
 
Moreover, it was observed that, unlike South Africa, the United Kingdom employs the so-
called single regulator model to combat market abuse activities in all its relevant financial 
markets.27   It was additionally noted that although South Africa has adopted some of the 
enforcement methods that are employed in the United Kingdom,28 more may still need to be 
done to prevent and curb market abuse practices in the South African financial markets.29 
 
It was observed that, unlike the position in South Africa,30 the European Union Directive on 
Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation31  has devised useful definitions of some key 
20       See discussions in Chapters Two; Three; Four & Nine of this thesis.   
21       See Chapter Five of this thesis. 
22       See discussions in Chapters Two; Three; Four & Nine of this thesis. 
23       See discussions in Chapters Two; Three; Four & Nine read with Chapter Five of this thesis. 
24       This is mainly true especially in relation to the insider trading prohibition. 
25       See related analysis in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
26       See the relevant discussions in Chapters Two; Three; Four & Nine of this thesis. 
27       See related remarks in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
28    See Chapter Seven of this thesis; also see Armour “Enforcement Strategies in UK Corporate Governance: 
A Roadmap and Empirical Assessment” in Armour and Payne (eds) Rationality in Company Law Essays 
in Honour of DD Prentice (2009) 71-119.      
29     See discussions in Chapters Two; Three; Four & Nine of this thesis. 
30     See discussions in Chapters Two; Three; Four & Nine of this thesis.   
31    See the Directive of the European Parliament and Council of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and 
market manipulation (market abuse) 2003/6/EC [2003] OJ L96/16 (hereinafter referred to as the EU 
Market Abuse Directive). 
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market abuse terms like “accepted market practices”, “regulated market”, “financial 
instruments”, “inside information” and “market manipulation” in order to enable all the 
European Union member states to implement its market abuse prohibition.32   In spite of this, 
it was noted that the EU Market Abuse Directive had some flaws especially with regard to, 
inter alia, (a) the mandatory duty for issuers and/or their agents to promptly disclose inside 
information, (b) issuers’ insider lists, (c) reporting of suspicious transactions and (d) the 
absence of specific common market abuse penalties applicable across all the European Union 
member states.33  
 
Furthermore, it was noted that the current Australian market abuse prohibition is broadly 
aimed at promoting, (a) equal access to the relevant non-public price-sensitive information, 
(b) market efficiency, (c) market fairness, (d) market integrity and (e) public investor 
confidence.34   It was also noted that, unlike in South Africa,35 the Australian market abuse 
regime contains both the structured and continuous mandatory disclosure requirements for the 
affected persons and/or issuers of securities to ensure that all the market participants have 
equal access to price-sensitive inside information relating to such securities.36  Furthermore, it 
was acknowledged that the Australian market abuse regime has devised several preventative 
polices, measures and procedures to identify and combat market abuse practices in its relevant 
financial markets.  
 
10 3  Conclusions     
 
In this thesis, it was concluded that the flaws, disparities and inconsistencies in the 
enforcement of the market abuse provisions is the core reason for this research, the rationale 
being to enhance co-operation between the enforcement authorities, promote market 
efficiency, market integrity and/or public investor confidence and to increase education and 
awareness thereof by adopting a robust anti-market abuse enforcement ethics culture in the 
South African financial markets.37 
 
32     See Chapter Six of this thesis. 
33     See Chapter Six of this thesis. 
34     See paragraph 8 6 in Chapter Eight of this thesis & related remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis.  
35     See discussions in Chapters Two; Three; Four & Nine of this thesis. 
36      See related analysis in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
37      See similar remarks in Chapter One of this thesis. 
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This thesis also dealt with the historical regulation of market abuse in South Africa.  In this 
regard, as discussed in Chapter Two,38 it was concluded that the various market abuse laws 
enacted in South Africa were mainly aimed at improving the regulation of market 
manipulation and insider trading to inter alia restore public investor confidence in our 
financial markets.   It was further concluded that numerous amendments and changes to the 
market abuse legislation were introduced from time to time in a bid to improve the regulation 
of market abuse practices in South Africa.39   Nevertheless, in relation to this, it was 
concluded that both the Stock Exchanges Control Act40 and the Financial Markets Control 
Act41 had little success in combating market manipulation in South Africa.42  It was also 
concluded that the pioneering provisions in the Companies Act43 (including all its 
amendments) were not only inconsistent for the purposes of combating insider trading, but 
were also not properly enforced.44   It was additionally concluded that the enforcement 
(approaches) methods adopted under the Companies Act as amended were few and only 
restricted to criminal sanctions, and other methods such as whistle-blowing, bounty rewards 
and administrative sanctions were not considered.45 The Insider Trading Act46 was eventually 
enacted and welcomed as another attempt to enhance the enforcement of insider trading in 
South Africa.47 Not giving less regard to some key factors like the challenges involving the 
availability of adequate financial resources, it was concluded that the Insider Trading Act, like 
its predecessors, also failed to expressly provide for other alternative practical enforcement 
methods like administrative sanctions, whistle-blowing, private rights of action, the 
establishment of additional self-regulatory organs and specific insider trading courts or 
tribunals to complement the enforcement efforts of the Financial Services Board.48 As a 
result, the Securities Services Act was later introduced and it brought more elaborate civil 
remedies, new criminal penalties, administrative sanctions and additional regulatory bodies 
such as the Enforcement Committee, the Board of Appeal and the Directorate of Market 
38      See the discussions under paragraphs 2 2; 2 3; 2 4; 2 5 & 2 6 in Chapter Two of this thesis. 
39      See the discussions under paragraph 2 6 in Chapter Two of this thesis. 
40      1 of 1985, hereinafter referred to as the Stock Exchanges Control Act. 
41      55 of 1989, hereinafter referred to as the Financial Markets Control Act. 
42      See paragraph 2 2 3 in Chapter Two of this thesis. 
43      61 of 1973, hereinafter referred to as the Companies Act. 
44      See the discussions in paragraphs 2 3 1 1; 2 3 2 1 & 2 3 3 1 in Chapter Two of this thesis. 
45      See paragraph 2 3 5 in Chapter Two of this thesis.   
46      135 of 1998; hereinafter referred to as the Insider Trading Act.   
47      See paragraph 2 3 5 in Chapter Two of this thesis.     
48      See paragraph 2 3 5 in Chapter Two of this thesis.     
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Abuse in a bid to enhance regulation and enforcement of the market abuse ban in South 
Africa.49 It was nonetheless concluded that the concept of market abuse is not statutorily and 
expressly defined in the Securities Services Act.50  In light of this, it was suggested and 
concluded that enacting a statutory provision for a definition of the concept of market abuse 
involving all the types and/or elements of this offence (how it is committed), as well as 
adequate presumptions could improve the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in 
South Africa.51 It was also concluded that instances where a “market corner” could have been 
formed in respect of, and/or influenced by the securities traded in the over the counter markets 
were not expressly outlawed under the Securities Services Act.52 The same flaw is retained in 
the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012.53  It was further concluded 
that the application of the market abuse prohibition under the Securities Services Act is not 
limited to situations where there is a territorial link between the actual commission of market 
abuse offences and South Africa.54   The same status quo is retained under the Financial 
Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012.55  In light of this, it was suggested and 
concluded that the prohibition on market abuse should apply to transactions on foreign 
markets where a territorial link is present by virtue, either of the fact that the offender is at the 
time physically present in South Africa, or was acting through an intermediary who is in 
South Africa, or by virtue of the prohibited conduct occurring in South Africa.56   In addition, 
it was also indicated and concluded that the Securities Services Act has inconsistently 
prohibited three major forms of market abuse, namely insider trading, trade-based market 
manipulation and the disclosure-based market manipulation relating to listed securities in 
South Africa.57 Moreover, it was submitted and concluded that the fact that prejudiced 
persons who prove their claims as provided for in the Securities Services Act, the Financial 
Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 will only get their compensation after the 
Financial Services Board has recouped its costs and expenses in relation to a successful 
49      See the discussions under paragraphs 2 4 & 2 5 in Chapter Two of this thesis. 
50      See paragraph 2 4 1 1 in Chapter Two of this thesis.     
51      See paragraph 2 4 1 1 in Chapter Two of this thesis.     
52      See paragraph 2 4 1 2 in Chapter Two of this thesis.     
53      See paragraph 2 4 1 2 in Chapter Two of this thesis.     
54     See paragraph 2 4 1 3 in Chapter Two of this thesis.     
55     See paragraph 2 4 1 3 in Chapter Two of this thesis.     
56     See paragraph 2 4 1 3 in Chapter Two of this thesis.     
57     See paragraphs 2 5 1; 2 5 2; 2 5 2 1; 2 5 2 2 & 2 5 3 in Chapter Two of this thesis.     
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litigation may, if not properly executed, give rise to bureaucracy and unnecessary delays 
before the affected persons receive their compensation.58      
 
Furthermore, an overview of the role-players in the enforcement of market abuse provisions 
in South Africa was provided in Chapter Three.    In relation to this, it was inter alia 
concluded that the enforcement framework established under the Securities Services Act can 
be welcomed as a better move towards improving the enforcement of the market abuse 
provisions in South Africa and the eradication of a general belief that market abuse practices 
might be still rife in our financial markets.59 For example, it was concluded that in an attempt 
to establish a good enforcement framework, more elaborate definitions, civil remedies and 
new criminal penalties were introduced under the Securities Services Act.60 Likewise, it was 
concluded that the Directorate of Market Abuse was established as an investigatory arm of the 
Financial Services Board, while the Enforcement Committee was empowered to hear cases of 
market abuse and to impose unlimited administrative sanctions against anyone who violates 
the market abuse provisions in South Africa.61  It was further concluded that the Board of 
Appeal was also given the mandate to hear appeal matters by persons aggrieved by any 
decision of the Enforcement Committee, claims officer of the Financial Services Board or the 
Registrar of Securities Services.62  With regard to the detection, prevention and investigation 
of market abuse activities, it was concluded that the Financial Services Board depends mainly 
on the JSE’s Surveillance Division.63  Irrespective of this, it was noted and concluded that 
various shortcomings are still found in the enforcement of the market abuse provisions in 
South Africa.64  Notably, the criminal penalties imposed against market abuse offenders are 
still very little for deterrence purposes.65  The same deficiency is still contained in the 
Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012.66  Furthermore, it was concluded 
that the establishment of additional structures such as the Enforcement Committee to hear 
market abuse cases on a referral basis and the introduction of administrative sanctions have 
58     See paragraph 2 5 4 in Chapter Two of this thesis.     
59     Generally see the analysis in sub-paragraphs under paragraph 2 2 in Chapter Two of this thesis & 
paragraph 3 3 in Chapter Three of this thesis.    
60      See the analysis in paragraphs 2 4 1 1; 2 4 1 2; 2 4 1 3 & 2 5 4 in Chapter Two of this thesis. 
61      See paragraph 3 3 in Chapter Three of this thesis.    
62      See paragraph 3 3 in Chapter Three of this thesis.    
63      See paragraph 3 3 in Chapter Three of this thesis.    
64      See the analysis in paragraphs 3 2 7 & 3 3 in Chapter Three of this thesis.   
65      S 115(a) of the Securities Services Act. 
66      Clause 115(a) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 111(a) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012. 
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not been able to encourage all persons to comply with the market abuse prohibition in South 
Africa.67  In relation to this, it was stated and concluded that the aforesaid referral procedure 
might have weakened the enforcement functions of the Enforcement Committee and could, if 
not properly managed, continue to have the effect of restricting or impeding the 
implementation of the administrative sanctions for market abuse in South Africa.68  It was 
also indicated and concluded that the Directorate of Market Abuse does not have the power of 
its own to make market abuse rules and this could be negatively affecting the execution of its 
duties.69 In relation to this, it was suggested and concluded that the Directorate of Market 
Abuse (which is a committee of the Financial Services Board) should be allowed to execute 
its duties without prior confirmation from the Financial Services Board in order to curb 
potential bureaucracy.70 It was also suggested and concluded that both the Directorate of 
Market Abuse and the Financial Services Board should have their own surveillance systems 
in place to detect, investigate and prevent the occurrence of market abuse practices in the 
South African financial markets.71  In relation to this, it was additionally noted and concluded 
that the failure of the Financial Services Board to have its own surveillance equipment that 
timeously detects any suspected market abuse practices and/or provides the details of the 
beneficial owners of securities held in nominee accounts in South Africa or elsewhere could 
be negatively affecting its efforts to combat cross-border market abuse practices.72  Moreover, 
it was noted and concluded that, in civil proceedings, the right to claim compensation is 
exclusively given to the Financial Services Board and no provision is made for the prejudiced 
persons to claim such compensation directly (a private right of action) from the perpetrators 
of market abuse.73 It was further concluded that this could be too rigid and bureaucratic and 
may, if not carefully enforced, lead to the failure, on the part of the Financial Services Board, 
to compensate all the affected persons speedily.74 It was also noted and concluded that the 
same weakness is replicated in the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 
67      See the analysis in paragraphs 3 2 3; 3 2 7 & 3 3 in Chapter Three of this thesis.    
68      See the analysis in paragraphs 3 2 7 & 3 3 in Chapter Three of this thesis.    
69      See the analysis in paragraphs 3 2 2; 3 2 7 & 3 3 in Chapter Three of this thesis.   
70      See the analysis in paragraph 3 2 7 read with paragraphs 3 2 2 & 3 3 in Chapter Three of this thesis.    
71      See the analysis in paragraph 3 2 7 above read with paragraph 3 3 in Chapter Three of this thesis.   
72      See the analysis in paragraphs 3 2 7 & 3 3 in Chapter Three of this thesis.   
73      S 82(2)(c) of the Securities Services Act; also see paragraph 3 3 in Chapter Three of this thesis.   
74      See paragraphs 3 2 1; 3 2 7 read with paragraph 3 3 in Chapter Three of this thesis.   
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2012.75  It was further suggested and concluded that the Financial Services Board should 
consider having more offices and other divisions of its departments in different regions of 
South Africa to increase awareness and to enhance the implementation of its functions.76  It 
was also concluded that the JSE’s enforcement efforts could still be interrupted and hampered 
by its inconsistent co-operation with other regulatory bodies.77  In light of this, it was 
submitted and concluded that the JSE should continue co-operating with the Financial 
Services Board, the Securities Regulation Panel and other relevant enforcement authorities in 
order to curb market abuse practices, especially in relation to over the counter transactions as 
well as cross-border market abuse activity.78 Not giving less regard to some practical 
considerations such as the current backlog in the courts, severe stress on the judicial resources 
and the availability of sufficient resources on the part of the Financial Services Board, it was 
concluded that that there is still a need to introduce other alternative enforcement measures to 
enhance and improve the enforcement of the market abuse provisions in South Africa.79 In 
relation to this, it was suggested and concluded that even though the availability of adequate 
resources could be problematic, more courts and/or additional special commercial courts and 
tribunals should be established to adjudicate on market abuse cases in South Africa.80  
 
The thesis further provided an overview of problems associated with the ineffective 
enforcement of the market abuse ban in South Africa.  Accordingly, it was concluded that 
significant progress has been made with regard to the co-operation between the Financial 
Services Board and other local enforcement bodies like the JSE.81 Nevertheless, it was 
concluded that there was inconsistent or minimal co-operation between the Financial Services 
Board and the listed companies as well as other similar international regulatory bodies.82  It 
was also concluded that the Financial Services Board does not provide or employ private 
rights of action for the prejudiced persons and other enforcement measures like bounty 
rewards and whistle-blowing immunity to encourage all the relevant stakeholders to bona fide 
75     See clause 91(2)(d) read with clauses 86 & 87 of the Financial Markets Bill; clause 86(2)(d) read with 
clause 84 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012 & also see paragraphs 3 2 1; 3 2 7 read with paragraph 3 3 in 
Chapter Three of this thesis.    
76     See the analysis in paragraphs 3 2 7 & 3 3 in Chapter Three of this thesis.   
77      See the analysis in paragraphs 3 2 7 & 3 3 in Chapter Three of this thesis.   
78      See the analysis in paragraphs 3 2 7 & 3 3 in Chapter Three of this thesis.   
79      See the analysis in paragraphs 3 2 7 & 3 3 in Chapter Three of this thesis.   
80      See the analysis in paragraphs 3 2 7 & 3 3 in Chapter Three of this thesis.  
81      See paragraphs 4 3 1 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis. 
82      See paragraphs 4 3 2; 4 3 3 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
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report any suspected market abuse activities to itself or to other relevant enforcement 
authorities so as to combat cross-border market abuse activities.83 Moreover, it was noted and 
concluded that the Financial Services Board does not seem to be using other detection 
strategies such as engaging more brokerages and companies that tape or digitally record 
telephonic orders and other transactions from clients to their agencies in order to isolate all 
possible market abuse activities timeously.84  It was further acknowledged and concluded that 
another challenge and/or problem associated with the enforcement of the market abuse 
prohibition in South Africa is the fact that insider trading and market manipulation offences 
are inconsistently defined and treated separately and differently.85  It was noted and 
concluded that market manipulation and insider trading cases are inherently difficult to 
prosecute.86  It was also acknowledged and concluded that the Securities Services Act, the 
Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 do not provide specific provisions 
for a separate maximum criminal penalty for individuals and juristic persons, with a much 
higher maximum penalty to be imposed on such juristic persons.87   
 
With regard to market abuse awareness, it was noted and concluded that the enforcement of 
the market abuse prohibition has not been very successful in South Africa, partly because 
some small companies and other relevant persons are still unaware of the nature and effects of 
market abuse.88  It was further noted and concluded that there is no specific provision in the 
Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 which 
expressly provides for awareness or extensive education on market abuse from the grassroots 
level in order to change the illicit norms and attitudes among the market participants and to 
help all the relevant persons to comply with the market abuse prohibition in South Africa.89  
Moreover, it was concluded that the Financial Services Board did not embark sufficiently on 
awareness programmes to ensure that all the relevant persons are fully acquainted with the 
market abuse prohibition.90  It was also noted and concluded that the legislature, the Financial 
Services Board, the JSE and other relevant stakeholders did not adopt a holistic approach with 
83      See paragraphs 4 2; 4 4 7; 4 5 & 4 8 read with paragraph 4 3 3 in Chapter Four of this thesis. 
84      See paragraphs 4 4 2 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
85      See paragraphs 4 4 4 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
86      See paragraphs 4 4 3 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
87      See paragraphs 4 4 5 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
88      See paragraphs 4 4 6 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
89      See paragraph 4 4 6 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
90      See paragraphs 4 4 6 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
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regard to the development of a strong anti-market abuse culture in South Africa.91  For 
instance, as indicated above, it was concluded that other enforcement approaches such as 
incentives and allowing the Financial Services Board to impose unlimited criminal penalties 
on the market abuse offenders are not used in South Africa.92 It also noted and concluded that 
the preventative measures adopted by some companies seem not to be targeted at preventing 
other market abuse practices such as market manipulation.93  Moreover, it was acknowledged 
and concluded that the Financial Services Board falls short with regard to market abuse 
preventative measures.94  For example, apart from relying on its powers to make market abuse 
rules and the JSE’s Surveillance Division to detect and prevent market abuse, it was 
concluded that the Financial Services Board does not seem to employ other preventative 
methods like public censure to discourage market abuse practices in South Africa.95 
Moreover, it was submitted and concluded that the Financial Services Board should consider 
establishing its own mandatory legally binding guidelines on market transparency to prevent 
relevant trading information asymmetry problems associated with issuers and market abuse 
activity.96  It was further noted and concluded that the JSE Listing Requirements have 
addressed some aspects of market transparency to a fair extent but nonetheless it was 
suggested that the determination of a reasonable degree of certainty in terms of these Listing 
Requirements should not be only contingent upon the issuers of listed securities and their 
directors to avoid possible subjectivity and/or bias which could hamper the market 
transparency enforcement efforts of the JSE.97  In addition, it was noted and concluded that 
the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 do 
not have provisions that specifically enforce market transparency best practices in relation to 
over the counter commodities and derivatives markets.98  It was noted and concluded that the 
market abuse provisions contained in the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill 
and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 do not expressly regulate matters involving investor due 
diligence.99 In relation to this, it was stated and concluded that the Securities Services Act, the 
Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be amended to 
91      See paragraphs 4 4 7 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
92      See paragraphs 4 4 7 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
93      See paragraphs 4 5 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
94      See paragraphs 4 5 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
95      See paragraphs 4 5 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
96      See paragraphs 4 7 1 2 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
97      See paragraphs 4 7 1 2 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
98      See paragraphs 4 7 1 2 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
99      See paragraphs 4 7 2 2 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
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accommodate new adequate provisions specifically dealing with investor due diligence to 
prevent insider trading, market manipulation and other possible financial risks in the South 
African financial markets.100  It was also submitted and concluded that another option could 
be enacting a specific statute that solely deals with market transparency, issuer transparency 
and investor due diligence to enable the Financial Services Board and the JSE to enforce 
investor due diligence best practices and to curb systemic risks and possible cross-border 
market abuse activity in the South African financial markets.101  Moreover, it was noted and 
concluded that there is no legislation that solely regulates issuer transparency standards in 
South Africa.102  It was also suggested and concluded that a specific legislation should be 
enacted in line with the International Organisation of Securities Commissions and the Group 
of Twenty proposals103 to deal solely with issuer transparency, investor due diligence and 
market transparency in both the regulated and unregulated financial markets in South 
Africa.104  It was further submitted and concluded that this legislation should provide a 
mandatory continuous disclosure requirement on the part of the issuers for them to disclose 
initial and ongoing information pertaining to their securities to enable the Financial Services 
Board, the JSE and other relevant enforcement bodies to combat insider trading, market 
manipulation and other related cross-border market abuse practices.105  
 
It was acknowledged and concluded that there are no specific market abuse provisions in the 
Securities Services Act, the Companies Act,106 the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012 that regulate and enforce credit rating agencies standards and 
requirements.107 Moreover, it was concluded that there is no specific regulatory body in the 
Securities Services Act, the Companies Act 2008, the Financial Markets Bill and the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 that oversees the regulation of credit rating agencies in South 
Africa.108  It was accordingly submitted and concluded that the Credit Rating Services Bill109 
100      See paragraphs 4 7 2 2 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
101      See paragraphs 4 7 2 2 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
102      See paragraphs 4 7 3 2 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
103      See paragraph 4 7 3 1 in Chapter Four of this thesis. 
104      See paragraphs 4 7 3 2 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
105      See paragraphs 4 7 3 2 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
106      71 of 2008, hereinafter referred to as the Companies Act 2008. 
107      See paragraphs 4 7 4 2 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
108    See paragraphs 4 7 4 2 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
109    [B-2011], hereinafter referred to as the Credit Rating Services Bill. 
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and/or the Credit Rating Services Bill 2012110 should be applicable to credit ratings of 
securities and/or financial instruments in both the regulated and unregulated financial markets 
to discourage the misuse of price-sensitive information through market abuse activities in 
these markets.111  Furthermore, it was noted and concluded that the responsibility of crisis 
management in South Africa is vested in the South African Reserve Bank as opposed to the 
Financial Services Board.112  However, it was submitted and concluded that the crisis 
management responsibility should be removed from the South African Reserve Bank and 
placed in an independent self-regulatory body like the Financial Services Board to promote 
transparency, less bureaucracy and less governmentally induced bias.113  In relation to this, it 
was concluded that an adequate and comprehensive national statute should be enacted to 
provide an effective enforcement framework for crisis management and compensation 
measures across the financial services industry and all the financial markets in South Africa in 
order to curb market abuse activities.114  It was also noted and concluded that there is no 
specific provision in the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012, which deals with the enforcement of risk management measures to 
expressly combat market abuse related systemic risks in all the South African financial 
markets.115   It was accordingly submitted and concluded that the policy makers should, in 
line with the European Commission proposals,116 statutorily empower an independent 
regulatory agency to enforce the risk management measures across all the South African 
financial sectors and financial markets.117  Moreover, it was noted and concluded that there is 
no legislation that solely and expressly provides an enforcement framework for market abuse 
related accounting standards violations in South Africa.118  However, it was stated and 
concluded that accounting standards violations are generally outlawed under different 
legislations, for example, the Companies Act 2008, the Financial Advisory and Intermediary 
110   [B8-2012], hereinafter referred to as the Credit Rating Services Bill 2012 (I have employed the term 
“clause” to refer to the provisions of both the Credit Rating Services Bill & the Credit Rating Services 
Bill 2012 because at the time of writing this Chapter, the aforementioned Bills were not yet effectively 
passed into law).    
111    See paragraphs 4 7 4 2 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
112    See paragraphs 4 7 5 2 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
113    See paragraphs 4 7 5 2 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
114    See paragraphs 4 7 5 2 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
115    See paragraphs 4 7 6 2 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
116    See paragraph 4 7 6 1 in Chapter Four of this thesis. 
117    See paragraphs 4 7 6 2 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
118    See paragraphs 4 7 7 2 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
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Services Act119 and the Financial Services Board Act.120   It was also concluded that these 
Acts do not have designated regulatory agencies to enforce their accounting standards to 
combat fraud, insider trading and market manipulation as well as penalties that could be 
imposed on the offenders in such instances.121  It was further acknowledged and concluded 
that there is no uniformity as regards the adopted accounting and/or auditing standards and 
accordingly it is hoped that a specific legislation will be enacted in future to enforce auditing, 
accounting and financial reporting standards uniformly across the financial services industry 
in order to combat fraud and market abuse-related accounting violations and to enhance 
comparability with the international accounting best practice.122 
 
It was suggested and concluded that the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill 
and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be amended in order to enact provisions that 
directly and expressly apply to possible quote stuffing and front running that might occur in 
the over the counter commodity and commodity derivatives transactions.123  It was further 
submitted and concluded that the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or 
the Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be amended to provide a mandatory requirement on 
the part of the financial analysts or advisors, brokers and other market participants to openly 
hold-on to their orders for specific minimum periods in order not to prejudice investors 
through quote stuffing or front running.124 Moreover, it was noted and concluded that the 
Companies Act 2008, the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 do not specifically prohibit dark pools and flash orders.125  It was 
accordingly concluded that the South African policy makers should consider enacting 
additional provisions to expressly prohibit flash orders and dark pools in all the relevant 
financial markets.126  In addition, it was submitted and concluded that the Financial Services 
Board and the JSE should strictly impose a mandatory requirement on the issuers of 
securities, brokers and other relevant market participants to disclose their trading interests in 
certain securities promptly and cautiously in order to detect and curb manipulative dark pools 
119    37 of 2002; hereinafter referred to as the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act. 
120   97 of 1990, hereinafter referred to as the Financial Services Board Act; also see paragraphs 4 7 7 2 & 4 8 
in Chapter Four of this thesis.   
121    See paragraphs 4 7 7 2 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
122    See paragraphs 4 7 7 2 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
123    See paragraphs 4 7 8 1 1 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
124      See paragraphs 4 7 8 1 1 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
125      See paragraphs 4 7 8 2 1 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
126      See paragraphs 4 7 8 2 1 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
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and flash orders.127  Furthermore, it was noted and concluded that the Securities Services Act, 
the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012’s market abuse provisions do 
not expressly prohibit hedge funds insider trading and high yield investment fraud.128  It was 
also noted and concluded that the Companies Act 2008, the Securities Services Act, the 
Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 do not expressly empower the 
Financial Services Board to combat hedge funds insider trading and commodities derivatives 
insider trading.129  It was also submitted and concluded that additional provisions should be 
enacted in accordance with other applicable reforms and proposals that were introduced 
elsewhere to expressly prohibit hedge funds market abuse activities and other securities 
violations, especially in the South African over the counter markets.130  Moreover, it was 
stated and concluded that the Companies Act 2008, the Securities Services Act, the Financial 
Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 do not specifically discourage high 
frequency trading, Internet-based market manipulation, programme trading and other related 
technologically perpetrated market abuse activities.131  It was further suggested and concluded 
that the JSE and the Financial Services Board should consider employing practically 
applicable proposals from other jurisdictions such as the back testing process, real-time risk 
monitoring and market surveillance measures to detect and curb illicit high frequency trading 
related market abuse activities.132   It was also noted and concluded that the Companies Act 
2008, the Financial Markets Bill, the Financial Markets Bill 2012 and the Securities Services 
Act’s provisions apply only to trades conducted on a regulated market and they do not directly 
or indirectly prohibit illicit or naked credit default swaps derivatives transactions in the over 
the counter markets.133  In line with this, it was submitted and concluded that the Financial 
Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be amended in order to provide a 
specific prohibition on naked credit default swaps and appropriate penalties against the 
offenders.134  It was also noted and concluded that the Securities Services Act, the Financial 
Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012’s market abuse provisions do not explicitly 
prohibit short selling.135 Consequently, it was suggested and concluded that the Securities 
127      See paragraphs 4 7 8 2 1 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
128      See paragraphs 4 7 8 3 1 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
129      See paragraphs 4 7 8 3 1 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
130      See paragraphs 4 7 8 3 1 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
131      See paragraphs 4 7 8 4 1 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
132    See paragraphs 4 7 8 4 1 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
133    See paragraphs 4 7 8 5 1 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
134    See paragraphs 4 7 8 5 1 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
135    See paragraphs 4 7 8 6 1 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
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Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be 
fastidiously amended, giving regard to relevant applicable developments in other 
jurisdictions136 to expressly prohibit naked short selling.137 
 
In addition, it is submitted and concluded that although the JSE was rated as the number one 
stock exchange by the World Federation of Exchanges with regard to regulation in 2010,138 
the various gaps in the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in relation to some 
specific aspects of the South African financial markets and in relation to some selected market 
abuse practices that occurred during the global financial crisis as earlier discussed139 could 
weaken the stability and integrity of the South African financial markets in the future.   In line 
with this, it was submitted and concluded that some flaws in the detection, prosecution and 
the general enforcement of the market abuse prohibition could have, to some extent, 
contributed to the poor reputation and low investor confidence associated with some of the 
South African companies and financial markets.140 In a nutshell, it was concluded that the 
market abuse problems as highlighted above as well as in Chapter Four should be 
appropriately resolved for the purposes of combating market abuse activities in South 
Africa.141 In other words, it was revealed and concluded that although South Africa, like 
several other countries, has made numerous efforts to combat market abuse practices, the 
current gaps and problems associated with the enforcement of the South African market abuse 
laws could have hampered such efforts.142 
 
The thesis also provided a comparative analysis of the enforcement of the market abuse ban in 
the United States of America.   In line with this, as discussed in Chapter  Five, it was 
concluded that the impropriety of market abuse in the United States of America is generally 
accepted by the public, judiciary, market participants and all the relevant stakeholders in that 
136    See paragraph 4 7 8 6 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
137    See paragraphs 4 7 8 6 1 & 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
138    National Treasury Reviewing the Regulation of Financial Markets in South Africa: Policy Document 
Explaining the Financial Markets Bill 2011 August 2011 5.  
139    See the discussion in sub-paragraphs under paragraph 4 7 in Chapter Four of this thesis. 
140    See sub-paragraphs under paragraph 4 4 in Chapter Four of this thesis & also see paragraph 4 6 in 
Chapter Four of this thesis.   
141    See paragraph 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
142   Cassim “An Analysis of Market Manipulation under the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004 (part 1)” 2008 
SA Merc LJ 33 33-36; also see paragraph 4 8 in Chapter Four of this thesis.   
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country, both at a state and federal level.143  It was noted and concluded that this could be 
supported, in part, by the fact that the enforcement of the market abuse ban is a co-operative 
effort involving the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, private litigants, 
self-regulatory organisations, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the 
Department of Justice at a federal level144 as well as the relevant financial or corporation 
departments at the states level.145 Moreover, as earlier discussed,146 it is clear that both the 
United States of America and the South African market abuse regimes maintain similar 
enforcement goals and missions.147  In spite of this, it was concluded that they adopt and 
implement very different approaches to achieve their enforcement goals or targets.148   It was 
also concluded that the most important characteristic of the regulatory framework in the 
United States of America,149 namely a co-ordinated (joint) effort between the courts, self-
regulatory organisations and the United States Securities and Exchange Commission to 
combat illicit practices like insider trading is relatively minimal or absent in South Africa due 
to the differences in relation to the financial markets sizes and enforcement approaches.150  
Put differently, it was noted and concluded that the United States of America’s market abuse 
enforcement framework employs the multi-functional regulatory approach which offers 
competition among the regulatory authorities at a federal level151 as well as the relevant 
financial or corporation departments at a State level,152 but nevertheless, resulting in far much 
greater and effective enforcement.  Moreover, it was noted and concluded that the United 
States of America’s market abuse enforcement framework provides the much needed 
resources, competent personnel in the courts and the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission as well as better technological surveillance mechanisms to detect illicit trading 
143   See the discussion under paragraphs (including sub-paragraphs) 5 2; 5 3; 5 4 & 5 5 & 5 6 in Chapter Five 
of this thesis; also see Steinberg 2003 The International Lawyer 169-171.  
144   In other words, the prevalent attitudes in the United States of America favour a rigorous enforcement of 
the market abuse prohibition.    Paragraphs (including sub-paragraphs) 5 4 1; 5 4 2; 5 4 3; 5 5 & 5 6 in 
Chapter Five of this thesis. 
145    See the discussion under paragraphs (including sub-paragraphs) 5 2 in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
146    See paragraph 10 2 above. 
147   Generally see paragraphs 5 3 1; 5 3 4; & 5 3 4 1 in Chapter Five of this thesis; also see paragraph 5 6 & 
paragraphs under 5 2 in Chapter Five of this thesis & relevant comparative analysis in Chapter Nine of 
this thesis. 
148    See paragraph 10 2 above; also see paragraph 5 6 in Chapter Five of this thesis & relevant comparative 
analysis in Chapter Nine of this thesis.   
149   See paragraphs 5 4 1; 5 5 1; 5 5 2 & 5 6 in Chapter Five of this thesis; also see paragraphs 5 3 1; 5 3 4 & 
5 3 4 1 in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
150    See the related analysis in Chapter Nine of this thesis.  
151    See sub-paragraphs under paragraph 5 3 & also see paragraph 5 6 in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
152    See sub-paragraphs under paragraph 5 2 & also see paragraph 5 6 in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
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practices.153  On the other hand, it was noted and concluded that the South African market 
abuse regime relies mainly on the Financial Services Board to police and enforce the market 
abuse ban.  It was also concluded that this approach has so far not been able to achieve more 
settlements and prosecutions in cases involving market abuse in South Africa.154 
 
Moreover, it was concluded that although the South African market abuse legislation was 
relatively influenced by the corresponding legislation in the United States of America, it 
sometimes lacks a rigorous practical enforcement approach and infrastructure to combat 
insider trading and other related activities.155  It was concluded that this could be evidenced, 
in part, by many delays in investigations, settlements and the inherent paucity of successful 
criminal prosecutions obtained in market abuse cases in South Africa to date.156   It was 
further concluded that although the adoption of some principles from the United States of 
America’s market abuse enforcement framework shows a significant effort by the legislature 
to provide an adequate market abuse proscription in South Africa, deficiencies such as the 
inconsistent application of the market abuse provisions and the use of few enforcement 
measures have directly impeded these efforts.157  It was additionally submitted and concluded 
that the South African legislature should not have blindly adopted some of the United States 
of America’s market abuse regulatory principles without proper measures in place to enforce 
them.158  In Chapter Five, it was also noted and concluded that the current South African 
market abuse legislation does not explicitly empower the Financial Services Board to operate 
its own separate and specific technological surveillance machinery in order to supplement the 
significant surveillance efforts of the JSE.   Moreover, the Financial Services Board is still to 
employ sufficient measures for the training of competent personnel and educational awareness 
programmes in order to prevent market abuse practices in the South African financial 
markets.159  Additionally, it was noted and concluded that, unlike the position in the United 
153    See paragraph 5 6 in Chapter Five of this thesis.   
154   Paragraphs 3 2 1 & 4 2 in Chapters Three & Four of this thesis respectively & relevant comparative 
analysis in Chapter Nine of this thesis.   Also see paragraph 5 6 in Chapter Five of this thesis.   
155    See paragraph 5 6 in Chapter Five of this thesis.   
156   See paragraphs 4 2; 4 4 3; 4 4 4 & other related remarks in Chapter Four of this thesis; also see relevant 
comparative analysis in Chapter Nine of this thesis & paragraph 5 6 in Chapter Five of this thesis.   
157   See paragraphs 4 2; 4 4 3; 4 4 4 & other related remarks in Chapter Four of this thesis; also see relevant 
comparative analysis in Chapter Nine of this thesis & paragraph 5 6 in Chapter Five of this thesis.   
158    See relevant comparative analysis in Chapter Nine of this thesis & also see paragraph 5 6 in Chapter Five 
of this thesis.   
159   See paragraphs 4 2 & 4 5 in Chapter Four of this thesis; also see relevant comparative analysis in Chapter 
Nine of this thesis & paragraph 5 6 in Chapter Five of this thesis.   
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States of America,160 most of the market abuse rules that could be made by the Financial 
Services Board are only limited to the general manner in which its administrative powers and 
roles should be conducted.161  On the other hand, in California, it was noted and concluded 
that when the Commissioner of Corporations receives some leads from the Internet 
Compliance and Enforcement Team’s surveillance, junk mail and public complaints and 
referrals from other enforcement bodies, he may impose damages or other applicable 
remedies against the offenders.162  It was further acknowledged and concluded that California 
has managed to develop a relatively consistent market abuse enforcement framework that 
effectively discourages a number of market abuse practices (including franchise-related, 
capital markets related as well as Internet-based market abuse violations).163  Likewise, it was 
noted and concluded that although Delaware does not have a statutory provision that 
expressly prohibits insider trading, it has to date successfully relied on common law principles 
on fiduciary duties to combat insider trading.164  It was accordingly noted and concluded that 
this success has prompted other commentators to submit that Delaware was effectively 
combating insider trading and market manipulation because it cedes other areas of its laws 
that involve insider trading enforcement to the federal government.165 Furthermore, in 
Washington, it was noted and concluded that the Director of Financial Institutions may 
impose administrative penalties such as public censure, suspension, or revocation of the 
license of any broker-dealer, salesperson, investment advisor’s representative, investment 
advisor or any other person who commits market abuse and other related securities 
violations.166  It was further noted and concluded that the advantage of Washington is inter 
alia the statutory availability of non-exclusive common law penalties and private rights of 
action for the prejudiced persons to claim their damages directly from the market abuse 
offenders.167 
 
160    See paragraph 5 4 1 read with paragraph 5 6 in Chapter Five of this thesis.   
161   S 82(2)(g) of the Securities Services Act; clause 91(2)(f) of the Financial Markets Bill & clause 86(2)(f) 
of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.  See further paragraphs 3 2 1 & 4 2 in Chapters Three & Four of this 
thesis respectively & also see paragraph 5 6 in Chapter Five of this thesis.   
162    See paragraphs 5 2 3 & 5 2 4 read with paragraph 5 6 in Chapter Five of this thesis.       
163    See paragraph 5 2 4 read with paragraph 5 6 in Chapter Five of this thesis.       
164    See paragraph 5 2 8 read with paragraph 5 6 in Chapter Five of this thesis.       
165    See paragraph 5 2 8 read with paragraph 5 6 in Chapter Five of this thesis.       
166    See paragraph 5 2 12 read with paragraph 5 6 in Chapter Five of this thesis.       
167    See paragraph 5 2 12 read with paragraph 5 6 in Chapter Five of this thesis.       
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Overall, it was acknowledged and concluded that, like the United States of America,168 South 
Africa also prohibits three main forms of market abuse, namely insider trading, trade-based 
market manipulation and disclosure-based market manipulation.169  It was also concluded 
that, like the United States of America,170 South Africa relies on civil, criminal and 
administrative sanctions to deter and discourage unscrupulous persons from engaging in 
market abuse activities.171 Nevertheless, it was concluded that, unlike the position in the 
United States of America,172 the Securities Services Act’s market abuse civil sanctions are 
only limited to cases involving insider trading.173  It was concluded that this flaw could be 
addressed by the Financial Markets Bill as it now extends civil sanctions to market 
manipulation offences.174  It was further concluded that, unlike the position in the United 
States of America where there are no specific statutory limitations for criminal actions,175 the 
competent courts in South Africa do not seem to have express statutory authority or discretion 
to impose any other additional penalties (apart from those stipulated in the Securities Services 
Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012) upon the market 
abuse offenders without violating the autrefois acquit or autrefois convict doctrine.176  It was 
also concluded that, in contrast to the position in the United States of America,177 little or no 
consideration was given to the introduction of specific civil penalties for commodities-based 
market manipulation practices in South Africa.178  It was further concluded that, unlike the 
168    See paragraphs 5 3 1; 5 3 4; 5 3 4 1 & 5 6 in Chapter Five of this thesis.       
169   Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 34-35; also see paragraph 5 6 in Chapter Five of this thesis & related analysis in 
Chapter Nine of this thesis.       
170    Paragraphs 5 3 2; 5 3 5; 5 3 6 & 5 5 3 read with paragraph 5 6 in Chapter Five of this thesis.  
171   See the relevant comparative analysis in Chapter Nine of this thesis & see further paragraph 4 4 7 in 
Chapter Four of this thesis; also see paragraph 5 6 in Chapter Five of this thesis.       
172    Paragraphs 5 3 2; 5 3 5; 5 3 6 & 5 5 3 read with paragraph 5 6 in Chapter Five of this thesis.       
173   S 77 of the Securities Services Act; also see relevant comparative analysis in Chapter Nine of this thesis 
& paragraph 5 6 in Chapter Five of this thesis.  
174   Clause 87 read with clauses 84 & 85 of the Financial Markets Bill; no similar provision is made in the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 & also see related remarks and comparative analysis in Chapter Nine of this 
thesis & paragraph 5 6 in Chapter Five of this thesis.  
175   See paragraphs 5 3 2 & 5 3 5 above & relevant comparative analysis in Chapter Nine of this thesis.    Also 
see paragraph 5 6 in Chapter Five of this thesis.       
176   See s 115(a) of the Securities Services Act; clause 115(a) of the Financial Markets Bill; clause 111(a) of 
the Financial Markets Bill 2012; also see paragraphs 5 3 2 & 5 3 5 read with paragraph 5 6 in Chapter 
Five of this thesis & relevant comparative analysis in Chapter Nine of this thesis.    
177    Paragraph 5 3 5 read with paragraph 5 6 in Chapter Five of this thesis.       
178   S 75; s 76 & s 115(a) of the Securities Services Act; see further clauses 84; 85; 87 & 115(a) of the 
Financial Markets Bill & clauses 82; 83 & 111(a) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012.  Also see relevant 
comparative analysis in Chapter Nine of this thesis & paragraph 5 6 in Chapter Five of this thesis.           
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United States Securities and Exchange Commission,179 the Financial Services Board does not 
have a specific unit that prohibits Internet-based market abuse activities.180   
 
The thesis further provided a comparative analysis of the enforcement of the market abuse 
ban in the European Union.  Accordingly, it was noted and concluded that broader definitions 
of “accepted market practices”, “regulated market”, “financial instruments”, “inside 
information” and “market manipulation” were introduced by the EU Market Abuse 
Directive.181  Furthermore, it was noted and concluded that the EU Market Abuse Directive 
brought stringent measures, for example:   
 
(a) a mandatory duty is imposed upon the issuers to promptly disclose inside 
information to the public;182  
 
(b) issuers or their agents are required to compile lists of their insiders (employees);183  
 
(c) persons in managerial positions are further required to report suspicious transactions 
which relate to their shares, derivatives or other financial instruments linked to 
them;184 and  
 
(d) any professional person who objectively suspects that certain transactions might give 
rise to insider trading or market manipulation is required to immediately report 
(whistle-blowing) them to the competent regulatory authorities in the European 
Union member states.185  
 
It was further concluded that these measures are clearly targeted at improving the detection 
and prevention of market abuse activities in the European Union financial markets.186  
179    See relevant analysis in paragraph 5 6 in Chapter Five of this thesis.    
180    Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 182-183; also see relevant analysis in paragraph 5 6 in Chapter Five of this 
thesis.    
181   Articles 1(1) to (5); article 2 read with articles 3; 4 & 5 of the EU Market Abuse Directive; also see 
related discussions in paragraphs 6 3 1; 6 3 2; 6 3 3 & 6 3 4 read with paragraph 6 5 in Chapter Six of this 
thesis.   
182    See paragraph 6 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis.     
183    See paragraph 6 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis.   
184    See paragraph 6 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis.   
185      See paragraph 6 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis.     
186      See paragraph 6 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis.     
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However, it was concluded that the EU Market Abuse Directive’s regulatory framework has a 
considerable number of flaws and such flaws include, inter alia, the failure on the part of the 
EU Market Abuse Directive to provide the specific types (whether civil, criminal or 
administrative sanctions) of market abuse penalties that are commonly applicable across the 
European Union member states and/or the various disparities that are found in relation to the 
interpretation and implementation of some of the provisions of the EU Market Abuse 
Directive in such member states.187  In relation to this, it was concluded that the 
implementation of the EU Market Abuse Directive in the United Kingdom was considered 
because it is generally regarded as one of the major economies in the European Union.188  
Accordingly, it was demonstrated and concluded that although the United Kingdom has 
implemented most of the provisions of the EU Market Abuse Directive, it has sometimes 
inconsistently applied heterogeneous enforcement approaches to combat market abuse in its 
financial markets.189 It was concluded that the key proposals brought by both the Criminal 
Sanctions Market Abuse Directive Proposal and the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal were 
aimed at addressing the flaws contained in the EU Market Abuse Directive.190  In relation to 
this, it was indicated and concluded that the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal seeks to 
extend the scope of the EU Market Abuse Directive to cover a wide range of financial 
instruments traded on regulated markets, multilateral trading facilities and/or organised 
trading facilities to curb the gaps in the regulation of new markets, trading venues or 
platforms and over the counter instruments.191 Despite this, it was concluded that the Market 
Abuse Regulation Proposal should be further reviewed so that it provides adequate practical 
measures or guidelines regarding the uniform application of its extended scope in the 
European Union member states to avoid balkanisation and other potential overregulation 
problems.192 It was further concluded that the aforementioned extended scope should be 
carefully revised to reduce, as much as possible, the risk of creating new transaction reporting 
administrative burdens and/or cross-border enforcement-related problems for regulators and 
other relevant stakeholders in the European Union member states.193 It was also concluded 
that the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal’s new definition for commodity derivatives 
187      See paragraphs 6 4 5 & 6 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis; also see related remarks in paragraph 10 2 above. 
188      See paragraphs 6 4 5 & 6 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
189      See paragraphs 6 4 5 & 6 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
190      See paragraphs 6 4 5 & 6 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
191      See paragraphs 6 4 5 & 6 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
192      See paragraphs 6 4 5 & 6 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
193      See paragraphs 6 4 5 & 6 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
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should be reviewed to ensure that it provides specific guidelines on how regulators in the 
European Union member states can oversee the regulation of spot commodity markets and 
derivative markets without discouraging legitimate derivative and spot commodity contracts 
transactions and/or imposing undue pressure on the issuers or other relevant market 
participants.194 It was further concluded that the Wholesale Energy Market Integrity and 
Transparency Regulation should be amended so that it may provide a clear roadmap on its 
application in the European Union member states and how it will dovetail with the Market 
Abuse Regulation Proposal and the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive Proposal to 
prevent potential negative effects of overregulation and/or violating the autrefois acquit or 
autrefois convict doctrine on the part of the market abuse offenders.195   
 
It was concluded that the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal’s new definition of inside 
information for emission allowances provides that emissions allowance markets participants, 
except small participants (emitters) whose transactions may not significantly affect the market 
price of emission allowances in question, will be mandated to create insider lists, report 
managers’ transactions and publicly disclose inside information.196 It was submitted and 
concluded that the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal should be reviewed to provide an 
optimal threshold for emissions or thermal input or a combination thereof to curb market 
abuse in spot carbon markets and to prevent the potential risk of smaller emission allowances 
participants circumventing their market abuse liability unduly.197  Moreover, it was concluded 
that the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal’s new definition of market manipulation was inter 
alia targeted at encouraging regulators to adopt a common approach when enforcing the 
market manipulation ban across the European Union member states and/or addressing 
concerns that the EU Market Abuse Directive lacked clarity on certain key elements 
pertaining to the attempted insider trading and attempted market manipulation offences, 
giving rise to legal uncertainty.198   It was further concluded that the Market Abuse 
Regulation Proposal gives regulatory bodies in the European Union member states the power 
to request existing telephone and data traffic records held by telecommunication operators if a 
reasonable suspicion exists that such records are required in an ongoing market abuse 
194      See paragraphs 6 4 5 & 6 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
195      See paragraphs 6 4 5 & 6 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
196      See paragraphs 6 4 5 & 6 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
197      See paragraphs 6 4 5 & 6 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
198      See paragraphs 6 4 5 & 6 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
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investigation.199  It was concluded that such regulatory bodies’ supervisory and sanctioning 
powers were revamped, for example, such bodies are now able to impose upon the market 
abuse offenders, civil or administrative pecuniary sanctions of not less than the profit made or 
loss avoided from the market abuse transactions in question and/or a maximum fine of not 
less than twice the value of any such profit gained or loss avoided.200 Moreover, it was 
concluded that the aforesaid regulatory bodies may impose a maximum fine of not less than 
five million euros on natural persons and civil or administrative pecuniary sanctions of up to 
10% of the total annual turnover in the preceding business year on legal persons.201  It was 
also submitted and concluded that the new regulators’ investigatory powers and whistle-
blower immunity provisions should be carefully and uniformly utilised in the European Union 
member states to minimise the risk of discouraging potential investors which is generally 
associated with overregulation.202  It was noted and concluded that the European Union 
member states are obliged to impose “effective, proportionate and dissuasive” criminal 
sanctions upon any person who intentionally engages or attempts to engage in insider trading 
or market manipulation activities or who incites, aids and abets or attempts to incite, aid 
and/or abet another to engage in such activities.203 Nevertheless, it was concluded that the 
Criminal Sanctions Market Abuse Directive Proposal should be reviewed to ensure that it 
clearly provides separate and different criminal sanctions for natural and juristic persons that 
will be homogeneously enforced across the European Union member states.204  
 
It was noted and concluded that the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal provides that the 
precise data to be included in insider lists should be defined in delegated acts and 
implementing technical standards adopted by the European Commission.205  In relation to 
this, it was concluded that the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal should be reviewed to 
provide adequate measures or provisions on the content of insider lists and/or conditions 
under which issuers shall have an obligation to draw up such lists to reduce administrative 
burdens, particularly on multinational companies.206  It was also concluded that in the case of 
199      See paragraphs 6 4 5 & 6 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
200      See paragraphs 6 4 5 & 6 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
201      See paragraphs 6 4 5 & 6 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
202      See paragraphs 6 4 5 & 6 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
203    See paragraphs 6 4 5 & 6 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
204    See paragraphs 6 4 5 & 6 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
205    See paragraphs 6 4 5 & 6 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
206    See paragraphs 6 4 5 & 6 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
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inside information relating to issuers of a financial instrument, whose financial instruments 
are admitted to trading on a small and medium-sized growth market, such issuers, like any 
other issuers, will be required to seek permission from the competent authorities if they want 
to delay the disclosure of the inside information.207  It was submitted and concluded that the 
aforementioned delayed disclosure of inside information might be very difficult to implement 
homogeneously in the European Union member states to prevent market abuse without being 
exploited by other unscrupulous issuers.208   
 
A comparative analysis of the enforcement of the market abuse ban in the United Kingdom 
was undertaken in Chapter Seven.   In relation to this, it was concluded, as already pointed 
out,209 that the United Kingdom employs an extensive regulatory approach which statutorily 
authorises only one regulator (the Financial Services Authority) to oversee the enforcement of 
its securities and market abuse laws.    It was concluded that the rationale for this single 
regulator model was inter alia to establish a more coherent and proportionate approach in 
relation to the regulation and enforcement of financial services, securities and market abuse 
laws as well as a level playing field for all investors and other relevant market participants in 
the United Kingdom.210  It was further concluded, in contrast to the position in South 
Africa,211 that there is a separate and specific statute, namely the Criminal Justice Act,212 that 
deals with insider trading213 and another one, namely the Financial Services and Markets 
Act,214 that widely deals with the prohibition of insider trading, market manipulation and 
other types of market abuse in the United Kingdom.215   It was noted and concluded that, 
unlike South Africa, the United Kingdom has devoted significantly more resources towards 
the enforcement of its securities and market abuse laws.216   It was further submitted and 
concluded that the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012 should be reviewed to enact provisions that specifically empower the 
207    See paragraphs 6 4 5 & 6 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis.   
208    See paragraphs 6 4 5 & 6 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
209   See paragraphs 7 5 1 & 7 8 in Chapter Seven of this thesis; also see related remarks in Chapter Nine of 
this thesis.     
210    See paragraph 7 8 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
211    See paragraph 7 8 in Chapter Seven of this thesis & related remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
212    1993 (c 36), hereinafter referred to as the Criminal Justice Act.   
213    See paragraphs 7 2; 7 1 & 7 8 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
214    2000 (c 8), hereinafter referred to as the Financial Services and Markets Act. 
215    See paragraphs 7 3; 7 1 & 7 8 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
216   See paragraphs 7 5 1 & 7 8 in Chapter Seven of this thesis; also see related analysis in Chapter Nine of 
this thesis.    
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Financial Services Board to appoint other additional skilled persons, apart from its own 
employees, to provide it with reports or relevant information relating to any suspected market 
abuse violations in South Africa.217  It was further concluded that South Africa should 
consider practically implementing only the relevant principles of the United Kingdom’s single 
regulator model because it is economical and less complex.218  It was concluded that the 
Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 
should be amended to enact provisions that expressly empower other self-regulatory 
organisations in South Africa, apart from the Financial Services Board, to impose their own 
penalties and/or take any other appropriate action against any persons who indulge in market 
abuse activities in South Africa.219  It was further concluded that the Financial Services Board 
should be expressly and statutorily authorised to impose separate and different penalties on 
individuals and juristic persons or companies that engage in market abuse activities in South 
Africa.220  Furthermore, it was concluded that the Financial Services Board, like the Financial 
Services Authority,221 should be statutorily empowered to publicise the names of the culprits 
who commit market abuse offences (public censure or name and shame approach) in South 
Africa.222  In line with this, it was submitted and concluded that the provisions of the 
Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 which seek to empower the 
Financial Services Board to publish by notice on its official website or by means of other 
appropriate public media any outcome, status or details of market abuse investigations (public 
censure or name and shame approach) if such publication is in the public interest should 
speedily come into force.223 Accordingly, it was concluded that the Securities Services Act, 
the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be reviewed to enact 
provisions that give private rights of action to the affected persons for them to claim their 
damages directly from the market abuse offenders.224  It was also concluded that the 
Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 
should be reviewed to introduce whistle-blower immunity provisions for the purposes of 
encouraging all persons to disclose any information regarding market abuse violations 
217    See paragraph 7 8 in Chapter Seven of this thesis & related remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
218    See paragraph 7 8 in Chapter Seven of this thesis & related remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
219      See paragraph 7 8 in Chapter Seven of this thesis & related remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
220      See paragraph 7 8 in Chapter Seven of this thesis & related remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
221      Generally see paragraphs 7 5 1 & 7 7 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
222      See paragraph 7 8 in Chapter Seven of this thesis & related remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
223      See paragraph 7 8 in Chapter Seven of this thesis & related remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
224      See paragraph 7 8 in Chapter Seven of this thesis & related remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
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voluntarily to the Financial Services Board or other enforcement authorities in South 
Africa.225 Moreover, it was concluded that the Financial Services Board should seriously 
consider establishing its own surveillance systems to improve and increase the timeous 
detection of market abuse activity in both the regulated and unregulated financial markets in 
South Africa.226 
 
In addition, it was concluded that more specialised market abuse courts manned by sufficient 
persons with the relevant expertise to adjudicate in matters involving market abuse should be 
established in all the provinces of South Africa to increase awareness and/or the combating of 
market abuse practices in the South African financial markets.227  It was also concluded that 
the Financial Services Board should be statutorily required to support the Director of Public 
Prosecutions and the relevant courts with the necessary information regarding ongoing market 
abuse cases in South Africa, by assigning certain persons with the relevant expertise to assist 
the Director of Public Prosecutions and/or relevant courts in their prosecution of such cases in 
South Africa.228 It was further concluded that although the Financial Services Board has 
reportedly forged co-operation agreements with some international self-regulatory 
organisations like the International Organisation of Securities Commissions, very little or no 
effort has been specifically made to enforce and exploit such co-operation agreements to 
combat cross-border market abuse practices in South Africa.229 It was accordingly concluded 
that the relevant provisions of the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 
2012 which now empower the Financial Services Board to assist foreign regulators with 
investigations pertaining to any cross-border market abuse cases should speedily come into 
force to enhance the combating of such cases in South Africa and elsewhere.230  Furthermore, 
it was concluded that the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be reviewed to enact provisions that expressly impose a 
mandatory co-operation obligation on both the Financial Services Board and the JSE to 
improve the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in South Africa.231  It was noted and 
concluded that the Criminal Justice Act only extends the insider trading liability to individuals 
225      See paragraph 7 8 in Chapter Seven of this thesis & related remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
226      See paragraph 7 8 in Chapter Seven of this thesis & related remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
227     See paragraph 7 8 in Chapter Seven of this thesis & related remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
228     See paragraph 7 8 in Chapter Seven of this thesis & related remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
229     See paragraph 7 8 in Chapter Seven of this thesis & related remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
230     See paragraph 7 8 in Chapter Seven of this thesis & related remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
231     See paragraph 7 8 in Chapter Seven of this thesis & related remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
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who deal in affected securities on a regulated market or where such dealing is conducted on 
the over the counter markets through a professional intermediary,232 while there is no similar 
provision in the corresponding legislation in South Africa.233  In line with this, it was 
concluded that the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012 should be amended to enact provisions that expressly discourage any 
market abuse activity or illicit dealing in securities on unregulated over the counter markets 
through agents or professional intermediaries and face-to-face transactions between non-
professional intermediaries in South Africa.234 
 
It was further concluded that the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be amended to enact provisions that expressly and 
adequately define the concept of insider trading in South Africa.235   Moreover, it was noted 
and concluded that the concept of, and conduct amounting to market manipulation or other 
market abuse practices is statutorily defined in the United Kingdom,236 while such concept 
and/or conduct is not statutorily defined in South Africa.237  In view of this, it was concluded 
that the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 
2012 should be amended to enact provisions that expressly and adequately define the concept 
of market manipulation in South Africa.238 Moreover, it was noted and concluded that, unlike 
the Securities Services Act,239 the Financial Services and Markets Act treats insider trading, 
market manipulation and other forms of market abuse practices on a more equal footing in the 
United Kingdom.240 It was concluded that this approach is desirable241 and consequently, it 
was suggested that the Securities Services Act should be amended in line with the Financial 
Services and Markets Act to enable the Financial Services Board and/or other enforcement 
authorities to enforce the market abuse prohibition consistently in South Africa.242  In relation 
232     See paragraph 7 2 in Chapter Seven of this thesis.   
233    See further related remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis; also see paragraphs 7 2 & 7 8 in Chapter Seven 
of this thesis.      
234    See paragraph 7 8 in Chapter Seven of this thesis & related remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
235    See paragraph 7 8 in Chapter Seven of this thesis & related remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
236    See related remarks in paragraph 7 3 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
237    See related remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis; also see paragraph 7 8 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
238    See paragraph 7 8 in Chapter Seven of this thesis & related remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
239   See s 75 & s 76 read with s 73 & s 77 of the Securities Services Act; also see related remarks in Chapter 
Nine of this thesis.   
240    See further related remarks in paragraph 7 3 in Chapter Seven of this thesis.  
241    See paragraphs 7 3 & 7 8 in Chapter Seven of this thesis & related remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
242    See paragraph 7 8 in Chapter Seven of this thesis & related remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
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to this, it was concluded that another option will be to ensure that the provisions of the 
Financial Markets Bill which now extends the civil liability compensation orders to cases 
involving both insider trading and market manipulation will speedily come into effect to 
enhance the enforcement of the market abuse ban in South Africa.243   It was further 
concluded that the Financial Services Board should be statutorily obligated to provide its own 
Code of Market Abuse Conduct containing sufficient and adequate guidelines on factors that 
should be considered from time to time in determining whether a trading practice and/or 
behaviour will give rise to or amounts to market abuse practices in order to enhance the 
combating of such practices in South Africa.244  Moreover, it was concluded that both the 
Financial Services Board and the JSE should consider embarking on more awareness and 
educative programmes such as developing an adequate anti-market abuse curriculum to be 
taught to students from high school level up to tertiary level; publishing adequate quarterly 
informative market abuse booklets on their respective websites; and conducting market abuse 
workshops and public lectures to prevent market abuse practices and increase the general 
awareness among the market participants and/or other relevant stakeholders in the South 
African financial markets.245  
 
The thesis also gave a comparative analysis of the enforcement of the market abuse ban in 
Australia.  In this regard, it was concluded that the Australian legislature has, as early as the 
1960s, consistently adopted a number of statutes, policies, recommendations and other 
necessary measures to combat market abuse activities in the Australian financial markets.246  
It was also noted and concluded that the concept of insider trading is not statutorily defined in 
the Australian statutes, including the Corporations Act.247  In line with this, it was concluded 
that the current Australian insider trading prohibition employs the “information connection 
only approach”.248  It was further concluded that this approach defines an insider as any 
person who has non-public price-sensitive inside information that relates to a company or to 
243    See paragraph 7 8 in Chapter Seven of this thesis & related remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis.  
244    See paragraph 7 8 in Chapter Seven of this thesis & related remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
245    See paragraph 7 8 in Chapter Seven of this thesis & related remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
246   See the historical analysis and other relevant discussions under the sub-headings in paragraph 8 2 & also 
see paragraph 8 6 in Chapter Eight of this thesis & related remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis.  
247   50 of 2001(Cth) as amended, hereinafter referred to as the Corporations Act; also see paragraphs 8 2 5 & 
8 6 in Chapter Eight of this thesis & related remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis.  
248    See paragraphs 8 2 5 & 8 6 in Chapter Eight of this thesis & related remarks in Chapter Nine of this 
thesis.  
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any listed securities or financial products.249  It was further concluded that such a person is 
prohibited from unlawfully trading in any securities (insider trading and tipping) on the 
premise of such information in order to avoid prejudice to other persons who did not have 
access to the information in question.250  In addition, it was concluded that the Corporations 
Act’s insider trading provisions apply to acts or omissions (unlawful trading) within Australia 
relating to securities or financial products of any person or foreign body corporate as well as 
extra-territorially to acts or omissions outside Australia in relation to the securities or financial 
products of a person or body corporate that is established or carrying on business in 
Australia.251  Likewise, it was concluded that the scope of application of the market 
manipulation prohibition in Australia is now broadly extended, not only to market 
manipulation, but also to other related activities such as dishonest conduct and market 
rigging.252 It was also concluded that the current market manipulation provisions dispense 
with the requirement of proving the intention to induce others to sell, buy or subscribe for the 
affected securities or financial products, on the part of the prosecuting authorities.253  It was 
noted and concluded that the criminal penalties for market abuse were recently increased to a 
maximum pecuniary fine of Aus $495, 000 or three times the profit gained or loss avoided, 
whichever is the greater, or ten years imprisonment or both, for individuals.  The maximum 
criminal penalties for a body corporate were increased to a fine of Aus $4, 950, 000 or three 
times the profit made or loss avoided, or 10% of the body corporate’s annual turnover during 
the relevant period in which the offence was committed, whichever is greater.254  It was 
further concluded that the Australian Securities and Investments Commission may refer any 
serious criminal matters to the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions and/or 
institute a civil action for insider trading and/or other market abuse offences in the name of, 
and for the benefit of the affected persons or the issuer of the affected securities or financial 
products in order to recover their losses, pecuniary damages, property or other entitlements as 
249   See further analysis in paragraphs 8 2 5 & 8 6 in Chapter Eight of this thesis & related remarks in Chapter 
Nine of this thesis.  
250   See further analysis in paragraphs 8 2 5 & 8 6 in Chapter Eight of this thesis & related remarks in Chapter 
Nine of this thesis.  
251    See paragraphs 8 2 5 & 8 6 in Chapter Eight of this thesis & related remarks in Chapter Nine of this 
thesis.  
252   See Part 7.10 of the Corporations Act; also see paragraphs 8 2 7 3; 8 2 5 & 8 6 in Chapter Eight of this 
thesis & related remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis.     
253   See paragraphs 8 2 7 3; 8 2 5 & 8 6 in Chapter Eight of this thesis & related remarks in Chapter Nine of 
this thesis.  
254   See paragraphs 8 2 6 2; 8 2 7 4 1; 8 2 5 & 8 6 in Chapter Eight of this thesis & related remarks in Chapter 
Nine of this thesis.  
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contemplated in the Corporations Act.255  It was also noted and concluded that the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission may also impose a civil penalty of up to Aus $1 
million on any person who violates its Market Integrity Rules.256 Moreover, it was concluded 
that the Australian Securities and Investments Commission may further institute infringement 
notices and/or enforceable undertakings against the market abuse offenders.257  It was noted 
and concluded that market manipulation and insider trading offences are now listed as serious 
offences under the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act258 and this empowers 
the Australian Federal Police and/or other interception agencies to apply for a telephone 
interception warrant in matters involving market abuse investigations.259 In line with this, it 
was concluded that the Australian Securities and Investments Commission may now rely on 
the Australian Federal Police to obtain intercepted telephone material which could be used in 
the prosecution of market abuse offences in Australia.260 Moreover, it was noted and 
concluded that the Australian Securities and Investments Commission is now responsible for 
the real-time surveillance of the Australian securities and futures markets in order to detect 
and prevent market abuse activities.261  It was also concluded that the declaration of 
contravention of market manipulation and/or other market misconduct provisions is a useful 
tool to expedite the actions for civil remedies by both the courts and the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission in Australia.262 It was concluded that a number of self-
regulatory organisations and other regulatory authorities are employed to complement the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission in curbing market abuse practices in 
Australia.263  It was noted and concluded that the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission has successfully forged some co-operation agreements with several international 
255   See further paragraphs 8 3 1; 8 2 5 & 8 6 in Chapter Eight of this thesis & related remarks in Chapter 
Nine of this thesis.  
256   See further paragraphs 8 3 1; 8 2 5 & 8 6 in Chapter Eight of this thesis & related remarks in Chapter 
Nine of this thesis.  
257   See further paragraphs 8 3 1; & 8 6 in Chapter Eight of this thesis & related remarks in Chapter Nine of 
this thesis.  
258    114 of 1979 (Cth) as amended, hereinafter referred to as the Telecommunications Act.    
259   See further paragraphs 8 3 1; & 8 6 in Chapter Eight of this thesis & related remarks in Chapter Nine of 
this thesis.  
260   See further paragraphs 8 3 1 & 8 6 in Chapter Eight of this thesis & related remarks in Chapter Nine of 
this thesis.  
261   See further paragraphs 8 3 1 & 8 6 in Chapter Eight of this thesis & related remarks in Chapter Nine of 
this thesis.  
262   See paragraphs 8 3 1; 8 2 7 4 3 & 8 6 in Chapter Eight of this thesis & related remarks in Chapter Nine of 
this thesis.                                                                                                                   
263   See paragraphs 8 3 2; 8 3 3 1 to 8 3 3 5; 8 3 4; 8 4 1; 8 4 2; 8 3 1 & 8 6 in Chapter Eight of this thesis & 
related remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis.    
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self-regulatory organisations for the purposes of combating cross-border market abuse 
activities in Australia and elsewhere.264 Moreover, it was concluded that a number of 
preventative enforcement methods such as Chinese walls, whistle-blower immunity 
provisions and private rights of action are employed to discourage market abuse activities in 
Australia.265  However, it was noted and concluded that bounty rewards are not yet employed 
in Australia to encourage more persons to provide the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission and/or other enforcement authorities with the relevant information that can lead 
to the recovery of civil remedies from the market abuse offenders.266     
 
It was further noted and concluded that an overall comparative analysis on how market abuse 
practices are detected, investigated, prosecuted and prevented in the European Union, the 
United Kingdom, South Africa, Australia and the United States of America was undertaken in 
Chapter Nine.267  In relation to this, as indicated in Chapter Five,268 it was concluded that, 
unlike the multi-functional regulatory approach of the United States of America,269 South 
Africa mainly empowers only the Financial Services Board to supervise and oversee the 
enforcement of its market abuse prohibition.270  It was concluded that although the Financial 
Services Board has to date managed to obtain some settlements in civil cases of market 
abuse,271 it falls short when comparing its market abuse enforcement record with that of 
similar foreign regulatory bodies like the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission,272 the Financial Securities Authority273 and the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission.274 It was also concluded that the Securities Services Act, the 
264   See further paragraphs 8 4 3 & 8 6 read with paragraph 8 3 1 in Chapter Eight of this thesis & related 
remarks in Chapter Nine of this thesis.  
265   See paragraphs 8 2 6 3; 8 2 7 4 3; 8 5 & 8 6 in Chapter Eight of this thesis & related remarks in Chapter 
Nine of this thesis.  
266   See paragraphs 8 2 6 3; 8 2 7 4 3; 8 5 & 8 6 in Chapter Eight of this thesis & related remarks in Chapter 
Nine of this thesis.  
267    Generally see paragraph 9 11 in Chapter Nine of this thesis.  
268    Generally see related analysis in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
269   See paragraphs 9 4; 9 6 & 9 11 in Chapter Nine of this thesis; also see paragraphs 5 4 3 & 5 5 2 in 
Chapter Five of this thesis & paragraph 10 2 above.     
270    Also see paragraphs 3 2 1 & 4 2 in Chapters Three & Four of this thesis respectively.   
271    See paragraphs 9 4 & 9 11 in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
272   See paragraphs 9 4 & 9 11 in Chapter Nine of this thesis; see further paragraph 5 4 1 in Chapter Five of 
this thesis & paragraphs 3 2 1 & 4 2 in Chapters Three & Four of this thesis respectively.    
273   See further paragraph 7 5 1 in Chapter Seven of this thesis; also see paragraphs 9 4 & 9 11 in Chapter 
Nine of this thesis.   
274   See further paragraph 8 3 1 in Chapter Eight of this thesis; also see paragraphs 9 4 & 9 11 in Chapter 
Nine of this thesis.   
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Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 do not expressly provide whether 
the self-regulatory organisations in South Africa are empowered like the Financial Services 
Board to impose their own penalties or to take any other appropriate action against the market 
abuse offenders in South Africa.275 Moreover, it was concluded that the Securities Services 
Act does not expressly provide civil penalties and remedies for market manipulation 
offences.276   It was further concluded that this omission on the part of the legislature could 
potentially weaken South Africa’s market abuse regime,277 compared to similar foreign 
legislation in countries like the United States of America.   In addition, it was concluded that 
the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 
fall short when it comes to the statutory provision and policing of commodities-based market 
manipulation remedies in South Africa.278 It was also concluded that the Financial Services 
Board has not fully utilised the support from other International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding member regulators to combat 
cross-border market abuse activities.279  It was also noted and concluded that, unlike the 
position in the European Union,280 very minimal attention has been given to the combating of 
cross-border market abuse practices in South Africa.281  It was further concluded that, 
although the Financial Services Board, like the Financial Securities Authority282 and the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission283 has also concluded some Memoranda 
of Understanding with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission and the 
Financial Securities Authority, relatively little progress has been made by the Financial 
Services Board to fully utilise such Memoranda of Understanding to combat cross-border 
market abuse activities in South Africa.284 It was also concluded the lack of reported 
successful cases of cross-border market abuse prosecutions and settlements might have been 
275   See Chapter VIII of the Securities Services Act; Chapter X of the Financial Markets Bill; Chapter X of 
the Financial Markets Bill 2012 & also see paragraphs 9 4; 9 6; 9 8 & 9 11 in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
276   S 75 & s 76; also see Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 192 & related remarks in paragraphs 9 3; 9 2 1; 9 3 1 & 9 
11 in Chapter Nine of this thesis.   Also see Cassim 2008 SA Merc LJ 36.   
277    See paragraphs 9 3 1 & 9 11 in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
278    See paragraphs 9 3 1 & 9 11 in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
279    See paragraphs 9 4; 9 6; 9 9 & 9 11 in Chapter Nine of this thesis & see related comments in paragraphs 4 
2 & 4 3 3 Chapters Four of this thesis.   
280    Generally see paragraph 6 4 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
281   See further related discussions in paragraphs also see paragraphs 9 4; 9 6; 9 9 & 9 11 in Chapter Nine of 
this thesis; also see paragraphs 3 2 7 & 4 3 3 in Chapters Three & Four of this thesis respectively.    
282    See paragraphs 7 5 1 & 7 6 3 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
283    See paragraphs 8 3 1 & 8 4 3 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
284   See related remarks in paragraphs 9 4 to 9 11 in Chapter Nine of this thesis; also see related comments in 
paragraphs 4 2 & 4 3 3 Chapters Four & Six of this thesis.    
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caused by the unavailability of sufficient resources and the adoption of inadequate 
preventative measures on the part of the Financial Services Board to monitor and enforce the 
market abuse prohibition, both at a local and international level.285 It was also indicated and 
concluded that, although it may be prima facie presumed that the Financial Services Board 
supports the Director of Public Prosecutions and the relevant courts with the necessary 
information regarding ongoing market abuse cases in South Africa, it is not clear whether the 
Financial Services Board is statutorily mandated to assign certain persons with the relevant 
expertise to assist the courts in their prosecution of such cases.286 As indicated in Chapter 
Seven,287 it was concluded that, unlike the position in the United Kingdom,288 all the persons 
who are prejudiced by market abuse activities are not statutorily given the opportunity to 
independently claim their compensatory damages directly from the perpetrators of such 
activities in South Africa.289  It was concluded that this approach has, in a way, contributed to 
the scanty and inconsistent enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in South Africa.290 
Moreover, it was concluded that, unlike the position in Australia,291 this approach could have 
been worsened by the absence of a mandatory duty of continuous disclosure on the part of the 
issuers of listed securities to prevent the market abuse offences in South Africa.292 It was also 
concluded that, unlike the Financial Services Authority,293 the Financial Services Board 
cannot impose unlimited financial penalties in matters involving criminal cases relating to 
market abuse in South Africa.294  Such unlimited penalties may only be imposed by the 
Enforcement Committee in respect of administrative cases for market abuse.295    
 
It was also concluded, as earlier stated in Chapter Six,296 that as is the case with the current 
European Union market abuse regime,297 a number of regulatory and enforcement measures 
285    Paragraphs 4 2; 4 3 1; 4 3 3; 4 3 4; & 4 5 in Chapter Four of this thesis; also see further discussions in 
paragraph 3 2 7 in Chapter Three of this thesis.    Also see paragraphs 9 4 & 9 11 in Chapter Nine of this 
thesis. 
286   See further related remarks in paragraphs 9 5; 9 7 & 9 11 in Chapter Nine of this thesis & also generally 
see paragraph 3 2 6 in Chapter Three of this thesis.     
287    See related analysis in Chapter Seven thesis. 
288    See paragraphs 7 4 & 7 7 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
289    See related comments in paragraphs 9 2 1; 9 3 1; 9 10 & 9 11 in Chapter Nine of this thesis.  
290    See related comments in paragraphs 9 2 1; 9 3 1; 9 10 & 9 11 in Chapter Nine of this thesis.   
291    See paragraphs 8 3 1; 8 2 7 4 2 & 8 5 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
292    See paragraphs 9 10 & 9 11 in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
293    Generally see paragraphs 7 5 1; 7 4 & 7 7 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
294    Generally see paragraphs 9 2 1; 9 3 1; 9 4; 9 10 & 9 11 in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
295    Generally see paragraph 9 2 1; 9 3 1; 9 4; 9 10 & 9 11 in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
296    Generally see related analysis in Chapter Six. 
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have also been employed to curb market abuse in South Africa.298   Furthermore, it was 
concluded that unlike the position in the European Union,299 the Securities Services Act, the 
Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 do not expressly provide or 
give any provisions that require issuers or their agents to draw up and update their employee 
or insiders’ lists and/or such issuers, managers or directors of juristic persons to immediately 
report (mandatory duty of disclosure) any suspicious transactions to the relevant authorities in 
South Africa.300   It was also noted and concluded that, in contrast to the EU Market Abuse 
Directive and the subsequent Market Abuse Regulation Proposal,301 the Securities Services 
Act, the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 do not expressly provide 
whether the Financial Services Board or other relevant regulatory authorities have the 
authority to access telephone and existing data traffic records from companies, issuers of 
securities and other suspected market abuse offenders in order to track down and 
meritoriously discourage the commission of market abuse offences in South Africa.302  In this 
regard, it was concluded that adopting the approach employed in the EU Market Abuse 
Directive or the subsequent Market Abuse Regulation Proposal303 could assist the regulatory 
authorities in South Africa to curb, as much as possible, the occurrence of market abuse 
activities in both the regulated and unregulated financial markets.304  Yet again, it was 
concluded that, unlike the position in the European Union,305 the South African market abuse 
laws do not expressly provide whether the issuers of securities are statutorily allowed to delay 
or defer the publication of inside information, especially where such delay could be 
reasonable and justifiable.306  It was additionally concluded that although the Financial 
Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 now stipulates that the Financial Services 
Board may assist foreign regulators with investigations pertaining to any cross-border market 
297    See paragraphs 6 4 1 to 6 4 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
298    See related remarks in paragraphs 9 4 to 9 11 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
299    See paragraph 6 4 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
300   Also see the relevant provisions under Chapter VIII of the Securities Services Act; Chapter X of the 
Financial Markets Bill; Chapter X of the Financial Markets Bill 2012 & also see paragraphs 9 2; 9 3; 9 10 
& 9 11 in Chapter Nine of this thesis.  
301    See paragraph 6 4 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
302   Also see the relevant provisions under Chapter VIII of the Securities Services Act; Chapter X of the 
Financial Markets Bill; Chapter X of the Financial Markets Bill 2012 & also see paragraphs 9 2; 9 3 & 9 
10 above.      
303    See paragraph 6 4 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
304    See paragraph 9 11 in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
305    See paragraphs 6 4 5 & 6 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
306   S 72 to s 87 of the Securities Services Act; clauses 81 to 95 of the Financial Markets Bill; clauses 79 to 90 
the Financial Markets Bill 2012 & also see paragraph 9 11 in Chapter Nine of this thesis.      
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abuse cases,307 it remains unclear whether the Financial Services Board is statutorily obligated 
to co-operate with other local enforcement bodies308 for the purposes of enhancing and/or 
increasing the curbing of market abuse activities in South Africa.309  It was also concluded 
that the failure on the part of the EU Market Abuse Directive310 to provide common market 
abuse penalties that are applicable across the European Union member states has contributed 
to the inconsistent implementation of its provisions.311 It was further concluded that this flaw 
is repeated in the Criminal Sanctions Market Abuse Directive Proposal312 while, on the other 
hand, the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal now provides specific civil or administrative 
pecuniary sanctions for market abuse.313 Moreover, it was concluded that, in contrast to the 
position in Australia,314 the United Kingdom315 and the United States of America,316 the 
Financial Services Board does not publicise the names of the culprits who commit market 
abuse offences (name and shame approach) in South Africa.317 It was further concluded that, 
in contrast to the courts in the United Kingdom,318 Australia319 and the United States of 
America,320 the South African courts are still to obtain more settlements and convictions in 
market abuse cases.321   
 
10 4  Recommendations  
 
It is submitted that a comprehensive, holistic and pragmatic approach to the enforcement of 
the market abuse prohibition should be adopted in South Africa.   In order to achieve this, 
307   Clause 91(2)(b) of the Financial Markets Bill; clauses 86(2)(b) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012 & also 
see related remarks in paragraph 3 2 1 in Chapter Three of this thesis.   
308   See the relevant provisions in Chapter X of the Financial Markets Bill & the relevant provisions in 
Chapter X of  the Financial Markets Bill 2012  
309    Also see paragraphs 9 2; 9 3; 9 6; 9 7 & 9 8; 9 10 & 9 11in Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
310    See paragraph 6 4 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
311    See paragraphs 9 2 1; 9 3 1 & 9 11 in Chapter Nine of this thesis; also paragraphs 2 5 4 & 4 4 5 in 
Chapters Two & Four of this thesis respectively.     
312    Articles 6 & 8; also see paragraph 6 4 5 in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
313   Article 26(1)(k); (l) & (m) of the Market Abuse Regulation Proposal; also see paragraph 6 4 5 in Chapter 
Six of this thesis & paragraphs 9 3 1 & 9 11 in Chapter Nine of this thesis.     
314    See paragraphs 8 3 1 & 8 5 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
315    Generally see paragraphs 7 5 1; 7 5 3; 7 6 2 & 7 8 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
316    See related comments in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
317    Also see paragraph 9 11 in Chapter Nine of this thesis.  
318    See paragraphs 7 5 2 & 7 6 1 in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
319    See paragraphs 8 3 4 & 8 4 1 in Chapter Eight of this thesis. 
320    See paragraph 5 4 2 & 5 5 1 in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
321   See further related remarks in paragraphs 9 5; 9 7 & 9 11 in Chapter Nine of this thesis & also generally 
see paragraph 3 2 6 in Chapter Three of this thesis.        
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firstly, a number of recommendations aimed at resolving the problems associated with the 
enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in South Africa will be enumerated below. 
Secondly, key recommendations and/or proposed provisions to combat market abuse in South 
Africa will be discussed as indicated in figure 1 below, in four categories, namely, the 
adoption of adequate and/or appropriate penalties for market abuse, the adoption of adequate 
market abuse preventative measures, mutual co-operation between the relevant stakeholders 
and the adoption of adequate market abuse awareness measures. Notably, the aforementioned 
key recommendations and/or proposed provisions will be briefly preceded by some relevant 
explanations where necessary.     
 
10 4 1  Overall Synopsis of the Recommendations 
 
The overall recommendations aimed at inter alia improving the enforcement of the market 
abuse prohibition in South Africa are broadly divided into four categories, namely, those that 
deal with (a) the adoption of adequate and/or appropriate penalties for market abuse, (b) the 
adoption of adequate market abuse preventative measures, (c) mutual co-operation between 
the relevant stakeholders and, (d) the adoption of adequate market abuse awareness measures 
as enumerated below.322    
 
10 4 1 1   Adoption of Adequate and/or Appropriate Penalties for Market Abuse 
 
It is recommended that: 
 
Firstly, the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets 
Bill 2012 should be amended to enact specific provisions for separate and distinct maximum 
penalties (civil, criminal or administrative) that can be imposed upon any individual or juristic 
person that commits or attempts to commit or that incites, aids and abets or attempts to incite, 
aid and/or abet another person to commit insider trading or market manipulation offences in 
South Africa, with much higher maximum criminal penalties being imposed on such juristic 
person;   
 
322    It is submitted, depending on the merits of each case, that the regulatory authorities should co-operatively 
select or flexibility consider employing the most suitable enforcement measures that are listed in any of 
the aforesaid categories, to effectively combat market abuse in South Africa.   
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Secondly, the Financial Services Board should be expressly and statutorily authorised to 
impose its own additional separate and distinct unlimited monetary and other appropriate 
(civil, criminal or administrative) penalties on individuals and juristic persons that engage in 
market abuse activities in South Africa; and/or to use the seizure and forfeiture method to 
recover or confiscate assets and other illegal benefits from the market abuse offenders;   
 
Thirdly, the Securities Services Act should be reviewed to expressly provide civil penalties 
for market manipulation offences and desist from rigidly relying on the policy goal of 
deterrence alone; and/or the provisions of the Financial Markets Bill which now empowers 
the Financial Services Board to claim from the market manipulation offenders, legal costs and 
civil compensatory penalties of up to three times the profit gained or loss avoided plus interest 
should speedily come into force to promote the consistent enforcement of the market abuse 
prohibition in South Africa;  
 
Fourthly, the relevant courts in South Africa should be expressly and statutorily empowered 
to impose other additional penalties (apart from those stipulated in the Securities Services 
Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012) upon the market 
offenders without the fear of violating the autrefois acquit or autrefois convict doctrine;   
 
Lastly, the Securities Services Act should be reviewed to statutorily and expressly empower 
the Financial Services Board to employ administrative sanctions or penalties such as public 
censure against the market abuse offenders in South Africa; or the relevant provisions of the 
Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 which seek to empower the 
Financial Services Board to publish by notice on its official website or by means of other 
appropriate public media, any outcome, status or details of market abuse investigations 
(public censure or name and shame approach) if such publication is in the public interest 
should speedily come into force.  
 
10 4 1 2   Adoption of Adequate Market Abuse Preventative Measures 
 
It is recommended that: 
 
Firstly, the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets 
Bill 2012 should be amended to provide for specific market abuse whistle-blower immunity 
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provisions and bounty rewards for the purposes of encouraging all the persons to report 
market abuse activities to the Financial Services Board or other relevant enforcement 
authorities in South Africa;   
 
Secondly, the relevant courts and/or the Financial Services Board should be statutorily 
empowered to make a declaration of contravention of the market abuse provisions in South 
Africa and/or to seek a court order for such declaration in South Africa whenever a 
contravention occurs, for deterrence purposes;   
 
Thirdly, the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets 
Bill 2012 should be reviewed to establish a specific regulatory body that prohibits and 
investigates Internet-based market abuse practices in South Africa, and to specifically 
discourage the dissemination or publication of rumours, false, deceptive or misleading 
information through the Internet and/or through the electronic media (disclosure-based 
manipulation with regard Internet related to publications) by insiders or any person who 
knows or ought to have known that such information is false, deceptive or misleading;  
 
Fourthly, the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets 
Bill 2012  should be reviewed to explicitly provide a statutory private right of action for the 
issuers of listed securities and/or other aggrieved or prejudiced persons to claim their market 
abuse damages directly from the offenders;   
 
Fifthly, the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets 
Bill 2012 should be reviewed to enact provisions that statutorily define the concept of market 
abuse in South Africa; 
 
Sixthly, the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets 
Bill 2012 should be amended to provide adequate and comprehensive statutory definitions of 
the concepts of insider trading and market manipulation, involving all the elements of these 
offences (how they are committed) as well as the various types of market manipulation 
practices to enhance the combating of such practices in South Africa;  
 
Seventhly, the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012 should be reviewed to enact provisions that expressly prohibit a person 
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who inadvertently aided or abetted another person to make or publish a false, misleading or 
deceptive statement, promise or forecast that relates to any security in South Africa;  
 
In the eighth place, the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be reviewed to enact provisions that expressly prohibit 
commodity-based market manipulation, and to introduce a specific anti-commodities-based 
market abuse enforcement commission or a regulatory body like the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission, to effectively and exclusively deal with the commodities-based market 
manipulation violations in South Africa; 
 
In the ninth place, the Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act,323 the Securities 
Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be 
reviewed to enact provisions that expressly empower the Enforcement Committee to enact or 
make its own independent market abuse rules, decisions, regulations and other appropriate 
disciplinary or administrative actions on matters involving market abuse practices to enhance 
the combating of such practices in South Africa;  
 
In the tenth place, notwithstanding the potential negative effects of bureaucracy, 
balkanisation, conflict of interests and confusion that may be associated with many regulatory 
bodies, it is submitted that more self-regulatory organisations, apart from the Financial 
Services Board, should be statutorily empowered to enforce the market abuse prohibition 
and/or to impose their own penalties or take any other appropriate action against any persons 
who indulge in market abuse activities in South Africa;   
 
In the eleventh place, the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be amended to enact provisions that specifically prohibit 
insurance-related insider trading in South Africa;  
 
In the twelfth place, it is submitted, as is the position in Delaware (where there is a system in 
place for the periodic revision of the Delaware Codes), that the South African policy makers 
should seriously consider appointing a National Market Abuse Commission to examine and 
review, from time to time, all the matters and laws pertaining to market abuse in South Africa; 
323    28 of 2001 as amended, hereinafter referred to as the Protection of Funds Act.   
536 
                                               
or the Directorate of Market Abuse and/or a new self-regulatory organisation should be 
statutorily established and authorised to independently engage in public consultation from 
time to time, to review or make proposals to the legislature and/or other relevant authorities in 
relation to any matter dealing with the securities law reform and the general regulation or 
enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in South Africa; 
 
In the thirteenth place, the South African policy makers should consider introducing 
provincial market abuse statutes to: (a) create regulatory competition among the provinces to 
attract investors by effectively combating market abuse activities, and (b) promote dual or 
concurrent regulation and enforcement of the market abuse ban both at a provincial and 
national level.   However, this should be managed well to avoid creating potential problems 
such as balkanisation and/or violating the autrefois acquit or autrefois convict doctrine;  
 
In the fourteenth place, the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be reviewed to enact provisions that mandate companies 
and all the relevant persons to have market abuse codes of conduct and to appoint market 
abuse compliance officers;  
 
In the fifteenth place, in light of the recent global economic crisis, the Securities Services Act, 
the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be amended to enact 
provisions which broadly extend the scope of the market abuse ban to cover securities or 
financial instruments traded on regulated markets, over the counter markets, organised trading 
facilities or multilateral trading facilities in South Africa or elsewhere, to enable the Financial 
Services Board and other relevant regulatory authorities to curb the market abuse challenges 
posed by high frequency trading and other related illicit activities associated with the new 
trading platforms;  
 
In the sixteenth place, the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be amended in line with the Market Abuse Regulation 
Proposal and the Wholesale Energy Market Integrity and Transparency Regulation to enact a 
specific definition of inside information for commodity derivatives, spot commodity 
derivatives and related spot commodity contracts to curb insider trading and cross-market 
manipulation in the South African physical (non-financial markets) commodities markets; 
and/or enacting separate, adequate and specific commodity derivatives regulations or 
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legislation that targets market abuse activities involving commodity derivatives, spot 
commodity derivatives and related spot commodity contracts in the South African 
commodities markets;    
 
In the seventeenth place, the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be reviewed to enact adequate provisions on emission 
allowances in order to discourage cross-border market abuse activities in the spot secondary 
markets or related emission allowances markets in South Africa and elsewhere;    
 
In the eighteenth place, the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be amended to enact specific, adequate and separate 
provisions that distinguish and prohibit both actual and attempted insider trading and market 
manipulation practices to enable the prosecuting authorities and/or the Financial Services 
Board to increase the number of successful prosecutions and settlements of cases involving 
such practices in South Africa;     
 
In the nineteenth place, the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be amended to enact provisions that oblige issuers and 
other relevant persons to draw and update their insiders’ lists to enhance the detection and 
prevention of market abuse practices in South Africa;  
 
In the twentieth place, the legislature should consider introducing mandatory, structured 
(periodic) and continuous statutory disclosure requirements coupled with civil penalties for 
non-compliance to enable the JSE and/or the Financial Services Board to oblige all the issuers 
or listed entities and directors (insiders) of such entities to promptly, consistently and publicly  
disclose the relevant non-public price-sensitive inside information (including their lending or 
pledging of securities or financial instruments), transactions executed on behalf of the issuers 
and/or their interests in the securities of those entities to prevent market abuse practices in the 
regulated markets, over the counter markets, small and medium-sized growth markets and/or 
other related trading platforms in South Africa;  
 
In the twenty-first place, the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be reviewed to enact provisions that expressly discourage 
any market abuse activity or illicit dealing in securities on unregulated over the counter 
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markets through agents or professional intermediaries and face-to-face transactions between 
non-professional intermediaries in South Africa; and/or provisions that expressly prohibit 
natural persons (agents or corporate insiders) who participate in the execution of transactions 
on behalf of a primary insider who is a legal or juristic person from committing market abuse 
practices and other related organised crime activities in the South African financial markets;   
 
In the twenty-second place, the Financial Services Board should have its own surveillance 
systems or other mechanisms in place to detect and prevent market abuse activity in the South 
African securities and financial markets.  Moreover, it is submitted that the Financial Services 
Board should be statutorily empowered to intercept telephonic data from the suspected market 
abuse offenders, to take over the real-time surveillance of the South African securities and 
financial markets from the JSE and to develop its own adequate technological mechanisms for 
market abuse cross-market surveillance in order to effectively and timeously detect, 
investigate and prevent market abuse practices in South Africa by eradicating the delays that 
might be associated with the Financial Services Board’s investigations into the JSE’s market 
abuse referrals;    
 
In the twenty-third place, the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be amended to enact provisions that clearly enumerate 
sufficient guidelines or conditions under which the extra-territorial application of the market 
abuse ban will be employed and/or to introduce a more adequate, feasible and practically 
enforceable extra-territorial approach which enforces the market abuse prohibition only where 
a violation of the South African securities listed on a foreign market has a territorial (nexus) 
link to South Africa, in order to prevent cross-border market abuse activities consistently in 
South Africa and elsewhere;    
 
In the twenty-fourth place, the JSE should consider establishing its own Markets Disciplinary 
Tribunal which specifically deals with any illicit violations of its Listing Requirements and/or 
market abuse cases in South Africa;    
 
In the twenty-fifth place, the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be amended to expressly provide some rebuttable 
presumptions or reduce the evidentiary burden of proof in criminal cases in order to assist the 
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Director of Public Prosecutions and/or the relevant courts in the prosecution of market abuse 
cases in South Africa;    
 
In the twenty-sixth place, insider trading and market manipulation should be statutorily 
treated as indictable offences in South Africa;    
 
In the twenty-seventh place, the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be amended to enact specific and adequate statutory 
provisions that deal with Chinese walls to reduce and discourage market abuse practices in 
South Africa; and/or other adequate and additional defences for market manipulation so as not 
to discourage legitimate securities trading by issuers or other potential investors;    
 
In the twenty-eighth place, the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be reviewed to provide adequate special or 
complementary definitions of inside information in relation to derivatives on commodities 
and/or to the persons (professional intermediaries) involved in the execution of orders relating 
to listed securities or other related derivative financial instruments.  It is submitted that this 
could prevent the commission of front running or other market abuse activities pertaining to 
commodities derivatives by some unscrupulous financial brokers and/or other related market 
participants in South Africa;  
 
In the twenty-ninth place, the definition of an insider which is provided in the Securities 
Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be 
amended in order to expressly acknowledge that a company (legal person) which repurchases 
its own shares would be an insider to itself.  It is submitted that this will protect shareholders 
of a company against such company taking advantage of the non-public price-sensitive 
information to repurchase their shares at a lower price than what the company would have 
paid if the information had been made public;   
 
In the thirtieth place, the Financial Services Board should consider employing infringement 
notices and enforceable undertakings to discourage market abuse activities in South Africa;    
 
Lastly, South Africa should consider adopting and implementing the relevant principles of the 
United Kingdom’s single regulator model because it is economical and less complex.  This 
540 
could increase the number of settlements and convictions in market abuse cases in South 
Africa.  
 
10 4 1 3   Mutual Co-operation between the Relevant Stakeholders 
 
It is recommended that: 
 
Firstly, the Financial Services Board should consider concluding a binding co-operation and 
information-sharing Memorandum of Understanding or other specific binding co-operation 
agreements with more local self-regulatory organisations such as the JSE and the Securities 
Regulation Panel to increase co-operation in relation to the detection and combating of market 
abuse practices in the South African financial markets; or the Securities Services Act, the 
Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be reviewed to enact 
provisions that expressly impose a mandatory co-operation obligation on both the Financial 
Services Board and the JSE to improve the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in 
South Africa;  
 
Secondly, the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets 
Bill 2012 should be reviewed to enact a specific provision that obliges the JSE to give 
reasonable assistance to the Financial Services Board regarding the combating of market 
abuse whenever it is necessary, by inter alia, searching the premises of the accused persons 
who are suspected of engaging in market abuse practices and by summoning any such persons 
to furnish it with other relevant information relating to ongoing market abuse investigations;   
 
Thirdly, the Securities Services Act should be amended to enact a provision that expressly 
empowers the Financial Services Board to co-operate with other local and international 
regulatory bodies in order to enhance the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in 
South Africa; or the provisions of the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 
2012 which seeks to empower the Financial Services Board to assist foreign regulators with 
investigations pertaining to any cross-border market abuse cases should speedily come into 
force to enhance the combating of such cases in South Africa and elsewhere;   
 
Fourthly, the Financial Services Board should be statutorily mandated to support the Director 
of Public Prosecutions and/or the relevant courts with the necessary information regarding 
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ongoing market abuse cases in South Africa by assigning from time to time certain persons 
with the relevant expertise to assist the Director of Public Prosecutions and relevant courts in 
their prosecution of such cases in South Africa; and/or the Financial Services Board and the 
Director of Public Prosecutions should consider concluding a binding co-operation and 
information-sharing Memorandum of Understanding to enhance their co-operation and 
enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in South Africa;   
 
Fifthly, the Financial Services Board should be statutorily authorised to appoint other relevant 
stakeholders and/or additional skilled persons, apart from its own employees, to provide it 
with reports or relevant information relating to any suspected market abuse violations;    
 
Sixthly, the legislature should consider enacting specific provisions which empower the 
Financial Services Board and the JSE to jointly form, fund, and operate a Joint Market Abuse 
Advisory Committee that would be tasked with considering and developing solutions to 
emerging and ongoing market abuse issues of common interest involving commodity and 
commodity derivatives as well as futures and/or securities traded in both the regulated and 
over the counter markets in South Africa.   In other words, the aforesaid Joint Market Abuse 
Advisory Committee should identify emerging regulatory risks, assess and quantify their 
implications for investors and other market participants, and recommend possible solutions to 
the Financial Services Board and the JSE;   
 
Seventhly, the legislature should consider enacting specific provisions which empower the 
Financial Services Board, the Securities Regulation Panel, the JSE and other relevant 
stakeholders to create a Joint Anti-Market Abuse Enforcement Task Force to harness 
synergies from shared market surveillance data; improve market oversight; enhance 
enforcement; and to reduce duplicative regulatory burdens and/or balkanisation. The Joint 
Anti-Market Abuse Enforcement Task Force should prepare and offer market abuse training 
programmes for the employees of all the relevant enforcement authorities, develop practical 
market abuse investigation and enforcement measures and timeously coordinate the sharing of 
relevant market abuse information.  Moreover, the Joint Anti-Market Abuse Enforcement 
Task Force should oversee the general execution of the day-to-day duties by the employees of 
all the relevant enforcement agencies to enhance the enforcement of the market abuse ban in 
South Africa;  
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In the eighth place, regulatory agencies such as the Financial Services Board and the JSE 
should establish a Joint Market Abuse Cross-Agency Training Programme for their 
employees to increase the enforcement of the market abuse provisions in South Africa.  This 
could be achieved by developing a training programme to increase the consistent and/or 
regular sharing of relevant information and rotating of employees between the Financial 
Services Board and the JSE.   This programme could, each year, give the employees of both 
the Financial Services Board and the JSE the opportunity to work at the other agency for a 
temporary specified period of time to enhance greater collaboration and coordination between 
these two agencies;   
 
In the ninth place, the Financial Services Board and the JSE should consider developing a 
Joint Market Abuse Information Technology Task Force to link their relevant information 
pertaining to on-going market abuse investigations if they consider such information to be 
jointly useful and/or in the public interest.  This could promote transparency and facilitate the 
use and understanding of such information by providing a comprehensive, consolidated 
database on persons and entities investigated by both the Financial Services Board and the 
JSE to combat market abuse activities in the South African regulated financial markets;   
 
In the tenth place, the South African Police Services and/or the Financial Services Board 
should be statutorily empowered to co-operatively work together and jointly have measures in 
place to intercept or access telephone and existing data traffic records from companies, issuers 
of securities and any other suspected offenders in matters involving market abuse 
investigations in South Africa; and/or the Financial Services Board and the South African 
Police Services should also consider concluding a binding Memorandum of Understanding 
relating to market abuse investigations in order to track down and meritoriously discourage 
the commission of market abuse offences in South Africa and elsewhere (cross-border market 
abuse activities);   
 
Lastly, the Financial Services Board should enter into more co-operation arrangements with 
other renowned international regulators such as the Ontario Securities Commission and the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission and similar bodies that enforce 
commodities-based market abuse laws such as the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 
the London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange Administration and 
Management and the Trade Point Stock Exchange to increase the combating of commodities-
543 
based market abuse practices and cross-border market abuse activities in South Africa and 
elsewhere.   
 
10 4 1 4   Adoption of Adequate Market Abuse Awareness Measures  
 
It is recommended that: 
 
Firstly, the legislature should consider statutorily establishing more specialised courts and 
mediation, arbitration and settlement tribunals that are manned with judges and other persons 
with the relevant expertise in all the provinces of South Africa to increase awareness, improve 
the negotiation, settlement and prosecution of market abuse cases and/or the general 
combating of market abuse practices in the South African financial markets;  
 
Secondly, the Financial Services Board should be statutorily required to provide its own 
adequate market abuse policy guidelines or Code of Market Abuse Conduct containing 
sufficient and adequate guidelines on factors that should be considered from time to time in 
determining whether a trading practice and/or behaviour will give rise to or amount to market 
abuse practices to increase awareness and the combating of such practices in South Africa;  
 
Lastly, the legislature, the JSE, the Financial Services Board and/or other enforcement 
agencies should co-operatively engage more on preventative, educative and awareness 
programmes such as developing an adequate anti-market abuse curriculum to be taught to 
students from high school level up to tertiary level; publishing some quarterly informative 
market abuse booklets on their respective websites; and conducting anti-market abuse 
workshops and public lectures to increase the general awareness among the market 
participants and/or other relevant stakeholders in the South African financial markets.   
 
10 4 2 Key Recommendations  
 
The key recommendations and/or proposed provisions will be briefly stated and, where 
necessary, some explanations for these proposed provisions will be provided as indicated 
earlier324 and as stated in figure 1 below.   Notably, the key recommendations and/or proposed 
324      See paragraph 10 4 above.  
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provisions are broadly divided into four categories, namely those that deal with (a) the 
adoption of adequate and/or appropriate penalties for market abuse, (b) the adoption of 
adequate market abuse preventative measures, (c) mutual co-operation between the relevant 
stakeholders, and (d) the adoption of adequate market abuse awareness measures.325 
Moreover, these key recommendations and/or proposed provisions and policy objectives are 
not numbered and enumerated in any specific order of preference; as a result there will not be 
any cross-referencing among these provisions.   In addition, notwithstanding the fact that, due 
to the peculiarities of the circumstances and/or differences in the merits of each case, a 
particular enforcement measure or a group of enforcement measures enumerated in a 
particular category as indicated in figure 1 below may be more suitable to remedy or combat 
certain market abuse cases as compared to other measures, it is submitted that these 
enforcement measures should be co-operatively and flexibly employed to combat market 
abuse activities effectively in South Africa.326   
 
Figure 1: The (viable) anti-market abuse model and/or policy framework.  
 
 
 
As indicated above, figure 1 represents the four main categories of the researcher’s proposed 
policy framework or model entitled “The (viable) anti-market abuse model and/or policy 
framework”.  The arrows that run back and forth between categories as indicated in figure 1 
325      See generally paragraph 10 4 & paragraph 10 4 1 (including its sub-paragraphs) above. 
326      See related remarks in paragraph 10 4 1 above. 
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denote that there is, and there should always be, an equally important inter-relationship 
between the proposed enforcement measures that fall into the aforesaid categories.   In the 
same vein, the arrows that run from the center of the model to the different categories as 
indicated in figure 1 denote that all these categories are part of, and/or comprise the 
fundamental pillars of the (viable) anti-market abuse model and/or policy framework.   In 
other words, the rationale for this model and/or policy framework is that the enforcement 
authorities should not rely on the enforcement measures that fall under one pillar or category 
alone and neglect those in the other categories.  Furthermore, it is submitted that the 
enforcement measures that fall under the different categories should be carefully, co-
operatively and flexibly employed, on a case-to-case basis, to improve the enforcement of the 
market abuse ban in South Africa.  In line with this, the proposed key provisions under each 
category are enumerated below: 
 
10 4 2 1   Adoption of Adequate and/or Appropriate Penalties for Market Abuse 
10 4 2 1 1   Criminal Penalties 
 
Currently, there are no separate and distinct criminal penalties that can be levied against 
individuals and/or entities (juristic persons) that commit market abuse offences in South 
Africa.327  Moreover, there are no specific, separate and distinct criminal penalties that can be 
levied firstly, against insiders (primary, secondary or corporate insiders) who violate the 
relevant market abuse provisions for their own benefit or for the benefit of others and 
secondly, against the tippees or other persons who unlawfully discourage or encourage others 
to deal in securities or who unlawfully disclose price-sensitive inside information to others 
and/or engage in market manipulation.328 Consequently, it is submitted that the Securities 
Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be 
amended to enact specific provisions for separate and distinct maximum criminal penalties 
that can be imposed upon any juristic persons or individuals that commit or attempt to commit 
insider trading or market manipulation offences in South Africa, with much higher maximum 
criminal penalties being imposed on such juristic persons to increase deterrence and enhance 
the combating of market abuse practices in the South African financial markets. 
327    See related remarks in Chapters Two; Three; Four & Nine of this thesis. 
328   Apparently, the criminal penalties contained in the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill & 
the Financial Markets Bill 2012 are rigidly applicable to all the categories of persons and types of market 
abuse violations in South Africa.  
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Proposed Policy Objective 
 
To increase deterrence by introducing adequate provisions for separate and distinct criminal 
penalties for juristic persons and individuals that commit or attempt to commit market abuse 
offences in South Africa. 
 
Proposed Provisions for Criminal Penalties  
 
(1)    An individual who is convicted of an offence relating to insider trading or market 
manipulation is liable to a fine of, but not limited to R85 million, or to imprisonment for a 
period of not more than 25 years, or to both such fine and imprisonment.  
 
(2)    A juristic person or company that is convicted of an offence relating to insider trading or 
market manipulation is liable to a maximum fine of R750 million, or to six times the profit 
made or loss avoided, or 20% of the company or juristic person’s annual turnover during the 
relevant period in which the offence was committed, whichever is greater. 
 
(3)    The Financial Services Board may, in addition to the penalties stipulated in subsections (1) 
and (2), impose its own separate and distinct unlimited pecuniary or other appropriate 
penalties against a company or juristic person and/or an individual that is convicted of an 
offence relating to insider trading or market manipulation. 
 
(4)    A juristic person or an individual that incites, aids and abets or attempts to incite, aid or abet 
another person to commit or attempt to commit an offence relating to insider trading or 
market manipulation, commits an offence, and is liable on conviction to a penalty as 
stipulated in subsections (1), (2) or (3). 
 
10 4 2 1 2    Administrative Penalties 
 
Proposed Policy Objective 
 
To enhance the combating of market abuse activities by employing additional administrative 
penalties and sanctions against any juristic person or individual who commit or attempts to 
commit insider trading or market manipulation offences in South Africa or elsewhere; or who 
incites, aids and abets or attempts to incite, aid and/or abet another person to commit insider 
trading or market manipulation offences in South Africa or elsewhere. 
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Proposed Provisions for Administrative Penalties  
 
(1)    The relevant South African courts may, whenever it is objectively necessary or in the public 
interest, impose their own additional administrative penalties against a juristic person or an 
individual that is convicted of an offence relating to insider trading or market manipulation.   
 
(2)   Whenever the disclosure is in the public interest, and whenever market abuse violations 
occur, the Financial Services Board may, subsequent to its investigations – 
 
(a)  by notice to the Director of Public Prosecutions; or 
(b)  in the Government Gazette; or 
(c)  on its official website; or  
(d)  by means of other appropriate public media, publicly censure an offender by 
disclosing the type of market abuse violations and the name of the offender. 
 
(3)   Where a juristic person or an individual is convicted of an offence relating to insider trading 
or market manipulation, including the offence of attempting to commit  insider trading or 
market manipulation or the offence of inciting, aiding or abetting or attempting to incite, aid 
or abet another person to commit insider trading or market manipulation in South Africa or 
elsewhere, the Financial Services Board or a relevant enforcement authority may, subject to 
subsection (1), impose an administrative penalty such as seizure and forfeiture orders, 
revocation of a license, suspension or disqualification from the profession, seize and desist 
orders, warnings, and the freezing of assets. 
 
10 4 2 1 3    Civil Penalties 
 
The Securities Services Act does not have a separate and specific statutory derivative civil 
remedy provision for market manipulation.  As a result, it submitted that the Securities 
Services Act should be reviewed to expressly provide civil penalties for market manipulation 
offences.  Moreover, it is submitted that this may positively deter some unscrupulous persons 
from indulging in market manipulation activities in South Africa.  
 
Proposed Policy Objective 
 
To desist from mainly or rigidly relying on the policy goal of deterrence alone and to treat 
market abuse offences on a more equal footing by inter alia introducing civil penalties for 
market manipulation in South Africa. 
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Proposed Provisions for Civil Penalties  
 
(1)   A juristic person or an individual that is convicted of the offence of engaging in or 
attempting to engage in market manipulation activities, or the offence of inciting, aiding and 
abetting, or attempting to incite, aid and abet another person to engage in market 
manipulation activities in South Africa or elsewhere, shall pay to the Financial Services 
Board as penalty – 
 
(a)   an amount of up to six times the profit made or loss avoided, or 20% of the company 
or juristic person’s annual turnover during the relevant period in which the violation 
was committed, whichever is greater;  
(b)   a fine of up to three times the profit gained or loss avoided, for individuals;   
(c)   a punitive and compensatory fine as determined by the relevant courts;  
(d)   administrative costs, legal costs and interest as determined by the Financial Services 
Board or the relevant courts; or  
(e)   a civil penalty for market manipulation as stipulated in the Financial Markets Bill, 
when it comes into force. 
 
10 4 2 2   Adoption of Adequate Market Abuse Preventative Measures  
10 4 2 2 1   Adoption of Adequate Definitions 
 
The Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 
2012 do not have complementary definitions of inside information in relation to derivatives 
on commodities and/or to the persons (professional intermediaries) involved in the execution 
of orders relating to listed securities or other related derivative financial instruments.   
Moreover, the concepts of insider trading, market manipulation and market abuse are not 
statutorily and expressly defined.  In relation to this, it is submitted that these concepts should 
be expressly defined in the relevant market abuse laws to enhance the enforcement of the 
market abuse prohibition in South Africa. 
 
Proposed Policy Objective 
 
To improve the combating of market abuse activities by inter alia adopting adequate 
definitions of the relevant key concepts. 
 
Proposed Provisions for Adequate Definitions   
 
(1)   “market abuse” means any act, behaviour, conduct, course of business, transaction or 
practice by a person,  including a juristic person, that takes advantage of the non-public 
549 
price-sensitive inside information, or that manipulates the supply of, the demand for, or price 
of, any securities or financial instruments traded on the regulated markets, over the counter 
markets, multilateral trading facilities, organised trading facilities or other trading venues to 
the detriment of other unwitting persons, and includes insider trading and market 
manipulation; 
 
(2)   “insider trading” means the unlawful use of non-public price-sensitive inside information by 
an insider or a person,  including a juristic person that has such information, to deal, acquire 
or dispose of, or attempt to deal, acquire or dispose of, for his own benefit or for the benefit 
of another, directly or indirectly, any securities or financial instruments traded on the 
regulated markets, over the counter markets, multilateral trading facilities, organised trading 
facilities and/or other trading venues in South Africa or elsewhere, to which that information 
relates to the detriment of other unwitting persons, and a juristic person or company which 
repurchases its own shares would be an insider to itself;   
 
(3)    A conduct, practice or transaction by a person, including a juristic person or an insider as 
contemplated in subsection (2), that has non-public price-sensitive inside information and 
that incites, aids and abets or attempts to incite, aid or abet another person to deal, acquire or 
dispose of, or to attempt to deal, acquire or dispose of, for his own benefit or for the benefit 
of another, directly or indirectly, any securities or financial instruments traded on the 
regulated markets, over the counter markets, multilateral trading facilities, organised trading 
facilities or other trading venues in South Africa or elsewhere, to which that information 
relates also amounts to insider trading; 
 
(4) (a) In relation to derivatives on commodities, “inside information” means non-public 
price-sensitive information which relates to one or more such derivatives or to the 
relevant spot commodity contracts and which, if it were publicly disclosed, would be 
likely to have a momentous or material effect on the value or prices of such relevant 
spot commodity contracts or derivatives traded on the regulated markets, over the 
counter markets, multilateral trading facilities, organised trading facilities or other 
trading venues in South Africa or elsewhere;329  
 
      (b) In relation to the persons or professional intermediaries involved in the execution of 
orders relating to securities or other related derivative financial instruments, “inside 
information” means non-public price-sensitive information which is disclosed by a 
client and related to the client’s ongoing or pending transactions in securities, 
derivative financial instruments or other relevant spot commodity contracts and which 
directly or indirectly relates to one or more issuers of such securities, derivative 
financial instruments or related spot commodity contracts or to one or more securities, 
derivative financial instruments or related spot commodity contracts and which, if it 
were publicly disclosed, would be likely to have a momentous or material effect on 
the value or prices of such relevant spot commodity contracts, securities or derivative 
financial instruments traded on the regulated markets, over the counter markets, 
329  This provision was based on a similar definition adopted in the European Union, see related analysis in 
paragraphs 6 4 5; 6 5 & other relevant paragraphs in Chapter Six of this thesis.     
550 
                                               
multilateral trading facilities, organised trading facilities or other trading venues in 
South Africa or elsewhere;330 
 
(5)  “market manipulation” means any act, behaviour, conduct, course of business, transaction or 
practice by a person, including a juristic person that manipulates, takes advantage of, distorts 
or disrupts the supply of, demand for or price of, or that attempts or is likely to attempt to 
manipulate, take advantage of, distort or disrupt the supply of, demand for or price of any 
securities or financial instruments traded on the regulated markets, over the counter markets, 
multilateral trading facilities, organised trading facilities or other trading venues in South 
Africa or elsewhere, to the detriment of other unwitting persons;   
 
(6)   A practice, behaviour, act, course of business, transaction or conduct by a person, including a 
juristic person as contemplated in subsection (5), that incites, aids and abets or attempts to 
incite, aid or abet another person to manipulate, take advantage of, distort or disrupt the 
supply of, demand for or price of, or to attempt to manipulate, take advantage of, distort or 
disrupt the supply of, demand for or price of any securities or financial instruments traded on 
the regulated markets, over the counter markets, multilateral trading facilities, organised 
trading facilities or other trading venues in South Africa or elsewhere, to the detriment of 
other unwitting persons also amounts to market manipulation;   
 
(7)    Without limiting the generality of subsections (5) and (6), market manipulation practices as 
contemplated may include various types such as trade-based market manipulation, 
information or disclosure-based market manipulation, commodities-based market 
manipulation and Internet-based market manipulation. 
 
10 4 2 2 2    Offences and Prohibited Practices 
 
In South Africa, the prohibition on market abuse is mainly restricted to conduct or violations 
that occur in regulated markets.   In this regard, it is suggested that such prohibition be 
extended to conduct or violations that occur in regulated markets, over the counter markets, 
multilateral trading facilities, organised trading facilities and/or other trading venues in South 
Africa.   In line with this, it is further suggested that attempted insider trading and attempted 
market manipulation should be expressly prohibited in South Africa. On the other hand, it was 
acknowledged that the JSE houses over 20 brokerages that provides online trading (Internet) 
facilities for the buying and selling of listed securities (online initial public offerings).   Be 
that as it may, the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012 do not expressly prohibit Internet-based market abuse practices in South 
Africa.  Therefore, it is submitted that such prohibition should be enacted.   It is further 
submitted that the Financial Services Board and the JSE must have some enforceable 
330  This provision was based on a similar definition adopted in the European Union, see related analysis in 
paragraphs 6 4 5; 6 5 & other relevant paragraphs in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
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guidelines or regulations in place that protect investors and that give all the issuers of 
securities sufficient guidance, especially on conducting online initial public offerings in order 
to curb market abuse practices.  Such guidelines could include practical measures which allow 
electronic prospectuses to be checked for accuracy, updated regularly and to have a restricted 
shelf life; ban manipulative hyperlinks to other websites, and which impose separate and 
specific penalties for Internet-based market abuse offences.   It has been noted that the current 
market abuse prohibition is seemingly based mainly on the policy goal of deterrence.  In 
relation to this, it is submitted that both the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill 
and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be amended in order to extend the civil 
prohibition on market abuse beyond the insider’s immediate relatives or market 
counterparties, to enable the aggrieved persons to recover their damages from all the possible 
market abuse offenders. 
 
Proposed Policy Objective 
 
To increase enforcement by inter alia strengthening and/or broadening the scope of the 
market abuse prohibition. 
 
Proposed Provisions for Offences and Prohibited Practices 
 
(1) In this section, unless the context otherwise indicates –     
 
         “attempted insider trading” includes –  
 
(a)  disclosing non-public price-sensitive inside information relating to any or certain 
securities or financial instruments traded on the regulated markets, over the counter 
markets, multilateral trading facilities, organised trading facilities or other trading 
venues in South Africa or elsewhere, to another person who fails to or does not trade 
or deal on the basis of such information;  
 
(b)   tipping, inducing or encouraging another person to deal, or to attempt to deal in any or 
certain securities or financial instruments traded on the regulated markets, over the 
counter markets, multilateral trading facilities, organised trading facilities or other 
trading venues in South Africa or elsewhere; 
 
(c)   discouraging or attempting to discourage another person from dealing in any or certain 
securities or financial instruments traded on the regulated markets, over the counter 
markets, multilateral trading facilities, organised trading facilities or other trading 
venues in South Africa or elsewhere;                
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 “attempted market manipulation” includes –  
 
(a)  disclosing false, deceptive or misleading information or non-public price-sensitive 
inside information relating to certain securities or financial instruments traded on the 
regulated markets, over the counter markets, multilateral trading facilities, organised 
trading facilities or other trading venues in South Africa or elsewhere, to another 
person who fails to or does not trade or deal on the basis of such information; 
 
(b)   unsuccessfully entering or attempting to enter an order, practice, artifice, device, 
scheme, course of business or transaction in respect of any securities or financial 
instruments traded on the regulated markets, over the counter markets, multilateral 
trading facilities, organised trading facilities or other trading venues in South Africa or 
elsewhere, to defraud other unwitting persons;  
 
(c)   engaging or participating, or attempting to engage or participate in any of the practices 
that are deemed manipulative practices under the Securities Services Act, the 
Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012.  
 
(2)   The Financial Services Board shall establish a specific regulatory committee or unit that 
prohibits and investigates Internet-based market abuse practices in South Africa.  
 
(3)   No agent, professional or non-professional intermediary, insider or other person may, 
directly or indirectly, engage or participate, or attempt to engage or participate in market 
manipulation practices in respect of any securities or financial instruments traded on the 
regulated markets, over the counter markets, multilateral trading facilities, organised trading 
facilities or other trading venues in South Africa or elsewhere, and an agent, professional or 
non-professional intermediary, insider or other person who does so, commits an offence.      
 
(4)   No agent, professional or non-professional intermediary, insider or other person may, 
directly or indirectly, engage or participate, or attempt to engage or participate in insider 
trading practices in respect of any securities or financial instruments traded on the regulated 
markets, over the counter markets, multilateral trading facilities, organised trading facilities 
or other trading venues in South Africa or elsewhere, and an agent, professional or non-
professional intermediary, insider or other person who does so commits an offence. 
 
(5)    An agent, professional or non-professional intermediary, insider or other person who 
inadvertently aided or abetted another person to engage or participate or to attempt to engage 
or participate in market abuse practices commits an offence.   
 
(6)    No agent, professional or non-professional intermediary, insider or other person may, in 
respect of any securities or financial instruments traded on the regulated markets, over the 
counter markets, multilateral trading facilities, organised trading facilities, emission 
allowances markets, spot secondary markets or other trading venues in South Africa or 
elsewhere, directly or indirectly engage or participate, or attempt to engage or participate in - 
 
(a)  emission allowances-based market abuse practices; 
 
(b)  commodity-based market abuse practices; or  
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(c)   insurance-based market abuse practices, and an agent, professional or non-
professional intermediary, insider or other person who does so, commits an offence.  
 
10 4 2 2 3    Enhancing Surveillance, Detection, Investigation and Prosecution 
 
Market surveillance is conducted by the JSE’s Surveillance Division and not the Financial 
Services Board in South Africa.  This has, in some instances, delayed the investigation and 
prosecution of market abuse cases in South Africa.  Consequently, it is suggested that the 
Financial Services Board should have its own market abuse surveillance systems which 
complement the enforcement efforts of the JSE’s Surveillance Division and/or take over the 
surveillance of the South African securities and financial markets from the JSE.   It has been 
noted that apart from the Financial Services Board, there are no other self-regulatory bodies 
that enforce the market abuse ban in South Africa.    In this regard, it is submitted that the 
legislature should consider introducing other self-regulatory organisations to enhance the 
curbing of market abuse in South Africa.   It was further noted that very minimal progress has 
been achieved in the prosecution of criminal cases of market abuse in South Africa.   In 
relation to this, it is suggested that the legislature should consider introducing rebuttable 
presumptions or reducing the evidentiary burden of proof in criminal cases of market abuse.    
In the same vein, it is submitted that the legislature should also consider adopting measures 
such as whistle-blowing and bounty rewards331 to encourage all persons to freely report all 
incidences of market abuse violations.  
 
Proposed Policy Objective 
 
To improve the prosecution of market abuse cases by inter alia adopting other alternative 
measures for surveillance, detection and investigation. 
 
Proposed Provisions for Enhancing Surveillance, Detection, Investigation and 
Prosecution  
 
(1)  The Financial Services Board may - 
 
(a)   develop or establish its own surveillance systems to detect, curb or prevent market 
abuse activity in the South African securities and financial markets; 
331     These measures are usefully employed in the United States of America.   See Chapter Five of this thesis. 
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(b)   develop or establish its own systems for cross-market surveillance to detect, curb or 
prevent market abuse activity in the South African securities and financial markets;     
 
(c)    intercept telephonic data from the suspected market abuse offenders; 
 
(d)   employ infringement notices and enforceable undertakings against the market abuse 
offenders in South Africa; 
 
(f)   employ whistle-blower immunity measures and bounty rewards to curb market abuse 
activities in South Africa. 
 
(2)    The Financial Services Board must, under subsection (1)(a) and (b), take over the real-time 
surveillance of the South African securities and financial markets from the JSE. 
 
(3)    Other relevant self-regulatory organisations may, from time to time and after notifying the 
Financial Services Board, impose their own penalties or take any other appropriate action 
against the market abuse offenders in South Africa. 
 
(4)    A juristic person known as the National Commodity Futures Commission is hereby 
established to deal with commodity and related derivative market abuse violations in South 
Africa. 
 
(5)    The Enforcement Committee may, subject to subsections (3) and (4) and after notifying the 
Financial Services Board, make its own market abuse rules, decisions, regulations or 
administrative actions on matters involving market abuse in South Africa.   
 
(6)    It will be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that the accused or defendant is an insider 
as defined in the Securities Services Act, or the Financial Markets Bill or the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012, and that such accused or defendant person knew that the information he 
or she had was inside information, and had in fact, appreciated its price-sensitive nature.   
 
(7)   Insider trading and market manipulation may be treated as indictable offences in South 
Africa.    
 
10 4 2 2 4   Other Preventative Measures 
 
The Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012 
do not clearly provide for a private right of action for the issuers of securities.   In this regard, 
it is submitted that all the affected issuers should, after notifying the Financial Services Board, 
have the option to claim their damages directly from the market abuse offenders if they fail to 
obtain such damages through the Financial Services Board or if no civil proceedings were 
instituted by the Financial Services Board. On the other hand, it has been noted that the 
unlimited extra-territorial application of the market abuse prohibition in the Securities 
Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 is sometimes 
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inconsistently enforced, probably due to limited financial resources.  As a result, it is 
suggested that a more restricted and practically enforceable approach having a territorial basis 
should be considered.  Moreover, the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and 
the Financial Markets Bill 2012 do not provide for a mandatory duty of disclosure of inside 
information on the part of companies and the issuers of securities.  In relation to this, it is 
submitted that mandatory disclosure requirements similar to those in the JSE disclosure 
requirements and the Securities Regulation Panel rules, coupled with appropriate criminal 
sanctions for companies or issuers who deliberately fail to comply, should be considered to 
impose a duty on all companies or issuers to disclose without delay, any negotiations towards 
any transaction that are likely to have a material effect on the demand for, supply of or price 
of their securities or financial instruments.  In addition, a public notice in a newspaper 
circulating in the Johannesburg area, newspapers circulating in the area where the issuer, 
company or institution’s registered office or principal place of business is situated, to Reuters, 
the South African Press Association and through the Stock Exchange News Service should be 
considered.  Although there was no room to discuss the JSE mandatory disclosure rules 
(which are internal rules of the JSE and not statutory principles) in detail in this thesis, it must 
be noted that the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets 
Bill 2012 do not expressly impose a duty of disclosure on the JSE to report to the Financial 
Services Board any suspected market abuse activity or unusual movements in the demand for, 
supply of or prices of securities or financial instruments, or unusual trade volumes in respect 
thereof.  It is further submitted that companies and other entities should be encouraged to 
develop their own appropriate internal mechanisms such as Chinese walls and mandatory 
reporting obligations on the part of their employees to report any abuse of unpublished price-
sensitive information relating to securities or other financial instruments to prevent market 
abuse practices in South Africa.   In the same vein, it is submitted that other definitional 
defences for market manipulation such as share buy-back programmes, a defence that the 
accused person’s reasons for entering orders to trade were legitimate and a defence that the 
accused person has acted honestly, having regard to all the relevant circumstances should be 
provided in order not to discourage or scare away potential investors.      
 
Proposed Policy Objective 
 
To improve the curbing of market abuse practices in South Africa, by inter alia introducing 
other relevant preventive measures.  
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Proposed Provisions for Other Preventative Measures  
 
(1)  A juristic person to be known as the National Market Abuse Commission is hereby 
established with the aim of– 
 
(a) examining and reviewing, from time to time, all the matters and laws pertaining to 
market abuse in South Africa;  
 
(b)  independently engaging in public consultation from time to time, to review or make 
proposals to the legislature and other relevant authorities in relation to any matter 
pertaining to securities law reform and the general regulation or enforcement of the 
market abuse prohibition in South Africa. 
 
(2)    The JSE shall be required to establish a Markets Disciplinary Tribunal to deal with any 
violations of its Listing Requirements to prevent or curb market abuse practices in South 
Africa.  
 
(3)    Companies, issuers and other relevant persons shall have internal regulatory measures, 
market abuse codes of conduct and market abuse compliance officers. 
 
(4) (a) The JSE shall impose a mandatory, structured (periodic) or continuous statutory 
disclosure duty on issuers or listed entities and insiders of such entities, for them to 
promptly, consistently and publicly disclose – 
 
(i)  the relevant non-public price-sensitive inside information (including their 
lending or pledging of securities or financial instruments); and 
 
(ii)  transactions executed on behalf of the issuers or their interests in the securities 
or financial instruments of those entities. 
 
(b)  An issuer, insider or person who fails to comply with the provisions of subsection 
(4)(a), shall be liable to civil penalties.  
 
(5)   Companies, issuers and other relevant persons shall to draw up and regularly update their 
insiders’ lists.   
 
(6)    Issuers or other aggrieved persons may, through their own private litigation, directly claim 
their market abuse damages from the offenders.    
 
(7)    Companies, issuers and other relevant persons are required to have Chinese walls or other 
relevant measures to curb market abuse. 
 
(8)   Where a person is accused of market manipulation it shall be a defence for that person if he 
can prove that – 
              
(a)  the reasons for entering orders to trade were legitimate;   
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(b)  he has acted honestly, having regard to all the relevant circumstances or share buy-
back programmes. 
 
(9)   A relevant court or the Financial Services Board may, in respect of any market abuse 
provision, make a declaration of contravention in South Africa whenever such contravention 
occurs. 
 
(10)  Market abuse provisions have extra-territorial application only where a violation in respect 
of any South African financial instruments or securities listed on a foreign market has a 
territorial link to South Africa.  
 
10 4 2 3    Mutual Co-operation between the Relevant Stakeholders 
10 4 2 3 1    Co-operation between the Financial Services Board and the JSE  
 
The extent or degree of co-operation between the Financial Services Board and the JSE is 
very difficult to accurately ascertain.  In line with this, it is suggested that the Financial 
Services Board and the JSE should continue to co-operatively play a leading role in the 
development of appropriate measures, policies and regulations that promote an anti-market 
abuse culture among all the relevant persons in South Africa.  It is also suggested that such an 
anti-market abuse culture can be established by employing strong, rigorous and mutual 
enforcement measures on the part of both the Financial Services Board and the JSE.   
 
Proposed Policy Objective 
 
To improve the detection and curbing of market abuse by inter alia promoting mutual co-
operation between the Financial Services Board and the JSE. 
 
Proposed Provisions for Co-operation between the Financial Services Board and the 
JSE  
 
(1)  The Financial Services Board shall from time to time appoint other relevant stakeholders 
and/or additional skilled persons, apart from its own employees, to provide it with 
information or reports relating to market abuse violations.    
 
(2)   The JSE shall be required to give reasonable assistance to the Financial Services Board 
whenever it is necessary, and may for this purpose – 
  
(a)   search the premises of an accused person; and     
 
(b)   summon an accused person to furnish it with relevant information. 
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(3)   The Financial Services Board and the JSE shall establish a Joint Market Abuse Cross-
Agency Training Programme to – 
 
(a)  deal with, provide for, adopt or propose necessary measures to increase enforcement 
and market abuse awareness;   
 
(b)  deal with, provide for, adopt or propose necessary measures to promote the regular 
sharing of relevant information; and 
 
(c)  encourage greater collaboration and coordination between the Financial Services 
Board and the JSE.   
 
(4)    The Financial Services Board and the JSE shall establish a Joint Market Abuse Information 
Technology Task Force to – 
 
(a)   link relevant information pertaining to market abuse investigations if such information 
is jointly useful to the Financial Services Board and the JSE; 
 
(b)  adopt or propose necessary technology systems and/or other measures to promote 
regular sharing of relevant information; 
 
(c)   provide a comprehensive and consolidated database of the persons investigated by 
both the Financial Services Board and the JSE; and 
 
(d)    promote transparency.  
 
(5)   The Financial Services Board and the JSE shall establish a Joint Market Abuse Advisory 
Committee to -   
 
(a)   identify emerging regulatory risks;  
 
(b)  assess and quantify the implications of emerging regulatory risks; 
 
(c)  develop and propose solutions to emerging or ongoing market abuse risks or issues of 
common interest. 
 
10 4 2 3 2    Co-operation between the Financial Services Board and Other Local 
Enforcement Authorities 
 
In South Africa, only the Financial Services Board is directly involved in the enforcement of 
the market abuse prohibition.  Moreover, apart from some involvement from the JSE and a 
few specialised units that investigate economic offences, there are no other regulatory bodies 
that complement the Financial Services Board’s efforts to enforce the market abuse ban in 
South Africa.  In this regard, it is submitted that the legislature should empower other 
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regulatory bodies or additional specialised commercial units to assist and/or co-operate with 
the Financial Services Board to combat market abuse.    
 
Proposed Policy Objective 
 
To promote co-operation between the Financial Services Board and other local enforcement 
authorities for the purposes of combating market abuse in South Africa. 
 
Proposed Provisions for Co-operation between the Financial Services Board and Other 
Local Enforcement Authorities 
 
(1)  The Financial Services Board shall:  
  
(a)  conclude a binding co-operation and information-sharing Memorandum of 
Understanding with the JSE and the Securities Regulation Panel; and 
 
(b) conclude a binding co-operation and information-sharing Memorandum of 
Understanding with any other relevant regulatory body in South Africa. 
 
(2)   A regulatory body as contemplated in subsection (1), may, at the request or behest of the 
Financial Services Board, assist it with investigations or relevant information pertaining to 
market abuse cases.  
 
(3)  The Financial Services Board, the Securities Regulation Panel and the JSE, shall, under 
subsection (1)(a), co-operate from time to time to detect, investigate or curb market abuse.  
 
(4)  The Financial Services Board, the Securities Regulation Panel, the JSE and other relevant 
stakeholders shall establish a Joint Anti-Market Abuse Enforcement Task Force, with the 
aim of – 
 
(a)   harnessing synergies from shared market information and surveillance data;  
 
(b)   improving market oversight; 
 
(c)  enhancing enforcement;  
 
(d)   reducing duplicative regulatory burdens and balkanisation; 
 
(e)  preparing and offering anti-market abuse training programmes for the employees of all 
the relevant enforcement authorities;  
 
(f)   developing practical market abuse investigation and enforcement measures;   
 
(g)   timeously coordinating the sharing of relevant market abuse information; and 
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(h)   overseeing the general performance and duties of the employees of the relevant 
enforcement agencies.  
 
(5)   The Financial Services Board shall conclude a binding co-operation and information-sharing 
Memorandum of Understanding with the Director of Public Prosecutions.  
 
(6)   The Financial Services Board shall, in accordance with subsection (5), provide necessary 
information or assistance on market abuse cases to the relevant courts. 
 
(7)  The Financial Services Board shall conclude a binding co-operation and information-sharing 
Memorandum of Understanding with the South African Police Services. 
 
(8)    The Financial Services Board and the South African Police Services shall: 
 
(a)  jointly have measures in place to access telephone and existing data traffic records 
from companies, issuers or any suspected market abuse offenders; 
 
(b)   adopt or employ any other necessary measures to investigate market abuse.  
 
10 4 2 3 3    Co-operation between the Financial Services Board and International 
Enforcement Authorities 
 
Proposed Policy Objective 
 
To promote co-operation between the Financial Services Board and international enforcement 
authorities for the purposes of combating cross-border market abuse. 
 
Proposed Provisions for Co-operation between the Financial Services Board and 
International Enforcement Authorities 
 
(1) The Financial Services Board may co-operate, support or engage with other likeminded 
international regulatory bodies in relation to -    
       
(a)   relevant information sharing;  
 
(b)  cross-border market abuse violations and investigations;  
 
(c)   mutual co-operation and enforcement agreements;  
 
(d)   expertise, resources and/or technological surveillance systems sharing.  
 
(2)    The Financial Services Board may, for the purposes contemplated in subsection (1), at the 
request or behest of other international regulatory bodies, assist such bodies with 
investigations and/or relevant information pertaining to cross-border market abuse cases. 
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(3)    Not giving less regard to the provisions contemplated in subsections (1) and (2), the 
Financial Services Board may alternatively co-operate with likeminded international 
regulatory bodies as stipulated in the Financial Markets Bill or the Financial Markets Bill 
2012, when it comes into force.  
 
10 4 2 4    Adoption of Adequate Market Abuse Awareness Measures 
10 4 2 4 1 Establishment of Specialised Courts and/or Arbitration and Settlement 
Tribunals 
 
A relatively minimal number of market abuse cases have been successfully settled or 
prosecuted in South Africa to date.  Many cases have probably been abandoned or delayed 
due to the everlasting backlog in the current few competent courts.  In this regard, 
notwithstanding the challenges regarding the availability of sufficient resources, it is 
submitted that specialist courts or mediation, arbitration and settlement tribunals for market 
abuse cases should be introduced on a regional basis or at least in each centre where there is a 
division of the High Court of South Africa.    
 
Proposed Policy Objective 
 
To increase market abuse awareness by introducing specialised courts and/or mediation, 
arbitration and settlement tribunals in all the provinces of South Africa. 
 
Proposed Provisions for the Establishment of Specialised Courts and/or Arbitration and 
Settlement Tribunals 
 
(1)    The Director of Public Prosecutions shall - 
 
(a)   establish specific market abuse courts in all the divisions of the High Court of South 
Africa; and 
 
(b)  establish specific market abuse mediation, arbitration and settlement tribunals in all 
the provinces, regions or divisions of the High Court of South Africa.     
 
(2)  A court or tribunal contemplated in subsection (1) shall - 
 
(a)   have exclusive jurisdiction in all matters involving market abuse;  
 
(b)   be manned by lawyers, judges or other persons with relevant expertise in relation to, 
inter alia, corporate law, market abuse legislation, financial markets and securities 
regulation;   
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(c)   have the discretion to impose additional penalties against market abuse offenders. 
 
 
10 4 2 4 2   Adopting a Code of Market Abuse Conduct 
 
In South Africa, there is no specific Code of Market Abuse Conduct with regard to market 
abuse activities to help or guide market professionals such as brokers, financial analysts, 
lawyers, accountants and publishing and printing companies who, from time to time, have 
access to unpublished price-sensitive information in the course of executing their duties.   In 
line with this, it is submitted that the Financial Services Board should be statutorily mandated 
to provide market abuse policy guidelines or a Code of Market Abuse Conduct.   It is further 
suggested that the company secretary should be statutorily responsible to the company for 
compliance with the market abuse prohibition and the internal enforcement measures of the 
company.  
 
Proposed Policy Objective 
 
To increase market abuse awareness in South Africa by inter alia adopting an adequate Code 
of Market Abuse Conduct.   
 
Proposed Provisions for a Code of Market Abuse Conduct 
 
(1)   The Registrar of Securities Services or the Financial Services Board shall, from time to time, 
in a proper consultative manner, adopt or prescribe a Code of Market Abuse Conduct for 
market professionals, market participants or issuers of securities or financial instruments. 
 
(2)     A Code of Market Abuse Conduct stipulated in subsection (1) shall provide that - 
 
(a)    market abuse includes insider trading and market manipulation;  
 
(b)   a market professional, market participant or issuer of securities or financial 
instruments must not engage or participate or attempt to engage or participate in 
market abuse practices; 
 
(c)  a market professional, market participant or issuer of securities or financial 
instruments must not act unfairly, dishonestly or in a manner that prejudices or that 
may prejudice other persons;  
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(d)  a market professional, market participant or issuer of securities or financial 
instruments must not act recklessly or in a manner that affects or that may affect the 
securities and/or financial markets integrity;  
 
(e)  a market professional, market participant or issuer of securities or financial 
instruments must not act recklessly or in a manner that causes or that may cause 
systemic risks. 
 
(3)   A market professional, market participant or issuer must have - 
 
(a)    sufficient and adequate market abuse preventative measures; 
 
(b)    market abuse awareness measures;  
 
(c)    internal rules or Codes of Market Abuse Conduct;  
 
(d)   any other measures or policies necessary and expedient for the compliance with the 
Code of Market Abuse Conduct and the relevant market abuse laws. 
 
(4)    The Code of Market Abuse Conduct is binding upon market professionals, market 
participants, issuers or other relevant persons, and on their clients, insiders and employees. 
 
(5)    A party or person as contemplated in respect of subsection (4), who contravenes the Code of 
Market Abuse Conduct may -  
 
(a)    be disqualified;      
 
(b)  have his license revoked; 
 
(c)   incur penalties as stipulated in the relevant market abuse laws. 
 
10 4 2 4 3   Education and Other Awareness Measures 
 
Apart from the insider trading manual (booklet) which was published by the JSE at the 
request of the Minister of Finance, there are very few other measures that were taken to make 
the public and the relevant stakeholders aware of market abuse practices in South Africa.    In 
this regard, it is suggested that effective publicity campaigns, even at grassroot level, and the 
development of an academic curriculum comprising securities trading for teaching at both 
secondary and tertiary levels in South Africa should be considered to increase awareness and 
for the general prevention of market abuse activities. 
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Proposed Policy Objective 
 
To increase enforcement by inter alia promoting market abuse education and awareness 
measures. 
 
Proposed Provisions for Education and Other Awareness Measures 
 
(1)  The JSE, the Financial Services Board and other enforcement agencies must - 
 
(a)   co-operatively conduct market abuse education and awareness campaigns; 
 
(b)   develop an adequate anti-market abuse academic curriculum for the South African 
high schools and tertiary institutions;  
 
(c)  quarterly or annually publish adequate and informative booklets or guidelines 
regarding market abuse practices on their respective websites;  
 
(d)  conduct market abuse workshops and public lectures to increase awareness among the 
relevant stakeholders; and 
 
(e)  employ any other measures or policies necessary and expedient for the promotion of 
market abuse awareness among the relevant stakeholders. 
 
10 5 Concluding Remarks  
 
As discussed in this thesis, there can be no doubt that the enactment of the Securities Services 
Act and the recent introduction of the Financial Markets Bill and/or the subsequent provisions 
of the Financial Markets Bill 2012 are positive attempts by the policy makers to improve the 
enforcement of the market abuse provisions in South Africa.  Nonetheless, considering the 
current shortcomings in the Securities Services Act, the Financial Markets Bill and the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 as outlined in this thesis, one can argue that such attempts were 
to a greater extend unsuccessful.332   It was pointed out in this research that many of the flaws 
contained in the Insider Trading Act were repeated in the Securities Services Act, sometimes 
even with the addition of new shortcomings.333 Likewise, it was indicated that most of the 
shortcomings contained in the Securities Services Act were duplicated in the Financial 
332    See particularly Chapters Two; Three & Four of this thesis for more information. 
333     See particularly Chapter Two read with Chapters Three & Four of this thesis for more information. 
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Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012.334   In light of this, it has been concluded 
and recommended that the relevant market abuse provisions of the Securities Services Act, 
the Financial Markets Bill and/or the Financial Markets Bill 2012 should be comprehensively 
reviewed in regard to the recommendations made in this research.335 Lastly, it is appropriate 
to conclude this thesis by highlighting some areas that could be explored further in future 
research.  As discussed in Chapter Four of this thesis, there are several problems associated 
with the inconsistent enforcement of the market abuse prohibition in South Africa.  Some of 
these problems were simply stated but not extensively dealt with in this thesis due to time and 
space constraints.   In relation to this, one question that could be empirically raised in the 
future is whether it is advantageous for the regulatory authorities to rely strictly and solely on 
a certain enforcement approach alone, say for example criminal penalties, to combat market 
abuse practices in South Africa.  Another empirical question that could arise is whether it is 
actually more effective and viable for the regulatory authorities to flexibly rely on a variety of 
enforcement measures to combat market abuse on a case-to-case336 basis in South Africa.   
Moreover, another debate that could be empirically entertained in future research is whether it 
is advantageous for the Financial Services Board to have its own market surveillance systems 
and/or to take over the real-time monitoring and market surveillance of the relevant South 
African financial markets from the JSE.  Moreover, the introduction, use and/or viability of 
other anti-market abuse enforcement measures such as bounty rewards, whistle-blower 
immunity provisions and prohibiting short selling and naked credit default swaps could also 
be theoretically and/or empirically explored further in future research.  In a nutshell, this 
chapter and thesis has advocated and revealed the vital need for vigorous, robust and effective 
enforcement of the market abuse provisions in South Africa and elsewhere.  Notably, similar 
views were also succinctly echoed by Schapiro: 
 
“Although we continue to learn more about the causes of the financial crisis, one clear lesson is 
the vital importance that vigorous enforcement of existing laws and regulations plays in the fair 
and proper functioning of financial markets…vigorous enforcement is essential to restoring and 
maintaining investor confidence. Through aggressive and even-handed enforcement, we hold 
accountable those whose violations of the law caused severe loss and hardship and we deter 
others from engaging in wrongdoing. Such enforcement efforts also help vindicate the 
principles fundamental to the fair and proper functioning of financial markets…”337 
334     See relevant analysis in Chapters Two; Three & Four of this thesis for more information. 
335     See the sub-paragraphs under paragraph 10 4 above & related analysis in Chapters Two to Nine of this 
thesis. 
336    The merits and/or circumstances in each case involving or relating to market abuse violations. 
337   Schapiro Testimony before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Concerning the State of the 
Financial Crisis 14 January 2010 2.       
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ANNEXURE A 
ACRONYMS AND GLOSSARY 
 
 
A 
ACCC 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission  
 
ACER 
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators 
 
ACH 
Australian Clearing House Pty Limited  
 
AFMA 
Australian Financial Markets Association 
 
Appeal Board 
an independent body established to hear and afford all the aggrieved persons an opportunity to 
appeal or lodge their complaints against any decisions of the Registrar of Securities Services, 
the Enforcement Committee or the Financial Services Board regarding market abuse for them 
to be addressed 
 
ASC 
Australian Securities Commission 
 
ASF 
American Securitisation Forum 
 
ASIC 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
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ASTC 
Australian Stock Exchange Settlement and Transfer Corporation Pty Limited  
 
ASXMS 
Australian Stock Exchange’s Market Supervision Private Limited  
 
ASX 
Australian Stock Exchange  
 
AuSF 
Australian Securitisation Forum 
B 
Bank for International Settlements 
an international organisation which encourages international monetary and financial 
cooperation and serves a bank for central banks 
 
BCBS 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
 
BESA  
Bond Exchange of South Africa 
 
Broker 
a trading party, who trades in securities or financial instruments on a regulated market either 
for itself or for its clients 
 
Broker Deal Accounting 
a JSE system which keeps the securities records and books of individual broking companies 
in respect of their clients 
 
Broker–Dealer Accounts System 
a method that is employed to extract relevant information from market participants such as 
brokers, by investigating their trading history for the purposes of detecting market abuse 
practices 
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C 
CA 
California 
 
Cal Ct App 
California Court of Appeal 
 
CAMAC 
Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee  
 
CASAC 
Companies and Securities Advisory Committee 
 
CEO 
Chief Executive Officer 
 
CESR 
Committee of European Securities Regulators  
 
CESR-Fin 
a permanent group under the Committee of European Securities Regulators which is 
responsible for financial information disclosures and coordinating the work of member 
regulators particularly with regard to the endorsement and enforcement of International 
Accounting Standards 
 
CESR-Pol 
an enforcement sub-committee of the Committee of European Securities Regulators which 
facilitates the sharing of information between member regulators to enhance their cooperation 
and coordination of surveillance, investigations and enforcement in the securities markets 
under their jurisdiction 
 
CFO 
Chief Finance Officer 
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CFTC 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
 
CHESS 
Clearing House Electronic Sub-register System  
 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange Group Incorporated 
the world’s largest derivatives exchange which was formed after the merger of the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange and the Chicago Board of Trade in 2007 
 
CLERP Act 
Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act 103 of 2004 
 
CME Group Inc 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange Group Incorporated 
 
Code of Market Conduct 
rules and principles that were adopted in the United Kingdom to inter alia guide all the 
relevant persons on conduct that amounts to market manipulation and related practices, 
including factors to be considered when determining whether or not such conduct amounts to 
market abuse  
 
Committee of European Securities Regulators 
an independent committee that was established in June 2001 by the European Commission to 
inter alia assume some advisory functions on the enforcement of the European Union Market 
Abuse Directive’s market abuse provisions by the relevant securities regulators in the 
European Union member states 
 
Commodities  
include non financial instruments such as corn, grain, oils, maize, precious metals like gold 
and platinum 
 
Commonwealth DPP 
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions 
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Covered Short Selling   
occurs where the value of the asset or security in question depreciates during the period 
between the time of the sale and its actual delivery giving rise to the seller to illicitly gain 
profit 
 
CPSS 
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems 
 
CRA 
Credit Rating Agencies 
 
Credit Default Swaps 
bilateral contracts designed for credit hedging or speculative investment and issues relating 
counterparty risk, operational risk and market transparency 
 
Credit Swap 
relates to credit default swaps and total return swaps 
 
Cth 
Commonwealth 
D 
Dark Pool 
a practice that involve more than one person colluding to buy or sell a security in a bid to 
create an artificial market activity 
 
DEL 
Delaware 
 
Del SC 
Delaware Supreme Court 
 
Del Supr. Ct 
Delaware Supreme Court 
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Division 3 Financial Products 
a term employed in Australia to refer to securities or derivatives; or interests in a managed 
investment scheme; or debentures, stocks or bonds issued or proposed to be issued by a 
government; or superannuation products other than those prescribed by the regulations made 
for the purposes of the insider trading prohibition; or any other financial products that are able 
to be traded on a financial market  
 
DMA 
Directorate of Market Abuse 
  
DOJ 
Department of Justice 
 
DPP 
Director of Public Prosecutions  
 
DTI  
Department of Trade and Industry 
E 
EC 
European Commission 
 
EDX London 
an equity derivatives exchange established in 2003 by the London Stock Exchange and the 
OM London Exchange Limited.   It is also a Recognised Investment Exchange and prescribed 
market for the market abuse regime in the United Kingdom 
 
EEC 
European Economic Community 
 
Electronic Data Gathering Analysis and Retrieval system 
a system that is used to assess, review and obtain misleading, manipulative or deceptive 
information regarding any filings with the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission     
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Electronic Document Lodgment 
a system that is employed in Australia to enable lodgment agents such as accountants, lawyers 
and brokers to promptly transfer relevant documents to the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission electronically and free of charge to effect disclosure of inside 
information    
 
ENF 
Enforcement (Manual) Handbook of the Financial Services Authority 
 
Enforcement Approaches 
measures and/or methods that are adopted or put in place to combat market abuse practices in 
various countries 
 
Enforcement Committee 
a committee of the Financial Services Board that adjudicates on all the forms of market abuse 
referred to it by the Directorate of Market Abuse or the Registrar of Securities Services  
 
ESCA 
Emirates Securities and Commodities Authority 
 
ESF 
European Securitisation Forum 
 
ESME 
European Securities Markets Expert Group 
 
EU 
European Union 
 
Euronext-LIFFE 
an electronic derivatives exchange that was formed in January 2002 after the takeover of the 
London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange by the Euronext 
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European Securities and Markets Authority 
an independent body that was established to inter alia oversee the enforcement of the 
European Union Market Abuse Directive’s market abuse provisions by the relevant securities 
regulators in the European Union member states 
 
European Union’s Action Plan for Financial Services 
a legislative programme that was introduced to inter alia formulate a common securities 
capital market in Europe 
F 
FASB 
Financial Accounting Standards Board 
 
FESCO  
Forum of European Securities Commissions 
 
Financial Markets 
infrastructures, institutions and procedures that are employed for the direct and indirect 
exchange (including the buying and selling) of securities, financial instruments or other 
financial assets and risk exposures by a variety of market participants and/or economic agents 
 
Financial Stability Board 
an international institution that tackles pertinent systemic risks by developing and 
implementing strong regulatory, supervisory and other relevant policies to enhance financial 
stability 
 
Flash Order  
a manipulative practice that allows a person who has not yet disclosed a stock quote, to 
quickly view other stock orders before the public and other interested persons are given a 
chance to trade in those stocks 
 
FOS 
Financial Ombudsman Service 
 
653 
Front Running  
a technique employed by market participants like brokers to anticipate the effect and/or 
impact of upcoming trading transactions on the price of certain securities 
 
FSA 
Financial Services Authority 
 
FSB 
Financial Services Board  
 
FSF 
Financial Stability Forum 
 
FSMT 
Financial Services and Markets Tribunal 
G 
Global Joint Initiative 
a joint and informal international forum that comprises of the American Securisation Forum, 
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, Australian Securitisation Forum and 
the European Securitisation Forum   
 
G7 
Group of Seven 
 
Group of Seven 
an informal and international forum that was established by finance ministers and central bank 
governors to inter alia promote financial stability 
 
G10 
Group of Ten 
 
Group of Ten 
an international cooperation forum that was established by central bank governors to deal with 
banking supervision    
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G30 
Group of Thirty  
 
Group of Thirty  
an international body composed of leading financiers and academics, which aims to deepen 
understanding of economic and financial issues and to explore the consequences of decisions 
made in the public and private sectors related to these issues in order to examine the choices 
available to policymakers and/or other market practitioners 
 
G20 
Group of Twenty 
 
Group of Twenty 
an informal forum established to systematically gather or coordinate important industrialised 
and developing economies to discuss pertinent and crucial matters in the global economy  
H 
Hedge Funds 
privately owned investment funds from different investors (usually wealth individuals or big 
financial institutions like banks) which are cooperatively managed by an appointed 
investment manager that may sometimes employ high-risk techniques in the hope of making 
huge profits 
 
High Frequency Trading 
a manipulative practice that involves persons like brokers, issuers and financial analysts who 
act in a proprietary capacity to employ sophisticated computerised algorithmic decision 
making systems in order to obtain advantage from some minute discrepancies in the financial 
markets stock prices and then quickly trade in such stocks in large quantities to gain profit 
I 
IASB 
International Accounting Standards Board 
 
IBSA 
International Banks and Securities Association of Australia 
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IDD 
Insider Dealing Directive 
 
IFSG 
Intermarket Financial Surveillance Group 
 
IMETS 
Integrated Market Enforcement Teams    
 
IMF 
International Monetary Fund 
 
IMM 
Intelligent Market Monitoring System 
 
Intermarket Financial Surveillance Group 
an independent body which was formed in 1987 comprising the self regulatory organisations 
of the United States of America’s securities and commodities exchanges  
 
IOSCO 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions 
 
ITD 
Insider Trading Directorate 
J 
JSE 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange Limited  
 
JSE’s Surveillance Division 
a division of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange Limited responsible for the preliminary 
detection, prevention and investigation of market abuse activities in South Africa  
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M 
Market Abuse 
a concept which generally include illicit practices such as insider trading and other various 
forms of market manipulation 
 
Matched Order 
occurs where a person and his associate places an order to buy or sell at the same time, for 
substantially the same number of securities or financial products at substantially the same 
price    
 
MiFID  
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
 
MOU 
Memorandum of Understanding 
 
MSRB  
Municipal Securities Rule Making Board 
N 
Naked Short Selling 
occurs when a seller agrees to short sell a security within a stipulated period without making 
prior measures to repurchase it back at a later stage 
 
NASD 
National Association of Securities Dealers  
 
NCSC  
National Companies and Securities Commission 
 
NSW 
New South Wales  
 
NYSE 
New York Stock Exchange  
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O 
Office of Internet Enforcement    
a unit or department that was introduced by the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission to combat Internet-based market abuse practices 
 
OSC 
Ontario Securities Commission  
 
OTC  
Over the counter    
 
OTC Market 
a market which provides for the trading of securities or financial instruments that are not 
listed on a regulated market and/or formal exchange 
P 
Pecuniary Penalty 
a penalty imposed only after a declaration of contravention of a financial services penalty 
provision has been proved in a court of law in Australia 
 
Ponzi Scheme 
a type of high yield investment fraud which attracts persons by low risk investment offers and 
a guarantee of unusually high and fast profit 
Q 
Quote stuffing 
a manipulative tactic which involves the prompt entering and withdrawing of large stock 
orders by any person in order to flood the market with quotes that other persons have to 
process, thereby causing them to lose their fair competitive advantage in such stocks 
 
R 
Regulated Market 
means any market, whether domestic or foreign, which is regulated in terms of the laws of the 
country in which the market conducts business as a market for dealing in securities listed on 
that market 
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Regulation M 
a regulation that was enacted to inter alia prohibit market manipulation during a public 
distribution (public offering of securities) and to allow price-stabilisation activities only in 
some specific circumstances in the United States of America 
 
Regulation SHO 
a regulation that was enacted to combat naked short selling and market manipulation in all the 
United States of America’s financial markets and in broker-dealer transactions 
 
RICO 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act of 1970 
S 
SA 
South Australia 
 
SEATS 
Stock Exchange Automatic Trading System 
 
SEBI 
Securities and Exchange Board of India 
 
SEC 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission 
 
SEETS 
Stock Exchange Electronic Trading Service 
 
SENS 
Securities Exchange News Service 
 
Securities Exchange News Service 
a real-time news service that is employed by the Johannesburg Stock Exchange Limited to 
disseminate company announcements and price-sensitive information to inter alia promote 
market transparency and investor confidence 
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Securities Market Automated Research Trading and Surveillance System   
a computer surveillance technique employed by the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission to isolate and detect possible market abuse activities in the Australian financial 
markets 
 
Short Selling 
a practice which involves selling securities or assets such as derivatives by the seller without 
owning them at the time of the transactions, with the intention of buying them back at a later 
stage but at a much lower price 
 
SIASDIA 
Securities and Derivatives Industry Association 
 
SIFMA 
Securities Industry & Financial Markets Association 
 
SOMA 
Surveillance of Market Activity 
 
SRO 
Self Regulatory Organisations  
 
SRP 
Securities Regulation Panel 
T 
The (viable) anti-market abuse model and/or policy framework 
a proposed policy framework or model comprising four main categories of recommendations 
that could be employed to enhance the combating of market abuse practices in South Africa 
 
Tipping 
a practice where an insider or any other person who has inside information tips off; or 
encourages or discourages another person to deal or not to deal in certain securities and/or 
financial instruments to which that information relates 
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U 
UK 
United Kingdom 
 
US 
United States of America 
V 
Vic 
Victoria 
 
Virt-x 
Virtual Exchange  
 
Virt-x Exchange Limited 
a Pan-European Blue Chip Stock Exchange that is regulated by the Financial Services 
Authority in the United Kingdom 
W 
Wash Sale 
occurs where a person or an associate is both the buyer and seller in the same transaction 
(selling and repurchasing of the same or substantially the same financial product for the 
purpose of generating activity and increasing its price)   
Y 
Yield-X 
a JSE trading venue or platform for the trading of interest rate products and cash bonds 
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ANNEXURE B 
LIST OF THE DIRECTORATE OF MARKET ABUSE’S CURRENT 
MARKET ABUSE INVESTIGATIONS1 
 
 
 
 
 
1       Adapted from the Financial Services Board Press Release 27 March 2012; the list shows the current 
market abuse investigations as at 27 March 2012; see further related analysis at 
<http://www.fsb.co.za/index.htm> (accessed 15-08-2012). 
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ANNEXURE C 
LIST OF THE DIRECTORATE OF MARKET ABUSE’S PAST MARKET 
ABUSE INVESTIGATIONS1 
 
 
 
 
1    The list of past investigations was derived and/or adapted from the Financial Services Board website, 
<http://www.fsb.co.za/index.htm/public/insider/20110331_Pastinvestigations.doc> (accessed 15-08-
2012); the list shows the past market abuse investigations as at 29 March 2011.    
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ANNEXURE D 
LIST OF THE DIRECTORATE OF MARKET ABUSE’S COMPLETED 
MARKET ABUSE INVESTIGATIONS1 
 
 
Insider trading • Telkom SA Limited 2008-10  
2008-05-27 - 2008-
06-02 
Closed 2010-03-
10 
Insider trading • Stratcorp Limited 2009-02 Closed 2010-03-
10 
Market 
manipulation 
• Skinwell Holdings Limited 2009-12 Closed 2010-03-
10 
Market 
manipulation 
• Money Web Holdings Limited 2009-12 Closed 2010-03-
10 
Market 
manipulation 
• Huge Group Limited 2009-12 Closed 2010-03-
10 
Insider trading • Blue Financial Services Limited (#2) 2008-08-07 Closed 2010-09-
07 
Insider trading • GijimaAst Group Limited 2009-12 – 2010-01 Closed 2010-09-
07 
Insider trading • Jubilee Platinum plc 2009-03 – 2009-06 Closed 2010-09-
07 
Assistance • Assistance to Australian Securities & 
Investments Commission 
2009-08 Closed 2010-03-
24 
Assistance • Assistance to Belgium Banking, Finance and 
Insurance Commission 
2008-03 – 2008-07 Closed 2010-09-
07 
Insider trading • Resilient Property Income Fund Limited 2008-06-01 – 2010-
03-23 
Closed 2010-09-
07 
Insider trading • Sentula Mining Limited (#2) 2008-06-25 Closed 2010-09-
07 
Insider trading • Wilson Bayly Holmes-Ovcon Limited 2008-07 – 2008-08 Closed 2010-09-
07 
Assistance • Assistance to Jersey Financial Services 
Commission 
Undisclosed Closed 2010-09-
07 
Insider trading • Accentuate Limited 2010-02 Closed 2010-11-
24 
Insider trading • Sentula Mining Limited (#3) 2009-10 Closed 2010-11-
24 
Insider trading • Africa Cellular Towers Limited 2009-10 Closed 2011-03-
29 
sider trading • FirstRand Limited 2011-03-07 – 2011-
03-08 
Closed 2011-03-
29 
Insider trading • Kumba Iron Ore Limited 2010-05-12 Closed 2011-03-
1      Adapted from the Financial Services Board website, <http://www.fsb.co.za/index.htm> (accessed 15-08-
2012); the list shows completed market abuse investigations as at 28 June 2011.         
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29 
Insider trading • Kumba Iron Ore Limited 2009-04-28 Closed 2011-03-
29 
Insider trading • Simmer and Jack Mines Limited 2009-12 Closed 2011-03-
29 
False reporting • Telkom Hot Enhanced Dividend Security 2009-04-28 Closed 2011-03-
29 
Insider trading • AG Industries Limited 2010-11-16 – 2010-
11-25 
Closed 2011-06-
28 
Insider trading • Gold Reef Resorts Limited 2010-04 and 2010-
07 
Closed 2011-06-
28 
Insider trading • Rolfes Technology Holdings Limited 2010-06 Closed 2011-06-
28 
Assistance • Assistance to the US Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission 
2010-01-01 - 2011-
05-31 
Closed 2011-06-
28 
Insider trading • Barnard Jacobs Mellet Holdings Limited 2010-05 – 2010-06 Closed 2011-09-
27 
Insider trading • Esorfranki Limited 2010-07-01 – 2010-
07-16 
Closed 2011-09-
27 
Insider trading • Wesizwe Platinum Limited (1) 2010-05 Closed 2011-09-
27 
False reporting • Wesizwe Platinum Limited (2) 2010-11-05 – 2010-
12-15 
Closed 2011-09-
27 
Insider trading • Pinnacle Technology Holdings Limited 2011-06 Closed 2011-11-
29 
Insider trading • Thabex Limited 2010-06-08 – 2010-
06-21 
Closed 2011-11-
29 
Prohibited 
Trading 
• Argent Industrial Limited 2009-01 – 2009-03 Closed 2011-11-
29 
Prohibited 
Trading 
• Freeworld Coatings Limited 2009-01 – 2009-03 Closed 2011-11-
29 
Insider trading • Brait S.A. 2010-11 – 2011-03 Closed 2012-03-
27 
Insider trading • Glenrand MIB Limited 2010-10-01 – 2010-
12-09 
Closed 2012-03-
27 
Insider trading • Workforce Holdings Limited 2009-03-27 – 2009-
03-31 
Closed 2012-03-
27 
 
Assistance 
 
• Huge Group Limited 
 
2008-08 – 2008-09 
 
Closed 
 
2012-03-
27 
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ANNEXURE E 
LIST OF THE ENFORCEMENT COMMITTEE’S MARKET ABUSE 
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS1 
 
 
Enforcement Actions  
Date Contravention Security Respondents/ 
defendants 
Outcome  
2010-
06-30 
Section 73 of the 
Securities Services 
Act (insider trading) 
  MTL  Mr G L van Niekerk  Administrative 
penalty R16 000  
Transcript of 
Determination 
2010-
06-30 
Section 75 of the 
Securities Services 
Act (Market 
Manipulation) 
  CAE  
  BEG  
Mr T Pretorius  Administrative 
penalty R2 000 000  
Transcript of 
Determination 
2010-
06-01 
Section 73 of the 
Securities Services 
Act ( Insider 
Trading)(1)and 
Section 76 of the 
Securities Services 
Act (False Reporting) 
  SNU Mr J Pieterse  
Mr N van der Merwe  
Administrative 
penalty R1 000 000 
First respondent  
Transcript of 
Determination 
2010-
03-15 
Section 73 of the 
Securities Services 
Act (insider trading) 
  DYM  
  CAE  
Mr M J I Brown and 
Mr R McGregor  
Mr A D Cheminais 
Administrative 
penalty R75 624 
First respondent 
Acquittal Second 
respondent 
Administrative 
penalty R50 000 
Third respondent  
Transcript of 
Determination 
2009-
10-21 
Section 73 of the 
Securities Services 
Act (Insider Trading) 
  WSL Mr M Meyer Administrative 
penalty 
R150 000 
Transcript of 
Determination 
2009-
09-29 
Section 76 of the 
Securities Services 
Act (false reporting) 
  LAB Labat Africa Limited 
and Mr B G van 
Rooyen  
Administrative 
penalties R25 000 
per respondent  
Transcript of 
Determination 
2009-
09-22 
Section 75 of the 
Securities Services 
Act (market 
manipulation) and 
Section 76 of the 
Securities Services 
Act (false reporting) 
  MTE 
  CRW 
Mr N L Hittler Administrative 
penalty 
R1 000 000 (for 
section 75)  
R10 000 (for section 
76)  
Transcript of 
Determination 
1  Adapted from the Financial Services Board website, <http://www.fsb.co.za/index.htm> (accessed 15-08-
2012); the list shows the Enforcement Committee’s market abuse enforcement actions as at 28 June 2011. 
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2009-
09-22 
Section 73 of the 
Securities Services 
Act (insider trading) 
  MRB  Mr G Pietersen Administrative 
penalty R94 500  
Transcript of 
Determination 
2009-
09-07  
Section 76 of the 
Securities Services 
Act (false reporting) 
  ALJ  AH-Vest Limited 
(formerly known as 
All Joy Foods 
Limited) and Mr M 
Pather 
Administrative 
penalties R1,5 
million per 
respondent  
Transcript of 
Determination 
2009-
07-16 
Section 76 of the 
Securities Services 
Act (false reporting) 
  STA  Stratcorp Limited Administrative 
penalty 
R50 000 
Transcript of 
Determination 
2009-
07-16 
Section 73 of the 
Securities Services 
Act (insider trading) 
  RBW Mr G D de Jager Administrative 
penalty 
R587 511 
Transcript of 
Determination 
2008-
11-27 
Section 76 of the 
Securities Services 
Act (false reporting) 
  WLL  Mr D Marais and 
Mr B Meyer 
Administrative 
penalties R100 000 
per respondent 
Transcript of 
Determination 
 
2008-
11-27 
Section 73 of the 
Securities Services 
Act (insider trading) 
  MRB  Mr C G Chelin Administrative 
penalty 
R94 500 
Transcript of 
Determination 
2008-
11-27 
Section 75 of the 
Securities Services 
Act (market 
manipulation) 
  IPL Mrs K Cull Administrative 
penalty 
R25 000 
Transcript of 
Determination 
2008-
11-27 
Section 73 of the 
Securities Services 
Act (insider trading) 
  YRK Dr W J Fouché 
Mr W J Fouché 
Dr E Fouché and 
Mr L van Luik 
Administrative 
penalties: 
R30 000 for first 
three respondents 
and 
R58 611 for fourth 
respondent 
Transcript of 
Determination 
 
2008-
11-27 
Section 73 of the 
Securities Services 
Act (insider trading) 
  ASR Assore Limited Administrative 
penalty 
R2,5 million 
Transcript of 
Determination 
2008-
11-27 
Section 75 of the 
Securities Services 
Act (market 
manipulation) 
Sunflower  Mr A J van Zyl Administrative 
penalty 
R50 000 
Transcript of 
Determination 
2008-
04-03 
Section 75 of the 
Securities Services 
Act (market 
manipulation) 
  STA Mr H P Olivier Administrative 
penalty 
R10 000 
Transcript of 
Determination 
2008-
04-03 
Section 75 of the 
Securities Services 
Act (market 
manipulation) 
  KNG  Mr A Erasmus Administrative 
penalty 
R10 000 
Transcript of 
Determination 
2008-
04-03 
Section 73 of the 
Securities Services 
Act (insider trading) 
  MRB Mr B S Davies Administrative 
penalty 
R36 000 
Transcript of 
Determination 
2008-
04-03 
Section 75 of the 
Securities Services 
Act (market 
manipulation) 
  SVB  Mr P F du Toit Administrative 
penalty 
R10 000 
Transcript of 
Determination 
2008-
04-03 
Section 75 of the 
Securities Services 
Act (market 
manipulation) 
  NRD Mr G D Cocolas Administrative 
penalty 
R750 000 
Transcript of 
Determination 
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2007-
11-01 
Section 75 of the 
Securities Services 
Act (market 
manipulation) 
  IFR  
  SAR  
Mr M Berman and 
Mr N Stacey 
Administrative 
penalties of R2 
million per 
respondent. 
Administrative 
penalty for first 
respondent reduced 
to R1 million on 
appeal 
Transcript of 
Determination 
 
2007-
10-15 
Section 73 of the 
Securities Services 
Act (insider trading) 
   ITI Mr D de W Koen and  
Mr K Gilliland  
Civil settlement 
(High Court case 
2003/6460) R275 
000 per defendant 
Media Realse 
 
2006-
12-20 
Section 76 of the 
Securities Services 
Act (false reporting) 
  SCN Scharrig Mining 
Limited and 
Mr Jason Holland 
Administrative 
penalty 
R750 000 
Media Release 
 
2006-
12-20 
Section 73 of the 
Securities Services 
Act (insider trading) 
 SCN Mr Jason Holland Civil settlement 
R109 440  
Media Release 
2006-
11-07 
Section 73 of the 
Securities Services 
Act (insider trading) 
  SKL Mr J S van der 
Merwe and Mr N M 
Ingledew  
Civil settlement 
(High Court case no 
2000/13325) 
R400 000 per 
defendant  
Media Release 
2006-
09-19 
Section 73 of the 
Securities Services 
Act (insider trading) 
  SCN Mr P 
Katzenellenbogen 
Civil settlement 
R180 600  
Media Release 
2005-
07-27 
Section 6 of the 
Insider Trading Act  
  PDM Mr M T Forster Civil settlement 
(High Court case no 
2003/15379) 
R330 000  
Media Release 
 
2004-
12-28 
Section 6 of the 
Insider Trading Act  
  CAS Mrs M Katz Civil settlement 
(High Court case no 
2003/27415) R2 851 
635  
Media Release 
 
2004-
04-16 
Section 6 of the 
Insider Trading Act  
  UNF Mr K P E Davies Civil settlement  
R487 136  
Media Release 
 
2004-
04-07 
Section 6 of the 
Insider Trading Act  
  DTC Deutsche Bank 
Limited 
Civil settlement 
(High Court case no 
2002/27587) R24 
million  
Media Release 
2003-
10-30 
Section 6 of the 
Insider Trading Act  
  ALC Mr F J C Hugo Civil settlement 
(High Court case no 
2002/23491) R260 
485  
Media Release 
2002-
12-20 
Section 6 of the 
Insider Trading Act  
  CAS Mr D J Vermeulen 
and L B Gottlieb 
Civil settlement 
(High Court case no 
2003/27415) R607 
170 and R619 170  
Media Release 
2002-
10-04 
Section 6 of the 
Insider Trading Act  
  ALC Messrs M S Bhana, F 
Bhana, F Essay, R 
Mahomed and N 
Mahomed  
Civil settlement R5,5 
million  
Media Release 
2002-
05-23 
Section 6 of the 
Insider Trading Act  
  TCM Mr A Dubbelmann Civil settlement 
R292 425  
Media Release 
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2002-
01-17 
Section 6 of the 
Insider Trading Act  
  LST Mr M Y Kajee Civil settlement 
R145 800  
Media Release 
 
2001-
12-03 
Section 6 of the 
Insider Trading Act  
  BDS Mr G H Ramsay  Civil settlement R55 
500  
Media Release 
 
2001-
11-09 
Section 6 of the 
Insider Trading Act  
  GRF Mr H Turner  Civil settlement R27 
000  
Media Release 
2001-
09-25 
Section 6 of the 
Insider Trading Act  
  SPI Mr J W du Toit  Civil settlement R4,2 
million  
Media Release 
2001-
05-21 
Section 6 of the 
Insider Trading Act  
  DTC Mr J P Montanana 
and Mr R Rindel  
Civil settlement R1 
000 000  
Media Release 
 
2001-
12-03 
Section 6 of the 
Insider Trading Act  
  BDS Mr G H Ramsay  Civil settlement R55 
500  
Media Release 
2000-
08-15 
Section 6 of the 
Insider Trading Act  
  STY Mr N Alexander  Civil settlement 
R342 920  
Media Release 
 
2000-
08-08 
Section 6 of the 
Insider Trading Act  
  LTR Mr A K Peer  Civil settlement R1 
278 545  
Media Release 
 
2000-
06-15 
Section 6 of the 
Insider Trading Act  
  BRY Mr H C Guthrie and 
Mrs N J F Wade  
Civil settlement R1 1 
017 135 and R10 
200  
Media Release 
 
1999-
12-23 
Section 6 of the 
Insider Trading Act  
  IFS Mr R D Sackstein 
and  
Civil settlement R1 
085 649  
Media Release 
 
1999-
12-23 
Section 6 of the 
Insider Trading Act  
  BRC  Mr J Livingstone  Civil settlement R41 
700  
Media Release 
 
1999-
12-08 
Section 6 of the 
Insider Trading Act  
  BEG Mr S R Rogers  Civil settlement 
R800 000  
Media Release 
 
1999-
10-26 
Section 6 of the 
Insider Trading Act  
  KGM Not identified  Civil settlement R33 
616  
Media Release 
 
1999-
10-26 
Section 6 of the 
Insider Trading Act  
  IDI Not identified  Civil settlement 
R209 076  
 
 
1999-
06-30 
Section 6 of the 
Insider Trading Act  
  MMW Not identified  Civil settlement R13 
950  
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ANNEXURE F 
LIST OF THE DIRECTORATE OF MARKET ABUSE’S ARCHIVED 
PAST MARKET ABUSE INVESTIGATIONS1 
 
  
 Type Security Period of 
investigation 
Outcome Date 
Insider trading • Feltex Limited 1999-03-02 Closed 1999-
06-29 
Insider trading • Global Capital Limited 1999-05-01 – 
1999-05-13 
Closed 1999-
08-24 
Insider trading • Afribrand Holdings Limited 1999-05-01 – 
1999-05-24 
Closed 2000-
01-25 
Insider trading • Corpcapital Limited 1999-01-18 – 
1999-02-02 
Closed 1999-
06-29 
Insider trading • Autopage Holdings Limited 1999-01-18 – 
1999-01-27 
Closed 1999-
06-29 
Insider trading • USKO Limited 1999-01-25 – 
1999-02-03 
Closed 1999-
08-24 
Insider trading • Terexco Limited 1999-01-01 – 
1999-02-08 
Closed 2000-
01-25 
Insider trading • Billcad Holdings Limited 1999-01-04 – 
1999-01-18 
Closed 1999-
06-29 
Insider trading • King Consolidated Limited 1999-01-19 – 
1999-01-27 
Closed 2000-
03-28 
Insider trading • MGX Electronics Limited 1999-11-01 – 
1999-02-28 
Closed 1999-
06-29 
Insider trading • Fralex Limited 1999-03-04 – 
1999-03-05 
Closed 2000-
03-28 
Insider trading • Fraser Alexander Limited 1999-05-26 – 
1999-06-09 
Closed 2000-
03-28 
Insider trading • Retail Corporation Limited 1999-06-01 – 
1999-06-09 
Closed 1999-
10-26 
Insider trading • Log-Tek Holdings Limited 1999-05-17 – 
1999-05-27 
Closed 1999-
10-26 
Insider trading • Cullinan Hotel & Leisure 
Group Limited 
1999-03-12 – 
1999-03-23 
Closed 1999-
06-29 
Insider trading • Truworths International 
Limited (1) 
1999-02-25 – 
1999-03-03 
Closed 2000-
03-28 
Insider trading • Berzak-Illman Investment 1999-01-14 – Closed 2000-
1  Adapted from the Financial Services Board website, <http://www.fsb.co.za/index.htm> (accessed 15-08-
2012); the list shows the archived past market abuse investigations as at 28 June 2011. 
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Group Limited 1999-01-19 01-25 
Insider trading • Glenrand MIB Limited 1999-02-11 – 
1999-02-25 
Closed 1999-
10-26 
Insider trading • Aspen Healthcare Holdings 
Limited 
1999-03-08 – 
1999-03-19 
Closed 1999-
10-26 
Insider trading • Barprop Limited Linked 
Units Limited 
1999-02-18 – 
1999-03-12 
Closed 2000-
07-25 
Insider trading • Connection Group Holdings 
Limited 
1999-04-20 – 
1999-04-23 
Closed 1999-
06-29 
Insider trading • Paradigm Interactive Media 
Limited 
1999-02-01 – 
1999-02-09 
Closed 2001-
02-27 
Insider trading • Pentacom Holdings Limited 1999-04-12 – 
1999-04-20 
Closed 1999-
06-29 
Insider trading • Core Holdings Limited 1999-04-09 – 
1999-04-30 
Closed 1999 
Insider trading • Nando's Group Limited 1999-04-21 – 
1999-04-04 
Closed 1999-
08-24 
Insider trading • Infinity Technologies Limited 1999-05-03 – 
1999-05-05 
Closed 1999-
08-24 
Insider trading • Absec Limited 1999-04-30 – 
1999-05-19 
Closed 2000-
07-25 
Insider trading • Cyberhost Limited 1999-05-28 – 
1999-06-01 
Closed 1999-
10-26 
Insider trading • Nimbus Holdings Limited 1999-06-11 – 
1999-06-24 
Closed 1999-
10-26 
Insider trading • Radiospoor Technology 
Holdings Limited 
1999-07-01 – 
1999-07-08 
Closed 1999-
10-26 
Insider trading • IST Group Limited 1999-07-01 – 
1999-07-22 
Closed 2000-
03-28 
Insider trading • Shoprite Holdings Limited 1999-07-19 – 
1999-07-27 
Closed 2000-
07-28 
Insider trading • Truworths International 
Limited (2) 
1999-07-01 – 
1999-07-12 
Closed 2000-
03-28 
Insider trading • MMW Technology Holdings 
Limited (2) 
7/1/1999 Closed 1999-
08-24 
Insider trading • Paradigm Capital Holdings 
Limited (1) 
4/14/2000 Closed 2001-
08-28 
Insider trading • Iscor Limited 1999-08-02 – 
1999-08-13 
Closed 2000-
01-25 
Insider trading • Computer Configuration 
Holdings Limited (2) 
1999-08-17 – 
1999-08-18 
Closed 2000-
03-28 
Insider trading • Amalgamated Appliance 
Holdings Limited (1) 
8/30/1999 Closed 2000-
01-25 
Insider trading • Brainware Limited 1999-09-01 – Closed 2000-
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1999-09-08 03-28 
Insider trading • MacMed Health Care Limited 1999-09-13 – 
1999-09-30 
Closed 2001-
08-28 
Insider trading • Kairos Industrial Holdings 
Limited 
10/1/1999 Closed 2000-
07-25 
Insider trading • Crux Technologies Limited 1999-09-20 – 
1999-10-01 
Closed 1999-
10-26 
Insider trading • Molope Group Limited 1999-09-29/ - 
1999-10-04 
1999-10-13 – 
1999-10-14 
Closed 2002-
02-26 
Insider trading • PSG Group Limited 1999-09-27 – 
1999-10-04 
Closed 2000-
07-28 
Insider trading • Adcock Ingram Limited 1999-10-05 – 
1999-10-06 
Closed 2000-
05-30 
Insider trading • Explorer Corporation 
Holdings Limited 
2000-05-02 – 
2000-05-16 
Closed 2000-
11-28 
Insider trading • Zenith Concessions Limited 1999-10-13 – 
1999-10-15 
Closed 2000-
01-25 
Insider trading • Sappi Limited 10/14/1999 Closed 2000-
05-30 
Insider trading • E-Data Limited 1999-11-26 – 
1999-12-02 
Closed 2000-
03-28 
Insider trading • JCI/Randgold Limited 1999-04-01 – 
1999-04-30 
1999-11-22 – 
1999-12-02 
12/7/1999 
Closed 2000-
03-28 
Insider trading • Real Africa Durolink 
Holdings Limited (1) 
1999-11-26 – 
1999-11-30 
Closed 2000-
11-28 
Insider trading • Computer Configuration 
Holdings Limited (3) 
1999-11-08 – 
1999-11-15 
Closed 2000-
03-28 
Insider trading • Karos Hotels Limited 1999-08-02 – 
1999-10-22 
Closed 2000-
07-25 
Insider trading • Carson Holdings Limited 1999-10-20 – 
1999-10-26 
Closed 2000-
05-30 
Insider trading • Distillers Corporation (SA) 
Limited 
2000-05-03 – 
2000-05-09 
Closed 2000-
11-28 
Insider trading • Quyn Holdings Limited 1999-11-29 – 
1999-12-07 
Closed 2000-
07-25 
Insider trading • Idion Technology Holdings 
Limited (2) 
1999-12-09 – 
1999-12-13 
Closed 2000-
03-28 
Insider trading • Essentiale Beverage 
Holdings Limited 
1999-08-18 – 
1999-09-06 
Closed 2000-
02-26 
Insider trading • Tiger Wheels Limited 2000-01-01 – Closed 2000-
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2000-01-13 09-26 
Insider trading • Mobile Industries Limited 1/19/2000 Closed 2000-
09-19 
Insider trading • Yabeng Investment Holding 
Company Limited 
1/10/2000 Closed 2000-
09-26 
Insider trading • Real Africa Durolink 
Holdings Limited (2) 
2000-06-13 – 
2000-06-14 
Closed 2000-
05-30 
Insider trading • Computer Configurations 
Holdings Limited (4) 
2000-01-31 – 
2000-02-04 
Closed 2000-
03-28 
Insider trading • Legacy Ventures Limited 2000-01-14 – 
2000-02-04 
Closed 2000-
05-30 
Insider trading • Bynx Holdings Limited (1) 2000-02-03 – 
2000-02-07 
Closed 2000-
05-30 
Insider trading • Mercury Alpha Capital 
Limited 
1/27/2000 Closed 2000-
09-26 
Insider trading • Roadcorp Limited (1) 2/1/2000 Closed 2001-
04-24 
Insider trading • Bynx Holdings Limited (2) 2000-05-10 – 
2000-06-14 
Closed 2000-
11-28 
Insider trading • Rentsure Holdings Limited 2000-05-30 – 
2000-06-13 
Closed 2001-
06-26 
Insider trading • Imperial Holdings Limited 2000-04-14 – 
2000-06-02 
Closed 2001-
08-28 
Insider trading • IOTA Financial Services 
Limited 
2000-07-04 – 
2000-07-26 
Closed 2002-
10-29 
Insider trading • Moresport Holdings Limited 2000-05-24 – 
2000-07-05 
Closed 2002-
02-26 
Insider trading • Faritec Holdings Limited 7/7/2000 Closed 2001-
06-26 
Insider trading • Carson Holdings Limited 2000-07-31 – 
2000-08-22 
Closed 2004-
05-04 
Insider trading • Roadcorp Limited (2) 2000-08 Closed 2001-
04-24 
Insider trading • OZZ Limited 2000-09 Closed 2001-
06-26 
Insider trading • Leisurenet (3) 2000-10-01 – 
2000-10-06 
Closed 2001-
02-27 
Insider trading • Barnard Jacobs Mellet 
Holdings Limited 
2000-08 Closed 2001-
02-27 
Insider trading • Cashbuild Limited 9/11/2000 Closed 2002-
04-30 
Insider trading • Tridelta Magnet Technology 
Holdings Limited 
2000-07-19 – 
2000-07-27 
Closed 2002-
06-25 
Insider trading • Metro Cash and Carry 2000-11-02 – Closed 2001-
677 
Limited 2000-11-14 02-27 
Insider trading • Siltek Limited (1) 2000-11 Closed 2001-
04-24 
Insider trading • Masterfridge Limited 2001-01-08 – 
2001-01-25 
Closed 2001-
08-28 
Insider trading • Top Info Technology 
Holdings Limited 
2001-01-02 – 
2001-01-19 
Closed 2004-
05-04 
Insider trading • Heritage Collection Holdings 
Limited 
2001-01-12 – 
2001-01-29 
Closed 2002-
10-29 
Insider trading • Ixchange Technology 
Holdings Limited 
2001-01-12 – 
2001-01-17 
Closed 2002-
04-30 
Insider trading • Trematon Capital 
Investments Limited 
2000-11 Closed 2002-
08-27 
Insider trading • Intervid Limited (1) 2001-01-15 – 
2001-01-18 
Closed 2002-
06-25 
Insider trading • DNA Supply Chain 
Investments Limited 
2001-02 – 2001-03 Closed 2002-
08-27 
Insider trading • Coronation Holdings 
Limited/African Harvest 
Limited 
2001-02 – 2001-03 Closed 2003-
02-25 
Insider trading • Advtech Limited 4/2/2001 Closed 2001-
06-26 
Insider trading • Billiton PLC 2001-03-16 – 
2001-03-19 
Closed 2002-
11-26 
Insider trading • Profurn Limited 2001-04-23 – 
2001-05-10 
Closed 2003-
02-25 
Insider trading • Northern Engineering 
Industries Africa Limited 
2001-03-29 – 
2001-04-05 
Closed 2002-
11-26 
Insider trading • Intervid Limited (2) 2001-05-18 – 
2001-05-28 
Closed 2002-
06-25 
Insider trading • Metropolis Transactive 
Holdings Limited 
2001-06-01 – 
2001-06-05 
Closed 2003-
02-25 
Insider trading • Global Technology Limited 
(1) 
2001-05-15 – 
2001-06-01 
Closed 2002-
06-25 
Insider trading • Primedia Limited 2000-11-01 – 
2000-12-31 
Closed 2004-
11-30 
Insider trading • Monex Limited 2001-06-25 – 
2001-06-28 
Closed 2002-
02-26 
Insider trading • Sun International (SA) 
Limited 
2001-08-21 – 
2001-08-27 
Closed 2002-
06-25 
Insider trading • M-Cell Limited 2001-11-16 – 
2001-11-27 
Closed 2002-
11-26 
Insider trading • Comair Limited 2001-11-27 – 
2001-12-07 
Closed 2002-
11-26 
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Insider trading • South African Breweries plc 
/ Interbrew Investigation 
2001-11-28 – 
2001-11-29 
Closed 2002-
04-19 
Insider trading • Fedsure Holdings Limited 2002-01-29 – 
2002-02-27 
Closed 2002-
10-29 
Insider trading • Prism Holdings Limited 2002-01-10 – 
2002-02-14 
Closed 2002-
11-26 
Insider trading • Sanlam Limited 2001-08 – 2001-09 Closed 2002-
08-27 
Insider trading • Global Technology Limited 
(2) 
2001-10 Closed 2002-
11-26 
Insider trading • Repo January 2002 2002-01 Closed 2003-
05-06 
Insider trading • White Maize (1) 2001-09 Closed 2002-
04-30 
Insider trading • Discovery Holdings Limited 2002-04 Closed 2002-
08-27 
Insider trading • Saambou Holdings Limited 
(2) 
2002-02 Closed 2002-
06-25 
Insider trading • Kreston Nominees 
Investigation 
2000-06-01 – 
2001-07-31 
Closed 2003-
07-29 
Insider trading • Corpcapital Limited 2002-04-09 – 
2002-04-10 
Closed 2002-
10-29 
Insider trading • Rectron Holdings Limited 2002-01-15 – 
2002-03-25 
Closed 2003-
02-25 
Insider trading • Planit Technology Holdings 
Limited 
2000-09 – 2001-11 Closed 2002-
11-26 
Insider trading • MB Technologies Limited 2002-07-17 – 
2002-08-29 
Closed 2002-
11-26 
Insider trading • PSG Investment Bank 
Holdings Limited 
2002-07-17 – 
2002-08-06 
Closed 2003-
07-29 
Insider trading • Iscor Limited 2002-01 – 2002-07 Closed 2002-
10-29 
Insider trading • Hosken Consolidated 
Investments Limited (1) 
2002-07 – 2002-08 Closed 2002-
11-26 
Insider trading • The Afrikander Lease 
Limited 
2002-07 – 2002-08 Closed 2003-
07-29 
Insider trading • Investment Solutions 
Holdings Limited 
2002-08-19 – 
2002-09-18 
Closed 2003-
02-25 
Insider trading • EC-Hold Limited 2002-06 – 2002-09 Closed 2003-
02-25 
Insider trading • BOE Corporation 
Limited/NIB 
2002-04-08 – 
2002-04-22 
Closed 2003-
05-06 
Insider trading • Grintek Limited 2002-10 – 2002-11 Closed 2003-
11-25 
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Insider trading • Fashion Africa Limited 2002-08 – 2002-10 Closed 2003-
09-30 
Insider trading • Hosken Consolidated 
Investments Limited (2) 
2003-01 – 2003-02 Closed 2003-
07-29 
Insider trading • Labat Africa Limited 2002-04-22 – 
2002-05-10 
Closed 2003-
05-06 
Insider trading • Fasic Limited 2000-04 – 2000-09 Closed 2003-
09-30 
Insider trading • Alexander Forbes Limited 2003-03 Closed 2003-
09-30 
Insider trading • Nedcor Limited 2003-01 – 2003-05 Closed 2003-
07-29 
Insider trading • March 2003 White Maize 
Futures Contract (2) 
2002-09 – 2003-02 Closed 2003-
07-29 
Insider trading • Capitec Bank Holdings 
Limited 
2003-03 Closed 2003-
09-30 
Insider trading • Durban Roodepoort Deep 
Limited 
2003-01 – 2003-03 Closed 2003-
09-30 
Insider trading • DNA Supply Chain 
Investments Limited (2) 
2003 Closed 2003-
11-25 
Insider trading • Diamond Core Resources 
Limited 
1999 Closed 2003-
09-30 
Insider trading • AMB Holdings Limited 1999 - 2001 Closed 2003-
09-30 
Insider trading • Redefine Income Fund 
Limited 
2002-12 - 2003-02 Closed 2006-
10-10 
Insider trading • NetActive Limited 2002-07 Closed 2004-
05-04 
Insider trading • Cadiz Holdings Limited 2004-04-19 – 
2004-04-22 
Closed 2004-
07-27 
Insider trading • CS Computer Services 
Holdings Limited 
2004-04 Closed 2006-
10-10 
Insider trading • Amalgamated Appliance 
Holdings Limited (2) 
2004-07 Closed 2004-
11-30 
Insider trading • Wetherlys Investment 
Holdings Limited 
2003-07-21 - 2003-
07-25 
Closed 2006-
02-16 
Insider trading • Relyant Retail Limited 2004-05 Closed 2006-
02-16 
Insider trading • Intervid Limited (2) 2003-05 - 2004-03 Closed 2006-
02-16 
Insider trading • McCarthy Limited 2003-10 - 2003-11 Closed 2006-
02-16 
Insider trading • Hosken Consolidated 
Investments Limited (4) 
2004-12 Closed 2006-
02-16 
680 
Insider trading • Glenrand MIB Limited 2005-08-11 - 2005-
08-12 
Closed 2006-
05-30 
False reporting • Tourism Investment 
Corporation Limited 
8/11/2005 Closed 2006-
11-29 
Insider trading • Liberty Group Limited 2005-06-10 - 2005-
07-20 
Closed 2006-
05-30 
Insider trading • Spescom Limited 2005-01 Closed 2007-
06-13 
Market 
manipulation 
• Thabex Exploration Limited 2004-07 - 2005-01 Closed 2006-
02-16 
Insider trading • Gubb and Inggs Limited 5/1/2002 Closed 2006-
05-30 
Insider trading • Capital Alliance Holdings 
Limited 
2004/11/22 - 2004-
12-01 
Closed 2006-
10-10 
Insider trading • White Maize Futures (3) 2005-09 Closed 2006-
11-29 
Insider trading • MICC Property Income Fund 
Limited 
2005-11-18 - 2005-
12-09 
Closed 2006-
05-30 
Insider trading • Brimstone Investment 
Corporation Limited (1) 
2004-11-29 - 2004-
11-30 
Closed 2007-
06-13 
Insider trading • Excellerate Holdings Limited 2004-12-01 - 2005-
01-30 
Closed 2006-
10-10 
Market 
manipulation 
• ACC-ROSS 2006-02-16 - 2006-
02-18 
Closed 2006-
10-10 
False reporting • Simmer and Jack Mines 
Limited 
2005-06 - 2006-05 Closed 2006-
06-05 
Insider trading • Peregrine Holdings Limited 2006-02-17 - 2006-
04-07 
Closed 2006-
11-29 
Insider trading • Freestone Property Holdings 
Limited 
2002-12 - 2003-02 Closed 2006-
10-10 
Insider trading • VenFin Limited 2005-10-26 - 2005-
11-03 
Closed 2006-
10-10 
Insider trading 
and false 
reporting 
• Verimark Holdings Limited 2006-04 - 2006-07 Closed 2007-
06-13 
Insider trading 
and false 
reporting 
• Steinhoff International 
Holdings Limited 
2004 Closed 2007-
08-28 
Insider trading • Arch Equity Limited 2006-02 Closed 2007-
11-27 
Insider trading • Blue Financial Services 
Limited 
2006-10 – 2006-11 Closed 2007-
08-28 
Insider trading • AfriOre Limited 2006-11 Closed 2008-
03-04 
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Insider trading • Sallies Limited 2007-03 Closed 2008-
11-25 
Insider trading 
and false 
reporting 
• Gold Fields Limited 2007-03 – 2007-04 Closed 2008-
06-03 
Insider trading • Consol Limited 2006-11 – 2006-12 Closed 2008-
06-03 
Insider trading • Italtile Limited 2006-06 – 2007-04 Closed 2008-
06-03 
Insider trading • Amalgamated Appliance 
Holdings Limited (3) 
2007-04 Closed 2008-
03-04 
Insider trading • Tiger Brands Limited 2007-04 Closed 2008-
11-25 
Insider trading • Sekunjalo Investments 
Limited 
2007-04 – 2007-05 Closed 2008-
09-02 
Insider trading 
and false 
reporting 
• Bonatla Property Holdings 
Limited 
2007-01-02 – 
2007-05-17 
Closed 2008-
03-04 
Insider trading • SCI Entertainment Group plc 2007-08 Closed 2008-
11-25 
Insider trading • Ideco Group Limited 2008-04 Closed 2008-
11-25 
Insider trading • Kagiso Media Limited 2008-04 Closed 2008-
11-25 
Insider trading • Super Group Limited 2008-07 Closed 2009-
03-03 
Insider trading • Mvelaphanda Resources 
Limited/Northam Platinum 
Limited 
2008-08 Closed 2009-
03-03 
Insider trading • CIC Energy Corp 2008-06 Closed 2009-
09-01 
Insider trading • Pamodzi Gold Limited 2008-10 Closed 2009-
11-24 
Market 
manipulation 
• Sunflower March 2009 
Contract 
2008-09 - 2008-10 Closed 2009-
11-24 
False reporting • Central Rand Gold Limited 2008 Closed 2009-
11-24 
Insider trading • Purple Capital Limited 2008-02 Closed 2009-
11-24 
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